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* 
Til min elskede far, der lærte mig livets, krimiens og plottets kunst 
* 
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* 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour. 
William Blake (1757-1827) "Auguries of Innocence" 
 
 
* 
Give me one matter of concern and I will show you the whole earth and heavens 
that have to be gathered to hold it firmly in place. 
Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern”  
 
 
* 
Mærk det lige – vi er endelig med 
Marie Key, “Uden Forsvar” 
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Acknowledgements and Preface 
”We say, ’The wind is blowing’, as if the wind were actually a thing at rest, which, at a given point in 
time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind 
could exist which did not blow’” (Elias, 1978: 112) 
 
This thesis marks the end of a long journey. However difficult the journey has 
been at times, and however much my life seemed to become intertwined with the 
project, as I engaged in mapping controversies in Chinese wind power, it has been 
a tremendous learning experience. And hopefully, not only have I learned 
something about wind power in China as well as about life in general, but readers 
of the thesis will hopefully also find their understanding of China enriched. This, 
despite of the fact that “next year, if you come out here again, we would probably 
tell you a completely different story”, as one of my many informants warned me. 
Indeed, China - and the thesis, reflect entangled stories of paradoxical and 
ambiguous transformation. Acknowledging that the controversy mapping is just 
one ’fractal’ amongst many, the story offered in the thesis has been formed based 
on extensive fieldwork in China. Further, it is informed by a ‘promiscuous’ 
coupling of heterogenous fields, i.a. of organisation studies, political economy, 
economic geography, international business, development, China, and culture 
studies, software and mechanical engineering, and mathematics. The thesis is the 
result of a long research journey, where the landscape to be encountered remained 
a riddle for a long time, and which has involved encounters with unexpected 
actors and issues, many of which turned out (often surprisingly) as central to the 
story. I guess, though, that one of my respondent’s comments still holds true:  
”It’s quite a task that you have embarked on! […] Well, that’s cool! I think it’s 
really great that you have taken upon yourself such a challenge. But it requires 
that you keep it straight!” 
To - hopefully - form a ‘straight’ and coherent story of the myriads of stories 
encountered in the field has involved ongoing work on emplotment. Maybe this 
has been inspired by my father’s lifelong research in narratives and, in particular, 
in the well-plotted crime fiction (Kirkegaard, 2013; 2014). The structure of the 
thesis may, therefore, in many ways resemble a crime plot or, to be more precise, 
the crime plot of the rhizomatic maze (Eco, 1983; Kirkegaard, 2013; 2014), which 
is the plot of conjecture. Through the botanical metaphor of the rhizome, Deleuze 
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and Guattari (1980-1987) write that the rhizome constitutes a net of entangled 
roots that grow under the soil in lateral directions, without any centre point, 
beginning or end, and no middle point (Deleuze and Guattari, 2011[1980]). While 
the rhizome and rhizomatic maze has inspired emplotment of crime fiction and 
related literature streams, it has also inspired the thesis, which presents a story 
with myriads of plots within plots, i.e., with no clear beginning or ending.   
In the process of tracing and disentangling the thick mesh of the emerging 
rhizomatic fractal, certain people have been particularly important to me. First of 
all, I should not forget to thank my many helpful respondents who have taught me 
so much, and have always been willing to explain and draw, also when I asked the 
same questions again and again, as I was slowly getting acquainted with wind 
power, software algorithms, aeroelastic codes, and many other pecularities (in 
English and Danish, but also in Chinese!). Many of these fields have been 
completely alien to me with my background in organisation and China studies. In 
addition to my respondents, without whom there would be no thesis today, I am 
forever grateful to all of my (many!) supervisors. Placed between and within 
heterogeneous fields, it has been an ongoing work and challenge to put the 
‘pieces’ together and to find ‘my own voice’ and story, and to couple fields that 
have not been coupled before, and which are evidently not easy to synthesise. 
Each of my supervisors have – with their particular expertise within one or several 
of the fields that my thesis touches upon – been of invaluable assistance. First, 
Professor Peer Hull Kristensen has been a generous, supportive discussant, and an 
immense help to me with his consistent trust in my work. Without his ability to 
follow my traces and the emerging story from the chaotic early drafts, I would 
have stopped many times halfway. Also Professor Susse Georg has displayed such 
immense empowering trust in my ability to work out the knots myself. Without 
her always being ready to discuss, read, draw, and offer words of support and 
wisdom during the progressings of my work, and on life in general, I would never 
have made it. The assistance from Associate Professor Stine Jessen Haakonsson 
who made everything possible at the outset, and with whom I have gone ‘GIN 
hunting’ many times – in China, Germany, and in Denmark – has been invaluable, 
involving so many fruitful and insightful discussions on Chinese wind power and 
GINs over the years. Last but not least, my Chinese supervisor, Professor Liu 
Xielin has been a great assistance and support for my work while conducting 
fieldwork in China. Overall, the Sino-Danish University Centre for Research and 
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Education (SDC) has, apart from supporting my work financially, also been a 
tremendous help, i.a. through my participation in joint SDC field trips to China.  
And then, of course, without a doubt, the most important support has come from 
my family, my friends, and my beloved ones, without whom I would never have 
applied for a PhD scholarship, nor would I have survived or completed it. Also, I 
want to thank my Chinese friends Yuhua, who helped my life in China in so many 
ways, and my friends at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. I will never 
forget. Without these people in my life, there would never have been the birth of 
my thesis.  Read it and hear it. Maybe you will find it a baroque fugue with many 
voices. Or maybe it’s a ‘China blues’. I look forward to hearing what you have 
found and heard! 
 
Source: Sylvano Bussotti, Rhizome, 1959 (Via MaryAnn Reilly);  
http://bryanjack.ca/tag/ds106radio/ 
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Abstract 
The thesis inquires into dynamics and controversies of constructing a market for 
wind power in China. Inquiring into what the thesis dubs a quality crisis in 
Chinese wind power after years of high growth rates, and into a potential turn to 
quality, the thesis traces such current ambiguous winds of change with point of 
departure in the notion of global innovation networks (GINs). Thus, it looks into 
how international collaborations on critical components, such as software 
programmes, play a critical role in the qualification of wind power as a 
‘sustainable’ renewable energy source.  
 
However, with a structural rather than micro-relational or processual lens, the 
existing GIN literature is claimed to be ill-equipped to grasp the genesis, 
dynamics, and agency of GINs. To fill this gap, the thesis develops a situational, 
constructivist framework based in Science and Technology Studies, which renders 
a processual and relational understanding of GINs as part and parcel of market 
construction. It does this by initially ‘looking away’ from the original metaphor of 
GINs, with the result of effectively reconceptualising it. This is done by 
illustrating the dynamics and the agency of GIN genesis through a mapping of 
controversies over issues of Intellectual Property Rights, standardisation, money, 
and cost and price calculations, entangled in a Chinese ‘system problem’ of state-
owned actors and a Chinese experimental pragmatism of market construction, 
which has had unintended effects.  
 
Tracing one potential GIN taking shape around a critical component, the thesis 
also contributes to the GIN literature through a new methodological approach. 
Illustrating the potentially disruptive dynamics of GIN construction, and how the 
emerging GIN around software programmes possesses disruptive agency in regard 
to the framing of the emerging Chinese wind power market, the thesis sheds light 
on some of the socio-material work needed to construct and maintain GINs and 
the markets it co-constitutes and is co-constituted by, as well as the negotiated 
roles, identities, and positions of actors in a developmental context of China. The 
thesis coins the seemingly particular Chinese mode of market construction within 
wind power a fragmented and experimental ‘pragmatics of (green) market 
construction’, with its agile responses to emerging issues. 
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Last, to overcome the dualism between structural and processual accounts, the 
thesis draws on the pragmatist notion of figuration (Elias, 1978). After 
demonstrating a potential figurational change reflected in the ongoing turn to 
quality, the thesis also considers the implications that the inquiry has for other 
related literatures, hereunder proposing a new research agenda for New Economic 
Sociology to understand market and GIN construction in a developmental context, 
which holds a promise for inquiring into China’s self- and other-disruptive, yet 
potentially path-creating modes of development and upgrading. 
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English Summary 
This thesis conducts a market construction (‘marketisation’) analysis of China’s 
wind power market, founded in the Anthropology of Markets and its 
performativity programme (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). The thesis 
demonstrates how the construction of a market for wind power in China can be 
seen as constituting a particular Chinese fragmented and experimental ‘pragmatics 
of green marketisation’. The sustainability of this pragmatics of green 
marketisation is, however, being contested, with the result of producing 
controversy as it has not only contributed to unprecedented high growth rates of 
installed wind power capacity, but also to extensive quality problems. These 
problems now, paradoxically, threaten to destabilise China’s emerging wind 
power market and its framing as a viable and sustainable renewable energy source 
in terms of development. That is, sustainability in China is linked to concerns for 
Scientific Development, which emphasise upgrading and development of 
indigenous innovation capabilities within core technologies. Facing a quality 
crisis, i.a. resulting in vast amounts of underperforming wind farms and lost 
generation of wind power, the framing of wind power as technically, scientifically, 
economically, environmentally, and even politically and developmentally 
sustainable has been destabilised. In addition to jeopardising the emerging wind 
power market in China, concerns are increasingly voiced that the quality crisis 
may threaten the reputation of wind power on a global scale. As China risks 
‘fighting its own windmills’ in its pursuit of rapid catch-up, the thesis inquires into 
the ongoing struggle to qualify wind power as sustainable. The thesis argues that 
while it is China’s ‘pragmatics of green marketisation’ that has produced a quality 
crisis, it is also the same pragmatics of green marketisation that is likely to enable 
an agile turn to quality, which i.a. opens up a contested and hybrid space of 
simultaneous collaboration and competition between Chinese and foreign actors. 
 
By inquiring into the particular mode of marketisation in Chinese wind power, the 
thesis also offers a contribution to the literature on global innovation networks 
(GINs) within economic geography. In the struggle to qualify wind power as 
sustainable, certain ‘core’ components such as software programmes in control 
systems, simulation tools, and prediction tools for wind turbines, have been 
framed as ‘critical’. While China’s wind power industry has emerged with 
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unprecedented growth rates and has upgraded capabilities rapidly, the legacy of 
technology sourcing and licensing in China’s wind turbine industry still plays a 
prevalent role in terms of core technologies such as software, and Chinese 
manufacturers are still largely dependent on sourcing of foreign core technologies 
and software. Thus, while Chinese actors actively strive towards independence 
from foreign technologies and towards developing indigenous innovation 
capabilities, in alignment with the doctrine of Scientific Development, they are, 
nevertheless, simultaneously engaging heavily in technology sourcing and 
collaborations with foreign suppliers. This strategy of leveraging foreign 
knowledge and technology is – along with China’s upgrading – taking place i.a. 
through the gradual global dispersion of R&D activities, the hiring of foreign 
experts, joint design agreements, and mergers and acquisitions. While 
predecessors such as the Global Value Chain and Global Production Network 
literatures within economic geography (e.g. Gereffi 1994a; 1994b; Bair, 2005; 
Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 2008; Ponte, 2009; Dicken et al., 2001; 
Coe et al., 2008a; Hess and Yeung, 2006), have sought to explain the global 
dispersion of production activities, the GIN literature has been concerned with the 
global dispersion of R&D and innovation activities through the metaphor of GINs 
(e.g. Ernst, 2006; 2008; INGINEUS, 2011; Cooke, 2012; Parrilli et al., 2013; 
Barnard and Chaminade, 2012). According to recent empirical studies of the 
Chinese wind turbine industry, different GINs (Silva and Klagge, 2013) and global 
learning networks and collaborative innovation networks (Lewis, 2013; Chen et 
al., 2014) can be detected in the Chinese wind turbine industry in the shape of 
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers, who have engaged in these globalised 
innovation activities. Based on the argument that integration into GINs, centred 
around core technologies such as software, can be seen as a mode of re-qualifying 
wind power as sustainable in developmental terms, the thesis is motivated to 
explore how and whether such GINs take shape around software, and how they 
may play a role in marketisation.  
 
Through a literature review, the thesis claims that the GIN literature, despite its 
proposals of having detected the emergence of GINs, i.a. in Chinese wind power, 
has not yet rendered insight into how these GINs emerge in the first place. This 
claim is based on the argument that the GIN literature does not look into the socio-
material micro-processes of relationship-building, but instead tends to look at GIN 
structures ‘from the outside’ and to identify their emergence ‘after the fact’, 
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instead of tracing their progressive construction. While having provided valuable 
insights into the structures and effects of GINs, treating them as globally organised 
webs of complex interactions between firms and non-firm organisations engaged 
in knowledge production related to and resulting in innovation (Barnard and 
Chaminade, 2012), the positivistic and structuralistic GIN literature does not put 
emphasis on the micro-processes of building and maintaining relations, nor on 
aspects of genesis, dynamics, and agency. Interested in how and whether GINs 
emerge around core technologies such as software, as well as in their dynamics in 
the current quality crisis of wind power, and how they may play a role in the 
qualification of wind power as sustainable, the thesis turns towards a constructivist 
lens, which offers an integral relational and processual perspective. In this way, 
the thesis argues that it initially must, somewhat paradoxically, ‘look away’ from 
GINs, i.e. it must avoid adopting the GIN metaphor in what in the thesis is termed 
its ‘marketisation analysis’, in order to open the black box of ‘the relational’ in the 
GIN construction, and thereby render insight into the genesis, dynamics, and 
agency of GINs. Consequently, with an empirical interest in how a turn to quality 
may take place in Chinese wind power – potentially reflecting a Chinese mode of 
green market construction – and how this turn to quality may de- and reconfigure 
relations between Chinese and foreign actors around software, the thesis explores 
how and whether an constructivist perspective may qualify the understanding of 
GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency in a Chinese developmental context.  
 
The thesis in this way takes up the challenge of connecting the ontological and 
epistemological divides between the constructivist Anthropology of Markets 
approach and the positivist GIN literature, which is suggested in the above dual-
pronged research question. This connection is undertaken through what thesis 
coins ‘a pragmatist tunnel’. On the one hand, the constructivist perspective (e.g. 
Latour, 2005a; Muniesa, 2013; Law, 1994) has explicit roots in the micro-
relational and processual philosophy of American pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, 1927; 
Whitehead, 1978; Elias, 1978; Mead, 1934) and the GIN literature is, on the other 
hand, founded on i.a. economic geography, which within certain streams has 
opened up towards a more relational and even constructivist perspective. On this 
basis, the thesis argues that cross-fertilisation between the constructivist and GIN 
literature is possible, and can take place through a pragmatist connection and their 
common concern for the ‘relational’. With this ambition of cross-fertilisation, the 
thesis develops a situational and ‘grounded’ theoretical and methodological 
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framework founded in constructivist streams within Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). The theoretical framework of the thesis is in particular drawing on 
Actor Network Theory (e.g. Callon, 1986a; 1998; Law, 1994; Latour, 2005a; 
2005b), the Anthropology of Markets and its performativity programme and 
pragmatics of valuation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b), as well as 
drawing on the sociology of associations (Latour, 2005a).  
 
The particular network construct used in the thesis to initially ‘look away’ from 
GINs, namely the concept of Techno-Economic Networks (TENs), is thus adopted 
from Callon (1998) and adapted to the present inquiry. Treating the ongoing 
quality crisis in Chinese wind power as a qualification struggle, the thesis 
subsequently dives into a number of overlapping TENs and the related processes 
of framing wind power, and some of the potential struggles such framing attempts 
may produce in collaborative relations around the core technology of software. To 
inquire into these struggles, the thesis also draws on the constructivist and 
ethnographically inspired method of ‘Mapping Controversies’ (Latour, 2005a; 
Yaneva, 2012; Venturini, 2009). To conduct a marketisation analysis of wind 
power in China, the thesis is based empirically on extensive, iterative processes of 
fieldwork in China (as well as Denmark and Germany) from the period September 
2011- September 2013 (amounting to 95 interviews).  
 
On this basis, the analysis first provides an historical account of how an 
ambiguous shift in policy priorities and means from a focus on quantity towards 
quality is taking place in Chinese wind power, which, as mentioned previously, 
i.a. positions upgrading and development of indigenous innovation capabilities in 
software as critical. To inquire further into what seems to be ‘winds of ambiguous 
change’ in Chinese wind power, and how these may be de- and reconfiguring 
relations between Chinese and foreign actors around software, the thesis maps 
four controversies. First, two controversies over the role of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) and standards in the framing of wind power as sustainable are 
analysed. These studies zoom in on collaborative Sino-foreign relations around 
control system technologies for the optimisation of the regulation of the wind 
turbine as well as simulation tools for the optimisation and certification of turbine 
designs. The two studies illustrate some of the myriads of power struggles taking 
shape around software algorithms in the software tools, e,g. because they are often 
black-boxed. To render a more fine-grained and situational understanding of the 
15 
 
controversies taking place around control systems and simulation tools, the thesis 
also studies controversies unfolding over money and cost and price calculations, 
which are entangled in wider controversies over what is being seen as a Chinese 
‘system problem’ of Chinese state-owned actors, as well as in a controversy over 
the sustainability of what seems to be a Chinese experimental and fragmented 
mode of marketisation.  
 
The thesis concludes that only by ‘looking away’ from GINs, does it become 
possible to ‘see’ them and to capture their progressive socio-material construction, 
their dynamics, and their agency. While the GIN literature has already concluded 
that there are GINs in China’s wind turbine industry, the thesis illustrates that 
when ‘diving deeper’, and looking into a specific core technology of software, 
there are no stabilised GIN(s) to be found. Rather, technology and knowledge tend 
to be commodified, leaving software to remain part of the value chain. As 
capabilities of Chinese actors are improving rapidly, there are, however, 
characteristics of GIN emergence, but not without continuous power struggles. 
The overly volatile nature of collaborations, which seem to unravel even before 
they are configured, is argued to bear resemblance to so-called ‘sustained 
contingent relations’ (Herrigel, 2010), which due to an extensive role ambiguity 
are being consistently destabilised and require ongoing maintenance. This 
instability can, in turn, be linked to shifting ambitions and agendas of Chinese 
actors, who grope their way forward in marketisation, as they build capabilities. 
Further, Chinese actors seek, somewhat ambiguously, to become part of GINs in 
order to build capabilities that can help upgrading, while they in the pursuit of 
indigenous innovation simultaneously seek to move beyond GINs, i.e. to become 
autonomous and independent from foreign technologies. While rendering Sino-
foreign collaborations in Chinese wind power overly volatile, the thesis also points 
towards a possible shift from an overall competitive space towards more 
collaborative spaces. 
 
The thesis makes a number of contributions. Firstly and primarily, it contributes to 
the GIN literature by adopting a constructivist marketisation perspective, which 
allows for shedding light on genesis, dynamics and agency in the emergence of 
GINs. The perspective offers insights into some of the controversies, exclusion 
mechanisms, and power struggles which GIN construction can engender, as well 
as into the many human and non-human actors that this construction involves. The 
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thesis further illustrates how GINs and, amongst other things, software algorithms 
can disrupt (as well as spur) marketisation. The thesis has done this by ‘looking 
away’ from the GIN construct, and by reconceptualising GINs, treating them as 
part of marketisation. Further, it has disassembled the wind turbine and zoomed in 
on the socio-material construction of relations around a particular core component. 
The thesis is, thereby, able to show how the socio-material resistance to obtaining 
access to algorithms has produced an intense power struggle and multiple matters 
of concern for i.a. indigenous innovation, leapfrogging, and catch-up, as well as 
concerns by Western actors as to how to simultaneously manage their relations 
with Chinese partners and protect their own core competencies and market shares. 
In future studies on GIN construction, it is recommended that studies attempt to 
‘dive deeper’, e.g. through ethnographic studies and by tracing processes of 
relationship-building around specific components.  
 
Secondly, the thesis renders an account of an extensive creative and agile 
experimentation in the marketisation of wind power, in which disruptive 
upgrading and governance relations is made possible. This contributes to the 
understanding of the potentially multiple alternative modes of marketisation. 
Overall, by cross-fertilising the GIN literature and constructivist perspectives 
through a pragmatist tunnel, the thesis also extends the marketisation lens and 
shows a particular mode of Chinese marketisation in China.  
 
Thirdly, in order to render further insight into the volatile dynamics of 
marketisation and the consistent de- and reconfiguring of relations between 
Chinese and foreign actors, the thesis also discusses how Elias’s (1978) pragmatist 
figurational sociology may contribute to the findings. It is here demonstrated that a 
gradual move from figuration I to figuration II, namely from a focus on speedy 
low cost production and installed capacity towards a focus on quality and 
generated electricity, can be seen in Chinese wind power. In this move towards 
figuration II, a new strategic and more complex game between Chinese and 
foreign actors has emerged, in which dynamics of collaboration and competition 
coexist and collide. In these paradoxical relations of figuration II, software 
programmes have become the centre stage of contestation.  
 
Lastly, the thesis contributes to a number of other literature streams, i.a. to China 
studies, related literatures on China’s specific variety of capitalism(s), upgrading 
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and governance studies, as well as to perspectives on industrial policy and Chinese 
prospects for innovative manufacturing. Having displayed how the structuralist 
perspective of GINs and the constructivist perspective of the Anthropology of 
Markets can cross-fertilise each other through a pragmatist bridging, the thesis 
proposes a new research agenda for New Economic Sociology to inquire into the 
construction of GINs and markets in a developmental context. Although there are 
limits to generalisation from the focus of the present inquiry into other countries 
and industries, the thesis nevertheless suggests that wider lessons on the nature of 
market construction in China within other strategic, i.a. green, industries in China 
can be drawn.  
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Dansk Referat 
Baseret på Callon og Çalişkans (2009; 2010a; 2010b) markedsantropologi og dets 
’performativitetsprogram’ analyserer afhandlingen konstruktionen af et marked 
(’marketisation’) for vindkraft i Kina. Afhandlingen viser, hvordan 
markedsskabelsen inden for kinesisk vindkraft ser ud til at repræsentere en særligt 
kinesisk ’grøn markedskonstruktionspragmatisme’, der er karakteriseret ved en 
fragmentarisk og eksperimenterende tilgang. Da denne pragmatiske tilgang til 
markedskonstruktion ikke kun har resulteret i hastig vækst i installeret vindkraft, 
men også i et væld af kvalitetsproblemer, illustrerer afhandlingen, hvordan selve 
bæredygtigheden af den pragmatiske tilgang til grøn markedskonstruktion har ført 
til debat, og at dette afspejles i forskellige kontroverser i 
markedskonstruktionsprocessen. De utilsigtede kvalitetsproblemer truer på 
paradoksal vis med at destabilisere Kinas spirende vindmarked. Dette skyldes 
blandt andet, at kvalitetsproblemerne truer med at skade vindkraftens ’framing’ 
som en bæredygtig vedvarende energikilde i overensstemmelse med et kinesisk 
udviklingsperspektiv. Dette hænger sammen med, at bæredygtighed i en kinesisk 
kontekst bliver koblet til såkaldt Videnskabelig Udvikling (Scientific 
Development), der lægger stor vægt på muligheden for industriel opgradering og 
udvikling af indenlandske innovationsevner – særligt inden for kerneteknologier. 
Eftersom det kinesiske vindmarked står overfor en kvalitetskrise, som blandt andet 
ses i det store antal vindparker, der leverer langt under den forventelige mængde 
elektricitet, samt i den store mængde tabt vindkraft på grund af mange og 
forskelligartede udfordringer med tilkoblingen til elnettet, er framingen af 
vindkraft som eksempelvis teknisk, videnskabeligt, økonomisk, miljømæssigt 
samt politisk og udviklingsmæssigt bæredygtig blevet destabiliseret. Udover at 
dette truer med at destabilisere det kinesiske vindmarked, betyder det også, at der 
er stigende grad af bekymring over, at kvalitetskrisen påvirker vindkraftens 
generelle rygte på globalt plan. Da Kina ser ud til at risikere at ’kæmpe mod dets 
egne vindmøller’ i jagten på hurtig catch-up, er afhandlingen interesseret i at 
undersøge den nuværende kamp for at frame vindkraft som bæredygtig i Kina. 
Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at den kinesiske ’grønne 
markedskonstruktionspragmatisme’, som på mange måder har været med til at 
afføde en kvalitetskrise, samtidig også er det, der potentielt muliggør et fleksibelt 
skifte til kvalitet i kinesisk vindkraft. På samme tid åbner det mulige 
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kvalitetsskifte op for et anfægtet ‘hybridrum’ karakteriseret ved simultant 
samarbejde og konkurrence mellem kinesiske og udenlandske aktører. 
 
Ved at undersøge den partikulære måde at skabe et vindmarked på i Kina leverer 
afhandlingen også et bidrag til litteraturen vedrørende globale innovationsnetværk 
(global innovation networks (GINs)) indenfor økonomisk geografi. I forbindelse 
med kvalitetskrisen bliver særlige kerneteknologier i vindmøllen, såsom software-
programmer i kontrolsystemer, simuleringsprogrammer og prognoseværktøjer, 
konstitueret som særligt kritiske for at kunne rekvalificere vindkraft som 
bæredygtig. Da Kinas vindmarked i høj grad er blevet etableret på grundlag af 
teknologi-sourcing og køb af udenlandske teknologi-licenser, er mange kinesiske 
vindmølleproducenter afhængige af udenlandske kerneteknologier og software til 
trods for, at de har opgraderet med meget stor hastighed i takt med en eksplosiv 
vækst i det kinesiske vindmarked. Mens kinesiske aktører arbejder sig hen mod at 
blive uafhængige af udenlandske teknologier og mod at udvikle egne indenlandske 
innovationsfærdigheder i overensstemmelse med doktrinen om Videnskabelig 
Udvikling, er de stadigt aktivt engagerede i teknologi-sourcing og samarbejder 
med udenlandske leverandører. Strategien om at tilegne sig udenlandsk viden og 
teknologi – som led i Kinas opgradering – forfølges blandt andet igennem en 
gradvis geografisk spredning af Forsknings- og Udviklingsaktiviteter (FoU), 
ansættelse af udenlandske eksperter, fælles designaftaler samt fusioner og 
overtagelser. Mens tidligere litteraturstrømninger vedrørende globale værdikæder 
og globale produktionsnetværk indenfor økonomisk geografi (f.eks. Gereffi 
1994a; 1994b; Bair, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon og Ponte, 2008; Ponte, 
2009; Dicken et al., 2001; Coe et al., 2008a; Hess og Yeung, 2006) har forsøgt at 
forklare den geografiske spredning af produktionsaktiviteter, bruger GIN-
litteraturen metaforen om GINs til at forklare en sådan global spredning af FoU- 
og innovationsaktiviteter (f.eks. Ernst, 2006; 2008; INGINEUS, 2011; Cooke, 
2012; Parrilli et al., 2013; Barnard og Chaminade, 2012). Ifølge nylige empiriske 
studier af den kinesiske vindmølleindustri findes der allerede forskellige GINs 
(Silva og Klagge, 2013) og globale læringsnetværk eller 
samarbejdsinnovationsnetværk (Lewis, 2013; Chen et al., 2014) i den kinesiske 
vindmølleindustri, hvilket ses i form af kinesiske vindmøllefabrikanter, der har 
engageret sig i globaliserede innovationsaktiviteter på forskellig vis.  
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Baseret på argumentet om, at integration i GINs, der er centreret om 
kerneteknologier såsom software, kan ses som en mulig måde at rekvalificere 
vindkraft som bæredygtig i en udviklingsmæssig forstand, forsøger afhandlingen 
af undersøge, hvorledes GINs potentielt tager form omkring software, og 
hvorledes de kan spille en rolle i markedskonstruktionsprocesser. Ved en 
litteraturgennemgang finder afhandlingen frem til, at GIN-litteraturen - til trods for 
dets fund af spirende GINs i kinesisk vindkraft – ikke har vist, hvordan disse GINs 
er opstået. Dette argument er baseret på, at GIN-litteraturen ikke undersøger selve 
den socio-materielle mikro-proces med at skabe relationer, men i stedet har en 
tendens til at se på GIN-strukturer ’udefra’ og til at identificere fremkomsten af 
GINs ’efter det er sket’ fremfor at følge deres gradvise konstruktionsproces. 
Selvom den positivistisk og strukturalistisk orienterede GIN-litteratur har bidraget 
med værdifuld indsigt i GIN-strukturer og –effekter ved at følge dem som globalt 
organiserede net af komplekse interaktioner mellem virksomheder og ikke-
virksomheder, der er engagerede i innovationsrelateret eller innoverende 
videnproduktion (Barnard og Chaminade, 2012), sætter GIN-litteraturen ikke 
fokus på processerne med at skabe og vedligeholde relationerne. Eftersom 
afhandlingens afsæt er en interesse i, hvorledes GINs vokser frem omkring 
kerneteknologier såsom software, samt i GIN-dynamikker under den nuværende 
kvalitetskrise og i den potentielle rolle, som de måtte spille for kvalificeringen af 
vindkraft som bæredygtig, åbner afhandlingen sig imod en konstruktivistisk optik, 
som tilbyder et relationelt og processuelt perspektiv. Det vil sige, at afhandlingen 
argumenterer for, at det er nødvendigt først at ‘se væk’ fra GINs og undlade 
brugen af GIN-metaforen i markedskonstruktionsanalysen for at kunne åbne ’det 
(’mikro’-)relationelle’, der udgør en ’sort boks’ (black box) i GIN-
konstruktionsprocessen, hvilket kan gøre det muligt at følge aspekter af GIN-
genese, dynamikker og agens. Med en empirisk erkendelsesinteresse i, hvordan et 
kvalitetsskifte potentielt finder sted i kinesisk vindkraft – og at dette potentielt 
repræsenterer en særlig kinesisk måde at skabe grønne markeder på – samt i, 
hvordan dette potentielle kvalitetsskifte de- og rekonfigurerer relationer mellem 
kinesiske og udenlandske aktører omkring software undersøger afhandlingen 
hvorledes et konstruktivistisk perspektiv kan hjælpe med at kvalificere forståelsen 
af genese, dynamikker og agens i GINs i en udviklingskontekst. 
 
Afhandlingen tager herved udfordringen om at overvinde de ontologiske og 
epistemologiske forskelle mellem det konstruktivistiske perspektiv i 
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markedsantropologien og den positivistiske GIN-litteratur op, hvilket afspejles i 
det ovenfor nævnte dobbelte forskningsspørgsmål. Denne kobling muliggøres 
igennem det, afhandlingen kalder en ’pragmatisk tunnel’. På den ene side har det 
konstruktiviske perspektiv (f.eks Latour, 2005a; Muniesa, 2013; Law, 1994) 
eksplicitte rødder i amerikansk pragmatisk filosofi og dennes mikro-relationelle og 
–processuelle perspektiv (f.eks. Dewey, 1927; Whitehead, 1978; Elias, 1978; 
Mead, 1934). På den anden side er GIN-litteraturen funderet i bl.a. økonomisk 
geografi, hvor nogle strømninger har åbnet op for et mere relationelt og endda til 
tider konstruktivisk perspektiv. På denne baggrund argumenterer afhandlingen for, 
at en krydsbefrugtning mellem det konstruktivistiske perspektiv og GIN-
litteraturen er muligt igennem en pragmatisk kobling og den delvist fælles 
voksende interesse i ’det relationelle’. Med en ambition om en krydsbefrugtning 
mellem perspektiver udvikler afhandlingen en situationelt specifik og empirisk 
funderet (’grounded’) teoretisk og metodisk ramme, der er baseret på strømninger 
indenfor den konstruktivistiske Science and Technology Studies (STS)-litteratur. 
Afhandlingen bygger således primært på aktør-netværksteorien (f.eks. Callon, 
1986a; 1998; Law, 1994; Latour, 2005a; 2005b), markedsantropologien og dets 
performativitetsprogram og valueringspragmatisme (pragmatics of valuation) 
(Callon og Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b), såvel som på en associations-sociologi 
(sociology of associations) (Latour, 2005a).  
 
Det specifikke netværksbegreb, som afhandlingen benytter sig af for at kunne ‘se 
væk fra’ GINs, er begrebet Techno-Economic Networks (TENs), der er lånt fra 
Callon (1998) og er blevet tilpasset afhandlingens specifikke undersøgelsesfelt. 
Afhandlingen behandler den nuværende kvalitetskrise i kinesisk vindkraft som en 
kvalificeringskamp, og i den forbindelse dykker den ned i en række overlappende 
og sammenflettede TENs og de relaterede processer med at ’frame’ vindkraft og 
nogle af de potentielle magtkampe, som sådanne framing-forsøg kan skabe i 
samarbejdsrelationer omkring kerneteknologien software. For at undersøge disse 
magtkampe trækker afhandlingen også på den konstruktivistiske og etnografisk 
inspirerede metode ’kontroverskortlægning’ (’Mapping Controversies’) (Latour, 
2005a; Yaneva, 2012; Venturini, 2009). Til gennemførsel af en 
kontroverskortlægning inden for markedsskabelsen af vindkraft i Kina er 
afhandlingen baseret empirisk på omfattende og gentagne feltstudier i Kina (såvel 
som i Danmark og Tyskland) i perioden september 2011 til september 2013 (i alt 
95 interviews). 
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På denne baggrund giver afhandlingen først en historisk redegørelse for et 
tvetydigt skifte fra et fokus på kvantitet til kvalitet i kinesisk vindkraft i de 
kinesiske politiske prioriteringer og politikker, hvilket – som tidligere nævnt – 
positionerer opgradering og udvikling af indenlandske innovationsfærdigheder 
indenfor software som værende af kritisk betydning. Afhandlingen kortlægger fire 
kontroverser i forsøget på nærmere at undersøge det, der ser ud som tvetydige 
transformationsstendenser i kinesisk vindkraft, samt for at se nærmere på, hvordan 
disse forandringer eventuelt medfører en de- og rekonfigurering af relationerme 
mellem kinesiske og udenlandske aktører omkring software. Først kortlægges to 
kontroverser i framingen af vindkraft som bæredygtig over henholdsvis 
intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder og standarder. Disse to studier zoomer ind på 
kinesisk-udenlandske samarbejdsrelationer omkring kontrolsystemteknologier for 
optimeringen af vindmøllens regulering samt omkring simulationsværktøjer for 
optimeringen og certificeringen af vindmølledesigns. De to studier illustrerer 
nogle af de myriader af magtkampe, som finder sted omkring software-algoritmer 
i disse software-værktøjer, blandt andet fordi disse ofte er ’black-boxed’. For at 
kunne give en dybere og mere situational forståelse af de to kontroverser omkring 
kontrolsystemteknologier og simulationsværktøjer undersøger afhandlingen også 
to kontroverser, der udfolder sig over penge samt omkostnings- og 
prisudregninger. Disse kontroverser er sammenflettet med andre kontroverser over 
det, der bliver kaldt et kinesisk ‘system-problem’ centreret omkring kinesiske 
statsejede aktører, samt en kontrovers over bæredygtigheden af det, der ser ud som 
en kinesisk eksperimenterende og fragmenteret måde at skabe nye markeder på.  
 
Afhandlingen konkluderer, at kun ved at ’se væk’ fra GINs bliver det muligt at ’se 
dem’ og indfange deres progressive socio-materielle konstruktion, deres 
dynamikker og deres agens. Mens GIN-litteraturen allerede har konkluderet, at der 
eksisterer GINs i den kinesiske vindmølleindustri, viser afhandlingen, at når man 
’dykker dybere’, og når man kigger på en enkelt kerneteknologi som software, er 
der ingen GIN(s) at finde. I stedet bliver teknologi og viden snarere 
kommodificeret, det vil sige gjort til en vare, hvilket efterlader software som en 
del af værdikæden. Samtidigt er der dog tegn på GIN-emergens i takt med at 
kinesiske aktørers færdigheder hurtigt bliver forbedret. Men dette sker ikke uden 
kontinuerlige magtkampe. Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at 
samarbejdsrelationernes stærkt flygtige karakter, hvor relationerne ser ud til at 
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blive brudt op, næsten før de er blevet etableret, har karaktertræk tilfælles med 
såkaldte ’vedvarende betingede relationer’ (Herrigel, 2010), hvilket skyldes den 
høje grad af rolletvetydighed, som kontinuerligt destabiliserer relationerne og 
nødvendiggør vedvarende vedligeholdelsesarbejde. Denne grad af ustabilitet kan 
desuden forstås ud fra den måde, hvorpå kinesiske aktørers ambitioner og 
agendaer også skifter, efterhånden som kinesiske aktører ’famler sig frem’ i 
opbygningen af et marked, samtidigt med at de forbedrer deres færdigheder. 
Desuden forsøger kinesiske aktører at blive en del af GINs for at kunne forbedre 
egne evner til opgradering, mens de samtidig forfølger målet om indenlandsk 
innovation. Denne tvetydighed medfører, at kinesiske aktører på sin vis søger 
videre end GINs, for at blive autonome og uafhængige af udenlandske teknologier. 
Mens dette gør kinesisk-udenlandske samarbejder i det kinesiske vindmarked 
meget flygtige, peger afhandlingen også på, at det potentielle kvalitetsskifte kan 
transformere det primært konkurrenceprægede rum (’space’) til et mere 
samarbejdsorienteret rum.  
 
Afhandlingen kommer afslutningsvist med en række bidrag til litteraturen. Først 
og fremmest bidrager den til GIN-litteraturen ved at anvende et konstruktivistisk 
markedskonstruktionsperspektiv. Overordnet åbner dette perspektiv for en 
belysning af genese, dynamikker og agens i forbindelse med GIN-emergens. 
Perspektivet giver indblik i nogle af de kontroverser, eksklusionsmekanismer og 
magtkampe, som GIN-konstruktion kan forårsage, samt i de mange menneskelige 
og ikke-menneskelige aktører, som disse processer involverer. Afhandlingen 
illustrerer desuden, hvorledes GINs og – blandt andre ting også software-
algoritmer – kan virke forstyrrende (såvel som fremmende) for 
markedskonstruktionsprocesserne. Afhandlingen har gjort dette ved at ’se væk’ fra 
GIN-metaforen og ved at rekonceptualisere GINs, dvs. ved at behandle dem som 
en del af markedskonstruktionsprocesserne.  GIN-begrebet bliver således 
rekonceptualiseret ved at splitte vindmøllen ad i dets komponenter og ved at 
zoome ind på den socio-materielle konstruktion af relationer omkring en specifik 
kernekomponent. Herved er afhandlingen blevet i stand til at påvise, hvordan der 
blandt andet findes socio-materiel modstand mod adgang til algoritmer, samt 
hvordan dette har skabt en intens magtkamp og anledning til utallige bekymringer 
blandt kinesiske aktører om blandt andet indenlandsk innovation, leapfrogging og 
catch-up, samt bekymringer blandt vestlige aktører om, hvordan man bedst 
håndterer relationer til kinesiske partnere samtidig med, at ens kernekompetencer 
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og markedsandel søges bevaret. Afhandlingen anbefaler, at fremtidige GIN-studier 
undersøger GINs ved at ’dykke dybere’, eksempelvis igennem etnografiske studier 
og ved forfølge processen med at etablere relationer omkring specifikke 
komponenter.  
 
For det andet viser afhandlingen en høj grad af kreativ og agil kinesisk 
eksperimentering i markedskonstruktionen af vindkraft, som muliggør 
’forstyrrende’ brud i opgradering og i governance-relationer. Studiet bidrager til 
en forståelse af de potentielt multiple mulige former for markedskonstruktion, der 
findes. Afhandlingen udvider herved også markedskonstruktionsperspektivet og 
bidrager med at kortlægge en særligt kinesisk måde at skabe markeder på i Kina, 
hvilket er muliggjort ved at krydsbefrugte GIN-litteraturen med det 
konstruktivistiske perspektiv via en pragmatisk tunnel.  
 
For det tredje, ved at sikre en dybere forståelse af de forstyrrende dynamikker i 
markedskonstruktionen og den kontinuerlige de- og rekonfigurering af relationer 
mellem kinesiske og udenlandske aktører diskuterer afhandlingen også Elias’ 
(1978) pragmatiske figurationssociologi. Her demonstreres det, at et gradvist 
skifte er ved at indfinde sig fra figuration I til figuration II, nemlig fra et fokus på 
hastig vækst og lave produktionsomkostninger og installeret kapacitet til kvalitet 
og genereret elektricitet. I dette skifte henimod figuration II indfinder der sig et 
nyt strategisk og mere komplekst spil mellem kinesiske og udenlandske aktører, 
hvor samarbejds- og konkurrencedynamikkerne både sameksisterer og kolliderer. I 
de paradoksale relationer i figuration II, der er præget af både konkurrence- og 
samarbejdsdynamikker, er software-programmer kommet i magtkampens centrum.  
 
Til sidst bidrager afhandlingen også til en række andre litteraturstrømninger, 
herunder blandt andet Kina-studier, relaterede litteraturer vedrørende Kinas 
specifikke ’variety of capitalism(s), opgradering og governance-litteraturerne samt 
til perspektiver på industriudvikling og kinesiske udsigter til innovativ 
fremstillingsvirksomhed. Efter at have vist, hvordan det strukturalistiske 
perspektiv på GINs og det konstruktivistiske markedsantropologiske perspektiv 
kan krydsbefrugte hinanden igennem en pragmatisk tunnel fremlægger 
afhandlingen et forslag til en ny forskningsagenda for Ny Økonomisk Sociologi 
(New Economic Sociology) for at kunne undersøge konstruktionen af GINs og 
markeder i en udviklingskontekst. Selvom der er grænser for mulighederne for at 
26 
 
generalisere fra det indeværende forskningsfokus til andre lande og industrier, 
indikerer afhandlingen, at resultaterne om markedskonstruktion ikke detso mindre 
også kan relateres til andre strategiske, evt. grønne, industrier i Kina. 
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PART I: Introduction and Positioning the Inquiry 
 
 
We have struggled our ways in different directions for quite a while, surrounded by 
thousands of people and Chinese kites in the air, before we finally manage to spot each other 
– the only other Western-looking person here around the Olympic Park metro-station in 
Beijing. The meeting has been set up at short notice, a couple of days after the China Wind 
Power Conference, which is held every year in Beijing in grandiose settings at the outskirts 
of Beijing. During the conference this year, I had wandered around for several days along 
the booths, approaching and talking with dozens of people – European and Chinese wind 
turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, consultants, diplomats, researchers, experts, 
and everything in-between. The hard work of introducing myself and my research has 
resulted in dozens of business cards in return for mine. While I had already written an 
introductory email to some of the people I have met in order to set up interviews, I had not 
yet reached this particular person on my endless contact list. However, he had now written 
me, keen to follow up on the brief talk we managed to have at the conference. It turns out 
that he is interested in learning more about my research.  
 
With a tightly packed schedule before I return to Denmark, we set up the meeting right 
away. I live near the Olympic City, which is known for somewhat brighter skies compared 
to the heavily smogged centre of Beijing, and as I am familiar with the area I take us to my 
favourite work café. After having been served our coffee, we find a quiet, dark spot in the 
back of the room and sit down to talk. I turn on the recorder and for more than two hours the 
talk almost takes off by itself. Although strangers, we have several things in common. Apart 
from being the only Westerners, we are both – me as a researcher and he as a control system 
supplier in the wind power field – struggling to understand exactly the same thing: How to 
understand the ’Chinese spiderweb’ that seems to constitute the Chinese wind power market, 
and how to deal with the complex relations between Chinese and foreign actors. Talking for 
a couple of hours, all the bricks in the puzzle begin to fall into their proper places. What he 
tells me is an intriguingly complex story of the challenges of trying to manage the thick 
mesh of the Chinese ’spiderweb’. In this story, software algorithms of the main control seem 
to take centre-stage, as they are seen as critical in ensuring the quality of the turbine, its 
reliability, and performance. Functioning as the ’spine’ of the wind turbine, the ’core 
algorithm’, positioned at the bottom of all the different source codes, binds together all 
44 
 
information from the different components to regulate the wind turbine in the most efficient 
and safe way. However, while being critical to the upgrading of Chinese wind power, which 
has stumbled upon a severe quality crisis in recent years, these software codes are being 
”locked, sealed, and protected in every possible and impossible way”. While the Chinese 
customers ”try in every possible manner” to get access to these codes, none have succeeded 
yet. Yet, if or when they do, “then the rest of us have to quit, I’m sure”, he says. Biking 
home to my flat from the café, I sense that the talk has set a direction for my journey 
through the algorithmic rhizome of the Chinese wind power market and the relations 
between Chinese and Western actors. 
 
And so the journey begins… 
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Chapter 1. Emergence or Collapse of China’s Wind Power Market? 
In less than a decade, the global wind power market has undergone a remarkable shift in 
geographical locus. Whereas Europe (in particular Denmark and Germany) and the US since 
the 1970s and 1980s represented the geographical locus of the global wind energy market 
(Karnøe and Garud, 2012), today China is the ”world’s clean energy leader”, leading the 
global “Clean Energy Race” (PEW, 2012: 14). As the Chinese wind power market has 
experienced a “velocity of capacity development never before witnessed” (Korsnes, 2014: 
176), China now constitutes a leading wind turbine player (Chen et al., 2014: 264). In less 
than a decade, China’s wind power market has grown from almost nothing, with 0.8 
Gigawatt (GW) installed capacity in 2004, to constitute the world’s biggest market (in terms 
of annual capacity installations/GW) in 2014, when China’s total accumulative installed 
capacity reached 91 GW (GWEC, 2014)1. Hereby, it has taken China 
”less than ten years to go from having no turbine manufacturing experience to having the ability to 
manufacture complete, state-of-the-art wind turbine systems that are either already available or soon to 
be available on the global market” (Lewis, 2013: 166). 
The rapid growth of China’s wind power market in the last decade can to a large extent be 
explained by a comprehensive, supportive Chinese policy framework for clean energy and 
related technologies, and specifically for wind power, in particular since 2005 (Lewis, 2013: 
23). Facing issues of power shortage, environmental degradation, and holding the position as 
the global number one emitter of CO₂ (e.g. Cherni and Kentish, 2007; Li, 2010; Liao et al., 
2010; Yu et al., 2009; Liu and Kokko, 2010), the Chinese Government “has made the 
commitment that by 2020 non-fossil energy will account for 15 percent of its total primary 
energy consumption” (Energy Policy 2012, II. Policies and Goals of Energy Development). 
China’s policy framework on renewable energies has been introduced in accordance with 
the overall aim of the Chinese political leadership of constructing a so-called ‘Harmonious 
Socialist Society’ (shehui zhuyi hexie shehui) (社会主义和谐社会) (Fan, 2006), which 
primarily is to be reached through the “portmanteau term of ‘scientific developmentalism’ 
(kexue fazhanguan)” (科学发展观) (Naughton, 2011). In turn, Scientific Development is to 
be achieved in large part by the construction of indigenous (‘home-grown’) innovation 
capabilities within core technologies (Fan, 2006: 709-717; Christensen, 2013).  
                                                     
1
 For list of abbreviations, please refer to pages 39-41. 
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The current consolidation phase – materialisation of a quality crisis after the golden 
period 
After a ‘golden growth period’ in the years from 2006 till 2010 and following nearly a 
decade of explosive growth in China’s wind power market, however, a slowdown and 
consolidation phase came around the year 2011 (GWEC, 2014; Korsnes, 2014; REN 2013: 
49, IEA, Oct. 14, 2010). In addition, despite the impressive numbers in installed capacity, 
wind power, still, only makes up a minor proportion of China’s total electricity output and 
consumption (GWEC, 2013: 18). This is claimed to reflect China’s ‘schizophrenic energy 
revolution’, in which coal is still reigning (International Business Times, 2014). 
Nevertheless, despite the consolidation, by 2013, China again represented the largest wind 
power market in the world, and growth rates were rising (Børsen, Sep. 10, 2014a; 
GlobalData, Jun. 10, 2014). In figure 1 below, the development in accumulative capacity 
and annual installed capacity (GW) is depicted for the period 2001 to 2013.  
Figure 1: Annual installed capacity and accumulative capacity  
 
Source: GWEC 2014: 43. 
 
If zooming in on annual installed capacity, it becomes visible that these have been marked 
by slowdown and fluctuations since 2010, as illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Annual installed capacity (GW) 2001-2013 
 
Source:  Calculations based on figures of accumulated installed capacity, GWEC 2014.  
 
As growth in annual installed capacity seems to have started to pick up again in 2013, some 
industry reports argue that the consolidation phase in China’s wind power market, which 
began after the peak year of 2010, is over (GWEC, 2014). Yet, the consolidation phase has 
not only initiated a shake-out process amongst wind turbine manufacturers (WTMs) and 
component suppliers in the Chinese wind turbine industry (EnergiWatch, Jun. 10, 2013), but 
has also revealed deeper quality issues (Interviews; Korsnes, 2014; China Wind Power 
Conference, 2013; Klagge et al., 2012; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 
15, 2012)2. Whereas China is able to “engineer wind turbines that cost as little as 75 per cent 
of the least expensive models offered by their foreign competitors” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 
2012: 14), China’s Central Government’s “preference of industry creation, and hence 
quantity before quality” (Korsnes, 2014: 192) has resulted in  
“massive quality problems. Massive grid break downs. Enormous problems. And you see that because 
you have been installing gigawatt by gigawatt of very poor quality. […] Without any of the key things 
you need to make a sustainable market...That’s the direct consequence of that policy” (Interview 1 
(hereafter, Int. 1)). 
                                                     
2
 Part of the slowdown can of course also be linked to the global recession following the 
financial crisis in 2007/2008, as well as a lack of efficiency in China’s fund for renewable 
energies and the competition with coal prices (Ecobusiness.com, Jan. 22, 2014). 
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With a focus on the lowest price bids for wind farm concession projects (interviews; 
Korsnes, 2014), on upfront investments in turbines, and on installation of GW capacity, 
rather than focusing on generated electricity through gigawatt per hour (GWh), the quality 
of wind turbines and the grid system in general, has suffered severely (Korsnes, 2014; 
Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). Consequently, already 
“[b]y late 2010 there were visible flaws in China’s wind power industry. The first was the production 
quality of the turbines. Since the government planners demanded quantity, and not performance, wind 
farm developers tended to cut corners. Thousands of China’s turbines lack the more expensive 
technology that keeps them operating when there is a disturbance on the power grid” 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). 
The resulting unstable power output from wind turbines and wind farms, i.a. due to poor 
quality, lack of certification, control system technologies, and forecasting tools, in 
combination with China’s weak electrical grid infrastructure, has resulted in vast amounts of 
potential wind power being wasted. That is, between one fourth and one third of installed 
wind power is reported to be disconnected from the electrical grid (interviews; Lewis, 2013; 
Bloomberg, 2012; Klagge et al., 2012). This reflects existing challenges associated with 
integrating large amounts of wind power rapidly into a poor quality power system (Lewis, 
2013: 186). Further, rapid integration of wind power of a relatively poor quality has created 
resistance against wind power amongst various actors (e.g. grid companies), as wind power 
threatens grid stability. Overall, quality issues are increasingly claimed to threaten the global 
reputation of Chinese wind turbines as well as of wind power in general (Interviews). 
Indeed, realising a ‘sustainable transition’ to meet environmental concerns in China still 
seems far ahead. 
The role of critical core components for quality and the role of software 
To solve what the thesis frames as the ‘quality crisis’ in Chinese wind power, certain 
component technologies have become constituted as particularly ‘critical’. For instance, 
software tools in a wind turbine’s various control system technologies, as well as in 
simulation tools for testing, documenting, and certifying new turbine designs, are being 
constituted as ‘core’ for developing high-performing, reliable, and intelligent wind turbines 
and for ensuring a stable output from wind farms. First of all, the wind turbine’s main 
control system (henceforth ‘main control’, unless otherwise noted) – including both 
hardware and software – helps to ensure the systemic interaction of the thousands of 
components that constitute a wind turbine. That is, the main control regulates the 
communication between the various sub-control systems, which in turn regulate different 
turbine components. As what, by some, is coined the ‘spine’ and ‘central nervous system’ of 
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the wind turbine, the main control’s software part contains a core algorithm, which ensures 
the optimal regulation and systemic interaction of the wind wind turbine’s thousands of 
components (Interviews). Second, aeroelastic software codes in simulation tools play a 
critical role for the standardisation and certification of new and adapted wind turbine 
designs. Acknowledging the strategic importance of advanced technologies such as software 
programmes, the development of capabilities for developing such critical software tools has 
become a strategic priority of the Chinese Government’s development plans for achieving 
the ‘Scientific and Technological Development’ of the Chinese wind power market (12th 
Five-Year Plan for the Scientific and Technological Development of Wind Power, 2012) 
(hereafter, 5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*) (asterix marking that the plan is in Chinese).  
As a relative latecomer in wind power, the development of China’s wind turbine industry 
has been based largely on foreign technology licenses, financial and technical support from 
donors, engagement in joint ventures with foreign companies, imitation, reverse engineering 
and backward design, as well as on technical assistance by foreign consultants (Lewis, 2007; 
Lema et al., 2013; Kristinsson and Rao, 2008; Lewis, 2013; Nahm and Steinfeld, 
2013/forthcoming; Chen et al., 2014; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Klagge et al., 2012). These 
strategic knowledge- and technology-seeking investments resemble an upgrading strategy of 
so-called linkage-leverage-and-learning, which is typical of multinational companies 
(MNCs) from newly industrialised countries (Mathews, 2002; 2006). While Chinese WTMs 
and component suppliers have developed manufacturing capabilities with tremendous speed 
from such technology- and technology seeking investments, it is widely acknowledged that 
in terms of the most advanced core technologies and indigenous wind turbine design, China 
is still dependent on technology transfer from foreign (i.e. Western) firms. As regards 
software programmes, for instance, these are still largely acquired from foreign companies 
on the basis of technology licenses (Interviews; Lewis, 2013). As core algorithms of 
software tools are locked by foreign companies as a matter of intellectual property (IP) 
protection, there is increasing Chinese concern that there may be barriers to China’s strategy 
of reverse engineering and upgrading (Interviews). For instance, without capabilities of 
developing advanced, indigenous simulation tools, there might be limits to the international 
certification of new Chinese turbine designs. Overall, while China’s wind power industry 
has made impressive progress in terms of wind turbine manufacturing and installments, it is 
confronted with various challenges and problems regarding the development of indigenous 
innovation capabilities (Klagge et al., 2012).  
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Emerging global innovation networks (GINs) in China’s wind power industry? 
Facing severe quality issues, or what the thesis, as mentioned, frames as a ‘quality crisis’, 
and so far not having created the necessary environment for catching up with global 
technology leaders (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1353), conventional technology transfer such as 
licensing agreements may turn out to have self-undermining effects. That is, positive 
outcomes of a linkage-leverage-learning strategy (Mathews, 2002; 2006) are not automatic. 
Accordingly, Chinese WTMs have realised that ”it is necessary to link [its] own resources 
more closely with external knowledge and innovation capacities” (Stamm and Altenburg, 
2007 and Altenburg et al., 2008 in Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1351), not only through 
conventional technology transfer, but by engaging in codevelopment and learning and 
innovation networks with foreign partners (Interviews). Accordingly, China’s leading 
WTMs have recently been claimed to have embarked on a new approach, which fits into the 
general trend of globalising knowledge production through the development of so-called 
global innovation networks (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1353). That is,  
”[w]hile global production networks [GPNs] have been a common feature in various industries 
including the wind industry, the internationalization of R&D [Research & Development] and specifically 
the emergence of global innovation networks [GINs] is a more recent trend” (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 
1351).  
Such global innovation networks have in the economic geography literature recently been 
abbreviated into and dubbed ’GINs’ (e.g. Ernst, 2006; 2008; INGINEUS, 2011; Cooke, 
2012; Parrilli et al., 2013; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012). GINs denote “[a] globally 
organized web of complex interactions between firms and non-firm organizations engaged 
in knowledge production related to and resulting in innovation” (Chaminade (2009) in 
Barnard and Chaminade, 2012: 2-3). Such ‘GINs’ within Chinese wind power, or what other 
scholars have more or less interchangeably dubbed international networks for learning and 
innovation (Lewis, 2013) and collaborative innovation networks (Chen et al., 2014), are 
claimed to play a rarely examined but crucial role in the development of China’s wind 
industry (Lewis, 2013: 3).  
Chinese navigational skills – and the debated sustainability of China’s growth path 
The volatile development of China’s wind power market – and the potential emergence of 
GINs – has been marked by the Chinese Government’s “policy flexibility and institutional 
adaptability” (Korsnes, 2014: 175). For instance, as the Chinese wind power market 
undergoes its quality crisis, the Chinese Government has gradually centralised approvals of 
new wind farms in order to slow down and coordinate growth and raise focus on quality 
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(Korsnes, 2014: 196). Further, higher standards have gradually been introduced in order to 
raise quality (Lewis, 2013; Korsnes, 2014; Børsen, Sep. 19, 2014b; Børsen, Oct. 20, 2014; 
Børsen, Oct., 21, 2014). This is claimed to reflect specific ”navigational skills” (Korsnes, 
2014: 196) of the Chinese State and an “impressive ingenuity in nurturing new industries”, 
as challenges emerge (Korsnes, 2014: 195).  
While rapid growth and a focus on price competitiveness has produced unforeseen effects, 
or so-called ‘externalities’ (Coase, 1960; 1988; also in Callon 1998), i.a. in terms quality 
issues and spilled wind, China is often argued to have achieved its competitive advantage by 
combining three variables, namely those of tempo, production volume, and cost (Nahm and 
Steinfeld, 2013/forthcoming; Lema et al., 2013: 65). This is deemed to constitute a unique 
competitive challenge for the developed West (Breznitz and Murphree, n.d.: 29), since  
”China’s industries are not competing with Western ones to lead at the cusp of novel-product 
innovation. Rather they are competing by successfully mastering all other stages of innovation and 
production. In so doing, although the largest shares of profits continue to be reaped overseas, the 
Chinese gain greater broad-based employment and economic growth. They also gain an intimate 
understanding of a wide variety of technologies, exactly the sort of understanding necessary for an 
eventual leap into ’higher’ forms of innovation. Thus the China challenge is whether or not the modern 
economic model in the developed West which relies on specialization at only the top of the innovation 
pyramid is sustainable when the remainder of the pyramid, with its skills and jobs has moved elsewhere” 
(Breznitz and Murphree, n.d.: 29-30). 
The ability of China to emerge as, what some term, a ‘scale-up nation’ (Nahm and Steinfeld, 
2012; 2013/forthcoming) is linked to today’s general global decomposition of production 
activities, which has led to increased modularisation and specialisation (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011; 2013; Lema et al., 2013). Currently, there is much debate amongst 
commentators as to the long-term sustainability of this Chinese scale up strategy. In terms of 
wind power, scholars are debating ”[w]hether the ability to sell turbines at competitive 
prices in the Chinese market requires quality shortcuts that will affect their long-term 
reliability” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 14). Overall, some scholars argue that China “is 
doomed to remain mostly an assembler and processor of foreign technologies, forever 
trapped in lowest value-added activities” (Steinfeld, 2004 in Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 
18). Conversely, others are more optimistic in regard to China’s development, arguing that 
the global decomposition of production can induce innovative manufacturing (Nahm and 
Steinfeld, 2012; 2013/forthcoming; Herrigel et al., 2013). Together, while many agree that 
China’s economic ’miracle’ is significantly transforming the global economy, there is 
uncertainty over its long-term sustainability (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011; 2013) as well as  
“uncertainty over innovation. Can China come up with new technologies that create new avenues for 
green transformation and reduce costs substantially?” (Lema et al., 2013: 65).  
52 
 
While China’s strategy of not competing at the cusp of novel-product innovation seems to 
constitute a competitive challenge for Western companies, Western companies may 
gradually come to acknowledge that there are prospects for interfirm collaboration all along 
the global value chain (GVC) for wind power. That is, there may be synergistic, mutual 
learning potentials for both Chinese and foreign WTMs to ”drive down costs, improve 
quality, and make wind power a more effective energy option for the world” (Lema et al., 
2013: 65). Such international collaboration is increasingly important for both Chinese and 
foreign actors. For China, collaboration to improve quality and make wind power a more 
effective energy option has become more important than ever, as China’s wind power 
market suffers from a reputation of technical and economical ‘unsustainability’. In addition, 
Western companies can learn from China’s ability to lower costs, i.e., from what by some is 
called China’s ‘cost out’ strategy (Interviews). The space for collaboration may in addition 
by expanded with the recent introduction of stricter quality standards in China. That is, as 
‘new winds [of quality] are blowing’ in China’s wind power market (Børsen, Sep. 19, 
2014b), the potential turn to quality in China’s wind power market is predicted to ease 
business in China for Western WTMs, such as the Danish WTM, Vestas, which compete on 
quality and innovation rather than low prices (Børsen, Oct. 20, 2014; Børsen, Oct., 21, 
2014). However, such collaboration in the midst of a competitive game may not be simple, 
but may engender paradoxes, conflict, and controversy.  
Introducing the dual research question of the thesis – a ‘fight against windmills’? 
Interested in the potential turn to quality, taking place within China’s wind power market in 
order to qualify wind power as a technically and economically viable and sustainable 
renewable energy source to overcome the current quality crisis, the thesis inquires into the 
potentially unique Chinese mode of constructing ‘green’ markets3 as a matter of 
qualification. Whether the ambiguous winds of change, which seem to blow over China’s 
wind power market, will transform the Chinese wind power market, and result in an actual 
shift in focus from price and quantity towards quality, remains to be seen. Rephrasing 
Cervantes’ (1705/1615) famous novel on Don Quixote’s vainful ‘fight against windmills’, 
the thesis asks rhetorically whether China might be ‘fighting against (its own) windmills 
(wind turbines)’, or whether the seemingly self-disruptive behaviour may turn out as a 
creative, pragmatic industrial policy that re-shapes dynamics and governance modes within 
the global value chain (GVC) for wind power. With an interest in how the ongoing quality 
                                                     
3
 ‘Green markets’ and ‘green market construction’ are in the thesis treated as a matter of the 
establishment of renewable energy markets such as the wind power market, overall reflecting a 
concern for ‘sustainable transition’.  
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crisis unfolds, in the role of collaborative and competitive relations between Chinese and 
foreign actors around the core technology of software in the requalification of wind power 
as sustainable, and in the potential controversies these relations may produce, the thesis, 
firstly, inquires into an empirically motivated research question: 
 
How may a ‘turn to quality’ in Chinese wind power - reflecting a Chinese mode of green 
market construction - be de- and reconfiguring relations between Chinese and foreign 
actors around software? 
 
Interested in the potential requalification of China’s wind power market, and interested in 
whether and how collaborative relations between Chinese and foreign actors around 
software take shape in this qualification process, and the potential(ly disruptive) 
controversies they may produce, the thesis takes its outset in the emerging literature on 
GINs. In the GIN literature, integration into GINs is claimed to possess a “developmental 
potential” (Cooke, 2013: 1081). In regard to China’s wind power market, integration into 
GINs is further claimed to constitute a strategy to overcome the technical and quality issues 
in China’s wind industry (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1351). The thesis is thus concerned with 
how GIN integration may play a role in the current qualification struggle of China’s wind 
power market, be it in terms of upgrading and/or stabilising or disrupting the market. 
Hereby, the thesis is interested in how GIN relations are formed between Chinese and 
foreign actors in the first place, and by whom how they are constituted and maintained. 
Acknowledging that GINs may constitute both collaborative and competitive forces, the 
thesis is interested in the quality and dynamics of these relations, and the potential 
controversies they may produce. For instance, in a developmental context of China, 
controversies may unfold over access and intellectual property rights (IPRs) to core 
algorithms, their implications for certification and standardisation, as well as controversies 
over money and liquidity in a crisis-ridden wind power market as well as over contested and 
negotiated cost and price calculations. Set into a Chinese context of protectionism of state-
owned-enterprises (SOEs), such entangled controversies are likely to engender wider 
struggles over what constitutes ‘sustainable development’, and what does not, with myriads 
of heterogeneous, socio-material actors taking part. Hereby, the thesis inquires into GIN 
genesis4, dynamics, and agency in China’s wind power market.  
                                                     
4
 The thesis treats genesis and emergence as two sides of the same coin, yet when employing the 
notion of emergence, emphasis is put on the ‘process’ of genesis, while the notion of genesis 
more points to the ‘event’. 
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The existing GIN literature has already provided valuable insights into the existence and 
structure of GINs (e.g. Cooke, 2013; Ernst, 2006; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; 
INGINEUS, 2011; Silva and Klagge, 2013), e.g. within a developmental context of Chinese 
wind power (Silva and Klagge, 2013). Yet, primarily looking into the ‘geography and 
structure’ of GINs (Liu et al., 2014), largely adopting a lens ‘from the outside’, the thesis 
finds, in the review of the GIN-literature, that the GIN framework does not possess the tools 
to inquire into the very microprocesses of relationship-building and –maintenance, into the 
potentially shifting quality of relations, the potential controversies they may produce, or 
their potential role in qualifying the markets they coconstitute. Instead, the GIN literature 
tends to assume GIN existence based on formal structures, i.e., looking at the ‘result’ of 
GINs instead of looking at GINs as ‘processes’ of relationship-building. Risking to miss out 
on how relations are established, the GIN literature misses the conceptual tools to inquire 
into issues of genesis. That is, GIN emergence and genesis cannot take place without the 
establishment of relations; yet, how these relations are built and maintained remains largely 
obscure in the literature as it does not provide a microprocessual account of ‘the relational’. 
Further, tending to focus on MNCs and their collaboration partners, the innovation system, 
and the institutional embedding context, the list of potential actors playing a role in GIN 
construction remains largely limited to humans, embedding institutions, and (innovation) 
systems, while the potential constructive or disruptive roles and agency of technologies, 
algorithms, discourses and narratives, grid codes, standards, IPRs, money, cost and price 
calculations, and other non-humans in the construction of GINs are largely left aside. In 
order to open the ‘black box’ of the relational in the dynamic socio-material networking of 
GINs, the thesis suggests that it is necessary to explore whether another theoretical 
perspective can help shed light on issues of GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency in a 
developmental context of China. Due to its inherently ‘micro’-relational, processual, and 
socio-material lens, the thesis therefore proposes an exploration of how a constructivist lens 
can help shed light on this issue. This sets the foundation for a theoretically motivated 
research question: 
 
As the GIN literature generally does not pay much attention to the question of genesis, 
dynamics, or agency, how may a constructivist perspective qualify the understanding of GIN 
genesis, dynamics, and agency in a Chinese developmental context? 
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The thesis thus aims to explore how  and to what extent a constructivist perspective can fill 
the identified gap in the existing GIN literature on ‘the relational’ and microprocessual, in 
turn hopefully rendering insight into the potential emergence and dynamics of GINs, and 
their potential role in the construction of a market for wind power. To do this, the thesis 
zooms in on the seemingly hidden dynamics of the consolidation phase (around 2011-2013), 
which has revealed an underlying quality crisis within Chinese wind power, and looks into 
collaborative relations between Chinese and foreign actors around software technologies. By 
inquiring into the genesis of GINs, as entangled processes of market construction, the thesis 
aims at providing an account of “how a play comes to be performed, or why this particular 
story is being staged instead of some other one” (Powell et al. 2012: 434), rather than 
resembling “a play that begins with the second act, taking both plot and narrative as an 
accomplished fact” (Powell et al. 2012: 434). 
Structuring the account 
To trace the potential genesis of a GIN configuring around software in China’s wind power 
market, the thesis is structured as follows: First, Part I ‘sets the stage’ through the 
introduction and a critical literature review of the GIN literature and a brief summary of how 
the GIN literature has emerged from other streams within economic geography. This draws 
the line for Part II, which outlines the theoretical and methodological premises of a 
constructivist perspective, adapted to look into market construction in China, and concluding 
with a situational ‘model’ for tracing GIN construction as part and parcel of market 
construction processes in a developmental context of China (Chapters 3-5). In Part III 
(Chapters 6-12), each chapter of the constructivist analysis constitutes an empirical (and 
ethnographically inspired) narrative, together forming a story on GIN construction in 
Chinese wind power. Whilst Chapters 6, 7, and 8 serve as an historical background for 
understanding the rapid growth, quality crisis, and role of software programmes for the 
survival of the industry, Chapters 9-12 offer more in-depth ‘microprocessual’ accounts, or 
so-called ‘controversy mappings’, of GIN construction. First, Chapter 9 provides an in-
depth analysis of a controversy unfolding over intellectual property rights (IPRs)5 in Sino-
                                                     
5
 The thesis looks into controversies over ‘IPRs’, as a practical matter of concern for protection 
of Intellectual Property (IP), in particular in terms of software algorithms. The thesis is not as 
such interested in the legal and/or formal understanding of the term as defined in the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), but rather as a matter of tracing how relations between actors are de- and 
reconfigured around the potentially controversial issue of IPRs. In this way, while 
acknowledging the relevance of the debate, the thesis is not concerned with discussions 
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foreign collaborations around control system technologies. Second, Chapter 10 dives into a 
controversy over international certification and standardisation, configuring around 
simulation tools. Third, Chapter 11 dives into a controversy over money (liquidity) and 
trust, entangled in a so-called Chinese ‘system problem’ of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in a highly state-controlled power sector. Last, Chapter 12 presents a controversy mapping 
over price and cost calculations in a struggle i.a. between wind power and fossil fuels, which 
is entangled in a controversy over the sustainability of China’s seemingly experimental 
mode of market construction. The last two controversy mappings (Chapter 11 and 12) serve 
to shed further light on the ‘algorithmic’ controversies (Chapter 9 and 10), by setting them 
into a wider context of China’s power sector and a seemingly specific Chinese mode of 
industrial policy. Upon summing up on the findings of Part III, in terms of a constructivist 
perspective, the foundation for the final Part IV (Chapters 13-15) has been laid out. In 
Chapter 13, the contributions of the constructivist approach to the GIN literature are in turn 
elaborated on. On this basis, the thesis provides a conclusion in Chapter 14 on the dually 
motivated research question. Finally, this leads to a discussion in Chapter 15 on some of the 
wider implications of the findings, suggestions for further research, and a reflexive critique 
on the limitations of the study. The structure of the thesis is outlined below. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
revolving around finer legal, definitional or ideological distinctions that seek to draw a line 
between IP, IPR and intellectual rights (IR). 
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Table 1: Structure of thesis 
Structure of thesis 
 Abstract and summaries Part I. 
Positioning the 
thesis 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Critical literature review on GIN and neighbouring literatures 
Chapter 3 Theoretical framing – basic assumptions of a constructivist 
marketisation perspective 
Part II. 
Theoretical 
and 
methodological 
tools – 
developing a 
situational 
model 
Chapter 4 Methodological and analytical tool set 
Chapter 5 Situational model for studying green marketisation in China 
Chapter 6 Rapid growth of the Chinese wind power – and rapid 
overflowing (background) 
Part III. 
Analysis: 
Background 
and 
controversy 
mapping 
Chapter 7 Potential turn to quality in Chinese wind power (background) 
Chapter 8 Emergence of a network for software tools in Chinese wind 
power (background) 
Chapter 9 Controversy over intellectual property 
Chapter 10 Controversy over standardisation and certification 
Chapter 11 Controversy over money entangled in a Chinese system 
problem 
Chapter 12 
(and 
summarising) 
Controversy over cost and price calculations entangled in a 
Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation. 
 
Summing up on findings (Part III) – based in constructivist 
perspective  
Chapter 13 Discussion across chapters of contributions Part IV. 
Discussion and 
conclusion 
Chapter 14 Conclusion 
Chapter 15 Wider implications and critique 
 
Against this backdrop, the thesis moves on to Chapter 2, which renders a critical review of 
the GIN literature and parts of the economic geography literature, with an explicit focus on 
the conceptualisation of ‘the relational’ in order to inquire into the issue of genesis, 
dynamics, and agency. 
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Chapter 2. Positioning the Thesis – a Critical and Explorative Review 
of (Missing) Relations in the GIN Literature – and a first pragmatist 
tunnel 
Interested in how and whether GINs are emerging in China’s wind power market, Chapter 2 
conducts a literature review of the GIN literature. The review relates the GIN literature to 
central streams within economic geography6, which lie at the foundation of the GIN 
literature7. These streams within economic geography include the global commodity chains 
(GCC), global value chain (GVC), and global production network (GPN) frameworks8. All 
concerned with the global fragmentation of production activities, the relatively young GIN 
literature has added to these three streams by pointing to how innovation activities are also 
being dispersed globally. To different degrees and with different emphases, these streams 
are all interested in the probability to (and limits to) industrial upgrading and local 
development from integration into GCCs, GVCs, GPNs, and GINs. Over the years, the 
different streams have converged, and in a recent comparative review of the GVC, GPN, and 
GIN frameworks, for instance, Parrilli et al. (2013) recommend the synthesisation of the 
GVC, GPN, and GIN literatures to provide a full account of implications for ‘local and 
regional development’ (LoRD) (Parrilli et al., 2013: 967). In this way, the latest stream 
within the reviewed literature streams within economic geography, the GIN literature, can 
                                                     
6
 E.g. Gereffi 1994a; 1994b; Bair, 2005; 2008a; 2008b; Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2008; Ponte, 2007; 2009; Sturgeon, 2002; 2004; 2008; Dicken et al., 2001; Dicken, 2007; Coe et 
al., 2008a; 2008b; Hess and Yeung, 2006. 
7
 Apart from economic geography, the relatively young GIN literature builds somewhat 
eclectically on ideas and concepts from innovation studies (e.g. Lundvall, 2010; Pavitt and Patel, 
2003; Fagerberg et al., 2005; Lee and von Tunzelmann, 2005; Chesbrough et al., 2008; 
Kristinsson and Rao, 2008), international business studies, in particular within a developmental 
context of technological capabilities (e.g. Vernon, 1966; Dunning, 1980; Meyer, 2004; Peng, 
2002; Chen, 2007; Archibugi and Iammarino, 2003; Mathews, 2002; 2006; 2008; 2009; 
Altenburg et al., 2008; Figeuiredo, 2002a; Fu et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2008), and alliance 
and network studies (e.g. Powell, 1990; 1998; Powell et al., 1996; Powell and Grodal, 2005; 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Padgett and Powell; 2012; Koza and Lewin, 1998; March, 1991; 
Brown and Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 2009; Lave, 2009; Yasuda, 2005).  
8
 In addition to the GCC, GVC, and GPN (and GIN) frameworks, economic geography also 
includes the industrial cluster literature (e.g. Malmberg and Maskell, 2006; Giuliani and Bell, 
2005; Krugman, 1991; Arthur, 1989; 1996; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Saxenian, 2006). 
While industrial clusters can be seen as localised/concentrated constellations of different 
configurations of GPNs (Parrilli et al., 2013: 970), the GPN, GVC, and GIN frameworks are 
rather based on a rationale of globalised/decentralised phenomena (Parrilli et al., 2013: 970). In 
the literature review, the cluster literature is only touched upon briefly. 
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be seen as the latest add-on to the current synthesisation, in particular to the GVC and GPN 
frameworks. 
Concerned with how GINs emerge and are maintained, i.e. the genesis, dynamics, and 
agency of GINs, the literature review focuses on how ‘the relational’ has been 
conceptualised in the existing literature. Hereby, the literature review first renders a review 
of the GIN literature, including GIN studies, conducted within the Chinese wind turbine 
industry. Second, the way in which the GIN literature relates to economic geography is 
outlined briefly. Third, this leads to an outline of how relations are conceptualised in the 
existing literature. Fourth, the chapter then renders a critique on an identified ‘gap’ within 
the literature in regard to ‘the relational’, and thus in terms of genesis, dynamics, and agency 
of GINs. This leads to the next section, which illustrates how the gap on ‘the relational’ has 
already been acknowledged in parts of the existing literature (Dicken et al., 2001; Coe et al., 
2008a; 2008b; Grabher, 2005). Concerned with the potential global reconfiguring of the 
wind turbine industry and China’s potential industrial upgrading during the current potential 
requalification of China’s wind power market, and with the potential role of GINs in 
qualifying wind power as sustainable, the thesis suggests that it is relevant to explore how 
and whether another ‘relational’ perspective can shed more light on these aspects, and thus 
inquire into genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs.  
 
Pointing to the need for attention to ‘the relational’, parts of economic geography have 
already opened up for potential inspiration from a constructivist perspective, which in turn is 
founded in a relational pragmatist perspective. Hereby, Chapter 2 concludes by suggesting 
that a constructivist perspective may be helpful in terms of shedding light on issues of GIN 
genesis, dynamics, and agency. The move from the GIN perspective to a constructivist 
perspective is made possible through the construction of what the thesis dubs a ‘pragmatist 
tunnel’. That is, the concern for the relational in economic geography shares characteristics 
with American pragmatism. Likewise, the proposed constructivist perspective employed by 
the thesis is founded in and born out of American pragmatism. In the hope of cross-
fertilising and extending the GIN and constructivist perspectives, Chapter 2 links up to the 
following Part III (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), which lays out a constructivist theoretical and 
methodological framework and proposed model for the analysis in Part III. While the 
analysis in Part III leaves the GIN metaphor all together, the GIN construct is revisited in 
Part IV, where potential contributions to the GIN literature and related literatures as well as 
to the constructivist perspective are discussed. 
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Review of the GIN literature 
First, the chapter provides a brief review of the GIN literature. This is done by looking into 
‘what a GIN looks like’, ‘who is involved’, ‘how and why GINs emerge’, and ‘how to find 
GINs’. This leads to a review of GIN studies conducted within wind power in China, and the 
types of questions that the GIN literature has addressed. 
What does a GIN look like?  
The GIN framework is concerned with how new knowledge is created across national and 
firm boundaries, how innovations emerge at a global level, and how it is no longer confined 
to the Triad of the US, Europe, and Japan, but is expanding to emerging economies such as 
China and India (e.g. Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; Cooke, 2013; Silva and Klagge, 2013; 
Ernst, 2006; Chen and Wen, 2011; Chen and Wen, 2013; INGINEUS 2.2; 4.1; 5.1, 2011; 
www.ingineus.eu). As “globally organised webs of complex interactions between firms and 
non-firm organisations engaged in knowledge production related to and resulting in 
innovation” (Barnard and Chaminade, 2012: 2), GINs are sometimes defined as globalised 
networks of innovation, which cross firm, sector, and country borders (Ernst, 2006: 12). A 
taxonomy of different types of GINs has been developed, based on different dimensions and 
degrees of ‘globalness’, ‘innovativeness’, and ‘networkedness’ (span and depth) (Barnard 
and Chaminade, 2012). This classification has been based on data from an EU-sponsored 
firm-level survey amongst 1,215 responding MNCs in seven European countries, plus 
Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, within different low-, medium-, and high-tech sectors 
(INGINEUS-project 2009-2011; 7th Framework Programme (www.ingineus.eu);  
INGINEUS, 2.2. in Barnard and Chaminade, 2012). Based on these data, six main GIN 
types have been identified, namely (1) balanced GINs (GIN and gin), (2) global asset 
exploiters (Gin), (3) innovators (gIn), (4) networkers (giN), (5) global networkers (GiN), 
and (6) domestics (*in) (Barnard and Chaminade, 2012: 20). In addition, GINs have 
sometimes been classified as either complex inter-firm GINs or intra-firm GINs (e.g. Ernst, 
2006). In this classification, inter-firm GINs constitute a ”set of relations among the case 
company (headquarters and subsidiaries) and the outside collaborators” (Liu et al., 2013: 
1462), reflecting innovation outsourcing of R&D activities of the focal firm (Ernst, 2006: 3, 
12). Conversely, intra-firm GINs constitute a ”set of relations among the functional 
departments or groups within a company’s headquarters and its subsidiaries” (Liu et al., 
2013: 1462). In this way, intra-firm GINs reflect the internalisation of R&D activities, i.e. 
innovation offshoring, of the focal firm (Ernst, 2006: 3, 12). Over time, broader and more 
loosely defined GIN conceptualisations have emerged, taking into account the institutional, 
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co-evolving and embedding context and looking beyond the lead firm. That is, as globalised 
networks of innovation, which cross firm, sector, and country borders, the GIN framework 
represents a methodological dualism (Parrilli et al., 2013: 975). That is, the ”unit of analysis 
is both the firm (and the R&D department within the firm) and the industry to which it 
belongs” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 974). In other words, the GIN framework represents a 
”very special approach to inter-firm industry relationships that goes beyond firm boundaries and 
national borders to take into account homogeneous or integrated groups and networks of firms and 
industries that shape technology and competition features of any industry and market on a global scale” 
(Parrilli et al., 2013: 974-5). 
With such methodological dualism, the GIN literature is based on an assumption of 
embeddedness into the institutional context (Granovetter, 1985). In turn, the 
conceptualisation of the institutional embedding context is often seen through the lens of 
innovation systems (e.g. Lundvall, 2010; Lee and von Tunzelmann, 2005; Kristinsson and 
Rao, 2008). As a still young and emergent research field, there is a certain lack of 
consensus, as to how to treat and conceptualise GINs, however. Apart from treating GINs as 
MNCs and/or as a ”GIN arrangement of interlocking businesses and, to some extent, TISs 
[technological innovation systems]” (Cooke, 2013: 1092), GINs are also treated as “a 
strategic framework for the analysis of current and future trends and leaderships in the 
globalized economy” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 974). Simultaneously, the GIN construct is 
sometimes treated as a somewhat normative and prescriptive tool for local development, 
with potentially performative and political effects. For instance, the relative advantage of 
GPNs and GINs as a ‘developmental model’ is being analysed by Cooke (2012: 1083), as 
”the GIN offers more opportunities to extend and upgrade the overall production pattern 
cultivated in any region” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 974). In this way, the GIN is treated as a 
prescriptive means of evolving and upgrading from GPNs (Cooke, 2013). At other times, the 
GIN is constituted as an embedding context for MNCs, regional economies, and clusters. 
That is, ”firms gradually embed in global innovation networks”, as they adapt their routines 
and change (Herstad et al., 2013: 26). At the same time, GINs are sometimes constituted as 
an embedding context of regions and clusters (Herstad et al., 2013: 26). That is, regions have 
become knowledge hubs in GINs (Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Liu et al., 2013: 1457).  
Who is involved in GINs? 
While pursuing a methodological dualism, and often being interested in the embedding 
institutional context, many GIN studies have tended to take as their starting point large focal 
firms, i.e. MNCs (OECD, 2008; Parilli et al., 2013; Ernst, 2006, Ernst, 2008; Barnard and 
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Chaminade, 2012; Chen and Vang, 2008; Chen, 2007; Liu et al., 2013), who have dispersed 
their R&D activities globally. For instance, in their analysis of the ”geography and structure 
of global innovation networks (GINs) of two multinational companies belonging to 
industries with different knowledge bases” (Liu et al., 2013: 1456), Liu et al. (2013) treat 
GINs as “a set of relationships of the case company aiming at technological innovation, both 
product and process innovation” (Liu et al., 2013: 1462). Likewise, Chen (2007) treats GINs 
as a matter of the dispersed R&D of MNCs (Chen, 2007: 394), inquiring into the interaction 
between the subsidiary innovation centres of the Western MNCs and local institutions 
(Chen, 2007: 373). Conducting a comparative study of what is termed ‘two MNC’s Regional 
Innovation Networks’ in China, the study illustrates how a developing country such as 
China has become integrated into ’[foreign] MNC global innovation networks’ (Chen, 2007: 
375). While Chen (2007) compares intra-firm GINs of two different MNCs, Liu et al. (2013) 
study both intra-firm and inter-firm GINs (Liu et al., 2013: 1456). Along the same lines, 
Chen and Vang (2008) conduct a case study on a single MNC (Motorola) and its dispersion 
of R&D activities, inquiring into the role of developing countries in MNC’s GINs (Chen and 
Vang, 2008: 11). Conducting a case study on GINs in China’s wind power industry, Silva 
and Klagge (2013) find that leading Chinese WTMs ”are trying a new approach which fits 
into the general trend of globalizing knowledge production through the development of 
global innovation networks (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1353). This is illustrated by the way in 
which turbine manufacturers are increasingly aiming  
”at integrating cutting-edge technology and the related innovation capabilities into their firms via 
acquisitions and the establishment of R&D units in developed countries in order to catch up with the 
technologically advanced and mature turbines by firms from these countries” (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 
1353).  
A somewhat alternative approach, than that of following GINs as constituted by MNCs, has 
been employed by Cooke (2013), who looks into the transition and evolution from GPNs to 
GINs in the Singaporean ICT sector. Cooke does this by focusing on a core ICT 
technological subsystem, namely hard disk drives (HDDs). The HDD subsector is less 
dynamic and innovative than other parts of the ICT industry, and is still primarily 
characterised by GPNs and a dominance of large MNCs. In contrast, GINs have emerged in 
the more dynamic and innovative parts of the ICT industry (Cooke, 2013: 1082). Cooke 
finds that  
“GPN set-ups are not particularly innovation-inducing, tend to stabilizing over the long term and firm 
growth is largely by acquisition. The contemporary global ICT system is, by contrast, endogeneously 
innovative, far from stable and has greater developmental potential because of its GIN characteristic, 
which is its capacity for novelty” (Cooke, 2013: 1081). 
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In addition, Linden et al. (2009) have taken as their starting point the product (Apple’s iPod) 
by looking into “who actually benefits from innovation”, i.e. inquiring into who captures 
value in a GIN (Linden et al., 2009: 140). Cooke’s (2013) and Linden et al.’s (2009) studies 
illustrate how the analysis instead can take as its starting point a particular 
technology/industrial subsector or product, and how the GIN literature generally 
experiments with other approaches to GINs, which do not have MNC strategies as their 
starting points as those illustrated above. In addition, the GIN literature has gradually shifted 
focus from GINs in Western countries, formed by Western MNCs exclusively, to GINs in 
emerging economies, sometimes also formed and shaped by MNCs from developing 
countries. This reflects that GINs are no longer a phenomenon exclusive to developed 
countries (e.g. Silva and Klagge, 2013; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; Ernst, 2006; Ernst, 
2008; EU, 2009; Chen, 2007; Chen and Vang, 2008; Parrilli et al., 2013; Cooke, 2013). 
Overall, the GIN framework emphasizes the role of new emerging powers and how they are 
joining globalised R&D activities, e.g. in the form of specialised R&D departments within 
foreign MNCs and/or within own MNCs (Parrilli et al., 2013: 971). The rise of developing 
countries as central actors in GIN formations is linked to the increasing use of innovation 
offshoring by Western MNCs (Ernst, 2006; Ernst, 2008), which has led to an increasingly 
central role of firms from developing countries (INGINEUS, 4.1., 2011; Silva and Klagge, 
2013; Lewis, 2013; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; Chen, 2007; Chen and Vang, 2009). 
How and why do GINs emerge? 
In the GIN literature, there are different accounts of how and why GINs are emerging. These 
accounts point to an enabling institutional context, evolution from GPNs to GINs, MNC 
strategies9, and industrial knowledge bases.  
First, with the methodological dualism of the GIN framework, the co-evolving institutional 
context embedding GINs is often used as an explanatory factor for GIN emergence, as 
already indicated above (e.g. Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; 
Silva and Klagge, 2013; Cooke, 2013; Ernst, 2006; INGINEUS, 4.1., 2011). These studies 
particularly emphasise the role of supportive government policies and of the innovation 
system (Cooke, 2013; Ernst, 2006; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; INGINEUS, 4.1; Silva 
and Klagge, 2013). For instance, Cooke (2013) finds that  
                                                     
9
 For instance, MNCs may adopt a strategy of either home-based knowledge exploiting or –
augmenting/exploring R&D labs (e.g. Ernst, 2006; INGINEUS, 5.1.; Chen, 2007; Chen and 
Vang, 2008). This distinction is founded on March’ (1991) distinction between explorative and 
exploitative innovation (March, 1991). 
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”TIS [technological innovation system] locations where capable innovation agencies, research institutes 
and economic governance bodies created a valued developmental infrastructure for indigenous and 
inward investing companies, innovation became possible for local companies that had started life as 
members of MNC supply chains. This presaged the rise of what some saw as a GIN” (Cooke, 2012: 
1092). 
Overall, changes in geographical organisation are often seen through evolutionary 
approaches in the economic geography literature (Martin, 2010; Boschma and Martin, 2007; 
Cooke, 2012; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Giuliani and Bell, 2005). For instance, Chaminade 
and Vang (2008) have looked at the role of regional innovation systems (RIS) for the 
emergence of GINs (Chaminade and Vang, 2008: 1688). To do this, they look at the co-
evolution of indigenous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Bangalore and the 
emerging RIS (Chaminade and Vang, 2008: 1684), in order to answer the question whether 
the emerging Bangalore RIS is evolving into a mature RIS that can provide the kind of 
support needed by upgrading firms (Chaminade and Vang, 2008: 1691). Further, Barnard 
and Chaminade (2012) have presented what, at first sight, might seem like counter-intuitive 
results, as they display how primarily institutionally disadvantaged and maybe even 
geographically distanced regions are more prone to the emergence of strong-form GINs. 
According to the authors, this indicates how scarcity of skills and locational (and 
institutional) disadvantages can induce firms to engage in GINs, as they start to exploit the 
potential of leveraging rich and globally dispersed networks (GINs) (Barnard and 
Chaminade, 2012: 32). Along the same lines, another study displays that GINs may emerge 
in regions, which are neither institutionally too thick or too thin, but where an interactive 
regional innovation system holds both the incentive and the capability to engage in GINs 
(INGINEUS, 4.1.: 3). These studies confront conventional wisdom of the institutional 
innovation system literature that institutionally thick regions with a well-established 
innovation system are more prone to be involved in GINs. Accordingly, these GIN studies 
emphasise the need to shed further light on the institutional infrastructure of regions 
(Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; INGINEUS, 4.1.), e.g. including universities, technological 
centres, and funding organisations (INGINEUS, 4.1.: 7).  
Second, a prevalent argument in the GIN literature is that GINs are evolving from GPNs, 
constituting a new and somewhat ‘higher-level’ form of cross-border relations, as they do 
not only take place within production, but also within innovation activities. Thus, the GIN 
literature inquires into the 
”shift from global production networks [GPNs], driven by the search for markets and lower cost 
production sites, to global innovation networks (GINs), driven by the search for knowledge” (Herstad et 
al., 2014: 495).  
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As touched upon briefly in Chapter 1, the seeming emergence of GINs is thus seen as 
marking a new stage of economic globalisation, namely reflecting how it is not sectors or 
industries, which are being geographically disintegrated, but stages of production including 
R&D and innovation, due to the global modularisation and disintegration of production 
(Chen and Wen, 2013: 1). The global decomposition of production, reflected in offshoring 
and outsourcing as well as in increased specialisation of production activities and services, 
has ”brought about prevailing cross-border production schemes” of GVCs and/or GPNs. 
Hereby, cross-border networking does not only take place within manufacturing, but 
increasingly also within services and even design and R&D activities (Chen and Wen, 2013: 
1). As different layers of industrial players within GVCs increasingly need to interact 
closely for innovation, this has caused a rise in GINs (Chen, 2004; Ernst, 2006 in Chen and 
Wen, 2013: 1). 
Third, the emergence of GINs is linked to strategic responses of MNCs to competitive 
pressures. That is, through access to GINs, MNCs are able to get access to valuable (and 
maybe even cost-efficient) resources and innovative capabilities of a lower-cost talent pool 
(Ernst, 2006: 3, 23; OECD, 2008). The turn towards low-cost talent pools is often explained 
through exogenous, macroeconomic competitive pressures. These exogenous pressures are 
claimed to have changed corporate innovation management procedures towards a more open 
innovation model (Ernst, 2006; OECD, 2008; EU, 2009: 1). This indicates an implicit 
assumption in some GIN studies of the paradigm of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2008), 
which denotes that firms increasingly (must) cooperate with suppliers, customers, 
knowledge institutions (universities, laboratories etc.), and sometimes even with 
competitors, to stay innovative and competitive. Importantly, however, open innovation 
does not refer to free knowledge or technology (such as ‘open source’), but to the 
collaborative methods applied (OECD, 2008: 2). Accordingly, an OECD study on GINs 
argues that “the innovation model stays relatively more open for non-core technologies and 
markets” (OECD, 2008: 5). While these arguments often refer to MNCs from developed 
countries, the GIN literature argues that, from the perspective of emerging economies like 
China, integration into GINs can help these countries ”to link own resources more closely 
with external knowledge and innovation capacities” (Stamm and Altenburg, 2007; 
Altenburg et al., 2008 in Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1351). Accordingly, within Chinese wind 
power, 
”[i]t is against this background that leading Chinese turbine manufacturers have recently started to 
pursue the establishment of and integration into global innovation networks [GINs]” (Silva and Klagge, 
2013: 1351). 
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Along these lines, as regards China’s wind power industry, ”[a]ccess to global learning 
networks can be highly valuable for assimilating technological expertise, which can be done 
through international research, development of demonstration partnerships, or even 
something as simple as hiring specialized workers from abroad” (Lewis, 2013: 167) 10. In 
these studies, GINs (or interchangeably ‘global learning networks’) are treated as an 
alternative to conventional technology transfer with its limits in regard to building 
indigenous innovation capabilities (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1351). With its “developmental 
potential” (Cooke, 2013: 1081), GINs are being constituted as a strategic means of industrial 
upgrading and regional development (Parrilli et al., 2013; Cooke, 2013), which can induce 
local governments to play an interventionist role in nurturing the transformation of GPNs 
into GINs (Cooke, 2013).  
Finally, the GIN literature has recently looked into the issue of why GINs emerge in 
particular industries. This has been done by inquiring into the specific knowledge base, 
constituted as either analytical or synthetic in nature, of the industry(-ies) in question 
(Herstad et al., 2014; Herstad et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014). As analytic knowledge is found 
to be more easily codified, and thus being less tacit and ‘sticky’ (Gertler, 2003; Gertler and 
Levitte, 2007; INGINEUS, 4.1., 2011: 5), industries with an analytical knowledge base will 
result in more GINs to be formed than within industries with more sticky, synthetic 
knowledge (Herstad et al., 2014; Herstad et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2013), for 
instance, map a so-called globally organised model of a particular MNC embedded in an 
analytical knowledge-based industry (telecommunication), comparing it to a locally 
organised model of an MNC within a synthetic knowledge-based industry (automobile) (Liu 
et al., 2013: 1456, 1468). Such analyses of industrial knowledge bases and technological 
regimes (Herstad et al., 2014: 495), which seek to explain sources of firm-level behavioural 
differentiation and understand how and why GINs evolve, can provide insight into how 
specific determinants nurture or constrain network linkages maintained by firms (Herstad et 
al., 2014: 496). 
How to find GINs? 
The methodological dualism of the GIN framework (Parrilli et al., 2013: 975), i.e. the way 
in which both firms and their embedding industries constitute the unit of analysis, has been  
                                                     
10
 Lewis (2013) does not subscribe directly to the GIN framework, but instead adopts the notion 
of global learning networks. However, the thesis argues that the conceptualisation of GINs and 
global learning networks overlap to the extent that it makes sense to treat Lewis’s work within 
the GIN framework. This is elaborated later in the chapter. 
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”tackled with nested case studies that offer the opportunity to collect and discuss critical information on 
two sets of actors as well as to maintain and to manage a very open approach to innovation dynamics 
derived from such agent’s multiplicity” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 975). 
To detect and find GINs, many GIN studies have conducted case studies of single MNCs or 
comparative studies of different MNCs (primarily within relatively high-tech industries)11 
and their strategies, treating them more or less as embedded in the institutional context. In 
GIN studies on MNC GINs, the literature detects GINs by mapping the global dispersion of 
R&D labs and innovation centres, and/or mapping links between actors of the GINs in terms 
of contractual R&D collaborations, technology sourcing agreements, M&As, hiring of 
specialised workers, and/or joint design agreements with external partners, which may be 
other companies, universities, and/or research institutes (Ernst, 2006, 2008; Chen, 2007; 
Chen and Vang, 2008; Liu et al., 2013; Chen, 2007; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Lewis, 2013). 
Mapping the geographical spread of innovation and technology sourcing models, GIN 
studies offer an  
”analysis of private sector objectives, plans and strategies of lead firms and less well-known specialized 
suppliers. In this endeavor, the GIN maps out the relationships that are being built up to develop higher-
level capabilities used to discover new technologies, formats and products that open the way for new 
industry segments in which significant market shares can be developed” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 982). 
Overall, inquiring into MNC innovation and technology sourcing strategies, GIN studies 
tend to focus on formal, i.e. contractual networks, adhering to the conception that 
”[c]ollaboration can be governed contractually, monitored administratively and adjusted 
according to project progression” (Adams, 2002 in Herstad et al., 2014: 496). The detection 
of GINs is, in addition, sometimes done through adoption of social network analysis 
(involving key connection analysis and structural equivalence analysis) and visual mapping 
tools (Liu et al., 2013: 1463; Chen et al., 2014)12. Sometimes inquiring into different 
innovation roles played by actors in the network, GIN studies also rely on different 
innovation typologies, e.g. distinguishing between incremental, radical, modular, and 
architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Ernst, 2009 in Parrilli et al., 2013). In 
order to render a nested case study and adhere to the methodological dualism, many GIN 
                                                     
11
 E.g. electronics, IT/ICT (and software), telecommunication, automobile sectors, and lately 
also wind power (Ernst, 2006: 4; Cooke, 2013; Ernst, 2008; Chen, 2007; Chen and Vang, 2008; 
Liu et al., 2013; Chen, 2004; Chen and Wen, 2011; Silva and Klagge, 2013). 
12
 Chen et al. (2014) have conducted a study on ’global collaborative networks’ in China’s wind 
turbine industry. The study has extensive overlaps with the GIN literature, while it does not 
position itself directly into the GIN framework. However, the thesis treats the notion of global 
collaborative networks as more or less synonymous with GINs, which is to be elaborated further 
later in the chapter. 
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studies include an analysis of the embedding institutional context (e.g. Chaminade and 
Vang, 2008; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Cooke, 2013; Ernst, 
2006; INGINEUS, 4.1., 2011). Finally, while most GIN studies are qualitative case studies 
(e.g. Cooke, 2013; Chen, 2007; Chen and Vang, 2008; Ernst, 2006; Silva and Klagge, 2013; 
Liu et al., 2013), GIN studies also often rely on quantitative methods and data, e.g. 
employing aggregated trade statistics, surveys, and descriptive statistical data (e.g. OECD, 
2008b,  EU, 2009; INGINEUS 2.2; 4.1, 2011; Barnard and Chaminade, 2012), and 
sometimes even conducting hypothesis testing in regression analyses, as seen in the case of 
studies on sources of behavioural differentiation (e.g. Herstad et al., 2014: 496; Herstad et 
al., 2013). 
GIN studies on Chinese wind power 
In recent years, a few studies have been conducted within China’s wind industry, which look 
into GINs or into other neighbouring constructs for global collaborative networks for 
learning and innovation. Looking both into as well as beyond China’s interventionist 
policies within wind power, a study by Silva and Klagge (2013) has illustrated the 
emergence of GINs in the shape of Chinese WTMs (Silva and Klagge, 2013). Constituting a 
means of ”the development of indigenous innovation and learning capabilities in a so far 
very successful process of catching up with market and technology leaders from developed 
countries” (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1342), ”[t]he most recent development in China’s wind 
industry is its increasing and deep integration into global knowledge networks” (Silva and 
Klagge, 2013: 1351). While Silva and Klagge’s study is the only one conducted so far, to the 
knowledge of the author, on GINs (interchangeably referred to as ‘global knowledge 
networks’) in Chinese wind power (Silva and Klagge, 2013), related studies have looked at 
Chinese wind power through a lens which, arguably, to a large extent resembles the GIN 
framework.  
Such neighbouring accounts are e.g. seen in Chen et al.’s (2014) study on the evolution of 
what they term a ’collaborative innovation network’ in China’s wind turbine manufacturing 
industry. They define collaborative innovation networks as a team of self-motivated 
organisations with a collective vision to collaborate in achieving a common goal by sharing 
ideas, information, and work (Gloor, 2005; Gloor and Cooper, 2007; Silvestre and Dalcol, 
2009 in Chen et al., 2014: 264). Hereby, their approach is relatively narrow, compared to the 
GIN construction, which includes more actors and a broader approach due to its 
methodological dualism. Aiming at uncovering the co-evolutionary dynamics of 
collaborative innovation networks in China’s emerging wind turbine manufacturing 
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ecosystem and sub-ecosystems of the leading WTMs in China (Chen et al., 2014: 265), the 
study adopts a so-called business ecosystem lifecycle model (BELC) (Rong, 2011; based on 
Moore, 1996). Adopting software to visually map social network relations between two 
leading WTMs and their domestic and foreign suppliers of core components (blades, 
gearboxes, generators and control systems), detected through identification of formal 
contracts (Chen et al., 2014: 266), Chen et al. (2014) identify five pathways of technology 
accumulation strategies of Chinese WTMs over the past 30 years, along the BELC life cycle 
model (Chen et al., 2014: 264, 267). The study illustrates how the Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturing industry have undergone different evolutionary stages along the BELC 
(emerging, diversifying, converging, consolidating, and renewing) (Chen et al., 2014: 268, 
293)13, and how Chinese MNC strategies of technology accumulation have shifted 
accordingly. That is, China’s wind turbine manufacturing industry has engaged in strategies 
of importing, in-licensing, joint R&D/co-designing, outbound M&As, and increasingly 
engaging in industry-university/research institution collaboration (Chen et al., 2014: 267, 
269). The authors conclude that China’ wind turbine manufacturing industry has followed a 
pathway of tentative experimentation and preliminary domestic co-development, reverse 
engineering and development, in-licensing and domestic co-development, international co-
designing/co-R&D and domestic co-development, and finally global innovation, i.e. 
working with domestic and international partners in cross-border M&As and domestic-
international co-designing (Chen et al., 2014: 293). Indeed, the latter stages on this path-way 
resemble what in the GIN framework is coined as GINs.  
Another related approach has been adopted by Lewis (2007; 2011; 2013), who has 
conducted a number of studies on Chinese wind power. In a couple of comparative case 
studies on leading WTMs, Lewis (2007) compares technology sourcing strategies of India 
and China (2007), among others adding South Korea (2011) to these in other studies. 
Having illustrated the technology and knowledge sourcing strategy of Chinese wind turbine 
companies (Lewis, 2007; 2011), as also illustrated in the studies by Silva and Klagge (2013) 
and Chen et al. (2014), Lewis (2013) demonstrates in her book, ’Green Innovation in 
China’, a shift in China’s mode of technology transfer (Lewis, 2013: 35). That is, Lewis also 
demonstrates a gradual move from conventional means of technology transfer towards joint 
design and M&As, largely enabled through ”[a]ccess to networks for learning and 
innovation” (Lewis, 2013: 3), which constitutes ”a new model for innovation through the 
global generation of technology” (Lewis, 2013: 33). Access to such “global learning 
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 Chen et al. add a ’diversifying phase’ to the framework to cover the diversified nature of 
innovation during an industry’s early and chaotic stages (Chen et al., 2014: 293). 
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networks” of Chinese WTMs has ”played a rarely examined but crucial role in the 
development of China’s wind industry” (Lewis, 2013: 3), and has contributed to Chinese 
”technological leapfrogging” within wind power technologies (Lewis, 2013: 2).  
Lastly, a study by Lema et al. (2013), although not employing a GIN framework, but relying 
instead on a GVC perspective, has provided insight into not only the global recomposition of 
the wind power value chain (Lema et al., 2013: 43), but also the organisational 
decomposition of the innovation process (Schmitz and Strambach 2009 in Lema et al., 2013: 
60-61). Focusing on the manufacturing value chain (and not the deployment-services chain) 
within wind power, Lema et al. (2013) illustrate how Chinese WTMs have modularised their 
supply chain, offering considerable cost and time reductions (Lema et al., 2013: 39, 44). 
This has been accomplished through cooperation with foreign partners: 
”Inter-company relationships are central to the Chinese model: Lead firm supplier relations buttress a 
flexible low-cost industry structure, and links to technology suppliers complement in-house expertise. 
Chinese firms do not seek to ”go it alone” in technology development. Instead, Chinese lead firms seek 
to develop turbine technology in cooperation with foreign partners” (Lema et al., 2013: 63).  
By emphasising the Chinese strategy of ‘not going it alone’, as expressed in the quote above, 
the study by Lema et al. (2013) bears resemblance to the GIN studies briefly outlined above, 
e.g. through its analysis of shifting mechanisms of technology transfer (from conventional 
technology transfer modes such as foreign direct investments (FDI), trade, and licensing to 
non-traditional technology transfer such as joint design, R&D collaboration and overseas 
R&D units) (Lema and Lema, 2012 in Lema et al., 2013: 60). Overall, Lema et al. (2013) 
find that China’s process of ”catching up with the old leaders in wind power” (Lema et al., 
2013: 60) reflects innovation strategies that combine internal development with heavy 
reliance on external knowledge sourcing (Lema and Lema, 2012 in Lema et al., 2013: 60). 
What questions does the GIN literature address? 
Having inquired into ‘what a GIN looks like’, ‘who is involved’, ‘how and why GINs 
emerge’, ‘how to find GINs’, and looking at how GINs have been conceptualised in Chinese 
wind power, the review of the GIN literature concludes by rendering an account of the type 
of questions that the GIN literature addresses. As illustrated, the GIN literature has made a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of the ”changing global geography of knowledge 
and innovation” (Ernst, 2009; Barnard and Chaminade, 2011 in Silva and Klagge, 2013: 
1353). Concerned with the geographical dispersion of innovation (Parrilli et al., 2013: 972), 
the GIN literature looks into what has become a politically sensitive issue, as it touches upon 
the presumed “hollowing out” of Western economies (Ernst, 2006: 2, 3), as knowledge 
intensive activity and knowledge creation seem to be spreading to developing countries 
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outside of the EU in different sectors (INGINEUS, 2.2, 2011: 2). Countering some of these 
fears, other studies emphasise the potential mutual benefit from GIN integration (Ernst, 
2006; OECD-report, 2008; INGINEUS, 5.1., 2011: 7). As somewhat normative studies, the 
GIN literature often provides policy recommendations, e.g. in terms of adjustments to the 
innovation system and the institutional framework in general (OECD, 2008b; EU, 2009: 2; 
Ernst, 2006: 4; Liu et al., 2013: 1470). Overall, this reflects how the GIN literature is 
preoccupied with the effect of GINs on upgrading and regional development, not only for 
developed, but also for developing countries. In particular, often treated as a potential means 
for upgrading and catch-up (Ernst, 2006; Parilli et al., 2013; Cooke, 2013; Silva and Klagge, 
2013; Herstad et al., 2013), the GIN literature tends to assume that MNCs from developing 
countries can rise up the so-called ”smiling curve” of value appropriation, when they enter 
”near the bottom of the curve but with aspirations and potential to rise along it” (Chen, 
2004; Chen et al.,  2010 [2011] in Cooke, 2013: 1089-1090). This “implies a catching up in 
R&D and innovation capabilities that are likely to change the global balance of power even 
more strongly over the next decade” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 971). In a comparative review of 
the GIN, GPN, and GVC approaches, Parrilli et al. (2013) argue that the  
”GIN framework delivers a third strategic asset [apart from global value chain (GVC) and global 
production network (GPN) frameworks] in the analysis of LoRD [Local and Regional Development]: 
innovation networks and strategies. This is distinct from ”innovation systems” as it takes into account 
the fast modifications that occur worldwide in the leading business activity, R&D&I [Research & 
Development & Innovation], which affects any country, region and locality, and in which any of these 
territories can upgrade through appropriate dynamics and strategies in order to catch up with, and 
consolidate, a more competitive position in global markets” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 982). 
At times, GIN studies claim to provide a “theoretical framework within which to situate case 
studies systematically so as to construct cumulative evidence of the genesis, performance, 
and implications of decentralized knowledge-intensive activities” (INGINEUS, 2.2.: 7). Yet, 
although the GIN literature “emphasizes the emergence of GINs, and their implications for 
local-global production inter-relationships” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 971), the literature does not 
provide an insight into the micro-processes of establishing relations, which lie at the 
foundation of their proclaimed genesis. Instead, formal, contractual relations for R&D 
collaboration and geographical mappings of R&D locations are treated as evidence of GINs, 
i.e. looking at GINs and their genesis as a result rather than as a process and potential 
outcome of specific dynamics and requiring ongoing work of maintenance. Overall, GINs 
tend to be seen from the outside, instead of inquiring into processes of relationship-building 
and dynamics of relationship maintenance. In addition, GIN studies do not look at how 
GINs may take part in the re-qualification of markets and vice versa. In the following, the 
chapter briefly looks into how the GIN literature has evolved from the GCC, GVC, and GPN 
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frameworks, which may render an explanation of why GINs and their genesis tend to be 
looked at from the outside. 
The intellectual heritage of GINs – on GCC, GVCs, GPNs 
As indicated in the above review of the GIN literature, the GIN framework has emerged 
from the GCC, GVC, and GPN literatures within economic geography. In the following, the 
chapter briefly looks into the foundational GCC, GVC-, and GPN literatures, which focus on 
the globalisation of production rather than innovation activities14.  
Conceptualising economic activities through chains and networks of production 
Overall, ”[c]onceptualizing economic activities as being organized functionally into a chain 
of interconnected elements has a lengthy history” (Dicken cited in Dicken et al., 2001: 97). 
The GCC framework, which evolved in the early 1990s (Gereffi and Korzeniewics, 1994; 
Gereffi, 1994a; 1994b; 1999; Bair, 2005; 2008a; 2008b; Bair and Gereffi, 2007; Bair and 
Peters, 2006; Sturgeon, 2008), is founded in earlier world-systems theory, which divides the 
world into core, semi-peripheries, and peripheries of the so-called ‘global North’ and ‘global 
South’ (e.g. Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977). Preoccupied with how economic globalisation 
influences the restructuring of international production, the GCC framework looks at GCCs 
as structures that connect actors across space, often in unequal ways (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewics, 1994; Gereffi, 1994a; 1999). Constituting the infrastructure of international 
trade, GCCs are “rooted in transnational production systems that give rise to particular 
patterns of coordinated international trade” (Gereffi, 1994b: 215).  
While the GCC framework does point to opportunities for upgrading through integration 
into GCCs, the later and still dominant GVC framework (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; 
2001; 2002; Ponte, 2007; 2009; Sturgeon, 2008; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Sturgeon and Gereffi, 
2009; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001; Gereffi and 
Memedovic, 2003; Pietrobello and Rabellotti, 2007; Morrison et al., 2008), which has 
evolved from the GCC framework since the late 1990s, offers a relatively optimistic account 
(with less focus on exploitation), of the possibility for upgrading for developing countries by 
integration into GVCs. The GVC framework is concerned with the cost-efficient 
                                                     
14
 Parrilli et al. (2013) position the GVC framework within sociology, economy and 
developmental studies, while they position the GPN and GIN frameworks within economic 
geography and innovation studies respectively. However, the thesis still treats the reviewed 
literature as part of the broader field of economic geography, as they are all concerned with the 
global dispersion of economic activities, interchangeably including production and innovation 
(Parrilli et al., 2013).  
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coordination of customer-supplier relations (based on a transaction cost calculus) (e.g. 
Coase, 1988, Williamson, 1981, 2002), and with how value appropriation and power is 
distributed and exerted in customer-supplier relations. In addition, the GVC framework is 
preoccupied with implications for the potential for industrial upgrading (Parrilli et al., 2013; 
e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). In terms of cost-minimising coordination and 
distribution of power in customer-supplier relations, this is seen through the lens of value 
chain governance. Overall, the GVC framework has developed an elaborate “tool to trace 
the shifting patterns of global production, link geographically dispersed activities and actors 
of a single industry, and determine the roles they play in developed and developing countries 
alike” (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011: 2).   
Not adopting a chain construct, but a network construct to conceptualise the globalisation of 
economic activities, the GPN framework (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe 
et al., 2008a; 2008b; Yeung, 2009; Dicken, 2007; Sturgeon, 2002; 2004; Hess and Yeung, 
2006) represents a more multidisciplinary framework (mainly within the economic and 
political fields), which feeds into economic geography (Parrilli et al., 2013: 972). While the 
GVC framework tends to overstate the role of MNCs, but understating the power of 
developing state organisations in ”both moderating and moulding those forms to suit their 
own territorial interests” (Cooke, 2013: 1082), the GPN framework takes a broader sector 
and/or industry approach (Parilli et al., 2013: 972, 974) and attaches more power to 
developing state organisations. Thus, the GPN literature takes  
“into account more widely the institutional and cultural features and constraints of different territorial 
ensembles, as well as the explicit policy approach taken by states and institutions, which seek to develop 
their own competitive positions” (Ernst and Kim 2002; Yeung, 2008, 2009; Coe et al., 2008 in Parrilli et 
al., 2013: 968). 
Hereby, conceptualising GPNs as “networks embedded within networks, with varying 
degrees of imbrications and interconnection”, the GPN framework allows for a more explicit 
analysis of the geographical and institutional context ‘embedding’ the GPN, and for a so-
called multi-scalar conception of levels and territorialities (Coe et al., 2008a: 277). Further, 
compared to the GVC framework, which took its outset in the analysis of the global textile 
industry, gaving rise to the GVC idea in the first place, the GPN construct has moved its 
focus to industries, which are more deeply based in science and technology (Cooke, 2013: 
1082). The GPN construct denotes the interconnectedness of nodes (MNCs) and their links, 
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which extend spatially across national boundaries, integrating parts of disparate national and 
subnational territories (Coe et al., 2008a: 274)15.  
 
Overall, the GIN framework bears most directly resemblance to the GPN framework, due to 
their network metaphors, the concern for more high-tech and science and technology-based 
sectors, the inclusion of more diverse actors, and the concern for the institutional context. 
Yet, in recent years, the GVC and GPN frameworks have converged, as they complement 
each other well. Accordingly, the GIN framework also draws on concerns of the GVC 
framework, in particular in regard to issues of governance and upgrading, which illustrates 
the potential for cross-fertilisation between the GVC, GPN, and GIN frameworks (Parrilli et 
al., 2013). In the following, it is briefly reviewed how issues of governance and upgrading 
are treated in the existing literature.  
Governing chains and networks 
Concerned with implications for local and regional development (‘LoRD’), e.g. in terms of 
the emergence of innovative clusters, integration into GCCs, GVCs, GPNs, and/or GINs, 
and transition from GPNs to GINs (ingineus.eu; Cooke, 2013; Parrilli et al., 2013), the 
economic geography literature is generally concerned with issues of power distribution or 
what is termed ‘governance’. Governance denotes “the process of organising activities with 
the purpose of achieving a certain functional division of labour along a value chain – 
resulting in specific allocations of resources and distributions of gains” (Ponte, 2007: 3). 
Gibbon et al. (2008) have developed a typology of different conceptualisations of 
governance in the existing literature, namely governance as driving, governance as 
coordinating, and governance as normalisation (Gibbon et al., 2008), which will be briefly 
reviewed in the following.  
 
First, the GCC literature treats governance as a matter of chain driving by so-called ‘chain 
drivers’/’lead firms’ (Bair, 2005; Gibbon et al., 2008). Based on this concept, the GCC 
literature identifies producer-driven versus buyer-driven GCCs (Gereffi, 1994a; 1994b; 
Appelbaum and Gereffi, 1994 in Bair, 2005). Though this lens, governance is a function of 
lead firm type (Gibbon et al., 2008: 320), which determines the ability of particular firms to 
make decisions about which other actors will be able to access the chain and under what 
                                                     
15
 Another definition of GPNs has been developed concurrently by Ernst (2002) and Ernst and 
Kim (2002), conceiving GPNs as the concentrated dispersion of the value chain across firm and 
national boundaries, with a parallel process of integration of hierarchical, systemic layers of 
network participants. 
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circumstances (Bair, 2008a: 351). Second, the GVC literature has developed the most 
elaborate theory for predicting governance modes, representing governance as coordination 
of relations. This refers specifically to the theoretical framework developed by Gereffi et al. 
(2005) for predicting GVC governance in dyadic buyer-supplier relations between economic 
actors in the global economy (Gereffi et al., 2005: 82). Based on a rationale of transaction 
cost minimisation, Gereffi et al. (2005) identify five different modes of governance, namely 
hierarchical, captive (network), relational (network), modular (network), and market 
coordination. Where there are low transaction costs, relations will be market-based, and 
where transactions costs are high, relations tend instead to be internalised through vertical 
integration, that is, through corporate hierarchical control (hierarchy) (Gereffi et al., 2005: 
83-84). In between these two ideal types of the continuum, i.e., between the governance 
modes of the market and hierarchy, three different network types of governance are 
identified, namely modular, relational, and captive. In turn, the specific choice of 
governance mode depends on the level of transaction costs associated with the specific 
buyer-supplier relations, which in turn relies on the level of supplier competencies, 
knowledge codification, and transaction complexity (Gereffi et al., 2005: 83-84). Third, 
governance in GVCs may also be treated as normalisation, which reflects an analytical 
focus on the discursive dimension of the value chain, as discourses produce rules, 
institutions, and norms, which frame buyer-supplier relations (Ponte, 2007; 2009; Gibbon 
and Ponte 2005; Ponte and Cheyns, 2013). The notion of normalisation denotes the ”project 
of re-aligning a given practice so that it mirrors or materialises a standard or norm” (Ponte, 
2009: 237). Most of these studies inquire into how standards and processes of 
standardisation influence the governance of industrial relations in GVCs, in particular the 
governance and role of quality, as they produce and are founded in normative systems16. 
Governance as normalisation is a mode of hands-off governance by lead firms, as standards 
rule and govern by setting norms and quality conventions, which work at a distance, making 
market coordination more cost-efficient (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 11; Ponte 2009). Along 
the same social constructivist lines, Gibbon and Ponte (2008) have looked further into the 
role of norms and narratives for GVC governance, adopting a governmentality lens, or 
rather, a so-called ‘programme of government’ approach (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008: 367). 
Inquiring into the potential shift ‘from governance to governmentality’, this approach dives 
deeper into the broader normative frameworks in which quality conventions operate, and the 
tools applied. Through the programme of government lens, the governance of the chain is 
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 Early work on governance as normalisation borrowed from convention theory (e.g. Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2009) to situate and analyse the dynamics of buyer-seller 
relations in wider normative contexts (in Ponte, 2009). 
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co-determined not only by economic characteristics, but also by the diffusion of a variety of 
broader normative paradigms and narratives circulating within society (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2008). 
Upgrading through chains and networks  
In addition to being preoccupied with issues of governance, the existing literature to various 
degrees also inquires into implications for industrial upgrading (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002; Gereffi, 2005; Ponte, 2007: 2; Morrison et al., 2008). Thus, economic geography 
looks into how international linkages and integration into global chains and/or networks of 
production and innovation can play a role in accessing technological knowledge and 
enhancing learning and innovation. While the earliest frameworks with a background in 
world systems theory tended to offer a somewhat bleak picture for developing countries, 
later frameworks have emphasised the potential for upgrading. In regard to the GCC 
literature (Gereffi, 1994a; 1994b; 1999), upgrading is treated as a matter of a dynamic 
movement from assembly towards becoming original equipment manufacturers, brand 
manufacturers, and finally design manufacturers (Gereffi, 1999: 51). Later, the GVC 
framework argued that the specific governance mode of the chain determines, not only the 
process of adding and distributing value along the chain, but also upgrading possibilities, 
and thus the potential for transforming and upgrading within the GVC (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002: 1017; Schmitz, 2004: 1; Parrilli et al., 2013: 970). The different ways in 
which countries and industrial clusters are inserted into GVCs, and particularly the GVC 
governance mode and the position of developing country firms selling to large, global 
buyers, thus have consequences for upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002: 1017). In 
parts of the GVC literature, upgrading is treated as a matter of process, product, functional, 
and chain- or inter-sectoral upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).  
While not having developed a comprehensive approach to governance or upgrading, the 
GPN framework instead focuses on the role of the institutional context for upgrading. In 
addition, GPNs may evolve into GINs, as innovative and potentially disruptive technologies 
enter the industry, and the power of incumbent MNCs is reduced (Cooke, 2013). Hereby, the 
GPN framework clarifies the margins for upgrading processes (Parilli et al., 2013: 976), e.g. 
by displaying how a specific GPN architecture of ICT globalisation is transitioning (or not 
transitioning) to a GIN (Cooke, 2012: 1082). For instance, in Cooke’s study on GINs and 
GPNs in the Singaporean ICT sector, the rise of GINs is taking place in only the most 
dynamic parts of the global ICT industry, while the less dynamic and innovative parts are 
still dominated by concentration of power in MNCs in a GPN (Chen, 2004; Chen et al., , 
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2010 [2011] in Cooke, 2012: 1089). Overall, these literatures (in particular the GVC 
framework) have also inquired into barriers to upgrading, i.a. seen as effects of particular 
governance modes and/or technological capabilities of suppliers (e.g. Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002; Fu et al., 2011; Figueiredo, 2002; Morrison et al., 2008).  
Moves towards synthesising frameworks within economic geography 
While the GVC literature has the most developed framework for upgrading and governance, 
the GIN literature offers a lens for regional upgrading processes in terms of innovation types 
and the position of the firm in the GIN (Parrilli et al., 2013: 972). Like the GPN framework, 
the GIN framework tends to look at regional upgrading processes as a matter of ’linking up’ 
with external resources, i.e. as a matter of ’strategic coupling’ (Parrilli et al., 2013: 970). 
With the gradual convergence of the GVC and GPN frameworks, and the emergence of the 
GIN framework, the GIN literature extends and adds to the coupling of the GVC and GPN 
literatures. With their respective strengths and weaknesses in terms of their insights into 
aspects of i.a. governance and upgrading, Parrilli et al. (2013) recommend that the 
contributions of the GVC, GPN, and GIN frameworks should be synthesised into a “more 
complete and dynamic territorial perspective on regional development in the context of 
globalization” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 967). With a concern for developing a framework for 
understanding the impact of integration into GVCs, GPNs, and/or GINs on local and 
regional development (LoRD), e.g. in terms of impact on industrial clusters17, Parrilli et al. 
(2013) argue that 
“we can think of GVCs and production-innovation networks as organizational clusters that produce foot-
prints in local locations. In each of these locations, there are territorially based clusters constituted 
through overlapping footprints of similar chains and networks” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 985). 
Consequently, “[w]e need to understand their [the clusters’] position in GVCs, GPN and 
GIN that are mediated through non-local links such as firm-specific organization of value-
chain activities” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 985). Having conducted a brief review of the GIN 
literature and its neighbouring literatures within economic geography from which it has 
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 The cluster literature (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005; Sturgeon, 
2004; Tödtling and Trippl, 2012; Tödtling et al. 2008; Giuliani, 2013; Giuliani and Bell, 2005; 
Herstad et al., 2014; Herstad et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Altenburg et al., 2008; Chaminade 
and Vang, 2008) is generally based on assumptions of agglomeration effects and increased 
returns to specific technologies, and thus embracing the notion of a ‘lock-in’ (Arthur, 1989, 
1996; Krugman, 1991) into certain technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982), which in turn 
indicates assumptions of path dependence in the cluster literature (Martin, 2010). 
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evolved, the chapter inquires in the following into how the existing literature has sought to 
conceive ‘the relational’. 
Relations in the GVC, GPN, and GIN literatures 
In the above, the thesis has illustrated many of the valuable insights provided by the GIN 
literature and related literatures within economic geography into the globalisation of 
production and innovation, governance relations and value distribution, institutional and 
other contextual factors, as well as into development prospects in terms of upgrading. In the 
following, the chapter reviews the literatures, by critically looking into their structuralist and 
rather static conceptualisations of ’the relational’. As already indicated earlier, the GIN 
literature looks into GIN genesis by looking at structures as evidence of GIN genesis, i.e. it 
looks at GINs from the outside and as a manifest result. Perceiving of relations in a 
network/systemic perspective (Parrilli et al., 2013: 972), the GIN literature tends to render a 
somewhat structuralist account, which does not put emphasis on the dynamics and/or 
potentially shifting quality of relations: 
”The interaction between the intra-firm and inter-firm networks influences the geographic pattern of a 
GIN as well as its structure. Structure is defined here as the pattern of relations in the network. The 
structure of a network reflects how the network is organized and suggests ’possible ways in which we 
could exploit it to achieve certain aims’” (Newman, 2003: 180 in Liu et al., 2013: 1457). 
Yet, no insight is provided into micro-processes of establishing relations at the outset, or of 
maintaining them over time. Without an insight into how relations are established at the 
outset, a micro-processual understanding of genesis is missing, as well as an understanding 
of the dynamics and agency of GIN construction. Overall, interested in ”the geography and 
structure of GINs” (Coe et al., 2008 in Liu et al., 2013: 1457), GINs tend to be seen from the 
outside. The structural, meso-level, and exogenous lens on GINs can be linked largely to the 
way in which the GIN literature is positioned within economic geography, and thus is a 
science of the meso-level, which is primarily offering a structural, systemic lens. Thus, GIN 
studies do not inquire into ‘micro’-processes of building relations or their potentially 
shifting quality, but tend to assume that relations are being built somewhat automatically, 
based on calculations of cost-minimising coordination of transaction costs, considerations of 
geographical scale and nearness, knowledge bases, and/or protection of core competencies. 
Assuming relationship-building away – on implicit foundations of different paradigms 
In the above, it has been indicated how the existing literature to a large extent, although to 
various degrees, builds on, – often implicit – assumptions of different overarching meta-
theoretical paradigms. First of all, the literature (in particular, the GVC framework) draws 
on the institutional theory of the firm, namely transaction cost economics (e.g. Coase, 1988, 
79 
 
Williamson, 1981, 2002), which treats relations as a matter of cost-minimising coordination. 
Second, the existing literature is informed by the resource-based view of the firm (e.g. 
Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993) and its dynamic capabilities view (Teece et 
al., 1997), which treat relations as strategic resources which can generate economic rents. 
This is e.g. seen in studies on the strategic considerations of firms to engage in GINs or not. 
Lastly, concerned with understanding the reorganisation of economic and social phenomena, 
the reviewed literature, in particular the frameworks which draw on more sociological and 
institutional perspectives, are also grounded in the paradigm of New Economic Sociology 
(NES) (e.g. Dobbin, 2004; Granovetter; 1985; Beckert and Zafirovski, 2011; Powell, 1998, 
Powell et al., 1996, Powell, 1990, Powell and Grodal, 2005; Padgett and Powell, 2012; 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). At the intersection between economy and sociology and 
launched largely as a critique of neoclassical views of perfectly competitive markets, strains 
within NES emphasise the structuring of production, or what can be termed a sociology of 
markets (Fligstein, 2001: 6). With overlapping interests in evolutionary economics (Nelson 
and Winter, 2002; Penrose, 1959), the embedding institutional context, and in the 
implications for path dependency and lock-in (Granovetter, 1985), parts of the reviewed 
literature have its roots in NES. The foundations of the paradigms of transaction cost 
economics, the resource-based view, and/or in NES however imply that the existing 
literature of the GIN and other economic geography frameworks to different degrees 
‘assume away’ the very micro-dynamics and potential socio-material resistances to 
relationship-building. The thesis argues that to open the black box of the GIN, and to render 
an account of GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency, it may help to set aside the very GIN 
metaphor in the analysis to avoid being ’misled’ and ’seduced’ by it. That is, the thesis 
argues that GIN studies must paradoxically ‘look away’ from the ‘GIN’ construct, instead 
treating GINs as a relational, emergent effect. In the following, the chapter ventures further 
into a critique of the ‘relational gap’ in the existing literature.  
Critique – rich in structure, impoverished in ’the relational’ 
It may be noted, though, that some GIN studies do inquire into the emergence of GINs, e.g. 
(as earlier indicated) treating it as a matter of the industrial knowledge base, the institutional 
context, or as a matter of transformation from GPNs into GINs. Indeed, the reviewed GIN 
and economic geography frameworks reviewed are strong in their structural accounts, and in 
the detection of patterns of ties. As a science of the meso-scale (Grabher, 2005: 13), the 
narrative of economic geography is one of scales and spaces at a relatively high level of 
spatial aggregation. Thus, the geographical and locational argument plays an important role 
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for the emergence of clusters, global chains and networks (Parrilli et al., 2013; Dicken et al., 
2001). However, to the knowledge of the author, there exist no in-depth, endogenous studies 
on intra-firm and inter-firm micro-processes of relationship-building, or on the shifting 
quality of relations. Rich in topographic structure, but impoverished in processes of 
relationship-building, the thesis argues that network genesis risks to be ‘assumed away’. 
That is, by ‘looking away’ from processes of building relations, the GIN literature tends to 
miss out on the emergence, activation, and durability of GINs. The thesis claims that by 
looking at GINs mainly through an exogenous lens from ‘above’ and ‘the outside’, as a 
‘fact’ and a ‘result’, and basing it largely on formal, geographical structures, implies a risk 
of overlooking the very networking (GIN-ing) of the network, i.e. GINs as an emergent 
effect. That is, the relational aspect of how the network must be actively constructed and 
maintained through various socio-material means is put aside.  
Critique: Dynamics in the GIN literature 
Having inquired into the conceptualisation of ’the relational’ in the GIN framework and 
economic geography, the following section critically reviews the conceptualisation of 
dynamics in the existing literature. While the chain constructs within economic geography 
offer a somewhat static, linear, and hierarchical account of economic globalisation, network 
studies (e.g. GIN and GPN frameworks) tend to adopt a more dynamic and holistic lens. 
This is e.g. done by adopting an evolutionary perspective or even what is coined a lens of 
’dynamic path dependence’, in order to account for ’on path’ development/evolution without 
lock-in and de-locking (Martin, 2010 in Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1342). This is e.g. seen in 
Silva and Klagge’s (2013) GIN study within China’s wind power market, which illustrates 
how the accumulation of small and incremental changes has led to fundamentally new 
structures, such as the construction of GINs (Silva and Klagge, 2013: 1341, 1352). Also, the 
GPN framework with its interest in the institutional context is more likely to be used to 
describe product network dynamics and changing regional and national landscapes of 
industries (Parilli et al., 2013: 974), as it adopts a more geographically sensitive network 
analysis of the global economy (Coe et al., 2008b: 269). Some of these studies inquire 
directly into dynamic “change processes” in an interplay between GPNs and GINs (Liu et 
al., 2013: 1470), as GPNs are sometimes transformed into GINs (Cooke, 2012: 1091). 
Accordingly, and as indicated earlier, Parrilli et al. (2013) argue that the integration of GIN, 
GVC, and GPN frameworks can render an explanation of ”the dynamic transformation of 
industrial clusters in LoRD [Local and Regional Development]” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 985). 
However, still looking at MNCs and other types of organisations ‘from the outside’, these 
units of analysis still tend to be black-boxed, which renders little insight into how they and 
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their relations may shift in quality. Hereby, a more fine-grained understanding of changing 
micro-dynamics of network configurations and transforming governance structures is still 
missing. 
Critique: Agency in the GIN literature  
Chain and network constructs and their constituting parts are, to a large extent, assumed to 
have a fixed ontology, as also indicated above. Thus, studies are seldom opening up micro-
processes and –relations of lead firms or other constituting parts, or of GCCs, GVCs, GPNs, 
GINs, clusters, or the institutional contexts embedding them. Instead, they tend to be treated 
as black-boxed entities, without rendering an insight into the heterogeneous actors and 
entities inhabiting them, and their potential ongoing transformations. Further, developing 
countries in the economic geography literature are often treated as relatively passive actors, 
without much leverage on the constitution of their networks. However, by inquiring into a 
sub-sector within the Singaporean ICT industry, Cooke’s (2013) qualitative case study does 
provide some insight into the agency of local governments, namely as the Singaporean 
Government has initiated a process of change, which ”opened up other GPNs to innovative 
competition from other TIS [technological innovation system] set-ups in NICs [Newly 
Industrialised Countries] and emerging markets” [such as China]” (Cooke, 2012: 1091-2). In 
this way, the country’s strategy has been  
”not to find itself at the end of a linear and hierarchical GVC, but to influence it by forging a GPN in 
which its economic and political interests were met as well as those of the inward investing MNC” 
(Cooke, 2012: 1091).  
However, network and chain constructs and their constituting parts still tend to be black-
boxed, and their ontology assumed fixed. Overall, agency is often automatically relegated to 
lead firms, governments, and institutional contexts (e.g. innovation systems), instead of 
inquiring into how and whether agency changes over time, and whether other actors may 
acquire agency, e.g. technologies. Nevertheless, Cooke’s study renders new insights, as he 
looks into how technological change elsewhere in the ICT industry, where GINs have been 
constructed, may “place the whole GPN sub-network [around hard disk drives (HDD)] in 
jeopardy” (Cooke, 2013: 1093). Thus, the emergence of disruptive technologies such as 
cloud computing (Cooke, 2013: 1090) in the innovative GIN of the ICT industry may pose 
perils to the relatively stable, cost-cutting, low-wage, un-innovative segment of the HDD 
technology and its GPN. This indicates a gradual (though largely implicit) 
acknowledgement of the potential agency of non-humans. Further, the GPN framework 
generally holds a somewhat more ‘open’ ontology than the other literature streams, 
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sometimes even claiming to allow for the incorporation of material processes (Coe et al., 
2008b: 271), since material technicalities of the specific transformational processes shape 
and are shaped by GPNs (Coe et al., 2008b: 274). Still linked to canonical forms of path 
dependence from institutional embeddedness, as outlined above, the literature, however, 
risks overlooking the potential agencies involved in bringing about GINs, i.e. agencies of 
relationship-building. 
Mind the gap! 
In the above, the chapter has demonstrated how the existing literature has started to look into 
the emergence of GINs. When GIN emergence is treated in the GIN literature, this is largely 
done by explaining it as a matter of evolutionary transition of GPNs into GINs, as causal 
relations between industrial knowledge bases and firm behaviour, and as knowledge-seeking 
strategies of MNCs from developing countries embedded in favourable institutional contexts 
and innovation systems. At the same time, it has illustrated how the literature has managed 
to offer insights into the structure of relations and the effects of networks, but not into the 
quality and content of relations. The thesis argues that treating relational structures after the 
fact risks overlooking processes of relationship-building, and thus of the genesis, dynamics, 
and agency of GINs. To be fair, however, the GIN literature (and the neighbouring literature 
streams) may not have as its goal to render a narrative on micro-processual and micro-
relational genesis. Yet, suggesting that the genesis (as well as dynamics and agency) lies at 
the heart of the matter, when trying to understand the seeming requalification of the wind 
power market in China during the current quality crisis, the thesis proposes that an 
exploration of how and whether another perspective than the GIN perspective might be able 
to provide insights into aspects of GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency. The argument for the 
need of a more processual and relational lens, which can render insight into the quality of 
relations, rather than the structure of relations, has also been raised in economic geography. 
For instance, in the GPN literature it is argued that 
”the structure of a network tells us little about the qualitative nature of the relationships, which is far 
more important than structure per se. Instead, we see power as the capacity to exercise that is realized 
only through the process of exercising” (Dicken et al., 2001: 93). 
In this way, the existing literature has raised concerns that scholars should ‘mind the 
(relational) gap’. In the following, the thesis dives further into the characteristics of a 
potential ‘relational turn’ in the existing literature.  
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A contested relational turn in economic geography 
Through its increasing focus on embeddedness and relations, the GPN framework in 
particular seems to have embarked on a ‘relational turn’. Flirting with ideas and perspectives 
from New Economic Sociology (NES), a ’relational economic geography’ is emerging as a 
“self-consciously relational and specifically geographic approach to the study of the global 
space-economy” (Hess and Yeung, 2006 in Bair, 2008a: 356). This relational economic 
geography draws inspiration from NES, which – as also touched upon in Chapter 1 – calls 
for  
“[m]ore process-oriented, case-based approaches [that] provide rich accounts of why ties are created, 
how they are maintained, what resources flow across these linkages, and with what consequences” 
(Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005: 394). 
Yet, in economic geography there is disagreement as to the benefits of the integration of the 
sociologically oriented NES perspective into economic geography. For instance, according 
to Bair (2008a), the relational network approach of NES is claimed to miss out on the 
‘global factor’ (Bair and Gereffi, 2007), as its focus on micro-sociological embeddedness 
perspectives offers a too myopic and locally biased view according to Bair (2008a). This 
risks neglecting the multi-scalar, structural dynamics of the global economy and the 
international dimension of economic organisation (Bair, 2008a: 347). While Bair concludes 
that the ontological and epistemological differences between NES and economic geography 
are too vast (Bair, 2008a: 347), Grabher (2005) is relatively open towards the potential 
cross-fertilisation of economic geography and network approaches in NES, concluding that 
there are interesting overlaps. At the same time, though, he warns against the ontological 
and epistemological pitfalls of combining and synthesising theories (Grabher, 2005: 2). This 
indicates a recognition of the potential benefits of a relational turn in economic geography. 
Within GPN, Dicken et al. (2001) take a more radical approach than adopting a sociological 
(NES) perspective, instead emphasising ‘the relational’ as methodology. This they do by 
pointing to how a constructivist lens of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (e.g. Callon, 1986a; 
1996a; Callon, 1991; 1998; 2007; 2009; Law, 1994; 2009) may provide an insight into the 
relational. That is, the constructivist ANT lens looks at ”[a]ctions or practices, rather than 
structures” (Dicken et al., 2001: 101), and treats networks as the configuration of emergent 
network relations (Dicken et al., 2001: 94).  
Indications of a shift towards lateral accounts, dynamics, and agency 
While chain constructs of economic geography, in particular, tend to suffer from a 
mechanistic, hierarchical, and linear lens, the GPN and GIN frameworks have taken steps 
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towards a more relational, contextualised, and embedded network approach. In addition, the 
GVC framework has attempted to introduce a ‘micro-foundational’ view of global industries 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2008; Ponte, 2007, Ponte, 2009), e.g. by emphasising the role of 
discourses, as they produce rules, institutions, norms, and conventions of ‘quality’ (Ponte, 
2007; Ponte, 2009, Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). Nevertheless, it is still the GPN framework, 
which has made the most significant steps towards including more types of actors and 
proposing a lateral account, where horizontal, diagonal, and vertical links can be seen to 
form multi-actor, multi-layered lattices of economic activity (Sturgeon, 2001: 10 in 
Henderson et al., 2002: 442). Proposing this lateral perspective, the GPN framework 
attempts to move beyond the linear flows and/or ‘simple’ circuits concept implicit in the 
chain heuristic/metaphor (Dicken, 2007: 13-15). Proponents within GPN have, accordingly, 
argued for dissolving the bifurcation of the global-local nexus, which construes a causality 
between spatial scale and density of ties, and instead operate without one scale dominating 
the other, i.e. looking into the intermingling of different geographical scales in network 
formation and network processes, or what is framed as ’spaces of network relations’ (Dicken 
et al., 2001). In addition to these proposals for dissolving the global-local nexus, the GPN 
framework has also been experimenting with incorporating non-firm actors as constituent 
parts (Coe et al., 2008b: 275) of networks, and thus providing other actors with potential 
agency. This indicates an increasingly flexible ontology of networks. Lastly, the GPN lens 
has also taken steps to prevent taking for granted the existence of networks, relating agency 
to the situational power to create, join, or escape networks (Dicken et al., 2001: 94). 
Accordingly, power is thus a contextual practice rather than a position within a network 
(Dicken et al., 2001: 93).  
In addition to these moves towards a more relational and lateral perspective, the GIN 
literature has (indirectly) opened up towards agency of technologies and to variations of 
GIN emergence within industries. In particular, while not relegating agency explicitly to 
material actors, Cooke’s (2013) study on the HDD subsector indicates that there may exist 
socio-material barriers to transformation into GINs. In this way, looking into GINs around 
specific components might be beneficial to a more detailed and sophisticated understanding 
of genesis, dynamics and agency of GIN construction, and how there may exist (socio-
material) barriers to transformation from GPNs into GINs. Overall, a potential relational 
turn with more lateral accounts and a more flexible ontology of chains and networks might 
be underway in the existing literature, with more focus on ‘the relational’. Despite these 
attempts in economic geography, the different approaches have in the empirical studies not 
moved very far in terms of developing a lens, which can capture the micro-processes of 
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building relations and their (potentially shifting) quality. Therefore, the different types of 
actors central to the analysis remain limited, e.g. not taking a ‘symmetrical’ approach, which 
would allow for human and non-human actors on equal terms, and mostly subscribe to a 
space/scale construct, which divides the world into ‘micro-’, ‘meso-’, and ‘macro’-scales. 
Such a space/scale construct tends to assume hierarchical power structures, instead of 
inquiring into how these structures are established at the outset. Overall, GINs tend to be 
seen from the outside, treated as a ‘result’. Hereby, an account of the emergence of GINs in 
Chinese wind power is still missing, i.e. an account which can render a deeper insight into 
aspects of potential GIN genesis, GIN dynamics, and GIN agency. 
Towards a constructivist perspective – through a pragmatist tunnel 
With an interest in inquiring into the genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs, the thesis is 
inspired by moves within economic geography, which has proposed that a constructivist 
perspective might provide a new set of tools for capturing processes of relationship-building 
(e.g. Dicken et al., 2001; Grabher, 2005). Such convergence indicates that ANT may not be 
completely incompatible with the economic geography. Indeed, it can be argued that both 
the perspectives of constructivism and of parts of the ‘relational’ economic geography, 
which have been inspired by NES and/or ANT, share an interest in the relational and 
processual. In turn, such concern for the ‘micro’-relational and –processual has 
philosophical roots in American pragmatism. ANT is explicitly founded in American 
pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, 1927; Whitehead, 1978; Elias, 1978; Mead, 1934; e.g. seen in 
Law, 1994; Callon and Çalişkan 2009; Muniesa, forthcoming; Yaneva, 2012; Latour, 2005a; 
2005b). That is, arguing that human beings discover and appropriate the world through their 
social (inter)action, pragmatist philosophy is interested in the micro-processes and ‘the 
relational’. With its relational and processual lens, a constructivist perspective of ANT, as 
well, is at its outset founded in American pragmatism (Muniesa, forthcoming). In turn, 
though economic geography is not founded in American pragmatism, and most streams 
within it does not ascribe to its micro-sociology, the thesis argues that the ‘relational turn’ in 
parts of economic geography and the turn towards constructivist lenses implicitly indicate 
pragmatist affinities. The thesis in this way seeks to connect the constructivist perspective 
with economic geography, including the GIN literature, through a ‘pragmatist tunnel’, due to 
common concerns for the relational. It is thus the ambition to conduct a study on GIN 
genesis, dynamics, and agency in Chinese wind power by way of exploring how and 
whether a constructivist perspective can contribute to the GIN literature through insights 
into genesis, dynamics, and agency, despite the ontological and epistemological divides 
between the constructivist and GIN perspectives. Summing up, the analytical framework of 
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the thesis has clear roots in the philosophy of American pragmatism and adopts a 
constructivist perspective in order to conduct its empirical analysis of GIN genesis, 
dynamics, and agency within Chinese wind power. In the following, the common 
‘pragmatist’ concerns of the constructivist perspective and of the ‘relational turn’ in 
economic geography are briefly outlined. 
A constructivist perspective founded in pragmatist philosophy 
With a focus on the mode of connecting/relating a nexus of entities (Whitehead, 1989, 
Latour, 2005 in Yaneva, 2012: 2), American pragmatist philosophy defines all things in 
terms of their relatedness, as they are coming together in an ‘event’ (Fraser, 2010). This 
makes the process of building network relations a matter of practical investigation. As 
indicated earlier, such pragmatist interest in how things come into being, by inquiring into 
its relational and processual aspects can be witnessed in parts of economic geography and 
NES, i.e. what the thesis has coined a potential ‘relational turn’. The potential cross-
fertilisation between economic geography and pragmatism is explicitly evidenced in an 
historical study on global supply and value chains, based on economic geography concepts, 
in the US and European manufacturing industries (automobile, machinery) as well as the 
U.S., German, and Japanese steel industries (Herrigel, 2010). In this study, a pragmatist lens 
is employed, looking into the quality and dynamics of relations, to ensure a lens for the 
complexity of supply chain relations through space and time through a bottom-up, anti-
structural, and relational approach (Herrigel, 2010: 149).  
Summing up, in the above, it has been indicated how some streams within economic 
geography adopt a micro-relational lens, which can be argued to reflect pragmatist affinities. 
At the same time, the constructivist perspective of ANT has explicit roots in American 
pragmatism. The pragmatist roots of ANT is reflected i.a. in the way that the constructivist 
perspective emphasises processes of connecting and ‘becoming together’, i.e. of relating 
heterogeneous (i.e. encompassing human and non-human entities) into networks (e.g. 
Latour, 2005, Yaneva, 2012; Callon and Çalişkan, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Law, 1994). With 
the knowledge on the emergence of GINs in different industries and regions, and in 
particular within China’s wind turbine industry, the thesis is interested in how these GINs 
emerge, and in their dynamics and agencies. Further, the thesis is interested in how and 
whether GINs take part in the de- and re-qualification of China’s wind power market during 
the current quality crisis. That is, the thesis inquires into the potential role of GINs in the 
market construction – or what is termed marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 
2010b) – in Chinese wind power. Yet, having pointed to the ‘micro-relational’ gap in the 
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existing literature, the thesis argues that a ‘pragmatist’ move away from the foundational 
GIN literature towards a constructivist perspective is needed. The relational lens of the 
constructivist perspective, its roots in American pragmatism, and the stream of 
Anthropology of Markets (AoM) (amongst others) will be expanded upon in Part II of the 
thesis. 
Adopting a constructivist marketisation lens for studying genesis, dynamics, and agency 
Having construed a ‘pragmatist tunnel’ through their common pragmatist affinities, the 
thesis can thereby move from the GIN perspective to the constructivist perspective in order 
to shed light on GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency. Further, this may help shed light on 
how emerging GINs may form part of market construction (marketisation) in a 
developmental context of greening, as they participate in qualification processes. By 
coupling the two seemingly conflicting approaches of the positivistic GIN literature and the 
constructivist (ANT) perspective through the use of American pragmatism, the thesis 
extends both the perspectives of economic geography as well as that of constructivism, to 
render an account of both the structural and the processual aspects of GIN construction. To 
do this, however, the thesis first leaves aside the traditional GIN construct altogether.  
In the following Part II of the thesis (Chapters 3-5), a constructivist theoretical framework 
for studying the case of potential GIN genesis, as well as dynamics and agency in China’s 
wind power market is outlined. This lays the foundation for a constructivist analysis in Part 
III (Chapters 6-12), which thus does not apply the GIN framework or GIN construct, but 
instead adopts a constructivist perspective to explore whether and how it can contribute to 
the GIN literature. Hereafter, the GIN construct re-enters the thesis in Part IV (Chapters 13-
15), where potential contributions from a constructivist perspective on GIN construction 
within Chinese wind power are discussed and concluded upon. Exploring what a 
constructivist perspective may render of insights into aspects of GIN genesis, dynamics, and 
agency, the thesis thus responds to wider calls within NES for studies on dynamics of 
network genesis and maintenance (i.e. their emergence, activation, and durability) (Powell et 
al., 2012; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005; Padgett and Powell, 2012).  
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Part II: Theoretical and Methodological Implications of a 
Constructivist Perspective – and Modest Modelling 
 
With an interest in the construction of a market for wind power in China, and the potential 
role of GINs in the current qualification crisis, the thesis points to a need to inquire into the 
genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs within Chinese wind power. Arguing that micro-
processes of relationship-building lie at the foundation of GIN genesis, Chapter 2 conducted 
a critical review of how ‘the relational’ has slowly begun to beconceptualised in parts of the 
GIN-literature and within parts of economic geography, from which the GIN literature has 
evolved. Illustrating how the GIN literature has adopted a structural lens of looking at GINs 
‘from the outside’, rather than looking at the micro-processes of relationship-building ‘from 
within’, the thesis suggests that the GIN literature misses the relational aspects of the 
genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs. The thesis proposes that a constructivist perspective 
– introduced through a so-called ‘pragmatist tunnel’, which bridges common pragmatist 
roots of the constructivist perspective and parts of economic geography – might help shed 
light on these issues.   
 
Inquiring into the potential emergence of GINs around software technologies in Chinese 
wind power, and exploring how and whether a constructivist perspective can be helpful, 
Part II (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) in the following unfolds a constructivist theoretical and 
methodological framework and tool set, which concludes with a proposal for how to study 
GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency in Chinese wind power. This is done by treating GIN 
construction as part and parcel of the requalification process in China’s wind power market. 
First, Chapter 3 conveys an outline of some of the basic premises and constructs of the 
constructivist perspective proposed by the thesis. Second, this leads to Chapter 4, which 
renders an account of the methodological implications of adopting a constructivist 
perspective. Together, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 lay the foundation for developing a 
grounded, situational ‘model’ in Chapter 5, which has been developed specifically for 
studying market construction of ‘green markets’ in a developmental context of China. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Premises and Constructs of a Constructivist 
Marketisation Perspective 
Inquiring into how GINs around software may be emerging and how they may be part and 
parcel of the requalification of wind power in China, Chapter 3 turns away from the GIN 
literature towards a constructivist perspective, with a focus on constructivist studies on 
market construction, or what is coined as ‘marketisation’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 
2010a; 2010b). Yet, while the thesis employs what it coins a ‘marketisation lens’ to inquire 
into the qualification of wind power in China as sustainable, the umbrella term of 
marketisation for the theoretical framework of the thesis covers a number of theoretical 
streams within the constructivist field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), some of 
which are not directly concerned with issues of market construction, i.e. marketisation. 
These different streams within STS have been coupled and synthesised in the thesis to 
provide the basis for conducting a situational study on the marketisation of Chinese wind 
power as a matter of qualification (Part III), and to expand on how such a marketisation lens 
of a constructivist perspective may contribute to the GIN literature (in Part IV).  
Apart from drawing on the marketisation lens of the Anthropology of Markets (AoM) and 
its performativity programme (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b), the thesis draws 
inspiration from the sociology of associations (Latour, 2005a; Garud et al., 2010a). These 
two literature streams are in turn founded on the basic premises of Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) (e.g. Callon, 1986a; 1986b; 1991; 1998; 2007; 2009; Callon et al., 2002; Latour, 
1992; 2004; 2005; Law, 1994; 2003; 2009). Although having different focus, the mentioned 
STS-streams all adopt a lens of an ecology of practice (Stengers, 2005a), or even an 
ecologies of practice (Gad et al., 2014), which is concerned in one way or the other, with the 
‘hows’ of assembling heterogeneous entities (humans, non-humans, and hybrids) into 
temporarily stabilised ‘wholes’ (e.g. ‘markets’, ‘economy’, ‘GINs’, ‘scientific facts’, 
sustainability, and ‘society’). Thus, founded in an ecology of practice, the unit of analysis in 
a constructivist marketisation account becomes the very practice (action, or so-called 
‘performance’) of connecting and relating heterogeneous entities into temporarily stabilised 
networks. This requires that  
”any practice must be studied with a view to the continuous processes through which it comes to change 
from other practices, but especially its ongoing process of transforming itself” (Gad et al., 2014: 6).  
Since each practice is assumed to be particular to the specific assemblage and its 
constituting parts, ”no practice can be defined externally, but has to be qualified ‘from 
within’, through its own specific mode of divergence” (Gad et al., 2014: 6). It is the 
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proposition of the thesis that such a study of an ecology (or ecologies) of practice is helpful 
to trace the relational (Gad et al., 2014: 6) and to open up constructs such as ‘the market’, 
‘the economy’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 371), ‘science’ and ‘scientific facts’ (Latour, 
2004), ‘the social’ (Law, 1994; Latour, 2005a), as well as ‘GINs’ and ‘sustainability’. In the 
following, the chapter sets out with a brief historical account of the origins of the 
marketisation lens. This leads to an outline of some of the basic premises of the adopted 
constructivist perspective, and some of the key analytical constructs employed in the thesis. 
Origins of the marketisation lens – and positioning it within New Economic 
Sociology (NES) 
In the following, the historical roots of the marketisation lens are outlined briefly. This 
involves an introduction to the origins of ANT, to the streams of the AoM and the Sociology 
of Associations, and to a positioning of the marketisation lens within New Economic 
Sociology (NES).  
Into the laboratory – on the roots of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
Since the late 1980s, ANT has emerged as an influential research agenda within STS. 
However, the stream of ANT already started as a current in the 1970s at the French 
engineering school oriented towards industrial innovation, l’École des Mines, in Paris. Here, 
scholars of what was later to become labelled as ANT drew inspiration from a number of 
fields, e.g. American pragmatism (e.g. Elias, 1978; 2006 [1969]; Whitehead, 1989; Dewey, 
1927), French poststructuralism (e.g. Serres, 1982; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983; 1987; 
Greimas; 1987; Foucault, 1991 in Muniesa, forthcoming: 3)18, as well as from the French 
tradition of the epistemology of science and the British tradition of sociology of scientific 
knowledge within studies on scientific inquiry (in Muniesa, forthcoming: 4). During the 
early foundational years, the main thrust of ANT studies were concerned with the sociology 
of science and the study of the interrelations between science and society (Muniesa, 
forthcoming: 2). This involved a number of studies conducted literally ‘in the laboratory’. 
That is, interested in how scientific facts and knowledge are being socio-materially 
constructed, e.g. through the use of tools for calculation (calculative tools), scholars went 
                                                     
18
 ANT is inspired by e.g. Serres through notions such as ‘translation’ (Serres, 1982, Serres and 
Latour, 1995 in Muniesa, forthcoming: 3); Deleuze and Guattari through notions of the rhizome 
and the collective assemblage of enunciation as well as a “philosophical take on a materialist 
understanding of signification” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2011 [1980], in Muniesa, forthcoming: 
3); Greimas (1987) through a semiotic actantial model to interpret operations of signs and texts 
(Greimas, 1987 Muniesa, forthcoming: 3), and Foucault (1991) through his concept of power 
and governmentality. 
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‘into the laboratory’ (e.g. Latour, 1982; 1987). These laboratory studies illustrate how 
scientific facts and knowledge are assembled and produced, e.g. through experimentations, 
measurements, inscriptions, calculations, and writings (Muniesa, forthcoming: 4). Hereby, 
they helped illustrate  
“the Janus face of science as both constructed and realist. In so doing we followed the actors, often 
ethnographically” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 48).  
Over time, the constructivist realism, as proposed by ANT, has moved out of the laboratory 
and into studies of engineering and technological innovation (e.g. Callon, 1986b), as well as 
into organisation studies, political science, anthropology, economic sociology etc. Overall, 
the ANT perspective constitutes a fusion of sociological and technological theory, 
“characterized by a distinctively materialist, radically constructivist approach to social 
theory and to empirical research” (Muniesa, forthcoming: 1). 
Moving into markets – on the marketisation lens of the Anthropology of Markets 
(AoM) 
After having moved into different fields such as economic sociology, ANT has also moved 
into the fields of economics and market studies (Callon, 1998; Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 
2010a; 2010b). In his studies on the socio-material construction of the economy, Callon 
(1998) argues that instead of assuming ‘the economy’ to exist a priori, studies should 
investigate how the economy is consistently performed and maintained by material 
processes, economics, and economic tools, in processes of economisation (Callon, 1998: 30-
31). In what is coined as a ‘performativity programme’ (Callon, 1998; Callon and Çalişkan, 
2009; Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a; 2010b), Callon (1998) has, in his seminal study on ‘The 
Laws of the Markets’ illustrated the embeddedness of the economy in economics (Callon, 
1998: 23). By demonstrating how there can be no economy without the theoretical field of 
economics, as economics enable the establishment of calculative agencies (i.e., the capacity 
to calculate) (Callon, 1998: 30), Callon and others illustrated how there can also be no 
market without the progressive construction and performation of the ‘economy’ 
(‘economisation’) (Callon, 1998; Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). Drawing 
inspiration from Callon (1998), Callon and Çalişkan (2009; 2010a; 2010b) have later 
extended the still emerging performativity programme to a focused study on the construction 
of markets. Callon and Çalişkan thus propose the development of a research programme – a 
so-called AoM – dedicated to the study of the socio-material work of marketisation (Callon 
and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b).  
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The AoM approach combines insights from science studies and disciplines of economic 
sociology and anthropology to inquire into marketisation and to demonstrate the entangled 
processes of economisation and marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 
Callon, 2007). Hereby, “[m]arketization becomes a dominant modality of economization. If 
the dynamics of economic markets are to be understood, then they must be placed within the 
context of broader movements that bring the economic into being” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 22). By inquiring into the progressive performation of the ‘market’ through socio-
material calculative tools, neither the construct of ‘the market’ nor of ‘the economy’ (Callon 
and Çalişkan, 2009: 371) can be taken for granted or be used as a priori explanatory factors. 
Instead, these constructs take on verbal and processual connotations. This is e.g. seen in how 
‘the economy’ and ‘the market’ are treated as processes (verb) of economisation and 
marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009), as well as of politicisation and scientification 
(Callon, 2009: 541). As on-going experiments, markets become objects for empirical and 
anthropological investigation. 
Dissolving the ontology-epistemology divide 
The lens of ANT sits ambiguously between a constructivist and a realist lens. Almost 
paradoxically, it conveys a both constructivist and realist lens (Latour, 1987, 1999 in 
Muniesa, forthcoming: 4; van Heur et al., 2013: 341, 357). That is, while rendering a 
critique of a purely realist perspective by demonstrating the constructed nature of e.g. ‘the 
market’, at the same time it emphasises the role of the materiality of markets (e.g. how they 
must be inscribed into a physical form, and how they must be socio-materially produced 
through calculations and calculative tools). With this both constructivist and realist stance, 
the ANT-lens questions the dualist divide between ontology as ‘what is’ and epistemology 
as our understanding and ‘representation of what is’ (Latour, 2004), a dualism which ANT 
frames as a product of ‘Modern Reason’ (Latour, 2004).  Instead, founded on an ecology of 
practice, ANT seeks to dissolve this ‘false’, foundational dualism19, inquiring into how this 
is being constructed in the first place. This line of thought within ANT draws inspiration 
from the American pragmatist Albert North Whitehead, who, according to Latour (2004), 
found it much more relevant to dive “much further into the realist attitude and to realize that 
matters of fact are totally implausible, unrealistic, unjustified definitions of what it is to deal 
with things”  (Latour on Whitehead (1920), 2004: 244). With a both realist and 
                                                     
19
 A related way stating this is that ANT seeks to dissolve the foundational dualism between that 
which is framed as ‘objective objects out there’ (what Latour terms ‘matters of fact’ (what 
is/ontology)) and constructed ‘Things’ (what Latour terms ‘matters of concern’ (representation 
of what is/epistemology)) (Latour, 2004; 2005b). 
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constructivist lens, ANT beckons the researcher to study the practice, actions, and socio-
material work involved in constructing ‘matters of fact’, such as e.g. ‘the market’, ‘the 
economy’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b), ‘the social’ (Latour, 2005a; Law, 
1994). That is, analysis should inquire into the socio-material work involved in assembling 
such unities into black-boxed, ‘objectified Matters of Fact’, as well as inquiring into how 
these objectified ‘Matters of Fact’ often instead entail controversies and negotiations, i.e., 
and constituting politicised ‘Matters of Concern’ (Latour, 2004).  
Critique of economics, anthropology, and New Economic Sociology (NES) 
The marketisation lens conveys a critique of neo-classical (but also institutional and 
evolutionary) economics and their studies on the market and the economy (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2009: 371-378; Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 2), as these tend to take for granted 
‘the economy’ and ‘the market’ as effects of supply and demand, and/or looking at them as 
pre-existing institutions, which function as what Callon and Çalişkan (2009) term ‘socio-
cognitive prostheses’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 392). In contrast, the marketisation lens 
looks at the economy [and market] as “an achievement as much as an outcome”, which is 
never over (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 2). In addition, the marketisation lens raises a 
critique of New Economic Sociology (NES) and anthropological studies on markets, value, 
and worth.  
One of the points of critique of these two fields of research is the way in which they tend to 
focus on the role of humans at the expense of the potential role of material actors (e.g. non-
humans such as calculative tools) in the performance of markets (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2009). Founded in ANT’s radical symmetry (Latour, 2005a; Gad et al., 2014), the 
marketisation lens treats humans and non-humans ‘symmetrically’ rather than prioritising 
humans over non-humans. To allow for an understanding of the potential role of calculative 
devices in performing the market, according to Callon and Çalişkan (2009), “[t]o arrive at 
our [performativity] research programme, the next crucial step would be to drop the 
hypothesis of an ontological asymmetry between valuating subjects/agents and valuated 
things/objects/goods altogether, while integrating the active role of materialities more 
generally” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 393). Such materiality obliges the researcher to take 
seriously that anything is potentially an agent/actor, i.e., that anything may always acquire 
agency (Gad et al., 2014: 7). In this way, the marketisation lens counters social 
constructivist perspectives, since emphasis is put on how “[t]he construction of markets is a 
socio-technical construction, not a purely social one” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 384).  
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In addition, instead of adhering to the heuristic explanatory device of  ‘embedding markets’ 
within ‘society’, which NES tends to adopt by “embed[ding] the economy in society (and 
consequently economics in sociology)” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 391), the marketisation 
lens sees marketisation as co-producing ‘the social/the society’ and vice versa. Such 
entangledness makes it impossible to use the ‘society’ or the ‘institutional context’ as an 
explanatory factor ‘outside’ of markets, since the social (like the market) must be 
consistently socio-materially ‘produced’, and since market and society are deeply 
intertwined processes.  
Positioning the marketisation lens within New Economic Sociology – a pragmatics of 
valuation  
Despite being launched as a critique of i.a. NES, Callon and Çalişkan (2009), however, 
simultaneously position their constructivist marketisation-lens within NES. That is, they 
seek to contribute to the study of markets by developing the performativity programme, 
which constitutes a “pragmatically oriented approach to valuation” (Callon and Çalişkan 
2009: 384). The “pragmatics of valuation”, which they propose, is based on insights from 
science studies as well as on the disciplines of economic sociology and anthropology 
(Callon and Çalişkan: 370). The “pragmatics of valuation” in the marketisation lens refers 
back to the American pragmatist John Dewey (in Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 389) and his 
”Theory of Valuation” (in Stark, 2009: 5-6). Dewey illustrated how a market cannot exist 
and how products cannot circulate amongst diverse actors, prior to the construction of value 
and worth. As Dewey puts it, 
“Nothing moves on its own. If a good is produced it is because it has a value for its producer; if it is 
distributed it is because it has a value in its consumer’s eyes. The forces that explain the circulation-
transformation of things are the same forces that give things value. In short, things circulate because 
they are valued and it is because they are valued that they become goods” (Dewey cited in Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2009: 389).  
In order to perform the “circulation-transformation of things” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 
389), i.e., basically transforming a ‘thing’ into a valuable good, which is produced, 
distributed, and consumed, value and associations of worth must first be associated to the 
thing and potential good. The association of singularised qualities to the thing requires 
socio-technical tools to enable valuation. Overall, according to Callon and Çalişkan (2009), 
the “advantages of the pragmatic stance to valuation to the study of economization [and 
marketisation is] its attentiveness to things and materialities” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 
384).  
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Sociology of associations – and attributing value to a thing through associations 
By inquiring into the construction of associations of value to an emerging good, the 
marketisation lens, which offers a pragmatics of valuation, also draws on a recent stream 
within ANT, namely the ‘sociology of associations’, applied to the study of the 
‘reassembling of the social’ (Latour, 2005a). The sociology of associations demonstrates 
how it is necessary to trace the socio-material work of construing associations to things, as 
such associations can frame/qualify them, and in turn help attribute a certain (calculable) 
value to it. That is, in order to valuate the value of a potential good, qualifying 
associations/properties must first be attached to the thing, which can then potentially 
transform it into a good. To frame and qualify through the socio-material construction of 
associations, calculative tools and inscription devices must be employed. “This explains why 
the materialities of things matter” in marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 389). In 
other words, by disentangling and relating qualities and associations to a thing, the resulting 
framing contributes to conferring value on things (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 392), and 
thereby enabling market transactions to be performed. To frame (and qualify) means to 
establish calculative agencies (the capacities to calculate), making things calculable and 
actors calculative (Callon, 1998: 3, 16-23). Thus, to construct markets, calculations must be 
made, as  
”markets are not possible without generating and then reproducing a stark distinction between the 
‘things’ to be valued and the ‘agencies’ capable of valuing them” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 5). 
Overall, the ”pragmatically oriented approach to valuation enables us to understand flexibly 
why certain things have properties that facilitate their engagement in certain regimes of 
circulation-valuation rather than others” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 389). 
Basic Premises of a Marketisation Lens 
Having outlined the historical roots of what the thesis coins a ’marketisation lens’ and its 
positioning within the literature, the following section looks further into the main tenets of 
such a ’marketisation lens’, namely by outlining some of its basic premises.  
Principles of a radical generalised symmetry, a material semiotics, and a variable ontology 
As indicated above, marketisation is a matter of qualification and valuation. To build a 
network (such as a ‘market’) around a potential good involves the participation of both 
human and non-human actors. That is, rather than privileging human and/or institutional 
actors in a constructivist marketisation lens, heterogeneous actors and entities are treated on 
the same basis, using the same words (Law, 1994: 12). This means that no entity can be 
assumed a priori to be more ‘important’ or ‘powerful’ or to have more ‘agency’ than others. 
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This principle of so-called radical generalised symmetry of ANT (Law, 1994: 12) lies at the 
foundation of a constructivist marketisation lens, and implies that the social and the material 
are perceived as inherently inseparable.  
The ANT lens at the foundation of the marketisation lens draws inspiration from Greimas’ 
(1987, in Muniesa, forthcoming and in Law, 2009) ‘semiotic approach’ to studying narrative 
structures of fairytales. In fairytales, all entities (actants) perform a certain ‘task’ to unfold 
the plot of the story. Hereby, each entity constitutes a ‘semiotic sign’ within the narrative 
structure. In turn, ANT-studies are founded on a ‘material semiotics’ (Law, 2009). This 
means that all entities (be they human, non-human, or even ‘hybrids’) are treated as ‘actants’ 
in the construction of networks (e.g. markets). An analysis should thus trace how certain 
entities take on roles as either actors/mediators or intermediaries in the performance of a 
potential network. Actors are mediators, which means that they attain agency to act and 
transform others (Latour, 2005a: 39), as they “define one another by means of the 
intermediaries which they put into circulation” (Callon 1991:140). In contrast, an 
intermediary, e.g. texts/literary inscriptions (patents, reports etc.), technical artefacts 
(scientific instruments, machines etc.), human beings (and their know-how, skills etc.), and 
money (Callon in Law 1991:135), is “anything passing between actors which defines the 
relationship between them” (Callon, 1991: 134). While actors have agency to act (i.e., acting 
as what is coined as an ‘author’), and to associate texts, humans, non-humans, and money 
(Callon, 1991: 140), intermediaries do not have agency, but instead transport meaning 
without transformation (Latour, 2005a: 39; Callon, 1991). According to this account, 
“intermediaries describe their networks in the literary sense of the form. And they compose 
them by giving them form. Intermediaries thus both order and form the medium of the 
networks they describe” (Callon, 1991: 135).  
Further, “[l]ike intermediaries, actors may be hybrid” (Callon 1991: 140). Such hybridity is 
seen in the way that “an actor is an intermediary that puts other intermediaries into 
circulation” (Callon, 1991: 141). Actants such as intermediaries and actors may thus have 
variable content, geometry, and ontology (Callon, 1991: 140; Latour, 2005a: 39; Law, 
2004). To find out whether an actant constitutes an actor/mediator or intermediary, and 
whether their ontology shifts over time, thus becomes a matter of empirical investigation 
(Callon, 1991: 141). Overall, “quite minimal changes may transform intermediaries into 
actors, or actors back into intermediaries” (Callon, 1991: 142). The hybridity and ambiguity 
of the ontology of actants is also linked to the way in which “the imputation of authorship 
[attempts at becoming an actor], like all the other claims or suggestions made by 
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intermediaries, is controversial, open to doubt or question” (Callon, 1991: 141). 
Accordingly, actors are not always successful, but may be rejected (Callon, 1991: 140). 
While the shifting ontology of entities must be traced empirically, the analysis should also 
trace how the network they constitute is transformed accordingly. That is, rather than 
treating a network as a context for the actor, or the actor as immersed (‘embedded’) into or 
framed by the network, actor and network are two sides of the same coin (Karnøe and 
Garud, 2012: 4). Hereby, as the ontology of entities shifts, the relations between entities and 
thus the constitution, geometry, and ontology of the network that they constitute shifts as 
well. Hereby, actors, their relations, and the networks they constitute are treated as network 
effects, i.e. as relational ”effects of a set of materially heterogeneous relations” (Law, 2009: 
145).  
On network effects of the ‘four moments’ of translation and on distributed agency 
Instead of categorising networks through stabilising nouns (Callon and Caliskan, 2009; 
2010a; 2010b) such as markets or technical systems (Callon 1991: 140), the marketisation 
lens looks at networks as continuous and multiple processes of connecting and assembling 
heterogeneous actors into a collective. Looking into ‘what the thing does’ (exploring the 
hows), rather than asking ‘what the thing is’, ANT inquires into “the hows of relational 
materiality”, which reflects a realistic mode of inquiry (Law, 2009: 148). To inquire into and 
describe the hows of assembling actors into a network is in ANT often coined under the 
heuristic metaphor of ‘translation’ (Callon, 1986a).  
 
Callon (1986a) treats translation through the notion of ‘four moments of translation’ (Callon, 
1986s) as described below. If going through the different moments, the ‘translation’ of the 
network has been (temporarily) completed. First, the need for a new potential network must 
be problematised in order to connect actors and entities into a potentially emerging network 
– or what in ANT-parlour is coined as actor-networks (Callon, 1986a; Callon, 1991). 
Hereby, (1) problematisation constitutes the first of four ‘moments’ of translation (Callon, 
1986a). Problematisation is often done by a so-called translator-spokesman. Second, if 
succeeding in problematising the need to connect, entities will be locked into their place in 
the emerging network. This constitutes the (2) ‘second moment’ of translation, namely 
interessement. When roles have been coordinated in the (3) ‘third moment’ of enrolment, the 
roles and future of heterogeneous entities can be (temporarily) stabilised/irreversibilised, and 
finally mobilising entities in the (4) ‘fourth moment’ of mobilisation (Callon, 1986a). When 
assembled into a particular network configuration, the network becomes able to ‘act and 
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accomplish something together’, i.e. acquiring a situational and particular mode of agency, 
which is dependent on how and by which entities it has been (temporarily) converged and 
assembled.  
 
The translation process and conceiving of agency as a network effect denotes how agency is 
perceived to be distributed amongst heterogeneous actors and entities. That is, agency “goes 
beyond the somatic resources of the individual, it is the variable outcome of a complex 
process of engineering” (Callon, 2007: 140). The notion of distributed agency was 
originally coined for technological innovation (Callon et al., 2002; Doganova, 2009), as an 
‘art of interessement’ (Callon et al., 2002). As regards technological innovation,  
“the outcome of a project depends on the alliances which it allows for and the interests which it 
mobilises, no criteria, no algorithm can ensure success a priori. Rather than speak of the rationality of 
decisions, we need to speak of the aggregation of interests which decisions are capable or incapable of 
producing. Innovation is the art of interesting an increasing number of allies who will make you stronger 
and stronger” (Callon et. al. 2002: 205). 
Applied to marketisation, distributed agency likewise denotes how agency is not contained 
within a single human being or contained in institutions, norms, values, and discursive-
symbolic systems, but how it is instead distributed amongst heterogeneous actors, 
constituting a particular network effect (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 28). 
Framing in marketisation 
When succeeding in a particular mode of translation, the actor network becomes ‘framed’ or 
‘qualified’ in a particular way, and the translator-spokesman becomes indispensable and 
representative of the network (Callon, 1986a: 206-214; Callon, 1986b: 24-28; Callon, 1991; 
Callon, 1998). Translation and framing are thus integral to each other. To frame actors, their 
relations, and a potentially emerging network implies processes of disentangling, 
singularising, and bracketing qualities, making “relations visible and calculable in the 
network” (Callon, 1998: 19). That is, framing denotes the ‘disentanglement’ and 
singularisation of entangled qualities (Callon, 1998: 19). Framing is both cognitive and 
physical in nature (Callon, 1998: 249) and works by establishing  
“a boundary [a frame against the outside world] within which interactions – the significance and 
content of which are self-evident to the protagonists – take place more or less independently of their 
surrounding context” (Goffman, 1971 in Callon, 1998: 249). 
In the following, framing/qualification processes are set into a context of marketisation. 
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Five types of framing for the performance of marketisation 
With regard to the construction of a market for an emerging good, as examined earlier, the 
good must be ‘framed/qualified’ through associations. These associations must be construed 
i.a. through socio-material calculative tools, which can help ‘pacify’ the potentially multiple 
and (sometimes mutually conflicting) entangled qualities into a calculable and stable quality 
and value (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 6-8, 28-29). Thus, calculative tools are needed for 
the establishment of calculative agencies, i.e., for the construction of the capacity to 
calculate. According to the marketisation approach, there are five types of framing required 
for the performation of markets. These comprise (1) pacifying goods, (2) marketising 
agencies, (3) market encounters, (4) price-setting, and (5) market design and maintenance 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 5). Thus,  
“[f]or markets to emerge involves varous framings (framing of goods, of agencies and of encounters), 
price-setting mechanisms, as well as issues of their design and implementation” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 22). 
These different types of framing are part of the establishment of calculative agencies, which 
is required for marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b), and each require material, 
textual and other investments, e.g. through the employment of so-called pacifying 
calculative ‘framing tools’. That is, ongoing valuation processes through employment of 
framing tools are necessary for the circulation and transformation of an emerging good, and 
thus for price-setting and trading of a good:  
In the process of (1) pacifying goods, i.e. of stabilising and black-boxing the many potential 
qualities of the thing into one (temporarily) pacified and irreversibilised quality/framing, 
framing tools such as property rights [e.g. intellectual property rights (IPRs)] and 
standardisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b) play an important role. Property rights and 
standardisation respectively assign ownership rights and quantify qualities through testing 
and documentation. Thus, in the pacification of goods, which produces pacified agency of 
the good so that it can be transferred as property (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 5), a 
distinction “between the ‘things’ to be valued and the ‘agencies’ capable of valuing them” 
must be generated and reproduced (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 5). In turn, another defining 
characteristic of marketisation is (2) marketising agencies, which is seen in how the 
“multiplicity and diversity of actors compete to participate in defining goods and valuing 
them” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 8). That is, a host of marketising agencies are involved 
in the definition of the value of the potentially emerging good. Subsequently, (3) “[f]or 
things to be valued, it is necessary to have agencies capable of valuing them. But for the 
activity of valuing to take place, calculating agencies and goods have to meet one another. 
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Market encounters are hereby the third characteristic of the marketiation process (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 14). Yet, such market encounters are not produced haphazardly (Callon 
and Çalişkan, 2010b: 14), but require a set of encountering devices (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 14) and mediators, which can organise and frame the encounter (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b).20 Together, these “three forms of framing (of goods, agencies and 
encounters) are closely interrelated and shape the process of marketization in its generality” 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 16).  
When market encounters have been settled, the thing can be transformed and distributed, as 
a price can be calculated (4). That is, the “existence of a market implies that the valuations, 
and the calculations that produce them, come out in the form of prices” (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 16). Yet, “Fixing a price is always the outcome of a struggle between 
agencies trying to impose their modes for measuring a good’s value and qualities” (Stark, 
2009 in Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 16). Lastly, as a dynamic and ongoing framing process 
to perform valuations, (5) marketisation requires consistent work of maintenance and market 
design (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b).  
Overall, these fives processes denote how framing processes are integral to the potential 
translation of a network configuring around a potentially emerging good.  
Overflowing as the norm 
While framing processes are integral to marketisation, the process of “cleansing, of 
disconnection, in short, of framing, is never over” (Callon, 1998: 17). That is, there “are 
always relations which defy framings” (Callon, 1998: 17). When the framing is defied, the 
framing overflows (Callon, 1998: 17). Overflowing denotes unexpected side-effects, which 
in mainstream economics would be coined as positive or negative externalities (Callon, 
1998: 16-17). Such overflowing may destabilise the framing temporarily. When overflowing 
has been (temporarily) ‘internalised’, the overflowing is contained and the framing can be 
re-instored. Yet, contrary to mainstream economics in which ‘framing’ (i.e. assigning a 
more or less stable means of valuation) is the norm, ANT assumes that overflows are the 
norm (Callon, 1998: 23). Due to this impossibility of total framing (Callon, 1998: 18), 
translation processes and the final stabilisation of any network can never be assumed to be 
completed or stabilised. This implies that instead of assuming markets to be stabilised 
(black-boxed) unities, markets are treated as inherently unstable, as their framing is never 
                                                     
20
 Callon and Çalişkan (2010b) prefer the word mediator rather than the less dynamic term 
intermediary, “since the idea of mediation stresses the active participation in producing an 
outcome” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 14). 
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complete. In this way, the marketisation lens renders an account of markets as only 
temporarily stabilised, and as requiring ongoing maintenance, which in turn requires 
ongoing investments in framing attempts (Callon, 1998: 252). By assuming overflowing to 
be the norm, a lens for dynamics and agency of markets is conveyed, which does not assume 
that conventional framing devices (e.g. contracts) can irreversibilise the framing. That is, it 
is “illusory to suppose that one can internalize every externality by drawing up an all-
embracing contract that provides for every eventuality”, or even that property rights can 
prevent this overflowing of know-how and technology (Callon 1998, 255).  
 
This instability also implies that marketisation is not irreversible in economisation (Callon 
and Çalişkan, 2010b: 23). Instead, the emergence and stabilisation of a market (‘genesis’) is 
but a potentiality (Fraser, 2010; Stengers, 2005a; 2005b). Thus, instead of assuming the 
existence of markets, their progressive socio-material construction must be traced as a 
potentiality, and as a matter of becoming (Whitehead, 1978). At the same time, by tracing 
the event of the situational performation of markets, the performativity programme of the 
AoM is potentially “useful for elucidating the range of possible choices (in terms of 
calculative equipment, modalities of framing goods, socio-technical algorithms for market 
encounters, price-setting, etc.)” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). That is, the AoM opens up 
to the potentiality of multiple ways of assembling markets, or even other modes of 
organisation than through markets. Hereby,   
“despite emerging tendencies, the idea of a market is indeed sufficiently open that original significations 
and alternative forms of organization are still imaginable. Moreover, the movement towards markets is 
by no means irreversible; other forms of economization can always be envisaged” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 23). 
Accordingly, a marketisation analysis should trace the specific socio-material construction 
and the specific types of framing involved in a specific site of valuation.  
Lateral accounts on structures, power, and politics 
Another basic premise of a marketisation lens founded in ANT is that these networks are 
laterally constituted. Instead of offering a hierarchical or vertical account of structures and 
scales, e.g. dividing the economy or market into ‘global’/‘local’ or ‘macro’/‘micro’, a 
marketisation lens holds the landscape flat by dissolving structures and levels (Latour, 
2005a: 181, 183), and thus offering a lateral, flat perspective with vertical, horizontal and 
diagonal relations.  
This evidently has implications for the GIN-approach and economic geography in general, 
which tend to be construed around constructs of geographical ‘spaces’ and ‘scales’ (e.g., 
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micro-macro, local-global). According to Murdoch (1998), such conventional geographical 
spaces and scales are based on ‘Euclidian space’, i.e. on physical distance where co-
ordinates are relatively fixed (Law 1997a in Murdoch, 1998). Instead, the constructivist 
(ANT) lens opens up to a new kind of geographical analysis, which is not based on 
Euclidian space, but instead celebrates a geography of topologies (Murdoch, 1998: 357). In 
this lens, space depends on the quality and relative stability of the relations of the 
investigated network. According to Murdoch (1998), adopting such lens of a geography of 
topologies, the analysis may not only identify spaces of prescription, which follow Euclidian 
space with relatively fixed coordinates and relatively formal and standardised sets of 
heterogeneous actors. It may also find spaces constituted by “fluidity, flux and variation as 
unstable actors or coalitions of actors come together to negotiate their memberships and 
affiliations” (Murdoch, 1998: 270). These relational spaces produce relatively autonomous 
topological or rhizomatic spaces of negotiation (Murdoch, 1998: 370). According to 
Murdoch (1998), in a constructivist ANT lens, even stable (‘Euclidian’) networks, which are 
framed by formal modes of calculation (Murdoch, 1998: 363), renders a space for 
contestation and negotiation, depending on the way in which these networks have been 
constructed. Thereby, even in more stable networks actors can carve out for themselves a 
degree of autonomy from the network prescriptions (Murdoch, 1998: 363).  
This indicates a high degree of agency and a space for contestation and negotiation. 
However, how agency and power is mounted must be traced empirically instead of assuming 
certain actors to hold more agency and power than others, as in a conventional ‘hierarchical’ 
and structural sense. That is, ANT seeks to “describe how it [the agency] is mounted” 
(Muniesa, forthcoming: 5) as a particular relational effect. Adopting such non-foundational, 
processual, and relational approach to power, inspired by American pragmatism (cf. Garud 
and Gehman, 2012: 990), the AoM inquires into how structures, hierarchies, and potential 
asymmetries may come into being as an effect and outcome of specific activities in the 
construction of markets (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 393). At the same time, ANT sees the 
potentiality of power and politics everywhere, e.g. in the very process of framing. That is,  
“Power and politics become a part and parcel of this process as framing contests unfold. However, from 
a relational perspective power is not a hierarchical concept, but a figurational one based on 
associations” (Garud and Gehman, 2012: 990).  
This illustrates how framing processes due to their contested, negotiated nature can be 
constituted as ‘political’. This political nature of framings is linked to how framings 
disentangle and simplify, and thereby also produce contestable ‘black-boxes’, as they not 
only include, but also exclude certain qualities (Callon, 1986b: 28-34). In this way, framing 
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as processes of inclusion and exclusion produces relations of domination (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 12, 18). Accordingly, framing is fragile (Callon 1991: 140, 141). For 
instance, when a ‘translator-spokesperson’ attempts to impute him/her/itself as ‘translator-
spokesperson’ with ‘authorship’ on behalf of a collective, by imposing a specific framing, 
this is likely to be  “controversial, open to doubt or question” (Callon 1991: 140, 141). This 
is, e.g., the case during market construction, where ”a multiplicity and diversity of actors 
compete to participate in defining goods and valuing them” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 8). 
Framing and translation is thus marked by power struggles or so-called trials of strength 
(Callon, 1986a). 
How markets produce matters of concern 
The ubiquitous nature of politics and power struggles is thereby also inherently part of 
marketisation. This reflects how markets cannot easily be singularised into a purely social, 
political, scientific, or economic framing (Callon, 1998: 260). Rather, markets are 
everywhere (Callon 2009; 2010b), in politics, in science, and, of course, in the economy 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 10). Through a marketisation lens, marketisation is 
consequently co-constituting and co-constituted by processes of not only economisation, but 
also politicisation as well as scientification (Callon, 2007). Hereby, the marketisation lens 
adopted by the thesis seeks to “give up the idea of substantial definitions of the economy 
and politics that can serve to distinguish between that which is economic and that which is 
political” (Callon, 2007: 139).  
 
Such entangled processes of marketisation, economisation, politicisation, and scientification 
at the same time implies a propensity of markets to overflow. Indeed, markets may produce 
so-called matters of concern and engender issues and feelings in the “ongoing process of co-
construction of the economy and politics” (Callon, 2007: 139). That is, markets may  
”trigger the emergence of matters of concern to which they are not always able to provide satisfactory 
answers. These matters of concern then evolve into many (potentially) political issues whose solutions 
may, in turn, impact on the organization of economic activities” (Callon, 2007: 139).  
When markets produce matters of concern, which must be divided into issues, this goes 
through processes of problematisation, i.e. the production of solvable ‘problems’. As 
expressed by Callon (2009), 
“[l]et us call problematization this gradual process of fragmentation and division of issues that evolves 
into the joint formulation of a set of different problems which in a sense, at least partially, are a 
substitute for the initial issue” (Callon, 2009: 543). 
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Sometimes, however, issues are entangled. In those cases, they may constitute a non-
differentiated and ‘totipotent stem issue’ (Callon, 2009: 543), which have a polysemous and 
still disputable formatting, which makes the issue neither a “strictly (or primarily) political, 
economic or scientific issue” (Callon, 2009: 542). In case of problematisation of (stem) 
issues, the “transformation of an issue into well-identified problems – which can be 
addressed by planning specific actions – is never completely consensual nor total” (Callon, 
2009: 43). In certain cases, markets are more likely than at other times to produce stem 
issues and to overflow. In particular, when there is no stabilised knowledge base (Callon, 
1998: 260) or consensus, markets can produce a so-called hot situation (Callon, 1998: 260) 
”where everything becomes controversial: the identification of intermediaries and overflows, the 
distribution of source and target agents, the way effects are measured” (Callon, 1998: 260).  
Such confused hot situations produced by markets have also been coined ”hybrid forums 
because facts and values have become entangled” (Callon, 1998: 260). For instance, when 
qualities of a potential good have not been pacified and knowledge on and tools used to 
qualify it lacks or are contested, a hot situation with myriads of different actors involved 
may evolve, constituting a hybrid forum. 
Key Analytical Constructs of a Marketisation Lens 
Having presented the key premises of the marketisation lens of the thesis, the last section of 
the chapter presents a couple of key analytical constructs adopted in the thesis. While the 
ANT literature has inquired into the ongoing translation of actor-networks (e.g. Callon, 
1986a; 1986b; Callon, 1991) for the study of translation- and framing processes, other key 
constructs have been coined over time for the study of networks around the translation of 
technologies and/or markets, namely techno-economic networks (TENs) and socio-technical 
agencements (STAs).  
Techno-Economic Networks (TENs) – and socio-technical agencements (STA) 
A key construct for the study of networks constituted around technologies and technological 
innovation is the notion of Techno-Economic Networks (TENs) (Callon, 1991; Callon, 
2007). TENs are organised around three distinct poles: the market pole, the technical pole, 
and the scientific pole (Callon, 1991: 134). These poles perform specific tasks of a 
potentially emerging TEN. That is, the market pole “refers to users or consumers who more 
or less explicitly generate, express or seek to satisfy demands or needs” (Callon, 1991: 134), 
whereas the scientific pole is “where scientific research is practiced: for instance, in 
independent research centres, universities and relatively basic laboratories” (Callon, 1991: 
133). Lastly, the technical pole “conceives of, develops and/or transforms artefacts. Its 
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products include models, pilot projects, prototypes, tests and trials, patents, norms, and 
technical rules, and it is found in industrial technical laboratories, research associations, and 
pilot plants” (Callon, 1991: 134). Lately, in order to describe today’s proliferation of 
‘networks of innovation’ or “innovation networks” (Callon, 2007: 150), Callon (2007) has 
suggested to look at “markets as TEN[s]” (Callon, 2007: 150). This marks an extension of 
the original notion of TEN (Callon, 1991), as it is related to an emergent modality of market 
organisation, which is conventionally termed ‘knowledge economies’, ‘knowledge 
societies’, and/or ‘(distributed) innovation regimes’ (Callon, 2007: 147). According to 
Callon, markets as TENs are constituted by simultaneous and conflicting forces of 
collective, interactive organisations (‘trans-organisational collectives’) and individualism 
(e.g. individual entrepreneurs) (Callon, 2007: 150-151). Engaged in distributed actions and 
individual agencies, such ‘markets as TEN’ constitute somewhat paradoxical dynamics of 
both collaboration and competition. That is, the “innovative logics” of such emergent 
innovation networks (‘markets as TEN’) imply a new form of economic competition “made 
of strategic interactive agents” (Callon, 2007: 147).  
Instead of adopting the notion of TEN to the study of markets, the emergent performativity 
programme within the AoM has instead proposed the notion of Socio-Technical 
Agencements (STAs) (Callon, 2007; Callon and Çalişkan, 2009; 2010a; 2010b), however. 
Looking at market(isation) as “arrangement” or “agencement” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 22), and as “hybrid collectives” (Callon and Law, 1995 in Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 9), the notion of STA denotes an 
“arrangement or assemblage (and power field) of heterogeneous elements which include, in particular: 
rules and conventions; technical devices; metrological systems; logistical infrastructures; texts, 
discourses and narratives […]; technical and scientific knowledge […]; and competencies and skills 
embodied in living beings” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 23).  
The thesis combines insights of the TEN and STA concepts21. Inherently, the thesis ascribes 
to the inclusion of narratives and discourses as well as to the emphasis on agency, which are 
integral to the STA construct. That is, agency lies inherently in the notion and in the verbal 
connotations of an agencement. Indeed, “The definition of markets as socio-technical 
arrangements or agencements (STA) raises the question of their design, implementation, 
management, extension and maintenance – in short, of their dynamics” (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 19).  
                                                     
21
 For the specific type of STA in marketisation, Callon and Çalişkan (2010b) have proposed the 
specific notion of market socio-technical agencements (mSTAs) (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 
22). 
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However, while the inquiry subscribes to the overall AoM-perspective (and thus principles 
of the STA construct) of Callon and Çalişkan (2009; 2010; 2010b), the conceptual construct 
of ‘TEN’ is nevertheless adopted in the inquiry of the thesis, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
different poles of the TEN construct are pragmatically deemed helpful in the 
operationalisation of a marketisation analysis of wind power. As marketisation takes place in 
all poles of the TEN, requiring ongoing work of qualification/framing and translation, the 
TEN construct can hopefully help open the ‘black-box’ of the market, as well as of the 
‘GIN’, as these are treated as co-constituting each other in processes of qualification. 
Secondly, the recent extension of the TEN construct to denote ‘networks of innovation’ 
(Callon, 2007), i.e. conceiving ‘markets as TEN’, makes it appropriate for the inquiry into 
potential GIN-construction that is part and parcel of the requalification taking place in 
Chinese wind power, and as constituting paradoxical dynamics of both collaboration and 
competition, representing coexisting collective and individual agencies.  
Moving away from GINs – towards marketisation 
Summing up on the above, while conventional studies on China’s wind turbine industry and 
wind power market tend to coin it a ‘market’ for wind power, the thesis claims that the 
current ‘quality crisis’ facing Chinese wind power, vividly illustrates how the valuation of 
wind has still not transformed wind into a circulating good with a consensus-based 
‘pacified’ value or worth. In this way, wind seems to have defied its own marketisation. 
That is, the Chinese wind power market overflows – e.g. due to wind turbines being 
disconnected from the grid, under-performing wind turbines, and component technologies – 
and can thus not be treated as a stabilised unity. Seeking to open up the black-box of China’s 
wind power market, the thesis traces the practice of attributing value to wind by looking into 
the progressive socio-material marketisation of wind power in China as a matter of 
qualification/framing. Such qualification may i.a. take place through attempts at technical 
improvements of the wind turbine’s different (overflowing) component technologies. In 
turn, such technical improvements may take place through collaborative (innovation) 
networks around specific core components (‘markets as TEN’).  
To map and trace the potential qualification of wind power, the thesis proposes to follow 
networks around specific core technologies of the wind turbine. In this way, the thesis 
‘disassembles’ the wind turbine, illustrating how it is not just a unified, single entity, but 
potentially many ‘leaking’ and overflowing entities, which need to be ‘reassembled’, 
pacified, and qualified through processes of framing, in order to succeed in the marketisation 
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of wind power. The thesis engages in such work of tracing valuation processes in China’s 
struggle to re-qualify wind power through the adoption of the TEN-construct. Tracing the 
entangled translation and framing processes of the wind power market (as TEN) in China, 
the market is treated as a matter of potentiality, and as a particular event (Fraser, 2010; 
Stengers, 2005a; Whitehead, 1978). This marks a radically different route of the 
constructivist perspective held by the thesis than that pursued by the positivistic GIN-
literature. That is, in the constructivist perspective proposed by the thesis to trace the 
genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs, GINs are not ‘out there’, i.e., they are not 
(structural) ‘Matters of Fact’, but rather negotiated and controversial processes producing 
‘Matters of Concern’ in marketisation.  
Further, by tracing marketisation of wind power as a matter of qualification, and by zooming 
in on networks (TENs) around specific core components, it should be noted that the thesis 
treats GINs methodologically in a radically different way that the GIN literature. That is, 
while the GIN literature has already claimed GINs to exist in the Chinese wind turbine 
industry in its entirety (Silva and Klagge, 2013), the thesis instead looks at GIN genesis as a 
potentiality, and as processes of GIN-ing around a specific core component (software) 
within the wind turbine industry. By doing so, the thesis hopes to ‘unpack’ the GIN 
construct by tracing how they are pontentially assembled through processes of qualification, 
being part and parcel of marketisation.  
Taking a radically different route than the one marked by the positivistic GIN literature, the 
thesis however has to leave aside the metaphor of GINs in the analysis (Part III) to explore 
its potential progressive construction in the marketisation of wind power in China. Thus, the 
thesis somewhat paradoxically ‘looks away from’ the GIN, in order to shed light on its 
genesis, dynamics, and agency. Yet, the thesis revisits the GIN construct in Part IV where 
the potential contributions of a constructivist perspective to the GIN literature are elaborated 
on. In the hope that the constructivist perspective can render insight into the ‘first act’ of 
GIN-genesis, dynamics, and agency, as well as the potentially transformational and 
disruptive dynamics and agencies of GINs in the qualification of Chinese wind power, the 
thesis thus seeks to open the black-box of GINs and markets by de- and reassembling them. 
In the following Chapter 4, the thesis outlines the methodological implications of adopting a 
marketisation lens. 
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Chapter 4. Methodological Strategies of Analysis 
“Only at the end of the trip does it make sense to credit the traveler with the courage and rationality 
necessary for its completion” (On the ‘Serresean sea-journey’, in Jensen, 2010: 12) 
 
Having outlined the basic theoretical premises and constructs of the proposed marketisation 
lens, and having in the previous chapter outlined how the thesis pursues another route than 
that laid out by the traditional notion of GINs, Chapter 4 outlines what the implications are 
for the methodological strategies of analysis, when ascribing to a constructivist perspective. 
This is done by presenting what the thesis dubs a basic methodological ‘tool set’, which 
constitutes a synthesis of strategies of analysis of ANT, the AoM, and of the so-called 
‘Mapping Controversies’ approach within STS, in order to inquire into marketisation within 
Chinese wind power. Upon a presentation of the basic tool set, this leads to an account of the 
implications for (1) data collection, (2) data processing, and for the (3) narrative 
(re)presentation and structure of the thesis. Together, Chapters 3 and 4 set the background 
for developing a situational ‘model’ for studying marketisation in Chinese wind power, 
which is presented in Chapter 5.  
Basic ‘methodological tool set’ of a constructivist perspective 
First, the chapter outlines methodological implications of adopting a constructivist 
perspective on market construction. 
Follow the actor – and map the controversy! 
A constructivist perspective implies that the researcher should strive to stay as open as 
possible in regard to detecting which actors and entities are relevant for the analysis. This is 
based on the methodological premise of ANT that the researcher should always strive to 
‘follow the actor’, as they emerge one by one in the mapping of an actor network (Latour, 
2005a), a TEN, or any other kind of network. For instance, in marketisation, and in 
marketising agencies, a host of different actors are likely involved, i.a. state services, firms, 
consumers, NGOs, economists, think-tanks, the international monetary or financial 
institutions, experts, and regulatory or standardiation agencies (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 
8). Hereby, instead of exercising censorship (Callon, 1991: 144) in a marketisation account,  
“[T]here is no standard list. Part of the analysis would involve drawing up an inventory for each and 
every case” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 8).  
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In addition, due to the potentially shifting ontology of agents, the constructivist perspective 
does not preach any “epistemological imperative, since it is entirely dictated by the 
[shifting] state of the network” (Callon, 1991: 152). In turn, attention to the shifting 
ontology of agents and the networks they constitute makes chronological history and 
description a necessary part of the analysis (Callon 1991: 152, 154). That is, the researcher 
should ”[j]ust follow and describe, describe and draw, draw and map!” (Yaneva, 2012: 45). 
Interested in tracing the socio-material performance and ‘becoming’ of things, the 
constructivist ANT lens moves from epistemology to enactment (Jensen, 2010: 2-3). That is, 
based in an ecology of practice (as outlined in the Chapter 3), the constructivist perspective 
requires an empiricist lens, as it seeks to capture the specificity of actions and processes. 
This implies that  
“the only faithful – indeed intelligible – method is that of literary description. Such description multiplies 
points of view to form a polyphonic narrative distributed over as many voices as there are actors, and 
recovers all relevant details” (Callon, 1991: 152).  
In this way, ’a good ANT-account’ is one “where a network is being traced”, “letting ‘the 
social’ become visible” (Latour, 2005a: 128). That is, “[i]f the social is a trace, then it can be 
retraced; if it’s an assembly then it can be reassembled” (Latour, 2005a: 128). Interested in 
the potential requalification of Chinese wind power, the unit of analysis of the thesis 
becomes the practice of framing/qualification, i.e. of producing associations, which is 
necessary for relations to be constructed and for the (potential) wind power market to be 
performed. As a qualification struggle, the thesis inquires into the marketisation of wind 
power in China by ‘following the (transformation of the) wind’. Tracing framing processes, 
the thesis inquires into the pacification of the potentially emerging good of wind power, 
following calculative tools such as IPRs and standards, as well as inquiring into price-setting 
processes by following money and price and cost calculations. Along the way, the thesis 
further follows software algorithms, as they ascribe associations of ‘developmental worth’ to 
wind power. 
Mapping Controversies – on mapping spaces of hybridity and transformational agency 
Concerned with the unfolding quality crisis in China’s wind power market and a current 
potential requalification, in which collaborative relations on core technologies are likely to 
play a critical role, the thesis adopts principles of the methodology of ‘Mapping 
Controversies’, which is also placed within ANT and STS studies (Yaneva, 2012; Venturini, 
2009). That is, collaborative networks in the ongoing qualification struggle are likely to 
produce conflict and power struggles. Drawing on among others Latour (2005), the Mapping 
Controversies approach was at the outset developed for visually mapping Web-based 
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controversies (Yaneva, 2012: 81). Yet, the thesis proposes that the Mapping Controversies 
approach can be a useful inspirational source for the mapping of controversies of market 
construction (and their inherent qualification), even when not being traced on the Internet, 
but instead amongst actors in the ‘field’.  
According to controversy studies, the analysis must “follow the processes and the 
associations of all the actors involved” by mapping the controversy ensuing (Yaneva, 2012: 
2) around an ‘event’. Taking the ‘event’ to be market qualification and construction in 
China, (being co-performed by the construction of ‘GINs’), the analysis thus seeks to map 
actors and “how they agree and disagree, how they shape alliances, how they scale and 
rescale the spaces where they move and create spatial disjunctions” (Yaneva, 2012: 81). 
Mapping the controversy as it unfolded (Yaneva, 2012: 3) involves the inclusion of 
heterogeneous actors (Venturini, 2009: 4; Yaneva, 2012), and will often have to mobilise 
both humanities and technologies (Yaneva, 2012: 3). That is, 
“In controversy studies, the analysis should not constrain the observation to any single theory or 
methodology; the phenomenon should be observed from as many viewpoints as possible and the actors’ 
voices listened to more than the researcher’s own assumptions” (Venturini, 2009: 4).  
Interested in aspects of genesis, dynamics, and agency, the Mapping Controversies approach 
is proposed to be useful as it offers a tool “to observe the social world and its making” 
(Venturini, 2009: 6, emphasis added). That is, when mapping controversies, where no 
consensus or agreement has been reached (Venturini, 2009: 4), the ‘social’ and the unstable 
state of the ‘social’ and the ‘technical’ can be displayed in its most dynamic form (Yaneva, 
2012: 3; Venturini, 2009: 4). Controversy mapping helps inquire into the stage where things 
are both solid and liquid and where transformation remains a potentiality. Such a hybrid 
state is with a metaphorical analogy likened to the ‘magma’ of a volcano: 
“Controversies are complex because they are the crucible where collective life is melted and forged: 
they are the social at its magmatic state. As the rock in magma, the social in controversies is both liquid 
and solid at the same time. But there’s more to this metaphor: in magma solid and liquid states exist in a 
ceaseless mutual transformation; while, at the margins of the flow, the lava cools down and crystallizes, 
some other solid rock touched by the heat of the flow melts and becomes part of the stream. The same 
fluctuation between different states of solidity can be observed in controversies. Through this dynamic 
the social is unremittingly constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed. This is the social in action and 
that’s why we have no other choice than diving in magma” (Venturini, 2009: 7). 
While the thesis is not as such focused on inquiring into the constitution of ’the social’ as 
reflected in the above quote but into marketisation, the entangled nature of marketisation, 
economisation, politicisation, and scientification may also render a glimpse of the socio-
material construction of ’the social’. Indeed, the thesis seeks to ’dive into the magma’ of 
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marketisation, looking into the hybrid stage where things have not completely stabilised, but 
at the same time have not completely disintegrated either. In this hybrid space, there is room 
for transformational agency. 
The promiscuous reduction-resistant approach of ’diving in magma’ 
Bringing the Mapping Controversies approach into the field of marketisation, requires the 
marketisation analysis to engage in a so-called ’cartography of controversies’ (Venturini, 
2009). At the same time, aligning with basic premises of ANT, the Mapping Controversies 
approach requires the study to be ‘reduction-resistant’ (Venturini, 2009: 5), i.e. not falling 
into categorisations, simplifications, dualisms, or generalisations. This is founded in the 
dictum of ANT to pursue a so-called ‘modest sociology’ (Law, 1994). Such modest 
sociology implies 
”slow method, or vulnerable method, or quiet method. Multiple method. Modest method. Uncertain 
method. Diverse method” (Law, 2004: 11).  
Through this lens, no event, no gathering, and no practice (e.g. marketisation) can be defined 
as any other. Instead, the ‘practice of green marketisation’ in China should be traced as it 
unfolds:  
”[N]o practice can be defined as any other, just as no living species is like any other. Approaching a 
practice then means approaching it as it diverges, that is, feeling its borders, experimenting with the 
questions which practioners may accept as relevant, even if they are not their own questions” (Stengers, 
2005a: 184). 
In this way, social ”cartographers have no choice but to dive into the technoscientific 
details” (Venturini, 2009: 8), and engaging in “theoretical and methodological promiscuity” 
(Venturini, 2009: 3). This implies 
“a multifarious inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, 
sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its 
existence” (Latour, 2004: 246).  
In the case of marketisation, processes of framing, so integral to valuation and price-setting, 
must be approached ethnographically (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 16). With an interest in 
valuation processes in specific sites, the analysis should also explore “alternative 
possibilities of markets”, which e.g. requires awareness of the social sciences, economics, 
and material technologies (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 23). Aligning with such a ”taste for 
a hybrid disciplinary positioning” characteristic of the marketisation lens, which encourages 
“a certain freedom of intellectual experimentation (with no imposed canon)” (Muniesa, 
forthcoming: 3), the researcher – or ‘social cartographer’ – is suggested to venture into an 
“investigation far beyond the limits of sociology and not only towards the neighboring 
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human sciences” (Venturini, 2009: 8). Indeed, since this often involves paying “painstaking 
attention to technicalities” (Venturini, 2009: 8), the thesis lies at the borderline of e.g. China 
studies, but also international business, natural science, political economy, aerodynamics, 
economic geography, software engineering, the IPR literature, the standardisation literature, 
mechanical and electrical engineering, and mathematics, in addition to being positioned 
within New Economic Sociology and founded in the GIN and marketisation lenses. 
Strenuous ethnography – roots in anthropological method 
Engaging in the ‘modest sociology’ (Law, 1994) of STS and its ANT stream, by adopting a 
marketisation lens and a Mapping Controversies approach, the thesis engages in the 
‘painstaking ethnography’ of ‘slowing down inquiry into controversy’ (Yaneva, 2012: 3). 
Thus, inquiring into how ”realities are practically and materially constructed by a 
multiplicity of things”, STS researchers are ”[e]ncountering ethnographic situations (Gad et 
al., 2014: 11). In this way, the AoM and ANT, the latter representing an ‘anthropology of 
modern reason’ (Muniesa, forthcoming: 5), have their roots in anthropological method and 
in an often multisited ethnography in which the investigator studies several, or, even diverse, 
settings (Stark, 2009: 198). Accordingly, the thesis engages in an anthropological inquiry 
into marketisation through multisited ethnography. This reflects a general trend within 
anthropology, in which in-depth ’mapping’ through ethnographic fieldwork has gradually 
moved towards ”more complex objects of study” (Marcus, 1995: 95, 96) such as the 
’anthropology of globalisation’ (Marcus, 2005: 1). Thus, anthropologists – and STS scholars 
– have moved from the conventional single-site location to ”multiple sites of observation 
and participation that criss-cut dichotomies such as the local and the global, the lifeworld 
and  the system (Marcus, 1995: 95), i.e. to ’multi-sited research’ (Marcus, 1995: 72).  
Research processes of controversy mapping in Chinese wind power 
Having outlined some of the theoretical and methodological premises of the thesis, and 
having developed a ‘tool set’ provided by the marketisation lens in combination with the 
Mapping Controversies approach, the following sections outline how these principles, 
premises, and assumptions have shaped the research process, as the researcher engaged in 
the ethnographic inquiry into marketisation in Chinese wind power. This “adventurous 
[research] journey” has been marked by both “curiosity and jouissance” (Serres and 
Whitehead in Jensen, 2010: 12), but also by iterative stages and ‘levels of confusion’ when 
encountering the ”relative messiness of practice” of ethnographers (Law, 2004: 18), as well 
as the “experimental quality” of the anthropological method (Marcus, 1995: 77). In the 
following, the chapter dives into the messiness of three iterative and inter-connected 
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processes of ethnographic research conducted for the thesis, namely (1) data collection, (2) 
data processing, and (3) narrative (re)presentation. These interconnected processes have 
been marked by iteratively changing strategies of e.g. improvisation (Weick, 2003), gut-
feeling, and experimentation. In the following, the progressive inquiry into ‘what is this a 
case of’, as the researcher ventured into an explorative inquiry about inquiry (Dewey, 
1933[1998] in Stark, 2009: 2; Stark, 2009: 204), is outlined. This illustrates how the idea 
about what to be ‘followed’ only gradually emerged, as the research(er) set out without a 
clear idea about what was to be found, reflecting the principle of no ‘censorship’, yet, still in 
the hope that something new and unexpected could be discovered (Barley, 2006: 19). 
Nevertheless, guiding the interest from the outset was the project’s formal positioning within 
a larger research project on GINs, set into the context of Chinese wind power.  
Identifying actors to follow – on data collection 
First, the chapter looks into iterative processes of data collection (in a symbiotic relationship 
with data processing and (re)presentation), illustrating processes of narrowing down the 
inquiry and identifying actors to follow. Following the premise of ethnographic ‘controversy 
mapping’ in China’s green marketisation, the thesis is based primarily on qualitative, 
primary data, collected during fieldwork in China (as well as in Denmark and Germany) in 
the period from the autumn of 2011 until the autumn of 201322. In total, two shorter and 
three longer field trips have been conducted in this period, resulting in seven months of 
fieldwork in China and a total of 95 interviews.  
Initial phase (autumn 2011 – autumn 2012): Background information and the emergence 
of component technologies 
The first field trip went to Beijing for ten days in the autumn of 2011, just a couple of weeks 
into the project. The field trip was conducted with a research group23 from the Sino-Danish 
University Centre for Research and Education (SDC). Without much time for preparation, 
the researcher was consequently ‘thrown’ into the field at a relatively early stage.  
 
The field trip resulted in valuable introductory interviews with some of the major Chinese 
and Western WTMs in China, as well as with some of the most important Chinese research 
                                                     
22
 One interview has been used in the thesis as well, although conducted in 2010 for the author’s 
Master thesis project, as it relates to China’s process of ’greening’ within renewable energies, 
including wind power. 
23
 With researchers from Copenhagen Business School, the Technical University of 
Denmark/Risø, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences of Technology for Development 
(CASTED). 
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institutions in the field. As the research group consisted of both Chinese and foreign 
researchers (and Chinese and foreign government officials), some within wind power 
engineering, a number of the interviews took on a relatively ‘technical’ character. In this 
way, without any prior insight into wind turbines, which had indeed been ‘black boxed’ by 
the researcher at the outset, the interviews started opening the black box slightly. That is, the 
wind turbine as a ‘whole’ already early in the research process started to ‘disintegrate’ and 
‘leak’, as the thousands of wind turbine components started to emerge as more or less 
important entities for the wind turbine to ‘perform’. In particular, a very preliminary 
understanding, of how specific components such as control system technologies and 
simulation tools were being constituted as more ‘core’ to the wind turbine and its ‘quality’ 
and ‘performance’ than others, was gained. In addition, during this first field-trip the ‘story’ 
already figuring in the mind of the researcher had to be re-drafted. While the research 
project had set out with an intent to illustrate and inquire into the ‘hows’ of what seemed an 
unprecedented ‘success story’ of rapid ‘green’ market construction, and the seemingly 
successful construction of GINs, it became clear that something new and unexpected was 
taking place in the field. That is, most of the interviews drew attention to an emerging and 
ongoing consolidation phase and ‘quality crisis’ in Chinese wind power. Consequently, 
attention was drawn towards the potential need to re-draft the initial ‘plot’ of the story to be 
told in the thesis.  
The initial insight into the role of different components for the performance of a wind 
turbine was further strengthened through a visit to the Technical University of Denmark 
(DTU, Risø), where one of the members of the SDC research working group was employed. 
This involved – apart from literally climbing into a wind turbine’s drive train – further 
insights into the complex dynamics of generating electricity from the kinetic forces of the 
wind. Here, the turbine’s drive train (containing many of the wind turbine’s ‘core 
components’) and the control system were emphasised as particularly ‘critical’ to wind 
turbine performance. Later, further insights into the many technicalities of a wind turbine 
and the role of e.g. simulation tools for wind turbine design were gained through interviews 
with a wind turbine design company. Apart from the emerging understanding of some of the 
critical component technologies, it was also becoming clear that both the Chinese and 
foreigners considered Chinese actors as ‘laggards’ in regard to these specific core 
technologies, and that this laggard position plays a critical role in the seemingly emergent 
‘quality crisis’ in Chinese wind power.  Lastly, during the spring of 2012, additional 
background interviews were conducted in collaboration with the SDC working group in 
Denmark (and Germany) (some conducted at industrial conferences held in Denmark 
(EWEA, Copenhagen April 2012) and Germany (Husum Wind, September 2012) with 
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Chinese and Danish/German companies present in Denmark, as well as with Danish industry 
associations and ministries related to wind power and to science, research, and innovation. 
Eventually, a last week-long joint field trip to China with the SDC working group was 
undertaken, with interviews conducted in the Shanghai and Chengdu areas. During this field 
trip, further insight into Chinese and foreign component suppliers was gained, not only 
within the field of wind power, but also within other renewable energy industries. These 
interviews have served as background information, enabling an ongoing comparison 
between wind power and other (related) industries, e.g. to cross-check whether or not the 
information on the wind power industry can be considered as ‘unique’ to the industry, or 
whether there were more general trends of market construction across industries.  
 
While the data already collected pointed towards a consolidation phase upon unprecedented 
growth rates, and a potential shift in attention from quantity to quality, as well as to the 
critical role of specific component technologies and collaborations, work on a 
comprehensive literature review of the GIN-literature, which was part of the overall research 
design form the outset, was conducted. The literature review helped narrow down the focus 
to an interest into the hows of GIN-genesis, -dynamics, and –agency, and linking it to the 
construction of a wind power market, which seemed to have stumbled upon a quality crisis. 
Yet, the consolidation and quality crisis only gradually entered the research as the researcher 
got more acquainted with the field. Further, while the interest in the potential role of ‘GINs’ 
had been part of the research from the outset, the interest in specific core technologies for 
these also only emerged gradually during field-work. Identifiying a ‘gap’ in the existing 
GIN literature in regard to issues of genesis, dynamics, and agency, as well as the potential 
role of both human and non-human actors (e.g. technologies and algorithms), the focus of 
the thesis moved towards the idea of following (GINs around) one or several critical 
component technologies. However, not acquainted with mechanical or electrical engineering 
or any of the like, the researcher still found the workings of the wind turbine ‘black boxed’, 
that is, impossible to grasp and disentangle, and thus selecting which component to follow 
was still unsettled.  
Further into the field (autumn 2012 (– spring 2013)): The emergence of algorithms 
Based on the initial insights already gained during the first year of research, the first longer 
(three months long) and individual field trip to China (Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and 
Ningbo) was conducted in the autumn of 2012. The two first shorter field trips had provided 
preliminary insights into the field, but still remained largely at the level of MNC strategies 
of supply and value chain governance, and of formal international collaborations. Thus, they 
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lacked in-depth inquiry, e.g. into how collaborative relations had been established, as well as 
into the dynamics (and potential controversies) of such collaborations and the potential role 
of core technologies on network dynamics. Indeed, one of the major insights gained during 
the first year of research had been the acknowledgement that tracing genesis, dynamics, and 
agency of ‘GINs’ within wind power, without selecting specific technologies to follow, 
would be impossible not only due to the ‘leaking’ black box of the wind turbine, but also 
due to pragmatic and practical reasons related to the vast size of China and the large number 
of potentially relevant actors and components to trace.  
 
Based on the initial insights already gained (i.a. from engineering experts within wind power 
in Denmark and China, lead firms and component suppliers, as well as secondary sources 
such as industry reports and Chinese policies on industry development), it was decided that 
tracing network configurations around components, which were being constituted as 
‘critical’ or ‘core’ to the performance of a wind turbine, would be interesting in terms of 
mapping controversies and upgrading potential. This was based on the rationale that 
development of Chinese capabilities within such ‘core components’, e.g. through 
international R&D collaborations, Chinese actors would not only be critical to the 
qualification of wind power as (e.g. technically and economically) sustainable, during what 
seemed an ongoing ‘quality crisis’, but would potentially also produce power struggles, as 
core technologies are often well-protected by owners and developers, and as rising 
capabilities would likely lead to power struggles as Chinese actors seek new roles and 
positions.  
 
As many of the earlier interviews as well as industry reports had pointed towards the 
electrical main control as ‘critical’ to the inter-play of the turbine’s many components, 
interviews during the third field trip focused on control system technologies. Accordingly, a 
variety of interviews were conducted with foreign control system suppliers in China, in 
addition to a number of in-depth interviews with a Chinese WTM, which provided insights 
into Chinese ‘upgrading’ strategies, i.a. through the establishment of various R&D-
collaborations and international R&D-facilities abroad, and an overall strategic emphasis on 
quality through building capabilities in software. In this way, a mapping was beginning of 
supply-customer relations configuring around control system technologies, in particular with 
focus on software. That is, during the fieldwork, it was gradually becoming clear that what 
was being constituted as ‘core’ was the software parts of the main control, and in particular 
the core algorithms that they contain. Construed as ‘critical’ to both wind turbine 
performance and to upgrading Chinese capabilities, as well as for framing wind power with 
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qualities of sustainability, an actor to be followed had begun to crystallise, namely software 
algorithms, around which controversies could be mapped. This process of inquiry reflects 
how “[s]urprise and curiosity should inspire their [the researcher’s] notions and protocols 
more than the other way around” (Venturini, 2009: 2). Indeed, it had never been expected at 
the outset that software algorithms would become central actors in the account, and the 
researcher was thus attempting “to remain as open as possible” (Venturini, 2009: 2), 
 
As the Mapping Controversies approach “refuses any handrail and recommends swimming” 
(Venturini, 2009: 6), the innumerable possible traces and potential actors to follow rendered 
the data collection process in China extremely hectic and somewhat chaotic. This is not the 
least due to the inevitable “illimitability of a certain kind”” (Strathern, 1999: 240 in Jensen, 
2007: 844) of ethnographic field-work, as “there are always more people to talk to, more 
situations to participate in – and how do you choose the right ones?” (Jensen, 2007: 844). 
The complexity of the data collection was also exacerbated by the lack of contacts at the 
outset. While some contacts had been established to certain actors during the first two field 
trips, the field trip in the autumn of 2012 was marked by the establishment ‘from scratch’ of 
an overwhelming number of contacts to be established. However, with a background in 
China studies and earlier employment at the Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing, some contact 
information could be gained through initial pilot interviews with diplomats. Apart from this, 
a critical source of data collection was participation in scholarly and industrial conferences, 
e.g. at the annual China Wind Power Conference, 2012 (Beijing). Whereas some initial 
interviews were not groundbreaking, they were, however, “good enough to generate a 
number of new ideas for topics and get suggestions for new contact persons” (Jensen, 2007: 
844). The snowballing (Saunders et al., 2003: 171-172, 176) strategy, with a consistently 
expanding spreadsheet of contacts, resulted in in-depth insight into different customer-
supplier networks emerging around Danish and German control system suppliers and their 
Chinese customers (WTMs), as well as controversies configuring around algorithms, in 
particular in relation to issues of Intellectual Property (Rights) (IPRs). 
 
Data processing and validating the data – digging deeper into the field (spring 2013 – 
autumn 2013): Initial controversy mapping 
After the first longer field trip to China in 2012, an intensive phase of data processing was 
undertaken during April 2013. Transcribed interviews were cut to pieces, constituting 
myriads of individual documents with interview quotes under headings according to type of 
actor, themes, and sub-themes, which could potentially be put together to constitute 
discourses, narratives, and/or controversies. Based on this, an initial rough outline of a 
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structure for the analysis was taking shape. In this emerging story line of the analysis, it 
became clear that controversies over IPRs and standardisation were configuring around core 
algorithms. In addition, a controversy was indicated around the issue of money (lacking 
liquidity) and trust, in what seemed a rhizomatic Chinese ‘spider web’ of state-owned actors 
in China’s power sector. Lastly, a controversy was surfacing in regard to the definition of 
sustainability, in what was emerging as a potentially particular Chinese mode of ‘green 
experimental marketisation’. To inquire further into whether these story lines could be 
confirmed by different technical experts, follow-up interviews were conducted in Denmark 
with control system suppliers, design houses, as well as with researchers at the Technical 
University of Denmark/Risø in order to gain a further understanding of some of the more 
technical aspects of the algorithms and different component technologies, which 
increasingly seemed critical to the configuration of the emerging controversies. These 
interviews confirmed the findings, while also fine-tuning the understanding of some of the 
more technical aspects. For example, it became clear that what was constituted as 
particularly ‘core’ to the optimisation of wind turbine performance was a variety of software 
programmes. Through these interviews, further insight was gained in regard to how not only 
control system software plays a vital role for wind turbine performance, but also how 
simulation tools and their aero-elastic codes as well as forecasting tools play a critical role 
for international standardisation and grid connection respectively. With this in mind, the 
next longer, field-trip was conducted in China (to Beijing and Shanghai) from late April to 
mid-July 2013. During this field-trip, concurrent processes were undertaken, namely data 
collection as well as data processing and data presentation. As it had become clear that it 
was necessary to inquire further into the wider network of the power sector, in order to 
understand the controversy dynamics of the traced networks within wind power and 
software, the focus of interviews was expanded from customer-supplier-(university) 
relations around software to interviews with i.a. grid companies, think tanks, ministries, test 
laboratories, and certification bodies. At the same time, a first rough draft of the analysis 
was written, with controversies over IPR and standardisation centred around core 
algorithms, set into a ‘developmental’ context of experimental industrial policy in a state 
controlled power sector.  
 
Lastly, upon further data processing in Denmark, the last field trip to China (to Beijing, 
Chengdu, Chongqing, and Zhangbei) was conducted in August-September 2013, with the 
aim of following up on some of the ‘loose ends’ in the account, in particular getting deeper 
into the Chinese perspective on the supplier-customer-(university) collaborations on control 
systems, expanding focus to the grid system and wider power sector, as well as getting more 
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insight into the function of so-called Chinese ‘agents’. While this field trip did not provide 
drastic changes to the overall story line that had already emerged, it functioned as a way of 
strengthening and fine-tuning the data and the account, as the findings could be cross-
checked with different actors. Overall, neither purely structured nor purely unstructured, the 
continuous explorative searching and exploration during “’yo-yo fieldwork’” (Wulff 2002 in 
Garsten, 2010: 63) in China has thus been characterised by a movement ”back and forth 
between home and the multi-sited field” (Garsten 2010: 63).  
Outline of Collected Data 
The five field trips undertaken in China (as well as others in Denmark and Germany) from 
the autumn of 2011 to the autumn of 2013 have resulted in 95 interviews, 22 of which have 
been conducted in Denmark (in Copenhagen, Roskilde, Odense, Ikast, and Silkeborg), one 
in Germany (in Husum), while the rest have been conducted in China, three of those over 
Skype. Interviews have been conducted with a host of different types of organisations, in 
particular Chinese and Danish/German/U.S. WTMs, as well as with Chinese, Danish, and 
Austrian component suppliers within wind power (and other related fields). In addition, 
interviews have been conducted with Danish and Chinese universities and research 
institutes, interest organisations and industry associations, with government officials and 
diplomats from different ministry departments and agencies, with China State Grid (i.e., 
different research institutions within Chinese State Grid Corporation), design/consulting 
companies, think tanks, certification bodies, test laboratories, and finance institutions.  
When allowed to be recorded, these interviews have been transcribed verbatim, resulting in 
a 859 page long single-spaced interview transcription. To render a voice for everyone on an 
equal basis, interviews have been conducted in English, Danish, and Chinese (Mandarin), on 
the preference of the interviewee. Speaking Chinese has been an opportunity for the 
researcher to get access to Chinese respondents who were not in command of English. Yet, 
it should be said that there is always something ‘lost in translation’, when conducting an 
interview in a foreign language. In addition, there exist certain language codes in Chinese 
used by Chinese officials, which are not easily noticed (Thøgersen, 2006). This was 
particularly evident when speaking to Chinese state-owned companies and officials, who 
often talk ‘as the policy and Five-Year-Plan reads’. In the analysis, Danish and Chinese 
quotes have been translated as literally as possible into English to ensure consistency and 
making the thesis readable (Chinese interviews, policies, and other references are marked by 
an asterix *).   
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Apart from face-to-face interviews set up in advance, an extensive amount of data has been 
gathered at conferences where informal meetings and interviews can often be conducted, 
and where business cards are often exchanged. In addition, observations have been made 
during interviews24, at conferences25, at a four-day long grid connection workshop held by 
the Asian Development Bank in China (involving e.g. a visit to a Chinese test laboratory) 26, 
and at a meeting with various foreign component suppliers present. Finally, archival data 
including academic and newspaper articles within wind power, consultancy and industry 
reports, statistics on China and renewable energies and wind power in particular, power 
point presentations by companies, and product portfolios have served to get more acquainted 
with the topic and potential issues. Further, pictures and drawings in the secondary data as 
well as pictures drawn by respondents to clarify technical issues have served to get a further 
understanding of control system technologies in the wind turbine, in wind farms, and for 
grid connection. Chinese policies, regulations, and Five-Year Plans (5YPs) on renewable 
energies, wind power, and (indigenous) innovation (in Chinese and/or English) have been 
consistently surveyed, serving as a foundation to detect and map discourses on indigenous 
innovation, sustainable development, and a ‘harmonious socialist society’.  
The thesis treats documents such as policies and plans as intermediaries and potential non-
human ‘actors’, as they may encourage “people to ‘perform’” (Mol, 2000 in Prior, 2008: 
81), and thereby acting-at-a-distance (Latour, 1987 in Prior, 2008: 88). For instance, by 
classifying things, such documents may encourage people to do certain things, serving as a 
“script for doing. In that sense, the text orders its readers as much as it orders ‘things’” “in 
                                                     
24
 e.g. observing production halls, control system technologies, use of computers and software in 
different settings, signs of collaborations and use of particular types of software (e.g. posters, 
advertisements), as well as body language regarding specific issues on software. 
25
 Participation in the following industrial conferences: China Wind Power 2012 (China), 
EWEA Copenhagen 2012 (Denmark), Husum Wind Power 2012 (Germany), and International 
Symposium on Materials for Wind Energy Applications 2012 (China). In addition to this, 
academic conferences have been attended, i.a. on wind power in China and different 
conferences on green transition in China, in Asia, and globally (Denmark; Hong Kong). Further, 
the researcher participated in the concluding meeting of the INGINEUS-study (2009-2011) on 
GINs under the European Union’s 7th Framework Programme, in 2011 in Brussels. 
26
 Data collection (interviews and observations) were conducted at the ’Regional Workshop on 
Large Scale Wind Power Integration’ in September 2013 with participants from a wide range of 
Asian countries including Chinese and foreign experts on grid connection. The conference 
involved a trip to Zhangbei (Hebei Province), one of the largest wind power basins in China, 
with visits to the Zhangbei National Wind and Solar Energy Storage and Transmission 
Demonstration Project and a wind farm in connection with a new test laboratory for grid 
connection of Chinese wind turbines.     
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the world” (Prior, 2008: 81), which means that “decisions written down in one context and 
setting can carry implications for action in future settings” (Prior, 2008: 88). Collecting both 
primary and secondary data continuously over a period of more than two and a half year has 
enabled continuous cross-checking of information between different types of data sources. 
In addition, it has rendered a processual study, as it has been possible to detect development 
and change over time within Chinese wind power, e.g. in terms of policy priorities, company 
strategies, and network configurations. In table 2 below, an overview of collected data 
(archival data, observations and ethnographic field diary, interviews) and its function in the 
research process is provided. 
Table 2:  Overview of collected data 
Data source 
 
Type of data Usage in the analysis 
Archival data Company-related documents: 
- Company presentations 
- Product catalogues 
 
Policy documents and plans: 
- Renewable energies 
- Wind power 
- Innovation 
 
Pictures and drawings: 
- Wind turbines 
- Control system technologies 
- Grid system 
General background on 
companies and their products 
Familiarise with issues and 
new actors and entities 
Familiarise with political 
strategies and plans 
Keep record and produce a 
map of the development of 
new discourses and 
instruments in policies and 
plans 
Familiarise with control 
systems and their function in 
the wind turbine 
Support and integrate with 
interview data 
Observations 
and field 
diary  
Field notes from interviews 
Field notes from visits to wind farm, test and certification site 
Field notes from conferences 
Field diary 
Participation in and observations at three industry conferences 
(China 2012, Denmark 2012, Germany 2012) 
Participation in and observations at one academic seminar on 
materials for wind energy application (China 2011) 
One industrial workshop for State Grid and Asian countries 
on grid integration (Asian Development Bank, China 2013) 
Informal conversations and notes with interviewees, e.g. at 
conferences and workshops 
Arranging workshop with researchers on wind power in 
China, held at CBS 2012 
Support reconstruction 
Support and integrate with 
findings from interviews 
Use as basis for further 
investigation in formal 
interviews and in archival 
data 
Support and integrate with 
analytical findings from 
interviews  
Interviews 
(859 pages, 
single-
spaced) 
95 interviews in total, representing 56 different organisations: 
- company interviews with 37 different companies (23 
of which Chinese);  
- 4 different research institutions and universities (3 of 
which Chinese);  
- 5 different ministries (2 of which Chinese) 
Familiarise oneself with 
issues and new actors and 
entities 
Support reconstruction 
Keep record of new 
controversies, issues, actors, 
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- 1 think tank (Chinese) 
- 5 different interest organisations/industry 
associations (2 of which Chinese) 
- 1 certification body (Chinese);  
- 1 test laboratory (Chinese);  
- 1 multinational finance institution (international) 
- 1 grid company (and 3 different research institutions 
within State Grid) 
 
Companies were represented as follows: 
Western companies: 
- 3 different WTMs 
- 8 different component suppliers related to wind 
power 
- 2 design companies 
- 1 service company 
Chinese companies: 
- 7 different WTMs 
- 4 different component suppliers related to wind 
power 
- 3 service companies 
- 9 background interviews with companies related to 
renewable energies 
 
1 panel discussion at component suppliers’ meeting  
and entities 
Use for further investigation 
in the following interviews 
Detect and map relations 
between actors 
Map network configurations 
and their dynamic changes 
over time 
Map controversies and issues 
and their changes over time 
 
 
Whereever possible, company interviews have been conducted with innovation managers, 
R&D directors, R&D engineers and/or chief engineers, at other times, with directors, 
general managers, vice presidents, CEOs, managing directors, policy advisors, technical 
experts and scientists, international business managers, sales managers, or chief strategists. 
Interviews have lasted a minimum of 30 minutes to around two to three hours.  
Interviews have normally been set up through e-mail correspondence and/or phone calls. In 
the initial phase, interview guides (in English, Chinese, and/or Danish) were sent to 
respondents in advance, reflecting questions related to issues identified in the GIN (and 
related) literature(s)27 as well as being informed by questions related to specific Chinese 
plans and policies on wind power, renewable energies, and to Science & Technology (S&T). 
Hereby, operationalisation of the GIN literature has helped guide the study in the initial 
phase, when the researcher was still lacking knowledge on what controversies or actors 
would turn out to be relevant. Over time, as discourses, narratives, controversy traces, and 
human and non-human actors had gradually emerged, interviews became more focused and 
customised to each type of actor. This made it possible to conduct very specialised 
                                                     
27
 e.g. IPRs, upgrading, learning, technology transfer, in- and outsourcing of specific activities, 
value and supply chain governance, innovation strategies, and R&D-collaborations. 
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interviews at the same time as the study continued to expand, revealing new issues and 
actors. At the same time, knowing the field better and better over time, the initial semi-
structured interviews became even less structured, with the overall guideline being specific 
controversy traces, actors, issues, and concerns. Thus, interviewees often did not receive an 
interview guide, while the researcher had a notepaper with specific actors and issues that 
would always have to be covered, so that a coherent account could be gathered, while also 
keeping an eye (and ear) open for new themes, actors, discourses, stories, and other 
surprises. To keep track of the continuously expanding networks with new actors, relations, 
stories, issues, and controversies etc. emerging along the way, a comprehensive note-
keeping system along with a field diary and multiple drawings was kept to assist in the 
researcher’s sensemaking (Weick, 2003) and the continuous tracing of themes, discourses, 
actors, controversies, time-lines, metaphors etc. Indeed, deciding which actors to follow has 
been a gradual process amongst the innumerable traces and data encountered in the field. 
However, over time, it became increasingly possible to detect how the same kind of actors 
and issues, concerns, and controversy-traces were re-appearing and repeated by respondents, 
which strengthened the ‘validation’ and ‘reliability’ of the account. 
Iterative data processing 
In order to identify relevant, reoccurring actors, themes, controversies etc. to enable the 
work with the narrative storyline of the thesis, intensive data coding has been conducted 
both during data collection as well as during breaks between field trips. With some 
resemblance to coding processes characteristic of the method of grounded theory, engaging 
in a constant comparison between data and theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), rather than 
being interested in general theory making and dividing data into 1st and 2nd order codes, the 
data has been coded along themes and subthemes. This thematic coding enabled the 
progressive work on categorisation and grouping together of themes, identifying potential 
storylines in the process of controversy mapping. In the first comprehensive round of data 
processing (spring 2013), an approximately 250-page long document was constructed with 
quotes from the different interview documents sorted under different themes and sub-
themes. This coding provided the basis for conducting the last field trip, with the aim of 
‘filling in’ some of the ‘holes’ in the data material and of verifying some of the statements in 
the data from various sources, as a matter of ‘triangulation’ (Erzberger and Prein, 1997). 
Thematic coding was later repeated after the last, longer field trip in the autumn of 2013, 
sharpening the story line and resulting in several new drafts of the analysis, during which the 
story line was slightly modified, although more or less sticking to the overall ‘story’. Thus, 
as early as during the initial data processing, (1) IPRs, (2) standardisation and certification, 
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(3) money, corruption, and trust in a Chinese ‘relational’ economy, and (4) a Chinese 
experimental pragmatism of green marketisation in a fight against fossil fuels and the role of 
price and cost calculations had emerged as traces of controversy. Table 3 below renders 
examples of some of the codes from the first, initial data coding used for developing the 
story line for the first draft of the analysis: 
Table 3: Thematic controversies 
Thematic 
controversies 
(’2nd order 
codes’) 
      Thematic issues (subcategories) (’1st order codes’) 
I: Controversy 
over intellectual 
property 
 
- Qualifying control system software as ’core’ 
- Collaborations configuring around control system technologies 
- Dilemma between sharing and protecting algorithms 
- Negotiated access to core algorithms, negotiated boundaries of ’coreness’ 
- Relating core algorithms to issues of quality problems in the industry 
- Cases of IPR infringement 
- Issue of upgrading 
- Issue of independence from foreign technologies and technology transfer 
- Knowledge transfer 
II: Controversy 
over 
standardisation 
and certification 
 
- Issue of quality 
- Difficulties of obtaining international certification of Chinese wind turbines 
- Certification requirements and industry standards 
- Issue of the right to define quality, construing quality through tools of certificates 
and standards 
- Negotiated quality 
- Issue of price versus quality 
- Emergence of Chinese certification system 
- Issue of Indigenous Innovation 
III: Controversy 
over money and 
China’s system 
problem 
 
- Issue of Politicised Market Conditions 
- Managing the Chinese web of ‘common pockets’  
- State-controlled power sector 
- Issue of interlinked state-owned companies and corruption 
- Quality as personal relations (guanxi) 
- Issue of dealing with the headquarter for Danish control system suppliers 
- Issue of emerging ’agents’ 
- Destabilised network relations 
- Issue of trust 
- A skewed market  and how to survive as foreign wind turbine manufacturer in 
China 
IV: Controversy 
over cost- and 
price-
calculations 
entangled in 
experimental 
sustainable 
transition 
 
- Struggle for allowing wind power on to the grid 
- Resistance from wind park owners and utilities 
- Issue of fluctating wind due to poor quality wind turbines 
- Issue of poor planning and implementation 
- Issue of political resistance 
- Power of calculative tools (e.g. cost and price calculations) 
- Collaborations on grid connection and grid compliance 
- Controversies over Sustainable Transition 
- Struggles with conventional power sources 
- Experimental policy-making in China 
- A pragmatics of market construction 
- Chinese exploration in a ’Big Laboratory’ – bad planning or adaptive governance? 
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Apart from rendering an overview of changing network configurations, a ‘story’ about the 
struggle to qualify wind power in China as sustainable, which was entangled in a struggle to 
succeed in industrial upgrading and economic catch-up emerged. Set into a developmental 
context of industrial policy with focus on quantity rather than quality, an historical mapping 
of rapid growth and decline was thus pitching the story. Later stages of re-writing and 
gradually ‘fixating’ the story line was conducted alongside theoretical considerations of 
contributions to the GIN literature and other fields of study, with readings of industry-
related scholarly articles, policies, and reports, in which it was easier to detect and find ‘the 
relevant’ actors, issues, and controversies for the story of the thesis. Further, the process of 
writing the discussion of the thesis has informed and fed into the last draft of the analysis, as 
the wider implications of the analysis to the GIN literature as well as to other academic 
fields gradually became clearer. Hereby, while the analysis is empirically and 
ethnographically ‘thick’ and detailed (Geertz, 1973), and has been driven by a largely 
inductive method of open inquiry, the research process has also been informed by theory, 
resulting in a somewhat ‘abductive’ or ‘retroductive’ reasoning (Blaikie, 2007).  
In this process, it has become evident that while algorithms are framed as critical actors in 
the account of the thesis, it is, however, more precise to say that it is the associations which 
software algorithms (and other calculative framing tools, such as IPRs, standards, cost and 
price calculations) ascribe to wind power, and the calculative agencies and controversies 
they produce, which are being followed. Construing associations of different qualities of 
sustainability and ascribing them to wind power, these algorithms play a critical role in the 
overall qualification struggle within Chinese wind power and can engender controversy in 
the framings they produce. In this way, the thesis offers a lens for studying actual, in situ 
valuations in ethnographic sites (inspired by Dewey in Stark, 2009: 32). As indicated, two 
‘story lines’ are intertwined in the thesis, namely an empirical story line alongside a 
theoretical story line. In the following, the narrative (re)presentation of the findings through 
both an empirical and a theorised story line is outlined further.  
Data presentation – on emplotted narratives and shifting, polyphonic stories 
Having outlined the data collection and data processing during the research, the following 
looks into the (re)presentation of the data. This is done by looking further into the narrative 
mode of emplotting the empirical and theorised story lines of the thesis. The narrative 
concern for emplotting the thesis – e.g. with the assistance of metaphors – is founded in the 
constructivist perspective of ANT, which is generally seeking for detailed descriptions 
(Law, 1994; Latour, 2005a) characteristic of anthropological method and its thick 
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descriptions (Geertz, 1973). Thus, the ANT lens emphasises that “good sociology has to be 
well written; if not, the social doesn’t appear through it” (Law, 2004: 124). Consequently, 
the thesis is inspired by the way in which the evocation of metaphors can be seen as a mode 
of inductive theory building (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011: 274), while the narrative 
represents a particular narrative mode of knowing in contrast to the logico-scientific mode of 
knowing (Bruner 1986 in Czarniawska, 2008: 7).  
Emplotting the data 
As already indicated above, the researcher has consistently experimented with different 
potential story lines in order to convey a coherent, fully fledged, and emplotted story. 
Indeed, the thesis has taken many shapes, as it has been re-drafted and re-written in myriads 
of iterative writing processes, in which the plot and the many details of the story has only 
slowly emerged and settled. That is, whereas “a narrative is understood as a spoken or 
written text giving an account of an event/action or series of events/actions, chronologically 
connected” (Czarniawska, 2008: 17), a plot can be seen as the ”basic means by which 
specific events, otherwise represented as lists or chronicles, are brought into one meaningful 
whole” (Polkinghorne 1987 in Czarniawska, 2008: 7). In this lens, a story is a narrative with 
a plot (Czarniawska, 2008: 19). Consisting of seven chapters, each chapter of the analysis 
constitutes a narrative in itself or a ‘fractal’, which has to be emplotted into a coherent 
(though rhizomatic) story.  
Over time, as algorithms and other calculative framing tools such as money, prices, and 
cost-calculations were construed as main actors in the emerging account, a plot similar to 
those of ‘crime novels’ seemed to evolve over time, in which a power struggle between 
Chinese and foreign actors in the ongoing reconfiguring of the Chinese wind power market 
and the simultaneous collaborative and competitive dynamics of relations between Chinese 
and foreign actors was taking place. To build a story through different fractionally coherent 
accounts, the crime plot has served as an inspiration in the writing process. Yet, rather than 
being emplotted as a relatively simple, structural detective fiction, configuring a 
unidirectional maze, the thesis is inspired by Eco’s (1983) notion of the highest and most 
refined form of the crime plot as mystery, or as a so-called ‘rhizo[matic] maze’ whose 
structure is relational (Eco, 1983: 253). In this way drawing inspiration from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ((2011 [1980]) metaphor of the ‘Rhizome’, Eco (1983) outlines how a story can 
be emplotted as a rhizomatic maze, denoting its potential endlessness as well as how it does 
not end up with one story, one conclusion, but rather with multiple fractals, beginnings and 
potential endings (Eco, 1983: 252; Kirkegaard, 2014). The botanical metaphor or the 
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rhizome with its ever expanding roots underground thus indicates how the story has no 
centre, no periphery, no exit, and thereby no clear-cut solution, trust, victim, or culprit. The 
emplotment of algorithms (and other calculative tools) as a red thread in the analysis of the 
thesis thereby only renders the illusion of finality, which has been necessary for the framing 
of the thesis.  
Indeed, despite the doctrine of “[j]ust observing a controversy” (Latour in Venturini, 2009), 
doing ‘Mapping Controversies’ research “is like wandering in a maze with a twine of 
threads to follow” (Venturini, 2009: 6). As the analysis dives deeper and deeper into the 
magma of diverse inter-twined controversies with one plot, one actor, one action, one 
relation, and one issue leading to the next, the analysis sheds light on what may be termed a 
web of ’rhizomatic negotiated spaces’ (Murdoch, 1998). Controversy mapping hereby 
resembles a ”composition of many diverse compositions, a plurality of pluralities” (Yaneva, 
2012: 107-108), which aligns with anthropological method (Marcus 1992 in Czarniawska, 
2008: 15). Expressed in terms of narrative, “openness to competing interpretations [...] is a 
virtue in narrative”, which means “that the same set of events can be organized around 
different plots” (Czarniawska, 2008: 7).  
Further, it should be noted that apart from the overall storyline of the analysis, another 
ethnographic storyline runs through the analysis, as each chapter in the analysis starts with a 
brief empirical vignette, shaped around ethnographic field-notes and sketching a ‘personal’ 
storyline of the research process. Lastly, the progressive construction of associations of 
worth and value to wind power can be seen as a power battle on emplotment (Czarniawska, 
2008: 31). That is, a power battle on the right to emplot the construction of a market for 
wind power as sustainable and/or as a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is taking place. 
Seeing through metaphors and figures 
The above has outlined how the metaphor of rhizome has served as a way of ‘disciplined 
imagination’ (Weick, 1989), serving as a cognitive and heuristic device (Cornelissen, 2006; 
Weick, 1989) in writing. What may seem particular to a ‘developmental’, and ‘socialist’ 
context’ of China is i.a. how sometimes multiple, conflicting agendas, ambitions, and 
priorities are colliding, constituting multiple, dense, and intertwined controversies. To 
reflect such ‘tightness’ and ‘density’ of controversies, the metaphor of rhizome alone may 
be insufficient, however. Consequently, the alternative metaphor of the ‘meshwork’ as “a 
tightly knitted net” has also assisted in the sensemaking process, as a meshwork seizes the 
“‘thick’ mesh of entanglements, as a cosmology” (Yaneva, 2012: 2), of e.g. marketisation. 
Apart from these metaphors, metaphors employed by respondents in the field have also 
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inspired the research, e.g. the ‘Chinese spider web’ of state-owned actors and ‘agents’ as 
well as human body analogies (e.g. ‘central nervous system’, ’spine’, and ’brain’) to explain 
the role of software tools in the wind turbine.  
Through the work on the thesis and representation of the data, figures and models have also 
been consistently developed as a means for sensemaking. The thesis uses a number of 
figures to illustrate some of the points visually. Yet, a ‘disclaimer’ to the figures must be 
made, as they all seem two-dimensional and static, due to limitations in the visual tools 
applied. Thus, while the function of the figures in the thesis is meant to ease comprehension, 
they should not be taken at face value, and the reader should try to abstract and see them as 
three-dimensional and dynamic in nature. Further, two-dimensional figures tend to separate 
things into levels and layers, with some circles and brackets seeming ‘larger’ than others. 
Again, in a constructivist, lateral, and symmetrical lens, none of these layers should be taken 
for granted. Thus, while some circles are depicted as visually larger, this is not meant to 
entail that they are more powerful or important than others. This is instead a matter of 
empirical investigation. Lastly, for practical reasons, many circles (e.g. poles and TENs) and 
brackets seem to be separated; yet, the reader of the figures should take into account how 
these different circles (poles and TENs) often tend to overlap. Despite this disclaimer, it is 
hoped that the figures will help in easing comprehension of the relatively abstract theoretical 
assumptions, in illustrating how the thesis has approached the field, and in summing up on 
some of the findings. A visual metaphor for how to approach controversy mapping has been 
the metaphor of electro-magnetic waves. While related to electricity – and thus fitting the 
issue of wind power – the fluctuating, multi-dimensional electro-magnetic waves can help 
render a sense of fluctuating controversies and transformative changes (waves) over time.  
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Figure 3: Electro-magnetic waves – as metaphor for controversy mapping 
 
Source: Own design.  
 
Not taken by the letter, but with a sense of ‘pragmatism’, the horizontal line can illustrate 
dynamics over time, with the vertical line illustrating intensity/quality of conflict, and the 
flat/lateral line illustrating the number actants involved. Still if each floating wave is seen to 
illustrate a controversy related to a specific issue, the figure is not meant to argue that one 
controversy necessarily follows the other; instead, controversies tend to overflow, overlap, 
and evolve simultaneously. The metaphor of electro-magnetic waves has been employed to 
reflect the potentially disruptive, ‘transformational change’ identified in Chinese wind 
power as a battle, illustrated and seen as a fluctuating wave.  
Theorised story line – construing an ambiguous space for coupling the incompatible 
While the seven chapter long analysis in itself has been emplotted as a coherent story, the 
analysis constitutes, at the same time, a part of an overall theorised story line (a plot) 
(Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007: 5, 46), weaving together relevant literature(s) with the 
field insights. That is, the different bits and pieces of the wider puzzle, i.e. the wider story of 
‘experimental green marketisation’ in a developmental context of China and the link to 
GINs, have also been emplotted along a theorised story line. In this way, the explorative 
research resembles a continuous ‘inquiry about inquiry’, as the researcher has consistently 
explored what story the data is really ‘about’ or a ‘case of’, using theory as a mirror, against 
which to debate the findings and fine-tune the plot. Paraphrasing Eco (1983), theoretical 
discussions function throughout the analysis as background music (1983: 252), displaying 
how issues relate to each other like rhizomatic structures. Hereby, it seems ‘impossible only 
to tell one story’ (Eco, 1983: 253). In the thesis, the review of the existing literature on GINs 
and some of its founding literature streams has been plotted so as to fill in a gap on genesis, 
dynamics, and agency. This reflects how “we are never the sole authors of our own 
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narratives; in every conversation a positioning takes place” (Davies and Harré 1991 in 
Czarniawska, 2008: 5).  
Overall, the theorised story line of the thesis construes a pragmatic bridge, which spans the 
ontological and epistemological divides between the positivistic GIN and the constructivist 
accounts. This is introduced in Chapter 2, and later elaborated on in the discussion (Part 
IV). By bridging such colliding accounts, the thesis may at first sight seem to sit 
ambiguously between two ‘incompatible’ perspectives: That is, the GIN literature seeks for 
causal explanations, generalisations, and theorisation, and thus represents what can be called 
a ‘strong research programme’. Such frameworks are in a constructivist perspective 
criticised for rushing “into classifying and inserting what you see into contextual 
frameworks, pre-defined lists and categories of explanation!” (Yaneva, 2012: 45). Instead of 
seeking for certainty and stable conclusions (Law, 2004: 9), the proposed constructivist 
perspective represents a ‘weak’, yet “radical programme” (Yaneva, 2012: 43), which 
pursues anti-reductionism (Fraser, 2010) and a regime of ‘presentational immediacy’” 
(Whitehead, 1978: 174 in Yaneva, 2012: 106): 
“Theories usually try to explain why something happens, but actor network theory is descriptive rather 
than foundational in explanatory terms, which means that it is a disappointment for those seeking strong 
accounts. Instead it tells stories about ‘how’ relations assemble or don’t” (Law, 2009: 141).  
Raising such critique of the ‘strong narratives’ of causalities, in a search for accuracy and 
consistency (Fraser, 2010), the modest method (Law, 1994) of the constructivist perspective 
instead prizes a good story and empirical detail to provide an account of the singularity, 
specificity, and situatedness of the specific event (Fraser, 2010: 66; Venturini, 2009: 12). 
This implies that the thesis does not render a strong account resembling conventional GIN 
studies.  
Nevertheless, while aligning with principles of ‘modest method’ (Law, 1994), the thesis 
simultaneously has an ambition to contribute to the GIN perspective (and vice versa). This 
reflects an acknowledgment that “formal organizations, networks of actors and actor-
networks, action nets and spontaneous organizing coexist – at the same time and in the same 
territory” (Czarniawska, 2013: 13). In other words, acknowledging the coexistence of 
genesis and structure and of disorder and order, the thesis embarks on the task of exploring 
how and whether the ‘thick descriptions’ of the processual and relational lens of the 
constructivist perspective can feed into the ‘stronger accounts’ of the structuralist and 
positivistic GIN literature, and vice versa. Indeed, setting out on such daring task, the 
courage and rationality of which can only be judged at its completion (paraphrasing the 
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‘Serresean sea-journey’, in Jensen, 2010: 12), the scientific journey of the researcher has 
admittedly been characterised by doubts and concerns throughout the research. Nonetheless, 
the ‘ambiguous positioning’ of the thesis reflects not only the ‘theoretical promiscuity’ 
inherent in mapping controversies (Venturini, 2009), but also an acknowledgement of how 
different approaches and ways of conceptualising organising each have their advantages and 
shortcomings (Czarniawska, 2013: 13). Running the risk of being rejected by either 
discipline, the thesis takes up the challenge of mobilising audiences from different 
disciplines (e.g. China-studies, the GIN-literature, marketisation studies, and even 
practitioners) by bringing ”together ideas or objects from previously unrelated domains” 
(Davis, 1971: 325). Ideally, such ‘innovative’ bridging can make the study ’interesting’ 
(Barley, 2006: 18), e.g. through its production of spaces of ambiguity (Stark, 2009: 3). 
Challenges of Doing Research in Chinese Wind Power  
Having provided an account of the methodological ‘tool set’ employed in the thesis and the 
implications that this has had for data collection, processing, and representation, the 
following provides a brief critique of the data and reflexive considerations on doing 
fieldwork in China.  
Becoming an ‘expert’ in unforeseen fields  
Throughout the process, as actors have been identified, the project took on a more and more 
technical character, going well beyond the familiar ‘terrain’ of the researcher. While 
Venturini (2009) claims that the best controversies to map are those configuring around 
technical issues (Venturini, 2009), the highly technical character of the field has been an 
ongoing concern and challenge, as the researcher did not speak the ‘local [scientific and 
technical] language’ of the respondents, so to speak. Over time, it became evident that it was 
necessary to make an attempt at learning to speak with respondents in their own terms 
(MacKenzie, 2003), as much as possible, that is, adhering to the notion of reduction resistant 
research and the approach of science-without-borders of the ‘promiscuous’ Mapping 
Controversies approach (Venturini, 2009: 5). Indeed, an understanding of ‘algorithms’, 
control systems, simulation tools, aero-elastic codes, and other technical aspects had to be 
built, but often also to be demolished and modified, since the ‘blackboxed’ understanding of 
the different components construed by the researcher proved unstable in many situations. 
Over time, a new vocabulary (in English, Danish, and Chinese) was gradually built, making 
it possible over time to explore an increasing amount of the technical aspects, which turned 
out as unexpectedly critical to the story line.  
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Lost in sensitivity? 
Apart from the challenge of technical specificities, there has been an ongoing concern of 
becoming “an entangled participant rather than an external observer occupying an overhead 
position” (Muniesa, forthcoming: 3). Indeed, sometimes it seemed as if the researcher was 
being drawn into the field, being treated as a consultant or ‘soul-searcher’ to render advice 
and recommendations for Chinese and Western respondents alike. This may largely be due 
to the in-between hybrid status of the researcher, i.e. being acquainted both with the Chinese 
and Western culture and language. It has thus been a challenge at times to handle the high 
degree of sensitivity of some of the investigated issues. Anonymisation of all interviews has 
been chosen throughout the analysis (coding them as ‘Int. 1’, ‘Int. 2’ and so forth, as they 
are being employed chronologically throughout the thesis), at the request of many 
respondents and in acknowledgement of the actual sensitivity of certain issues, which could 
have repercussions within the Chinese bureaucratic cadre-system in particular. Such high 
level of sensitivity and need to anonymise data is a prevalent concern in the field of China-
studies (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006). The level of sensitivity has further been reflected in 
the way that it has sometimes been impossible to decide whom to talk with. For instance, 
when conducting interviews during a field trip to China with the SDC group, everything had 
been settled in advance by the Chinese collaboration partners without any chance to select 
which companies and people to talk to, and with interviews translated through interpreter. 
Sometimes, there have even been indications of being ‘spied upon’, as well as attempts at 
‘recruiting’ the researcher as ‘agent’, to assist in the work of maintaining relations. Indeed, 
some things and details may have been lost in translation during some interviews, that is to 
say, potentially also being ‘lost in sensitivity’. On the other hand, Chinese contacts have 
been crucial in terms of assisting in establishing contacts with otherwise inaccessible state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and diplomats.  
In China, the conception of what is perceived as ‘sensitive’ is often different from Denmark. 
Sometimes, the researcher has been directly (or indirectly) warned about the ‘sensitivity’ of 
the investigated issues. This created continuous experimentation as to ‘how far’ into the 
explorations the researcher was allowed to proceed. That is, as more and more knowledge 
was gained on the field (and its technicalities) over time, it was increasingly possible to ask 
more sensitive questions. Yet, this was a balancing act that had to be managed with care, 
always being observant of almost invisible signs in body language, eye movements etc. as 
indications of whether or not the limit had been reached or even trespassed. Often, Chinese 
people reject answering a question which is sensitive (or offensive), by way of silence 
and/or laughter, i.e. responding with non-action (无为 wuwei), which is a typical sign of 
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losing face (丢面子diu mianzi) (Wong et al., 2007, Fang, 1999). Otherwise, a way of 
rejection due to the sensitivity of the issues may have been the many times that phone calls 
or e-mails have been left unanswered. Over time, the researcher managed to get ‘deeper’ 
into the field than initially expected. This was largely made possible by establishing 
relations with some respondents with whom several interviews were conducted. Such 
critical contacts functioned in many ways as gatekeepers in order to get in contact with 
otherwise inaccessible contacts. In China it is often impossible to establish contact without a 
good personal relation to refer to. Hereby, ‘snow-balling’ seemed the only viable strategy 
for data collection, as the personal relations (guanxi 关系) of one respondent had to be 
employed as an ‘interessement device’, to mobilise the next respondent in line28. Indeed, the 
fieldwork oftentimes resembled the translation process of a ‘detective’s undercover work’, 
slowly mobilising and translating actors into the ‘web’ (or assemblage/agencement) of the 
thesis. Overall, personal relations (guanxi) have been critical to the research, since changes 
in rules and policies or changes in the industrial landscape are often not possible to be found 
officially in China, but are often only accessible through ‘Chinese whispers’. In turn, such 
whispers have to be double-checked as much as possible, as the meaning of these ‘whispers’ 
may be diverted over time and as they are translated from agent to agent, often starting from 
the political leadership. Indeed, ‘Chinese whispers’ are ubiquitous in the Chinese wind 
power industry, be it about new regulations and policies, upcoming Five-Year Plans (5YPs), 
new industrial standards, the status of competitors, or the development trend of the industry 
etc.  
Towards ‘Modest Modelling’ 
Having outlined the methodological implications of adopting a constructivist perspective, as 
well as how the thesis is positioned ambiguously in the space between the stronger and 
weaker programs of the GIN and constructivist perspectives, the thesis in the following 
Chapter 5 develops a ‘model’ for studying marketisation in a developmental context. While 
this at first sight might seem to ‘compromise’ principles of modest method, it renders no 
grand scale ideal-type model. That is, acknowledging limits to generalisation, what is to be 
presented is a brief account of how the theoretical and methodological ‘tool set’ has been 
operationalised (and modified) for a situational study of marketisation of wind power in a 
development context of China. On that note, and having outlined the methodological tool 
                                                     
28
 In China, meetings are often set up with very short notice, while planning of meetings more 
than a week ahead is more or less impossible. This requires a high degree of flexibility and 
agility on part of the researcher. 
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box of a marketisation lens, the next chapter outlines a situational model for studying green 
marketisation in China, engaging in what may be termed ‘modest modelling’.  
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Chapter 5. Proposing a ‘Modest Model’ for Studying Green 
Marketisation within a Developmental Context of China 
After having introduced the general theoretical and methodological premises of the 
constructivist perspective of the thesis, Chapter 5 engages in ‘modest modelling’, i.e. 
outlining a ‘model’ for inquiring into ‘green marketisation’ within wind power in a 
developmental context of China. Together, Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) and Part II (Chapters 
3, 4, and 5) lay the foundation for the analysis in Part III. First, Chapter 5 outlines a few 
aspects of the marketisation lens, which have been ‘adjusted’ to suit a study of wind power 
in China. Second, the ‘modest model’ is developed, which concludes by an example of what 
kind of actors may be captured through a marketisation lens, which would most likely not be 
captured through a conventional GIN lens. As mentioned earlier, the model to be developed 
is not an ideal-type model, but a pragmatic means to bring order to the analytical account.  
Twisting the marketisation lens 
In the following, the chapter outlines how the marketisation lens has been slightly ‘tweeked’ 
and adjusted in order to look into the specific case of Chinese wind power. Indeed, taking 
the marketisation lens to China may help shed light on the many alternative possibilities of 
markets, i.e., potentially capturing some of the ‘Chinese characteristics’ of marketisation in 
China.  
Introducing TENs within TENs  
Through the notion of (market as) TEN, the analysis maps how and whether market, 
technical, and scientific poles around wind power are being assembled into a TEN in 
processes of framing/qualification. The thesis treats marketisation of wind power as a 
potentially emerging wind power-TEN. As the wind power-TEN is overflowing in the 
current quality crisis, the wind power-TEN seems to disintegrate, revealing how it is 
constituted by TENs around different component technologies. To inquire into the 
requalification of wind power in China, the thesis disassembles the wind turbine into its 
component parts, and zooms in on one component, which is being constituted as critical to 
the requalification of wind power, namely software. With a focus on a potentially emerging 
software-TEN, the thesis traces how the software-TEN and wind power-TEN are co-
performing each other. Below, figure 4 provides a few examples of some of the myriads of 
TENs around different wind turbine component technologies, which co-constitute the 
potential wind power-TEN, and vice versa. (Though with the caveat, that the two-
dimensional figure provides only a static and hierarchical perspective, and therefore does not 
illustrate that poles and TENs overlap, does not illustrate their relations, nor how these may 
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change over time). The different component-TENs are perceived as co-constituting parts of 
the wind power-TEN’s different poles. 
Figure 4: Examples of TENs within TENs in Chinese wind power-TEN 
 
 
Source: Own design.  
 
Apart from tracing the translation of an emergent wind power-TEN and software-TEN, the 
thesis also looks into how these are co-constituted by and co-constituting China’s state-
controlled electrical power sector, or what the thesis coins a power-TEN. This entangled 
nature of ‘TENs within TENs’ is attempted illustrated in figure 5 below. Although they are 
not depicted in the figure, the power-TEN – apart from the wind power-TEN – contains i.a. 
a coal-TEN, solar-TEN, and biomass-TEN. Further, while for instance the blade-TEN, the 
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control system-TEN, and software-TEN are depicted as part of the wind power-TEN, they 
are also part of the power-TEN. This means that the same TENs and poles may figure in 
different TENs simultaneously.  
Figure 5: TENs within TENs – introducing a power-TEN  
 
 
Source: Own design. 
 
It should be noted that linkages of the entangled networks can unravel quickly, with “even 
one change impacting all the other links in a domino like fashion” (Garud et al., 2010a: 7). 
Hereby, the de- and re-framing processes of the wind power-TEN impact not only the 
configuration of the software-TEN, but also the power-TEN, and vice versa (as well as other 
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component technology-TENs). As described in Chapter 4, the thesis zooms into the 
potential software-TEN and the network configurations and controversies it may produce in 
the ongoing qualification struggle of the emerging wind power-TEN. The choice to trace the 
potential construction of a software-TEN has been selected not only because of its status as a 
‘critical’ component for wind turbine performance and grid connection, and thus also for its 
potentially disruptive agency to the framing of the wind power-TEN, but also because of its 
importance for China’s upgrading potential in accordance with Chinese industrial policy 
ambitions. Constituting a strategic component for China’s ‘Scientific-’ and ‘Sustainable 
Development’, a software-TEN is deemed a fruitful site for tracing a qualification struggle 
and for mapping controversies. In figure 6 below, the entangled mesh of ‘TENs within 
TENs’, and the focus of the thesis on a potential software-TEN in the marketisation of wind 
power, is illustrated.  
Figure 6: Zooming in on the software-TEN 
 
Source: Own design. 
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Introducing a political pole 
Entangled in a heavily state-controlled power sector (power-TEN), the thesis adds a fourth 
pole, a so-called political pole, to the market, scientific, and technical poles of the TEN 
construct. The political pole in a Chinese context denotes China’s political leadership, which 
in particular denotes Central and local Chinese governments, the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), party cadres and nomenclature, and sometimes even state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
within state-controlled sectors29.  
The political pole is in addition the space in which political agendas and priorities are 
inscribed into policies, plans, and regulations, e.g. through interessement devices such as 
discourses, narratives, feed-in-tariffs (FITs), and targets. In figure 7 below, the political pole 
has been added. By adding a political pole, the thesis argues that it becomes possible to 
account for how the political pole at times attempts to institute itself as ’translator-
spokesperson’ in the marketisation of Chinese wind power. Thus, while a marketisation lens 
normally conceives politics to be part and parcel of ’everything’, the thesis claims that 
politics takes on a more direct and distinct role in the developmental context of China, i.e. 
constituting and entangled in ’big politics’. It should be noted that due to the way in which 
certain sectors may be more or less controlled and/or owned by the political pole in China, 
the market, scientific, and technical may be(come) deeply intertwined and sometimes even 
impossible to disentangle from the political pole. In turn, such impossibility of framing (and 
thus of bracketing and disentangling) may institute myriads of coexisting controversies, 
which in turn produce extensive and potentially disruptive overflowing. 
                                                     
29
 In the thesis, the political pole encompasses the Chinese political leadership, Central and local 
governments, the Communist Party of China (CPC), the local and central Chinese state 
bureaucracy, as well as policies and Five- and 15-Year Plans, political discources and narratives, 
as well as state-owned enterprises, etc. This also reflects how China oftentimes is referred to as 
a ‘Party-State’ (Delman, 2005), due to the monopoly right of the CPC to form the government 
(Lawrence and Martin, 2013). 
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Figure 7: Introducing a political pole 
 
Source: Own design. 
By enabling a lens for the potentially particular ‘political’ characteristic of Chinese 
marketisation in wind power, the thesis may be claimed to look into the potentially multiple 
modes of marketisation and economisation. This aligns with the call for marketisation 
studies, which are open to multiple modes of marketisation and economisation, which in 
turn 
“introduces an explicitly political dimension into the process of economization, especially when it means 
marketizing objects and behaviours that have previously defied marketization” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 23). 
Indeed, in a ‘socialist’ market economy of China, it can be argued to be (particularly) 
relevant to dig into the potentially many alternative possibilities of markets, which do not 
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necessarily fit into the ‘Western’, ‘capitalist’ model of ‘developed countries’. That is, 
”[m]arkets have a history; they also have a future that cannot be reduced simply to an 
extrapolation of the past” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). Accordingly, the thesis 
proposes to look into marketisation in Chinese wind power by tracing how it may constitute 
a particular tension between designing and experimenting characteristic of marketisation 
(Callon, 2009: 536).  
‘Narrative’ and ‘discursive’ devices 
The often activist ’political pole’ (and/or other poles) in the potentially emerging Chinese 
wind power-TEN might employ interessement devices to mobilise other poles in the 
collective, distributed effort of marketisation. Such interessement devices may i.a. be 
policies and plans, into which discourses have been inscribed. When such discourses add a 
temporal aspect – often intertwining past, present, and future – such as a plot, a narrative is 
constructed, which can potentially delineate, order, and perform certain roles and framings 
of the TEN. When employed strategically to enrol and mobilise other actors into an 
emerging TEN, the thesis terms these ’discursive’ or ’narrative’ tools/devices’. In this way, 
amongst calculative tools, not only ‘metrological’, calculative tools (e.g. simulation tools, 
certificates, audit systems) (Callon, 1998: 21)30 play a role, but also ‘textual’ calculative 
tools31. Treated as physical (material) textual tools, constituted by material things (words), 
these tools not only function as intermediaries, but may also play a role as actors, as they 
make other actors act and de- and reconfigure the emerging TEN32. Textual (discursive 
and/or narrative) devices can assist in the (de- and re)qualification (and legitimisation) of 
new potential products and the markets that they may assemble, and thus in the translation 
of a potential TEN. This is done through the (temporal) framings they produce, as they sever 
                                                     
30
 Although the notion of ‘qualculative’ tools has been advanced to display how agents are 
capable of making both qualitative and quantitative calculations, i.e. so-called qualculations 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 29), the thesis does not find the distinction between calculation 
and qualculation particularly clarifying, as calculative tools can also associate qualities and thus 
be qualculative and vice versa. 
31
Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) illustrate how business models can act as both 
calculative and narrative devices that allow entrepreneurs to explore a market, thereby playing a 
performative role (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009: 1559). 
32
 Constituting “any kind of symbolic expression requiring a physical medium and permitting a 
permanent storage”, texts not only describe things, but do things (Taylor and Every in Phillips et 
al., 2004: 636). Although this definition subscribes to a social constructivist account of 
discourses (e.g. Phillips et al. 2004; Czarniawska 2008), the thesis takes a constructivist 
approach rather than a social constructivist, sensemaking, and/or institutionalisation approach to 
discourses or narratives. 
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certain links and (at least temporarily) stabilise/make irreversible certain trajectories of a 
potential TEN.  
Narrative tools in a developmental context may be employed to construe associations of e.g. 
a ‘grand narrative’ of ‘(sustainable) development’ or ‘catch-up’. On a related note, as 
regards the construction of new markets within a clean-tech sector such as wind power, 
marketisation requires the economisation of environmental concerns (Karnøe and 
Doganova, 2014, forthcoming). That is, to transform wind from a thing into a good requires 
the construction of associations of environmental quality (“cleanliness”) and economic 
worth (price) (Karnøe and Doganova, 2014, forthcoming). However, set into a 
developmental context of China, the thesis opens up to the potentiality of other coexisting 
concerns, qualities (such as different ‘sustainabilities’), and the construction of different 
worths. For instance, economic worth may collide with what may be termed ‘developmental 
worth’, and the quality of ‘environmental sustainability’ may collide (even more than in 
developed countries) with ‘technical sustainability’. Such colliding qualities and worths are 
likely to produce controversy, and to be ubiquitous in a developmental context with 
multiple, shifting, and often conflicting agendas.   
Forces of opening up and protection – introducing a competitive space 
The potentially multiple and competing worths and qualities of wind power, which are likely 
to complicate marketisation, may be linked to how China as a newly industrialised country 
(and the wind power-TEN in particular) is entangled in seemingly contradictory and 
paradoxical processes of so-called national “community economies” and “global 
interdependent markets” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 42-43). That is, seeking to protect its 
domestic enterprises, China may be claimed to bear traits of a national ‘community 
economy’. Such national community economies are likely to create hierarchies, alliances, 
and boundaries, as well as to produce confrontations between communities. In contrast, 
simultaneous forces of global interdependent markets, which are characterised by extending 
boundaries, and by principles of free circulation of people, knowledge, and technologies 
(e.g. software), are producing a ‘flat world’. Whereas the national framework of community 
economies “remains politically strategic” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 42) for a newly 
industrialised country such as China, participation in global interdependent markets is 
becoming more critical, e.g. in order to access important resources. Hereby, the two 
processes “coexist and merge, shaping hybrid and evolving configurations as they do so” 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 45). As newly industrialised countries integrate into global 
interdependent markets, positions and roles of actors are likely to be transformed, 
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constituting a new agencement (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010: 42). In turn, the coexistence of 
such conflicting processes is likely to produce a hybrid space of confrontation and power 
contestations in the marketisation of Chinese wind power. To account for these processes, 
the thesis extends Murdoch’s (1998) negotiated spaces, introducing a so-called ‘competitive 
space’ between Chinese and foreign actors in the marketisation of Chinese wind power, to 
illuminate the potentially conflicting agendas and spaces of confrontation, as well as the 
negotiation of roles, positions, and identities of actors (Callon, 2007: 159) in the 
simultaneously collaborative and competitive relations around software. 
Unfolding a case-specific marketisation framework within Chinese wind power 
Having outlined how different concepts and constructs of the marketisation lens have been 
adjusted to the situated study of green marketisation in a developmental context of China, 
the chapter briefly outlines a situated model for studying marketisation of wind power in 
China. This is done by outlining how the thesis treats the current quality crisis as a 
qualification struggle, i.e. of framing. The section concludes with a visual model along with 
an outline of how the model will be employed in the different chapters of the analysis. 
Tracing the potential emergence of a wind power-TEN 
If calculative agencies for calculating and valuating the worth of wind have not been 
established, wind is not to be considered a good, as no market can be assembled around it. 
Lacking stable calculative agencies of wind power in China, the thesis treats the wind power 
market (the wind power-TEN) as a potentiality. In order to build a strong collective – a 
market – around wind where wind power can be dispatched in the grid, it must first be 
transformed from a thing (wind) to a good (wind power). This necessitates work of 
qualification, which can contribute to the valuation of wind power. The thesis proposes that 
a marketisation analysis of wind power in China should inquire into how and through what 
means different actors of various poles are enrolled into a collective around an emerging 
good. To enroll poles, different interessement devices may be employed. For instance, if the 
political pole attempts to institute itself as translator-spokesperson on behalf of a potential 
new wind power-TEN, the political pole might employ subsidies such as FITs, quantitative 
growth targets (e.g. GW targets), purchase agreements, and ‘narrative’ and ‘discursive’ 
devices. Further, mobilisation of poles may happen by problematising the need to solve a 
(stem) issue such as i.a. ’sustainable development’. Raising such matters of concern, and 
framing a potential good as a potential (partial) solution to such issues, a collective may be 
mobilised around an emerging market.  
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If the framing of an emerging TEN has been severely destabilised, however, it must be 
restabilised by containing the overflowing. That is, when not containing the overflowing 
(temporarily), the emerging TEN is likely to disintegrate. This means that if wind power 
cannot be framed as a sustainable good, it can be difficult to translate i.a. the grid system, 
algorithms, generating companies, coal-fired power plants, standards, local governments and 
other actors into an emerging wind power-TEN. Accordingly, overflowing can result in 
socio-technological lock-in (Callon, 2007: 140) to fossil fuels. A way of stabilising the 
framing and pacifying the emerging good may be the translation of other related TENs 
around specific component technologies, which can produce associations of higher quality. 
In this way, the translation of a potential software-TEN, amongst others, can be construed as 
a (partial) solution to frame wind power as ’technically’ or ’economically’ sustainable.  
 
Stabilising associations through calculative framing tools 
When a market undergoes a qualification struggle due to overflowing, the good has not been 
successfully framed or pacified. A marketisation analysis should look into the work of 
stabilising the framing (e.g. producing associations of sustainability), i.e., into the 
pacification of goods. In this way, the analysis should trace the employment of calculative 
framing devices, which are adopted to associate the product (wind power) with specific 
qualities. Amongst other framing tools, these may involve (a) IPRs and (b) standards. IPRs 
(a) and standards (b) take part is the pacification of goods, which are necessary for 
marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 8).  In addition, IPRs and standards can in a 
Chinese context produce associations of scientific and technical quality, which aligns with 
ambitions of industrial upgrading, and potentially producing a framing of sustainability. As 
regards IPRs, they assist in defining the right to use certain assets, and thus enable the  
“laborious and ongoing process of construction of spaces for calculation and transaction, of accounting 
systems that determine both who is accountable and how and what to count and not to count, and of 
simplified, uncontroversial owners, products and modes of ownership” (Callon 1998 in Lohmann, 2009: 
500). 
In addition, by transforming a thing into a good through specific processes of 
standardisation, described in both abstract and precise terms, certified and guaranteed by a 
series of textual and material devices, the framing of a thing can be disentangled from other 
possible framings/qualifications and issues, and be (temporarily) stabilised (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 7, 8). In this way, the process of certification and standardisation 
legitimises a certain way of evaluating quality, and its worth. Such calculative framing tools 
can be seen as obligatory passage points (OPP) (Callon, 1986b: 26-27) through which 
entities must pass to be legitimised and associated as constituting parts of the network. By 
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pacifying the potentially multiple qualities of the thing into a certain framing, marketising 
agencies can be established, and the good can be marketed (a.k.a. ‘market encounters’). In 
turn, price-setting can be conducted, i.a. involving the flow of (c) money and the handling of 
liquidity between actors in the emerging TEN, as well as (d) price and cost calculations, to 
make the value and worth of wind power comparable to other goods. However, in a 
‘socialist’ Chinese context, price-setting may employ other calculative tools and involve 
other actors than conventionally expected, e.g. (‘corrupted’) agents, personal relations 
(guanxi 关系), local growth targets, and coal quota.  
Controversies over framing tools – on IPRs, standardisation, money, and costs and prices  
As illustrated earlier, framing processes – including the framing tools and the calculative, 
marketising agencies, they produce for price-setting – may engender conflict and 
controversy. That is, natural objects do not express stable qualities without resistance, but 
instead involve controversy ”because objects participate in producing conflicting data about 
themselves” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 6). For instance, protection of IPRs leads to the 
exclusion of others, as e.g. patent rights confer ownership on specific entities to the 
exclusion of others. Hereby, even though software, technical devices, documents, people 
and their embodied knowledge may increasingly circulate freely in today’s emergent global 
interdependent markets (Callon, 2007: 140), there may be limits to the circulation of certain 
entities (e.g. software algorithms). Just as calculative framing tools (e.g. IPRs, standards and 
certificates) can stabilise, their framing displays powerful mechanisms of exclusion (Callon 
and Çalişkan, 2010b: 7), which can make the framing overflow. When some actors are 
excluded from e.g. access and property rights to specific entities (e.g. algorithms), which are 
framed as ‘critical’ to the stabilisation of an emergent market (wind power-TEN), IPRs (as 
well as other framing devices) may destabilise more than stabilise. That is, rather than 
pacifying the framing of the potential product, a variety of sometimes conflicting qualities 
may emerge, destabilising the emerging TEN even further. In terms of a framing of 
sustainability, this may in particular be the case as “different organizational actors may 
define sustainability differently based on the practices that they embrace” (Garud and 
Gehman, 2012: 990). When calculative tools, modes of valuation, and marketising agencies 
conflict, controversies are likely to configure over the very right to choose calculative tools 
and to define qualities. 
Mapping controversies in the qualification of Chinese wind power 
In a developmental context of China, the construction of a market for wind power is likely to 
be entangled in concerns or (stem) issues for e.g. ‘Sustainable Development’ through 
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‘Scientific Development’. Yet, if stumbling upon exclusion processes performed by framing 
tools (IPRs, international standards) and price-setting (money and price and cost 
calculations), these exclusion processes are likely to engender ethical or political 
considerations, as well as resistance and rejection. Markets can hereby function as an 
apparatus for spurring and triggering the proliferation of new social identities and 
unexpected groups that demand to be heard, recognised, and received (Callon, 2007: 158). It 
is thus relevant to follow some of the potential 
“legal, ethical, scientific or economic debates triggered by actions of framing and assigning ownership. 
The directions taken by marketization processes are profoundly shaped by the content of these 
controversies and by their resolutions” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 8). 
Such debates may reflect how roles, positions, and identities of the different involved actors 
and ‘new social identities’ collide. Such overflowing may be further intensified when actors 
and poles are deeply intertwined. This can e.g. be the case of state-controlled markets and 
markets characterised by many SOEs, which in the case of China is sometimes constituted 
as a specific Chinese ‘system problem’.  
The marketisation analysis inquires into how overflowing is allowed and how it is being 
contained, potentially constituting a ‘pragmatic’ and experimental mode of ‘designing’ and 
‘planning’, with a particular blend of agnosticism and experimentation (Callon, 2009: 536). 
Since the recognition of emergent identities and the construction of spaces of confrontation 
are preconditions for finding economic or political solutions (Callon, 2007: 159) to an 
overflowing market, the marketisation analysis of the thesis attempts to trace the situational 
myriads of overflows and their different sources. To inquire into the diverse yet entangled 
controversies, the analysis first outlines an historical background of the marketisation of 
wind power in China as a matter of ‘boom and (potential) bust’. After this, a controversy 
mapping is conducted, diving into the magma of controversies over IPRs, standardisation, 
money, and price and cost calculations, which in turn are entangled in a Chinese ‘system 
problem’ and a potential ‘pragmatics of green marketisation’33.  
The progression of the controversy mapping of the thesis is illustrated in figure 8 below, 
which simultaneously visualises the multidimensional and potentially transformational 
dynamics of such controversies, by using the figure of electro-magnetic waves. It should be 
noted that all controversies intermingle and overlap, which tends to intensify each other’s 
                                                     
33
 This notion plays on the words of ’pragmatic’ industrial policy often ascribed to Chinese 
policy-making (Heilmann, 2008; 2009; 2011) and theoretical ’American pragmatism’, which 
has been used as way to bridge the GIN literature with a constructivist perspective. 
149 
 
dynamics. Thus, the figure is employed as a visual-analytical tool to illustrate the 
progression of the analysis, which firstly looks into the controversy over IPR, secondly into 
the controversy over certification and standardisation, thirdly over money and China’s 
‘system problem’, and lastly over money and cost calculations entangled in a Chinese 
‘pragmatics of marketisation’. Thus, the fluctuating waves do not depict how certain 
controversies come before the other; instead, they are seen as overlapping. 
Figure 8: Analytical model for mapping controversies 
 
Source: Own design – adapted model of electro-magnetic waves. 
 
Set into the context of a marketisation account, figure 9 below illustrates the overall 
structure of the controversy mapping within the software-, wind power-, and power-TENs. It 
should be noted that all controversies are overlapping and at times can be part of one or 
several TENs.  
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Figure 9: Mapping controversies over marketisation of wind power in China   
 
 
Source: Own design. 
On prospects of capturing genesis, dynamics, and agency of GIN construction 
By disassembling the GIN construct – decomposing the wind turbine and diving into 
controversies around a particular core component – the thesis inquires into the dynamics and 
agencies of shifting relations. The constructivist perspective seeks to capture some of the 
multiple actors and dynamics involved in the genesis of GINs. In figure 10 below, a few 
examples of the heterogeneous actors, calculative devices, intermediaries, and issues 
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potentially to be captured in the mapping of controversies of green marketisation in China 
are illustrated. These are not normally captured through a GIN account. 
Figure 10: Examples of unexpected actors 
 
Source: Own design. 
 
By opening the black box of the GIN construct and mapping the controversies it configures, 
the thesis argues that by diving into the ‘magma’ of controversies over green marketisation 
in China – and capturing some of the ‘Chinese characteristics’ of green marketisation in 
China - insights into the genesis, dynamics, and agency of GINs can be gained. This will be 
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explored as the thesis now moves on to the analysis (Chapters 6-12) of Part III, which 
adopts the constructivist perspective as outlined above. Later, in Part IV, the thesis 
elaborates on the potential contributions from such constructivist perspective to the GIN 
literature. 
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Part III: Analysis – Mapping Controversies in China’s Emerging Wind 
Power Market  
 
 
After having met and talked briefly at the China Wind Power Conference in 2012, I am 
pleased to finally have managed setting up a meeting with this foreign wind power scientist, 
before I am soon going back on fieldwork in China.  
“The important part to understand is that…well, they [the Chinese] have had a lot of different agendas 
along the way. Well, they also had an industrial policy agenda, and that was very obvious, and they 
didn’t conceal that either. Wind power development – that was industrial policy. In the beginning, it was 
about building an industry, and then within a number of years, China was meant to become competitive. 
Chinese industry experts were predicting that, within a certain number of years, based on the industrial 
base, China would be able to produce quality wind turbines. But quality was not the first step. That was 
not the important thing in the beginning. The most important was to make the industry try…to let them 
try out producing turbines. And then see if any turbines could come out of that, and find out who were 
getting good at it, while giving a lot of financial support at the same time”. 
As I board the plane to China, I am filled with anxiety, but also hope…I am looking forward 
to tracing the genesis, dynamics, and agency of China’s wind power market in China. What 
shape the story will take, though, I am still not sure! 
 
Parts I and II have positioned the thesis and provided the theoretical and methodological 
backdrop for the following marketisation analysis in Part III (Chapters 6-12). Each chapter 
of the following analysis begins with a short empirical vignette, which renders an account of 
the personal ‘scientific journey’ of the researcher, while contributing to the narrative that 
each of the chapters of the analysis constitutes in itself. Together, the seven chapters of the 
analysis provide an emplotted ‘story’ on (green) marketisation in China. Each chapter 
concludes by short theoretical considerations in relation to a constructivist perspective.  
The first three chapters of the analysis (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) provide an historical 
background for understanding the emergence of a potential wind power-TEN (Techno-
Economic Network) as well as of a potentially emerging software-TEN. The three 
introductory chapters lead to a detailed controversy mapping conducted in Chapters 9-12. In 
the two controversy mappings, a ‘micro’-relational ‘algorithmic’ account of controversies 
over intellectual property (rights) (IPRs) and standardisation, taking shape around software 
algorithms, is offered. In this way, the two algorithmic controversy-mappings dive into 
dynamics around the pacification of goods, as referred to in Part II. The last two 
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controversy-mappings shed additional light on the paradoxes and dynamics illustrated in the 
two former controversy mappings, diving into dynamics of price-setting. This is done first 
by mapping a controversy over money, which is entangled in a so-called Chinese ‘system 
problem’ of corporate restructuring and ‘capitalist transition’. Second, the last controversy 
mapping looks into a controversy over price and cost calculations, which is entangled in a 
controversy over the sustainability of a seeming Chinese ‘pragmatics of green 
marketisation’. Together, this controversy cartography provides a picture of a paradoxical 
collaborative and competitive space marked by negotiation and ambiguity, in which 
identities, roles, positions, relations, and qualities are contested.  
Overall, it is the ambition of the thesis that Part III can capture some of the ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ of green marketisation in China, indirectly contributing to an insight into the 
genesis, agency, and dynamics of GIN construction within Chinese wind power. Part III 
concludes by summing up on the main findings from the analysis (Chapters 6-12), in light 
of a constructivist perspective of marketisation. On this basis, Part IV discusses some of the 
potential contributions to the GIN literature (Chapter 13) from the constructivist 
perspective. Having concluding on insights for a constructivist and GIN perspective 
respectively, Chapter 14 concludes on the dually motivated research question, which leads 
to a discussion on wider implications for related literatures (Chapter 15). 
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Chapter 6. The Emergence of a Chinese Wind Power-TEN in China?  
 
 
Silently, I sit listening to the foreign wind power expert. We have talked for a long time this 
morning about the rapid and volatile development of China’s wind turbine industry. Now he 
turns his attention to the current challenges that seem to be facing the wind power market. 
To do this, he refers back to the initial Renewable Energy Law, which focused on scale-up 
of installed capacity of wind power:  
”I found it a senseless policy back then – when the new wind power market started up around 2005…a 
bad policy…because you use a lot of resources, areable land…eh, and grid, electricity grid in order to 
install some poor technology. But according to the Chinese experts, this was not a problem back 
then…they said, ’we have enough land, we will make sure to maintain them, it will be okay’. They based 
this argument on a rationale of low production costs, that is, China will have a comparative advantage 
just being cheaper. This was used to argue for not having to develop in technological terms. ’We can 
make do with the second-las [technology] generation’. Nevertheless, some Chinese experts were critical 
towards the lack of requirements and standards for wind farm design and wind turbine quality…But back 
then, the only thing that mattered, and the only thing really demanded in the Renewable Energy Law, 
was just Megawatt…how much Megawatt could be installed. Whether the turbine would run, they didn’t 
care. It was all about capacity [measured in Gigawatt], and nothing about productivity [measured in 
Gigawatt per hour]”. 
Is something new about to happen in China’s wind power industry I wonder, as I walk 
home. 
 
Historical overview of the potential genesis of a Chinese wind power-TEN in China 
The analysis starts with Chapter 6 offering an historical backdrop for understanding the 
rapid development of a potential Chinese wind power-TEN, which has already been hinted 
at in earlier Parts I and II.  
This is done by looking into how policies and regulations have been employed over time in 
China to mobilise rapid growth in installed capacity of wind power, which is measured in 
Gigawatt. As the resulting rapid quantitative growth has led to diverse quality issues, 
however, the framing of wind power as sustainable seems to have become unstable. The 
chapter hereby points towards an emerging ‘qualification struggle’ taking place in China’s 
wind power market. The chapter first offers an account of the emergence of a 
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comprehensive notion of sustainability in China, which has been linked closely by the 
Chinese political leadership to the doctrine of so-called Scientific Development as well as to 
a broader narrative of China’s catch-up and industrial upgrading. Entangled in concerns for 
‘sustainable catch-up’, the chapter secondly offers an historical outline of the diverse range 
of policies and plans in support of renewable energies, in particular wind power. Thirdly, the 
chapter looks into how different poles of a potential wind power-TEN seem to be gradually 
assembled. Next, the chapter inquires into the current quality crisis and consolidation, in 
which the very sustainability of the emerging wind power-TEN seems to be put increasingly 
into question. The chapter ends by pointing towards a potential reconfiguration – or a 
‘qualitative shift’ – of China’s potentially emerging wind power-TEN, leading on to Chapter 
7, which dives further into a potential ‘turn to quality’ in Chinese policies, regulations, and 
plans on wind power. 
Sustainability in China – a matter of Scientific Development? 
In order to understand the rapid growth of China’s wind power sector, it is necessary to 
understand how wind power as a renewable energy source has been framed as sustainable. 
First, however, this requires a brief outline of the genealogy of the very notion of 
sustainability in China.  
Towards a comprehensive ‘developmental’ framing of sustainability 
China’s transformation from a low-income centralised planned economy into an emerging 
industrialising giant has brought with it vast, detrimental environmental effects. With rising 
concerns over environmental degradation, an emerging regulatory framework for China’s 
fossil fuel-dominated energy sector has emerged. This includes i.a. supportive policies, 
regulations, and plans for the development of renewable energies. Although environmental 
concerns (and concerns for energy security) are linked to the Chinese notion of sustainability 
and the development of renewable energies, the very notion of sustainability in China is 
being constituted by and linked to a wider web of ideas concerning China’s general social 
and economic development strategy (Christensen, 2013: 69, 91; Lewis, 2013; Fan, 2006). In 
the following, the chapter inquires into how sustainability has been constituted as a matter of 
what may be termed ‘developmentalist concerns’ of a newly industrialised country. 
Sustainable development and the aim of a “Harmonious Socialist Society” 
Whereas industrial growth was the overarching mantra of the first generations of China’s 
communist political leadership, the notion of ‘Sustainable Development’ has been gradually 
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incorporated into the party doctrine of China’s Communist Party (CCP) (Christensen, 2013; 
Fan, 2006), marking its legitimisation. Below follows a brief account of how a 
comprehensive notion of sustainable development has been developed, as part of a potential 
‘new economic mode’ of China’s modernisation project. 
A ‘social’ vision for China’s sustainable development – the Harmonious Socialist 
Society 
The idea of sustainable development entered Chinese political discourse in 1994 when 
China formulated its own Agenda 21, two years after China’s participation in the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 (Christensen, 2013: 69). 
Whereas the 3rd generation of China’s leadership (1992-2003/Jiang Zemin) was relatively 
liberal in economic terms (Meidan et al., 2009: 593), promoting the notion of ‘common 
prosperity’ (Jiang Zemin, 1995: 12 in Christensen, 2013: 84 ), a more ‘social’ vision for 
China’s economic and social development was developed during the subsequent 4th 
generation (Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao, 2003-2012). During the 4th generation, while holding 
back on giving freer rein to market mechanisms although continuing market reforms 
(Meidan et al., 2009: 592), emphasis was put more on social equity and a more balanced 
growth pattern (Meidan et al., 2009: 593; Fan, 2006; Christensen, 2013). This is e.g. 
reflected in slogans such as ‘the Moderately Well-Off Society’/‘a well-off society in an all-
round way’, which through people-centered growth and putting people first (yiren weiben 
/一人为本) should contribute to ensuring common prosperity (gongtong fuyu /共同富裕) 
(Fan, 2006; Christensen, 2013: 85, 86). Hereby, it was only with the 4th leadership 
generation that sustainability as a matter of sustainable development was taking a centre 
stage in plans and policies, being linked to a web of other ideas (Fan, 2006), which all form 
part of the overarching objective of establishing a so-called Harmonious Socialist Society 
(shehui zhuyi hexie sheshui / 社会主义和谐社会) (Fan, 2006; Meidan et al., 2009) with 
long-term, environmentally, and socially sustainable, economic development. This ‘social’ 
vision for China’s sustainable economic and social development, which denotes a 
remarkable shift away from the previous development philosophy of ‘letting some get rich 
first’ (Deng Xiaoping 1978; in Fan, 2006; Christensen, 2013), is continued by China’s 
current political leadership (Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang-administration, 2013-continued). This is 
e.g. reflected in the recent slogan of the ‘Chinese Dream’ (zhongguomeng / 中国梦) 
(People’s Daily, May 11, 2014; The Economist, May 4, 2013), which reflects a goal of 
achieving a harmonious, stable, peaceful, equitable, and sustainable development (PWC, 
2013; The Economist May 4, 2013).  
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Achieving a Harmonious Socialist Society through Scientific Development 
The goal of a ‘Harmonious (Socialist) Society’ is to be achieved through Scientific 
Development, that is, through a so-called ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ (Meidan et 
al., 2009; Fan, 2006; Christensen, 2013) (科学发展观), which is a notion, which was 
introduced in 2003 by President Hu Jintao (Christensen, 2013: 85, 86). However, the idea 
that science, technology, and education are critical to ‘Sustainable Development’ was 
already expressed earlier, e.g. in 1996 when China “adopted ‘Sustainable Development’ and 
‘invigorating China through science and education’ as principles in the national guidelines 
for development (Christensen, 2013: 84). As the ideas of a ‘Scientific Outlook on 
Development’ and ‘Sustainable Development’ were enshrined in Party doctrines of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CPC) in 2007 (Christensen, 2013: 86), Scientific Development 
has become constituted as a critical means to comprehensive, balanced and sustainable 
development (Christensen, 2013: 85, 86). Put briefly, a “harmonious society is the objective 
and scientific development is the method to reach it” (Fan, 2006: 709-717). Linking 
doctrines and ideas of Sustainable Development with the goal of a Harmonious Socialist 
Society through the means of Scientific Development marks a way of constituting 
sustainability in comprehensive terms. That is, sustainability and sustainable development is 
a matter not only of environmental concerns and efficient resource consumption, but also of  
“what type of industrial production the government was promoting. An industrial upgrading was called 
for with an increased reliance on advances in science and technology” (Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th 
Party Congress. Chapter V. Promoting Sound and Rapid Development of the National Economy in 
Christensen, 2013: 86). 
The notion of Scientific Development, framed as a means of Sustainable Development 
towards a ‘harmonious socialist society’, is consequently being linked to industrial 
upgrading.  
Scientific Development as a matter of industrial upgrading and advances in core 
technologies 
While critical to achieving the goal of sustainable development, Scientific Development is in 
turn to be achieved through science, education, and industrial upgrading within ‘Core 
Technologies’ (Christensen, 2013: 85). In this regard, so-called ‘indigenous innovation’ 
(zizhu chuangxin / 自主创新) capabilities, i.e. capabilities of ‘homebred’ or ’independent’ 
innovation, is based on the urge to reduce dependence on Western technology (Christensen, 
2013: 89; Serger and Breidne, 2007). The idea of indigenous innovation has been promoted 
systematically by the Chinese leadership since 2004 “as a way for China to climb up the 
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global value chain” (Christensen, 2013: 88). In this way, building ‘indigenous innovation’ 
capabilities within core technologies is being constituted as a solution to the issue of China’s 
sustainable development.  
Sustainable development as ‘scientific developmentalism’ – a note on China’s 
‘economic mode’ 
The above description has shown how a web of notions around sustainable development has 
gradually been developed. In particular, the notion of a “Scientific Outlook on 
Development” and the national guidelines for development, i.e. the guideline of 
‘invigorating China through science and education’ to achieve sustainable development, 
have become “increasingly intertwined as a new way of thinking development in China” 
(Christensen, 2013: 86). In this way, “a comprehensive, programmatic idea of sustainability 
becomes elevated to a ‘national guideline of sustainable development’” (Christensen, 2013: 
90), representing what may be termed a specific type of ‘scientific developmentalism’ 
(Naughton, 2011) and a reflection of a ‘new economic mode’ (Christensen, 2013: 83). In 
other words, Sustainable Development is linked to China’s ‘socialist modernisation’ through 
the means of a Scientific Outlook on Development (Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th Party 
Congress, in Christensen, 2013: 87), launched in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Opening Up 
Reforms’ and the strategy of ‘letting some get rich first’ (Deng in Christensen, 2013: 84). 
China’s socialist modernisation project along the protracted transitioning process from a so-
called planned to a market-based economy has been marked by cautious and still ongoing 
market and liberalisation reforms (Meidan et al., 2009: 593; PWC, 2013). Over time, framed 
variably as the official ideology of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ associated with 
the Open Door Policy (1978) and a ‘socialist market economy’ (1992), both attributed to 
Deng Xiaoping, the more recent ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ can “be seen as the 
substantiation of the milestones of the second phase in the national tale” (Christensen, 2013: 
86), as China attempts to move from an extensive economic growth model towards an 
intensive economic growth model (former President Jiang Zemin, 1995: 8 in Christensen, 
2013: 83). In this shift, science and technology is positioned as a critical means for 
Sustainable Development. Below, the timeline in figure 11 seeks to depict some of the most 
noticeable developments in China’s conceptualisation of sustainability and sustainable 
development. 
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Figure 11: Timeline over notions of Sustainable and Scientific Development in China 
 
Source: Own design; based on Christensen, 2013; Fan, 2006; Serger and Breidne, 2007; Meidan et al., 
2009. 
Ensuring the great renaissance of China through Science & Technology 
As indigenous innovation capabilities within core technologies have been positioned as a 
critical means of Scientific Development towards a sustainable development in the 
realisation of the second part of China’s national tale, a host of plans, regulations, and 
policies on innovation and Science & Technology (S&T) have been issued. In particular, the 
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology’s (MOST) 15-year National Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology in the Medium and Long Term (2006-2020) (MLP 
S&T) links the notion of scientific development to the rejuvenation of China (MLP 
S&T(II(1)). Further, following the concept of scientific development, the plan claims that 
China ”must strive for the prosperous development of China’s scientific and technological 
enterprise so as to realize the goals of the full-fledged construction of a well-to-do society 
and provide powerful S&T support for building a harmonious socialist society” (MLP 
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S&T(II(1)). Overall, the plan encapsulates entangled objectives of “indigenous innovation, 
leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and leading the future” (MLP 
S&T(II(1)) to realise “the great renaissance of the Chinese nation” (MLP S&T, preface). 
Hereby, China’s S&T policy is being inscribed into a wider narrative of China’s overall 
development, catch-up, and renaissance. Overall, the MLP S&T seeks to transform China’s 
S&T system into a national innovation system, e.g. including strategies on IPRs and 
standards (China’s Intellectual Property Rights Strategy and Technology Standards Strategy) 
and the expansion of international and regional S&T cooperation and exchanges. 
Accordingly, in addition to the MLP S&T, a comprehensive policy framework has been 
developed in regard to e.g. IPRs and standards. This has particularly gathered pace since 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Ernst, 2013). China’s 
innovation policy (including policies on S&T, standards, and IPRs) can be seen as an 
integral part of strengthening China’s domestic innovative capacity as a key to transforming 
China’s economy beyond the export-oriented ’global factory’ model (Ernst, 2013: 2). In the 
following, the chapter briefly accounts for how different ‘frontier’ technologies and research 
areas are framed as critical in aligning with the narrative of China’s rejuvenation and 
renaissance. 
Selected frontier technologies and research areas – on software, renewable energies, 
and manufacturing 
To achieve the goal of a harmonious socialist society and ensure the renaissance of China, 
the plan develops a vision for “frontier technologies and basic research, which will, in turn, 
create new market demands and new industries expected to lead the future economic growth 
and social development” (MLP S&T, preface/(II(1)). Striving “for breakthroughs in key, 
enabling technologies that are urgently needed for the sustainable and coordinated economic 
and social development” (MLP S&T(II(1)), the plan selects a number of main areas, priority 
topics (e.g. renewables, the manufacturing industry, IT and software (the ‘Information 
Industry and Modern Service Industry’)). In addition, it outlines ‘major special projects’ and 
various ’frontier technologies’34, and ’frontier scientific basic research issues’35  (MLP S&T, 
III/MLP S&T, VI, 3(6); MLP S&T, VI, 3(10)). These are often related to IT, software, core 
mathematics, manufacturing, and (renewable) energies. For instance, the MLP S&T 
emphasises the need to raise the capability of equipment design, manufacturing, and 
                                                     
34
 E.g. information technology (IT), advanced manufacturing technologies, and advanced energy 
technologies. 
35
 E.g. core mathematics and its application in cross disciplines and key scientific issues in 
sustainable energy development. 
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integration, e.g. by promoting technological innovation, realising proprietary design and 
manufacturing of high-end programmed machine tools and key components. It further 
highlights the need for transforming and upgrading manufacturing industry using high 
technology (MLP S&T). In addition to the MLP S&T, a host of strategies, plans, and laws 
are positioning core technologies, often related directly or indirectly to wind power, as 
critical to China’s sustainable development trajectory and the transformation from a ‘global 
factory’ to an innovation-based development. In the following, the chapter inquires into how 
renewable energies, in particular wind power, have been constituted as part of China’s 
Sustainable Development, and constituting a means of China’s Scientific Development 
towards it. 
China’s energy policy as sustainable scientific development 
The doctrines of Scientific Development and sustainable development have also had an 
impact on China’s Energy Policy (2012). Thus, as stated in China’s Energy Policy,  
”China will continue to take the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guiding principle, and work 
hard to transform its development pattern, giving prominence to building a resource-conserving and 
environment-friendly society. It relies on scientific, technological and system innovation to raise 
efficiency in all aspects of energy utilization, further develop new and renewable energy resources, and 
promote the clean and efficient development and utilization of fossil energy resources” (Energy Policy 
2012, preface).  
In addition, the Energy Policy aligns itself with the comprehensive, developmentalist 
doctrine of sustainable development of the economy, society, and ecology, ”as the country 
moves towards its goals of modernization and common prosperity for its people” (Energy 
Policy 2012, preface). In addition, the Energy Policy mentions the strategic role of core 
technologies (and the need to reduce dependency on foreign import of these), key 
equipment, and the need for further R&D, international cooperation, standardisation, and 
technological upgrading as well as a more environment-friendly energy mix (Energy Policy 
2012). 
Renewable energies and wind power as matter of sustainable and scientific 
development 
With regard to renewable energies as part of the energy policy, these have recently been 
promoted as constituting an increasingly important strategic sector in China, although still 
only accounting for a minor role in the overall energy mix. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
(5YP) (2011-2015) promotes renewable energy as one amongst several other “strategic and 
emerging” industries, namely industries such as energy saving and environmental 
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protection, next generation IT, biotechnology, high-end manufacturing, new energy 
(nuclear, solar, wind, and biomass), new materials, and clean- energy vehicles (Lewis, 2013: 
23). These new strategic and emerging industries are replacing the often state-owned old 
strategic pillar industries such as coal, oil, national defense, telecom, electricity, airlines, and 
marine shipping (Lewis, 2013: 23).  Apart from being constituted as ‘strategic’, the rationale 
for supporting renewable energies is largely based on the concern for ‘sustainable 
development’. This is e.g. reflected in the Medium and Long Term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energies (MLP RE (2007)):  
”In order to speed up the development of renewable energy, promote energy conservation and reduce 
pollutants, mitigate climate change, and better meet the requirements of sustainable social and economic 
development, the Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China is 
formulated” (MLP RE 2007 p. 1/preface). 
While renewable energies have been included in earlier plans and policies36, it was 
particularly during the ‘revolutionary’ 11th 5YP (2006-2010) (Fan, 2006) that emphasis on 
the renewable sector was linked to the emerging, comprehensive notion of sustainability 
(REN21, 2009; Fan, 2006). Linking renewable energies to China’s sustainable and scientific 
development and being framed as a means towards the goal of a harmonious socialist 
society, renewable energies have been framed within the wider narrative of China’s 
sustainable development. In addition to the 11th and 12th 5YPs (2011-2015) (the latter 
continuing the focus on sustainable development and renewable energies) for the general 
social and economic development of China, specific action plans for each renewable energy 
source (e.g. wind power) have been formulated in different dedicated 5YPs for renewable 
energy. In particular, a watershed shift in terms of emphasis on renewable energies was 
marked with the Renewable Energy Law (REL) (2005) and the Medium- and Long-Term 
Plan for Renewable Energies (MLP RE) (Fan, 2006: 709-717; Klagge et al., 2012: 379). The 
single legitimising reason of the REL (2005) is to ensure “the sustainable development of 
the economy and society” (REL, 2005, art. 1). The REL is China’s first comprehensive 
policy document for the promotion of renewable energy (Cherni and Kentish, 2007: 3618). 
In addition, different policies and plans emphasise the need to develop indigenous 
innovation capabilities within renewable energies. For instance, as expressed in the MLP RE 
(2007), “China should also develop selfdependent [indigenous] innovation abilities as the 
basis for its renewable energy R&D and industry development system” (MLP RE 2007: 
                                                     
36
 Alternative energy was already included in China’s 5th 5YP, and the Electricity Law (1995) 
encouraged supply of power in rural areas through wind, solar energy, and biomass in 1995.  
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2.2). This includes the absorption of foreign technologies in order to establish China’s own 
domestic manufacturing capability (MLP2007: 5(5)):  
“On the basis of bringing in foreign technology from abroad, the capacity to absorb and innovate should 
be strengthened, so that, as soon as possible, selfdependent innovation capabilities are achieved” 
(MLP2007: 5(5)). 
In addition, goals are set for China’s “domestic manufacturing capability based mainly on 
China’s own IPRs […] satisfying the needs for deploying renewable energy on a large scale 
in China” (MLP2007: 5(5)). This reflects an overall strategy of building indigenous 
innovation capabilities. The comprehensive notion of sustainability, as a matter of achieving 
a harmonious socialist society through scientific development and by mastering core 
technologies, has not only been linked to renewable energies in general but also to wind 
power in particular. For instance, apart from constituting a central, ‘mature’ renewable 
energy source in the REL (2006) and being framed as a sustainable ’new energy’ under 
’encouraged development’ (People’s Daily Online, May 11, 2011; Lewis, 2013), a 5YP, 
specifically directed at the ’Scientific and Technological Development of Wind Power’, 
links wind power to China’s Sustainable and Scientific Development (12th Five-Year Plan 
for the Scientific and Technological Development of Wind Power, 
关于印发风力发电科技发展“十二五”专项规划的通知,国科发计(2012) 197号; hereafter 
5YP S&T Wind Power*).  
Mobilising concerns for developing a wind power-TEN 
Having outlined the genealogy of the Chinese notion of Sustainable Development and its 
connection to Scientific Development in the above, and how it has been linked to renewable 
energies such as wind power, it has been indicated how the notion of sustainability has been 
strategically employed by the Chinese political leaderhip as a ‘narrative tool/interessement 
device’ to mobilise i.a. a wind power market. That is, linking sustainability to broader 
discourses of China’s catch-up and reinvigoration, sustainability has been construed with 
temporal properties, rendering a story on China’s ‘renaissance’. Due to its equivocal 
qualities, sustainability is constituted as a ‘stem issue’. Such stem issue has largely worked 
to enrol heterogeneous actors, e.g. WTMs, scientists, wind turbines, and core technologies, 
to engage in solving some of the diverse challenges linked to China’s sustainable and 
Scientific Development. In this way, it seems that the Chinese political leadership is 
attempting to install itself as translator-spokesperson on behalf of a potentially emerging 
wind power-TEN. As expressed by a Chinese wind turbine manufacturer (WTM): “What 
drives the growth is the Chinese policy. With the passage of the Renewable Energy Law 
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[REL]. That was kind of a kick off” (Int. 3). Accordingly, in industry reports and scholarly 
analyses on China’s wind power market, the REL is being framed as critical to the rapid 
growth of China’s wind turbine industry since 2005 (Li, 2010; Yu et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 
2012b; Korsnes, 2014; Wang et al., 2011). This is e.g. due to how the REL introduces ”a 
mandatory grid-connection system, national target system, cost-sharing scheme, and feed-in 
tariff scheme” (REL, 2006). Hereby, despite the general character of the REL, “the law was 
an unequivocal declaration of intent to promote renewable energy both as a part of the total 
energy mix and as an area of industrial and technological development” (Lema and Ruby, 
2007: 3886). Consequently, with the REL,  
”the Chinese electricity generating companies were asked to enter this [renewable energy sector]; as 
wind energy is a more mature technology than solar; the wind power industrial chain is long, it is 
leading the industry, so we had to choose a major industry, and wind energy was receiving more 
national attention (Int. 4*, 2011).  
Overall, the political pole’s wind power policy continues to play a central role in wind 
power (Fang et al., 2012: 350). In addition to the aforementioned interessement devices, a 
host of other tools have been employed by the emerging political pole to spur the genesis of 
a wind power-TEN. In particular, these are linked to money. That is, what moves and drives 
wind energy development in China is largely ‘show me the money’ (Lam et al., 2013: 423).  
Thus, financial and regulatory support including investment and R&D subsidies, tax breaks, 
favourable pool purchase pricing of wind power, tax exemptions or reductions, financial 
subsidies, government-run projects (concessions, 2003-2009), and fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT), 
have all played a critical role in spurring industrial growth (Klagge, Liu et al., 2011; Fang et 
al., 2012: 350). In the following, some of the central policies and regulations directed at 
spurring growth in the wind market industry are outlined, many of which have been focused 
on quantitative growth in installed capacity. First, however, a brief historical account of a 
gradually more coordinated policy effort towards wind power is outlined, set into the 
context of China’s power sector.  
From fragmented to concentrated efforts at constructing a wind power market 
China’s wind turbine manufacturing industry was founded in the late 1980s, relatively late 
compared to mature, advanced Western wind turbine industries. In general, the development 
of a policy framework for China’s wind turbine industry can be divided into several stages 
(e.g. Li, 2010; Lema and Ruby, 2007), moving gradually from more ‘fragmented’ (i.e. 
uncoordinated) efforts towards more concentrated (coordinated) efforts (Lema and Ruby, 
2007). Starting out with limited experience (Lema and Ruby, 2007; Korsnes, 2014; Liu and 
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Kokko, 2010; Wiser and Lewis, 2007; Li, 2010), wind power investment was in the initial 
years primarily undertaken in the form of scientific research or state demonstration projects 
without commercialisation, largely based on foreign grants, soft loans, and foreign aid (Zhao 
et al., 2012a: 227-228; Lema and Ruby, 2007). Since the early 1990s, efforts at building a 
wind turbine manufacturing industry became more coordinated, mainly through the Ride the 
Wind Programme (1996), in which Sino-foreign joint ventures were promoted, as well as 
through the National 863 hi-tech scientific research plan and other Science and Technology-
advancing projects (S&T) (Cherni and Kentish, 2007; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Wang et al., 
2011; Lema and Ruby, 2007; Li, 2010). 
Whereas the period up until 2002 was marked by an extensive fragmentation of authority, 
reflecting an indecisive Chinese leadership as to whether China should seek to establish its 
own domestic industry or rely on turbine import (Lema and Ruby, 2007), the pace and 
coordination of development changed with the beginning of the so-called wind farm 
concession programme/wind tender programme, introduced in 2003 and running until 2009 
(García, 2013: 130). Corresponding more or less with the time of the introduction of the 
doctrine of Scientific Development, a central decision was made to boost (local) indigenous 
wind turbine production through such wind farm concession programme, which implies 
large government-led wind farm concessions with a guaranteed grid-connection tariff, 
determined by the tendering process (Li, 2010: 1159). As a tender system, developers of 
wind power were invited by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to 
bid for a given site that had been chosen by the government and assessed for wind resources 
(Lema and Ruby, 2007; Wang et al., 2011: 146; Zhao et al., 2012b; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; 
García, 2013; Korsnes, 2014). The concession programme marked a shift towards 
centralised, large-scale commercialisation of wind farms. 
Increased coordination – on unbundling in the power sector 
The shift towards more concentrated efforts in China’s wind power market came alongside 
the general ‘unbundling’ of China’s power sector. That is, although China’s power sector 
has undergone several rounds of liberalisation reforms, the major restructuring of the energy 
sector did not come until 2002, when power generation was unbundled from transmission. 
This means that the pre-existing China State Power Corporation was split into two grid 
companies (State Grid Corporation of China (hereafter, State Grid) and China Southern 
Power Grid Corporation) and five separate power generating companies, the so-called ‘Big 
Five’ (the Huaneng Group, Huadian Corporation, China Datang Corporation, Guodian 
Corporation, China Power Investment Group, accounting for 40 per cent of the installed 
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capacity in China) (Yu et al., 2009: 5223; García, 2013; Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5523; Lema 
and Ruby, 2007)37. Further, along with the concession strategy in 2003, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, and in particular, the Energy Bureau of the 
NDRC), which has departments at local levels (local Development and Reform 
Commissions (DRCs) (Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3885), took on a more active role in 
coordinating supply and demand for wind power and for renewable energy in general (Lema 
and Ruby, 2007; Korsnes, 2014). Consequently, a more coherent policy for the wind power 
sector was to be developed (Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5523). In the following, the chapter looks 
further into policies which have spurred quantitative growth in China’s wind power 
installations and the build-up of indigenous, local manufacturing capabilities.   
Policies spurring quantitative growth (scale-up) and delegating responsibilities 
Along with more coordinated efforts to construct a base for commercialising wind power, 
numerous policies and regulations have been introduced over time. First, the chapter looks 
into policies and regulations which have focused on spurring quantity-based growth, 
including targets for installed capacity (GW), responsibility delegation between involved 
actors, and fiscal and financial aids and pricing policies.  
Setting national targets for installed capacity 
First, while the aforementioned concession programme constitutes a quantity-based system 
for promotion of renewable energies (García, 2013: 130), other supportive policies for scale-
up are e.g. quantitative national targets. That is, a national target system for the development 
and utilisation of renewable energy was introduced with the REL, whereby targets for 
installed capacity of wind power, measured in GW, are set at the central level by the energy 
authorities of the State Council for both mid- and long-term (REL, art. 4). A few years later, 
the MLP RE (2007) set a target for wind power for 2020 at 30 GW wind (including 1 GW 
offshore) (MLP RE, 2007). Yet, this target was later revised upwards to 100 GW by 2020, 
as the target had already been met by 2010 (García, 2013: 135; Wang et al., 2011). In 
addition, the MLP RE set market share targets for non-hydro renewable electricity at 10 per 
cent in 2010 and 15 per cent in 2020 of China’s total primary energy consumption (MLP 
RE, 2007)38. Although these targets are not compulsory (García, 2013: 135), targets for wind 
power have several times been superseded before time.  
                                                     
37
 In addition to these Big Five, a number of smaller generating companies were established. 
38 In China, electricity generated by wind power accounted for 2.6 per cent of the national total 
in 2013, an increase of 0.5 per cent from 2012 (GWEC, 2014: 42). 
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Delegating responsibilities to wind power generators, grid companies, and governments 
Second, in order to ensure that targets can be met, policies have been formulated to ensure a 
supply and demand for the wind power by delegating responsibilities to the different actors 
involved. For instance, the REL requires grid companies to purchase all the generated 
electricity (REL, art. 4; Lewis, 2007). Further, through the concession programme, the 
NDRC sought to ensure ”that power companies are compelled to produce wind power and 
grid companies are compelled to buy it” (Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3885). Measures to ensure 
compliance by both wind power generators, wind power transmitters (grid companies), and 
wind power consumers (local governments) have been undertaken, e.g. through 
mandatory/mandated market shares (MMS), national renewable energy portfolio standards 
(RPS), and power purchase agreements (PPAs) (Bloomberg, 2012: 3). Further, a cost 
sharing mechanism has been introduced, ensuring that the incremental cost of wind power is 
shared within the provincial power grid (nationwide since 2006) (Wang et al., 2011: 138, 
146) (in REL 2005; Amendment to REL, 2009).  
First of all, MMSs have been introduced in the MLP RE in order to ensure supply of 
renewable energy power. That is, MMSs oblige power generating companies (that is, the 
Big Five) to source a proportion of their power from renewable energy generation and thus 
to invest in wind farms (Bloomberg, 2012: 2; Cherni and Kentish, 2007: 3624; Lema and 
Ruby, 2007). In terms of demand-side goals, grid corporations are required to source a 
certain share of its transmitted power from non-hydro renewables (Bloomberg, 2012: 2). 
Other demand-side related means are PPAs (e.g. seen in the concession programme) as well 
as the mandatory grid connection system introduced in the REL. These instruments oblige 
grid companies to ensure that all electricity generated by wind projects is purchased by the 
provincial power grid company (Wang et al., 2011: 146; Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3888; 
García, 2013: 132; Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5524), as well as obliging grid companies to 
provide each wind farm facility with connection to the grid (García, 2013: 132). Due to lack 
of enforcement, however, the REL Amendment, which was issued in 2009, introduced 
stronger central supervision and control of grid companies to ensure the purchase of 
renewable power, and introduced fines on grid companies for non-compliance (Bloomberg, 
2010). Lastly, the demand-related scheme also obliges local governments to consume the 
renewable energy generated, transmitted, and dispatched to local consumers (Lema and 
Ruby, 2007: 3888). 
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Fiscal and financial aids and pricing policies 
Third, fiscal and financial aids and pricing policies have been employed over time to ensure 
growth and compliance to targets and agreements. To counter the higher costs of generating 
wind power compared with fossil fuels, a host of fiscal and financial aids and preferential 
pricing policies and tax rebates, as well as preferential loans and fiscal aids such as tax 
reductions, have been introduced over time (e.g. REL, art. 25, 26; García, 2013; Lewis and 
Wiser, 2007; Cherni and Kentish, 2007). In addition, an important part of supporting the 
development of wind power in China has been the establishment of a pricing system. The 
development of the pricing system has undergone several stages, experimenting with setting 
prices that cover the costs of wind power.  
From 1986 to the early 1990s, wind power prices were extremely low and similar to thermal 
power, making it unattractive for investors due to the higher generating costs (Zhao et al., 
2012a: 227-228; Wang et al., 2011: 146). Later, from 1994 to 1997, grid companies were 
obliged to purchase wind power at a price determined by repayment of capital with interest, 
yet, still being more or less similar to thermal power (Zhao et al., 2012a: 227-228; Wang et 
al., 2011: 146). From 1998 to 2002, the price was negotiated on a case by case basis between 
wind farms and the former Power Grid Company (now, the State Grid) (Zhao et al., 2012a: 
228). It was particularly during the period with concessions, however, that experiments were 
undertaken to find the ‘appropriate’ price, in order to ensure that wind power prices were 
held above wind power generating costs, which so far entailed that wind power prices must 
be higher than thermal power prices (Zhao et al., 2012a; Wang et al., 2011). In the tender 
system, investors were invited to submit offers/bids, specifying the lowest price at which the 
investor was prepared to supply electricity to the grid (Wang et al., 2011: 140). In effect, 
two pricing systems existed during the concession period, namely (1) wind power 
concession bidding pricing and (2) government-led pricing, based on local benchmarked 
coal prices and a wind power compensation model (Wang et al., 2011: 140). Whereas 
concession projects were above 50 MW, smaller wind farm projects were approved by 
government contracts with power generating companies through PPAs (Li, 2010: 1160).  
As tender pricing had a tendency to result in below cost pricing, however, bidding was over 
time complemented with examination and approval pricing39 (Zhao et al., 2012a: 228; Liao 
                                                     
39
 Bidding prices in the four years of concession projects were in the range of 0.373-0.519 
yuan/kWh, whereas financially feasible prices were deemed to be around 0.566-0.703 
yuan/kWh (Li et al., 2006 in Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3887). Even though there were hopes for a 
FIT in the REL, it was only in 2009 that it was finally implemented (Lema and Ruby, 2007: 
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et al., 2010). The final approval price was based on ’cost plus revenue’, ensuring that a 
revenue would be earned (Zhao et al., 2012a: 228). Finally, in the period from 2009 till now, 
a fixed benchmark pricing (Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs)) and bidding pricing system has 
eventually been introduced by the NDRC. The FITs/benchmark prices are divided into four 
different levels, according to four geographical regions which China has been divided into, 
based on regional differences in wind energy resources and engineering construction 
conditions (Zhao et al., 2012a: 228; Wang et al., 2011; García, 2013; Korsnes, 2014). Apart 
from supporting the development of a wind power market through quantitative targets, 
delegating responsibilities, and support through financial and fiscal means, policies have 
also spurred local indigenous manufacturing capabilities, e.g. through localisation policies, 
attraction of foreign technologies, and support of Research and Development (R&D) . 
Policies spurring localisation of production and improving indigenous capabilities 
Many of the aforementioned policies bear within them a degree of a ’localisation’ agenda, 
i.e. an aim to encourage domestic production of wind turbines rather than to continue 
imports. While concessions have favoured the lowest bidding price, which have been 
offered by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), so-called local content requirements is 
another means to build indigenous capabilities. For instance, local content requirements 
have been a central part in the evaluation criteria during concessions, meaning that a certain 
amount of the equipment must be produced in China (Lewis, 2007; Lewis 2013; Wang et al., 
2011). This reflects an urge to master novel technologies and reinforce national 
competitiveness, as well as to reduce investment costs by building national manufacturing 
competences. This localisation strategy was already seen early on, namely in the Ride the 
Wind Programme (1996), which e.g. included an element of demand for local products 
through local content requirements. This indicates that China from early on has pursued an 
industry-oriented approach (Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3882; Cherni and Kentish, 2007; Zhao et 
al., 2012b; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Klagge et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011; Korsnes, 2014).  
Technology for market – attracting foreign technologies 
Localisation policies have further been instrumental in attracting foreign technologies. For 
instance, a goal of the Ride the Wind Programme, constituting a part of the so-called 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3887; Korsnes, 2014; García, 2013). In 2009, bidding as a basis for pricing was forbidden 
according to a ‘Notice on Wind Power Energy Prices’ NDRC. Benchmark prices were set for 
each of these areas, ranging from 0.51 and 0.61 yuan per kWh (the bidding prices, in contrast, 
were sometimes as low as 0.38 yuan per kWh) (Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5524). 
171 
 
‘technology for market’/’trade-market-access-for-technology’’ policy (Klagge et al., 2012), 
was to encourage domestic manufacturers to cooperate with foreign manufacturers by means 
of importing technology and constructing Sino-foreign joint ventures (Wang et al., 2011: 
144; Cherni and Kentish, 2007: 3620; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Klagge et al., 2012: 376). As 
expressed by a Chinese component manufacturer, 
“your technology is an asset in your hand, you should take advantage of this asset, you should just find a 
good market, and China has a good market, and that is what I [Chinese supplier] want: to reap your 
technology in exchange for this market  exchange” (Int. 6*, 2013).  
Further, to win bids during concessions, foreign WTMs have also sought to abide by the 
local content criteria. That is, apart from being evaluated (first and foremost) on the lowest 
price, the degree of localisation has constituted an important evaluation criterion qualifying 
bidders (Wang et al., 2011; Ru et al., 2012: 65; Liu and Kokko, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012b)40. 
The strategy of attracting foreign technologies to the Chinese market is also visible in import 
tariffs for renewable energy equipment, which have been in place since 1996 (Cherni and 
Kentish, 2007: 3623), refunding import tariffs on imported wind turbines. Over time, 
however, only key parts and components for larger-size wind turbines could receive tax 
refunds in order to promote domestic development of wind power equipment (Lewis and 
Wiser, 2007: 1853; Cherni and Kentish, 2007; Liu and Kokko, 2010).  
Supporting R&D activities 
In addition to these policies, financial and fiscal support has been granted to R&D-related 
activities. For instance, the REL introduced the Renewable Energy Development Fund to 
support S&T development as well as to spur localisation of production (REL, 2005: Chapter 
6, Art. 24; Cherni and Kentish, 2007: 3624; Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3887)41. The amendment 
to the Renewable Energy Law (2009) establishes further guidelines as to the management of 
the fund, which is to be financed by a surcharge on retail power tariffs for power grid 
companies along with a contribution from the Ministry of Finance. In addition, fiscal and tax 
incentives for R&D-related activities have been introduced in the MLP RE (2007: 5(4)).  
                                                     
40
 In the beginning of the concession programme, all bids were expected to reach a minimum of 
50 per cent localisation. This local content requirement was raised to 70 per cent by 2005 to help 
promote the development of a local wind power industry; however, it was abolished in 2009 in 
order to attract foreign companies (Zhao et al., 2012b: 425; Ru et al., 2012: 65). By then, 
however, most foreign companies in China had already fulfilled the requirement. 
41
 As early as 1996, the National High Tech R&D Programme (863 Programme) was introduced 
in the 9
th
, 10
th
, and 11
th
 5YPs, in which funds were made available from MOST for renewable 
energy R&D (Lewis, 2013: 68-69).  
172 
 
Scale-up in China’s wind power industry – on unprecedented growth rates  
So far, the chapter has outlined some of the most central policies, plans, and regulations, 
which have supported the development of a domestic wind turbine industry and wind power 
sector. While China has experimented with grid-connected wind turbines since the 1980s, 
development of the sector was relatively slow until the early 2000s (Lema and Ruby, 2007; 
Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5523; Li, 2010: 1155). It was only with the wind farm concession 
programme and the REL (2005) that growth in all round investment in wind power, capacity 
installed (GW), manufacturing scale-up, and large-scale commercialisation of wind farms 
took off (Li, 2010: 1155; Korsnes, 2014; Klagge et al., 2012: 379; Lema and Ruby, 2007: 
3886-3887). Reflecting the will and support of the Chinese political leadership (Ru et al., 
2012; Zhao et al., 2012a: 223; Zhao et al., 2012b: 424; Lema and Ruby, 2007: 3886-3887), 
the REL resulted in ”very rapid development of wind energy, each year about 100 percent 
increase. According to this development, we [domestic WTM] took this opportunity to 
develop” (Int. 7, 2011). This resulted in a veritable boom in terms of installed capacity. 
China’s wind power capacity grew from 0.8 GW in 2004 to 91 GW in the beginning of 2014 
(Li et al., 2007; GWEC, 2014 in Korsnes, 2014: 176). By 2008, China’s new wind power 
capacity ranked as the second largest in the world and accounted for 22 per cent of the 
world’s wind power capacity. The year after, China became the fastest growing wind power 
country in the world, number one in scale in new wind power installations and accounting 
for 33 per cent of new installations globally. In 2010, this trend continued, and China 
became number one in total wind power capacity (Zhao et al., 2012a: 223). Thus, as 
expressed by a Chinese wind power expert, due to the incentives policy,  
“that's why we are...our wind turbine installation has increased. Haha! Abruptly during the period of 
2006 and to 2010, I think that, arrrrrh, the growth was about one hundred per cent” (Int. 8, 2013). 
With a comprehensive policy framework installed for wind power, China has witnessed a 
velocity in growth rates within wind power capacity never witnessed before (Korsnes, 2014: 
176). 
Growth in investments and equipment manufacturers – domestic as well as foreign 
Within a few years, investments from power generating companies increased dramatically, 
with the number of wind turbine- and component manufacturers rising accordingly. That is, 
largely “stimulated from above”, these Chinese companies have “thrown themselves after 
the ball” in large numbers, as money have been ”rushing down the system very fast” (Int. 9). 
The rapid growth leads industry analyses to argue that ”the Chinese manufacturing industry 
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is becoming increasingly mature, stretching over the entire supply chain” (Yu et al., 2009: 
5222). Hereby, in terms of wind turbine manufacturing, although not directly part of the 
electric sector reform, but constituting a crucial sector in the manufacturing production chain 
for the renewable energy industry (García, 2013: 137), the wind turbine industry has 
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of wind turbine manufacturers (WTMs). For 
instance, while Goldwind was the only notable domestic WTM in 1998, and although there 
were only about five WTMs prior to 2004, there were about 40 companies operating in the 
sector by the end of 2007, and by the end of 2008, WTMs numbered between 70 and 80 or 
even higher (Global Wind Energy Outlook, 2010; REN21, 2009; García, 2013: 137-138; Ru 
et al., 2012: 58; Interviews). At the same time, the number of Chinese component suppliers 
is in the hundreds (García, 2013: 138). By 2013, the top three Chinese WTMs were 
Goldwind, Guodian United Power, and Mingyang, together accounting for a 40 per cent 
share of the annual Chinese market. In addition, the previously “dark horse” Envision, has 
more than doubled its market share and moved up from 15th in 2011 to 4th place in 2013 
(GWEC, 2014: 42). Indeed, Chinese companies and research institutes 
”are listening to what they receive, as I understand it, to what kind of signals that they get from above, 
and then they try to adapt their strategies according to these signals […] coming from above. And that 
means that they start shifting their targets in another direction, when they receive new instructions” (Int. 
20, 2013). 
While Chinese WTMs are constituted by four types, namely, (1) SOEs and state-holding 
enterprises, (2) private enterprises, (3) wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE), and (4) 
joint ventures (Zhao et al., 2012b: 425; García, 2013: 138), Western WTMs have also 
entered the Chinese wind power industry, in particular since 2005. As a foreign component 
supplier expressed it: “Yeah, yeah – we also jumped on this train” after the issuing of the 
REL (Int. 15). Some of the major foreign WTMs operating in China have included Suzlon, 
Vestas, Gamesa, and more recently General Electric and Siemens (REN21 2009a in García, 
2013: 138, Zhao et al., 2012b). Whereas joint ventures were the only way to enter the 
Chinese market in the initial phase, from 2005 foreign WTMs started to establish wholly 
foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs) in China (Zhao et al., 2012b: 424). However, it may be 
noted that none of the international WTMs are any longer on the top ten list in terms of 
installed capacity in China (GWEC, 2014). 
An emerging market pole? 
In the above, it has been indicated how a variety of different actors within what seems an 
emerging market pole have been assembled, as they engage i.a. in wind turbine 
manufacturing, component manufacturing, wind farm operations, and transmission and 
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dispatch of wind power in the grid. First, in terms of equipment manufacturing, WTMs and 
component suppliers are engaged in the design, testing, manufacturing, and operational 
assistance and maintenance of wind turbines, sometimes assisted by consultancy companies, 
design houses, certification bodies, and industry associations (Stargrove, 2011). Second, in 
terms of wind farm operations, wind farm operators/developers, primarily constituted by one 
of the ’Big Five’ power generating companies, are responsible for generating wind power 
and operating wind farms. Wind farm developers develop and sometimes own and operate 
wind farms. Wind power managing owners are in turn responsible for the operation, 
maintenance, and administration of the completed wind farms (Stargrove, 2011). Often, 
much of this responsibility is subcontracted to specialist firms, including subsidiaries of the 
manufacturers. Wind power managing owners sell the electricity generated to public utilities 
under project-specific, long-term agreements. Often, wind farm developers and park owners 
are the same in China (Stargrove, 2011). Third, grid corporations are responsible for 
transmitting and dispatching power to end users in local provinces. Finally, administrative 
bodies control and steer the market at both central and local levels, while service companies 
supporting Operations and Maintenance (O&M) are increasingly emerging as well 
(Stargrove, 2011; Interviews).  
Destabilising the framing of wind power 
While looking impressive, the high growth rates have had unintended effects, i.e., they have 
overflowed. In the following, the chapter inquires into some of the seeming overflows, 
which is followed by an inquiry into what the overflowing means for the framing of wind 
power as a sustainable renewable energy source.   
A period of consolidating flux?  
As early as late 2010 there were visible flaws in China’s wind power industry, the first being 
the production quality of turbines, and the second being oversupply, which persists till today 
(Klagge et al., 2012; Korsnes, 2014). At the same time as a ‘quality crisis’ is indicated, more 
or less concurrently, a slowdown in growth rates came in the wind power market, which 
marks a consolidation phase taking place since 2011 (Korsnes, 2014: 186). According to a 
Chinese WTM, 
“the market is not stable, it's moving. […] Up and down... […] Exactly. And in the year of 2008, that's 
the golden period for Chinese wind... [After the REL] […] That's a cycle. But [in the] last two years, it 
developed too fast” (Int. 10, 2012). 
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Further, as expressed by a foreign WTM, the Chinese wind turbine industry “is in flux – the 
high-peak years with more than 100 per cent growth rates are gone, and now the market is 
stabilising or even in crisis, stagnating…in flux. According to some, the around 100 
manufacturers will have to go down to around a handful” (Int. 3, 2012). Accordingly, the 
number of Chinese WTMs is being reduced, as “almost all wind companies are struggling 
badly right now”, going bankrupt and struggling with losses (Int. 11, 2012): 
“From an historical point of view, then in 2009 there was a peak, and then from 2009 to 2012 there was 
a period of adjustment, just like the stock market adjusts itself slowly from time to time, adjusting from 
the peak period to a recession period…until June 2012 that was the time of the lowest price, the growth 
in accumulated installed capacity was also slow. It was certainly not just our company, it was the entire 
wind power industry which was like this” (Int. 12*, 2013).  
While China seemed more or less back on track in 2013 in terms of growth rates (GWEC, 
2014; China Energy Viewpoint, Feb. 06, 2014), it is predicted that a consolidation will 
continue in the coming years. Further, while the ’ups and downs’ of the Chinese wind 
turbine industry are influenced by global economic recession and wider development trends, 
investments in wind power have also been reduced over time due to severe quality issues, 
which face the industry. Indeed, the quality crisis is not yet quite over in China (China 
Energy Viewpoint, Feb. 06, 2014). In the following, the different quality issues, many of 
which can be linked to ‘overflowing’ incentive policies, which have focused on quantitative 
growth in GW, are outlined. Amongst other challenges, the issues most often mentioned are 
poor quality of wind turbines, poor efficiency of wind farms, and large shares of wasted 
wind power due to a lack of grid connection.  
An issue of poor wind turbine quality – favouring installed capacity and low prices 
over quality 
The emerging market for wind power in China has in recent years been haunted by low 
quality of turbines. For instance, this is seen in low capacity factors, uncertain long-term 
performance, and major quality accidents. These quality issues are suggested to be caused 
by China’s lack of experience (and consequent reliance on foreign technology licenses), 
incentive policies and targets spurring quantitative growth in capacity, and wind-generated 
electricity prices being determined by the lowest price provider. Thus, ”[s]ome problems are 
the result of immature technologies, while others stem from poor craftsmanship and a low-
skilled workforce, the lack of proper preventive maintenance or from poor decisions 
regarding site selection and appropriate equipment” (Klagge et al. 2012: 376). As expressed 
by a foreign component supplier, 
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”China started…as I remember it, around 2005, ’06, or ’07. And what did they do? They went out and 
bought some licenses…started producing some turbines or wind turbines from those drawings and 
explanations. And then they produced like crazy. And the background was a policy of the State, because 
they gave subsidies for the number of machines that came out of it. A totally mistaken strategy in my 
view. But that’s how it was. And that means that a host of companies – all more or less state-supported – 
started producing wind turbines, because now that was the thing” (Int. 13, 2013).  
That is, economic incentives have been based on adding installed capacity rather than 
generating electricity as “what was required in the Renewable Energy Law” was just ”how 
many megawatt, how much capacity, that had to be installed. But they didn’t care whether 
they were running” (Int. 18, 2013), or whether they produced electricity (Int. 18, 2013). 
With a focus on quantitative growth in installments together with a bidding criterion 
emphasising the lowest bid, bidders have intentionally underestimated operating costs to get 
a lower grid connection price compared to other bidders (Li, 2010: 1163; Korsnes, 2014; 
García, 2013: 138; Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5524; Yu et al., 2009). Apart from making 
investments in wind power projects unprofitable, this bidding strategy has been at the 
expense of wind turbine quality, as wind farm owners have pushed WTMs and component 
suppliers to press down prices of equipment (Li, 2010: 1163; Liao et al., 2010) and also 
pushed “the manufacturing sector to produce poor quality products” (Yu et al., 2009: 5224): 
”There are many types of analysis of what goes into the winning. A part of this is the overwhelming 
criterion to have low equipment prices…Which is not the cost of the 20 years but the costs up front, the 
CAPEX [capital expenditure]. This is also something that we really emphasise. We cannot compete on 
these” (Int. 3, 2012). 
In this way, “[t]he low prices may impact the entire fledgling Chinese wind industry 
negatively as utilities may unduly pressurize wind turbine manufacturers to reduce costs, to 
offset the low concession” (Liao et al., 2010: 1884). Overall, price competition across the 
wind power equipment market has become fierce, which brings hidden dangers to the 
quality of wind turbines (CWEA-Vestas Wind Technology (China) Co., Ltd., 2011*). 
However, the rating of different criteria in concession projects has moved gradually from an 
(almost) exclusive focus on prices to take the quality of inputs, the management capacity, 
and size of wind turbines into account, which i.a. involves choosing the average bid rather 
than the lowest or highest-price bid (García, 2013: 130). Price is, however, still the 
determining factor (García, 2013: 130; Yu et al., 2009: 5224; Interviews). It is increasingly 
acknowledged, it seems, that “Lower prices of wind turbines manufactured by domestic 
firms, however, come along with major drawbacks” (Klagge et al. 2012: 376). For instance, 
there have been ”frequent reports of quality problems and technical difficulties of 
domestically manufactured wind turbines” such as blade and shaft fractures, generator fires, 
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or gearbox or brake failures (Lian and Wu, 2011 in Klagge et al. 2012: 376). Increasingly, 
wind power in China is framed as ‘sick’: 
“I don't think the wind energy, the wind, the whole energy is healthy. No. It's sick. Because of the end 
market. […] The competition now is very poor. It's not healthy development. [...] Because the policy-
making for the bidding – cheap price. That's not a wise term to judge a bid” (Int. 10, 2012). 
Another central reason for quality issues are overflowing quantitative targets and incentives, 
which have been focused on installed capacity (measured in GW) rather than generated 
electricity (GWh). Overall, the underperformance of Chinese wind turbines can be linked to 
a lack of incentives to ensure improvements or innovation in regard to power output and 
efficiency rather than growth in installations (Gosens and Lu, 2014).   
An issue of underperforming wind farms 
Poor wind turbine quality, where domestically made turbines are often operating below 
expected production levels, e.g. due to repeated introduction of cheaper, outdated 
technologies, has also led to an issue of wind farm underperformance, as Chinese companies 
develop parks and generate electricity with lower standards than foreign companies would  
(García, 2013: 137; Klagge et al. 2012: 376; Int. 14). Accordingly, many wind farms cannot 
generate electricity in accordance with their installed capacity (Fang et al., 2012: 353). That 
is, technical obstacles, poor quality control, unfit geographical site selection, and unsuitable 
site design, e.g. due to poor feasibility studies and microdesign of wind farms and evaluation 
systems, all have a detrimental effect on the incentive to invest in wind power, as ”[t]he 
domestic manufacturing quality and unprofessional design of wind farms made most 
developers’ financial returns unrealistic in the wind market” (Yu et al., 2009: 5221). That is, 
technical issues in wind turbines have detrimental effects on the efficiency, capacity factors, 
and lifetime of wind parks (Interviews; García, 2013: 137; Yu et al., 2009; Ru et al., 2012; 
Li, 2010: 1162; Nanjing, 2011; Cherni and Kentish, 2007: 3621; Zhao et al., 2012a; Lewis 
and Wiser, 2007: 1847). 
Issues of grid connection and curtailment – an issue of transmission and dispatch 
issues 
A critical issue in China’s wind power industry is that while capacity numbers of new 
installations, i.e. numbers of wind turbines installed and measured in accumulated GW have 
increased, this has not been followed by corresponding increases in electricity generated 
from wind power (Li et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2012), measured in GWh. That is, although 
thousands of wind turbines have been installed in the ground, around 30 per cent of installed 
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capacity remains dormant, ”while the other 70% may be operating with minimal efficiency” 
(García, 2013:129). Thus, it is widely acknowledged that between one third and one fourth 
of Chinese wind farms are idle or underperforming, with a grid connection rate at 75 per 
cent or below (Bloomberg, 2012; Fang et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012a: 222; Yang et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2014). These numbers reflect how wind power is overflowing; yet, it remains 
somewhat unclear how much of this reflects grid connection or curtailment issues, 
respectively. That is, the grid issue is constituted by two entangled phenomena, namely, 
transmission issues and dispatch issues, the latter denoting the downrating/curtailment of 
wind power. That is, the issue is either related to situations where the grid cannot transmit 
the wind power (largely due to technical issues), or where wind farms are simply not 
allowed to dispatch the available wind power to the grid. Basically, curtailment is a matter 
of being able to produce wind power, but not being allowed to connect to the grid and 
dispatch it: 
”So this is curtailment. Wind is available, the turbine machines are available, but the dispatching 
authorities, they say no, no load...you have to shut down” (Int. 8, 2013). 
At the same time, the reasons for these entangled issues are diverse (refer also to Chapters 
11 and 12). Some of these are related to technical (quality) issues and power system 
coordination issues (Li, 2010: 1156; Yang et al., 2012). Even though the rate of curtailment 
seems to be decreasing slightly42, in some areas the rate still goes up to 25-35 per cent at 
certain periods of time (GWEC, 2014: 45), and the curtailment issue in general tends to 
produce resistance against wind power i.a. due to incurred economic losses. Indeed, the grid 
issue (grid connection and curtailment) “is a very complex problem. The grid issue in China, 
whether you look at it from a cost perspective or a technical perspective, it is a huge 
challenge. Last year by the end of the year, 25 per cent of the wind turbines installed were 
not connected” (Int. 3, 2011). In the following, some of the different explanations for the 
grid issue are outlined. 
Overflowing wind power – the issue of grid connection 
In terms of grid connection, this issue is primarily being constituted as a result of poor 
quality of wind turbines (Li, 2010: 1161) and lack of a grid code up until 2011. Accordingly, 
”for example this year [2011] there is a lot of disconnected turbines from the grid. This 
technology is not very good. I think this is a problem” (Int. 4*, 2011). Having integrated 
                                                     
42
 In 2013 curtailment reaching 11 per cent nationwide, down by about 6 per cent from 
previous year (GWEC, 2014: 45). 
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large bulks of wind power into a weak grid with high pace without an established grid code 
has been detrimental to grid stability, resulting in ”massive quality problems, massive grid 
break downs” (Int. 1, 2013). That is, a grid code ensures grid stability, e.g. through 
requirement of a so-called ’low-voltage-ride-through’ (LVRT) technology, which ensures 
that wind turbines stay connected to the grid without tripping even while the grid 
experiences short voltage dips (Int. 15, 2012; Int. 2, 2012). Without having installed such 
control technology at the outset, it is predicted that 
”a lot of the turbines, which are out here, are of such poor quality that they will probably never start 
running, before they are being adapted [with proper control technologies]” (Int. 2, 2012). 
In addition, the issue of grid connection and curtailment is linked to the stochastically 
fluctuating, intermittent nature of wind, which does not resemble conventional (fossil fuel-
based, often thermal) power plants, which can be easily controlled and deliver stable base 
load  power (Li, 2010: 1161, 1165). With a lack of advanced forecasting systems and control 
systems for power output from wind turbines and wind farms, the random, intermittent 
power from wind has been detrimental to grid stability (Li, 2010: 1161; Li et al., 2014; Int. 
2; Int. 16). In turn, combined with a weak electrical power grid infrastructure, which is 
largely unfit to handle the additional load from large amounts of wind power (Bloomberg, 
2012: 2), large-scale wind power integration has impacts on power system related issues, 
and has resulted in grid fall outs and wind farm outages (Li, 2010: 1162). This means that 
even if the output from wind turbines and wind farms is stable, the frequency of the Chinese 
grid is fluctuating, as the grid in itself is unstable (Int. 2, 2012). Hereby, the grid connection 
and curtailment issue is not only linked to poor quality of wind turbines, but also to an 
insufficient grid capacity: 
“Because the grid...the grid is very...很弱,很小 [hen ruo, hen ruo / very weak, very small). So when the 
wind farm is bigger and bigger, so integrating into the power grid...the power grid cannot [absorb]” 
(Int. 17(*), 2012). 
When not being able to absorb the additional load from the wind energy, wind farms are 
required by the grid company to disconnect from the grid or downrate/curtail their 
production. This can e.g. be done by pitching the blades of the wind turbine (Int. 15, 2012). 
However, the generating company is not compensated for the lost production, even though 
“he would have been able to produce it if the grid had allowed him to. And that’s a problem here, that 
they are downrating them all. Then we are going to decide in our wind park whether we will stop some 
turbines, or whether we will reduce it by pitching the blades (Int. 15, 2012). 
As grid companies focus on maintaining grid stability, many wind farms are curtailed as a 
matter of securing grid stability. Consequently, ”[i]t is widely believed that the ratio of wind 
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power in the network should not be more than 5-10% of its capacity” (Yu et al., 2009: 
5224). The weak grid structure in China is linked to the way in which wind power must be 
transmitted over long distances from the wind power supply bases in the ’Three Norths’ of 
China, whereas power demand (load centres) are placed in large cities along the Eastern 
coastline of China. In this way, most wind sites are far away from demand centres and built 
at the weak ends of power grids in order to maximise output (Yu et al., 2009: 5224). The 
weak grid infrastructure and problems of interregional transmission make the transport of 
wind power over long distances highly inefficient and costly. Overall, “many installed 
capacities [in China are] actually sitting idle (Li, 2010: 1156).  
Overflowing wind power – curtailment as a matter of power sector coordination 
In addition to technical issues of wind turbines and grid infrastructure, lack of coordination 
can also help explain issues of grid connection and curtailment. Overall, apart from a weak 
grid infrastructure, there has been a lack of coordination and planning between central and 
local governments and authorities with different responsibilities for wind power (García, 
2013; Korsnes, 2014). This has created a bottleneck ”due to the limited national 
infrastructure of the entire grid, so it could not be consumed, could not absorb the large 
amount of wind power emitted by the wind power industry” (Int. 12*, 2013). Amongst other 
things, lack of planning and coordination has resulted in overcapacity, as local governments 
have made speedy approvals of new wind farm projects on the one hand, while there has not 
been corresponding investments in the power grid at the central level on the other hand 
(Korsnes, 2014: 186). As expressed by a foreign component supplier, 
”from, let’s say from 2005 till today, that’s about eight years, in that period they have produced wind 
turbines so they are now the largest producers in the world. But if you look at grid connection, and if you 
look at efficiency, well, then it’s an entirely different picture that you get. Because they don’t work as 
they are supposed to, and they haven’t extended…[the grid]. It’s not just because the turbine is not good 
enough, I have to say, because there’s also this thing about them lacking to expand the grid properly. So 
they can’t connect them at all…well, it’s like…it began in the wrong way” (Int. 13, 2013). 
For instance, between 2003 and 2011, more than 90 per cent of constructed wind farms had 
been approved by local governments. Yet, this led to a mismatch between local wind farms 
and the centrally planned power grid construction (Li et al., 2012 in Korsnes, 2014: 186). 
That is, while local governments have been very efficient and fast in rolling out new 
projects, in their quest for stimulating local economic growth (Korsnes, 2014: 187), building 
out new power grid lines takes longer time. 
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“The grid development is really several years behind the development of wind farms, so the energy 
[generating] companies keep complaining, ‘ah! Our wind farms cannot be connected to the grid!’” (Int. 
5, 2012).  
The delay in expansion of the electrical power grid has created an urgent need for long-
distance transmission grid networks from supply to demand/load centres (Li, 2010: 1161; 
Bloomberg, 2010 June: 1; Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5520). Further, the delay is related to 
resistance from ministries with responsibility over different parts of the energy system, 
which prefer more stable power sources (RAP, 2012: 4; Zhao et al., 2012a: 230).  
The configuration of a qualification struggle? 
In the above, the chapter has so far depicted a story of rapid growth in China’s wind power 
industry. At the same time, it illustrates how rapid growth in installations have come at the 
price of quality issues, which e.g. is reflected in failing and underperforming wind turbines 
and wasted wind power, which is not being translated to the grid. As wind power is 
increasingly being qualified as a “trouble-maker” (Int. 8*, 2013), actors are in turn reluctant 
to invest in or absorb wind power. For instance, as generating companies, which are 
demanded to curtail, are not compensated for their losses, they have become more reluctant 
in terms of investing further in wind power in their energy portfolio (Li, 2010: 1161): “The 
curtailment of the wind power is very huge, so this makes the developers more cautious that 
the development cannot continue as fast as before” (Int. 19*, 2013). Further, 
underperforming wind farms and the relatively low FITs for wind power (Li, 2010: 1161) do 
not create sufficient economic incentives for grid companies to give priority to wind power 
over more stable and cheaper thermal power. At the same time, coal power plants lose 
revenues and potentially profits if making more space for wind power in the grid, which 
leads to resistance to wind power from not only grid companies but also thermal power 
plants (Zhao et al., 2012a; Interviews).  
In this way, the quality crisis has produced economic concerns, which produce further 
resistance against wind power, which is seen e.g. in terms of resistance against increasing 
wind power grid integration and in regard to the decrease in new wind power investments 
and installments. Hereby, the consolidation phase and quality crisis are deeply intertwined, 
intensifying each other. This has induced leading scholars to raise their concerns and make 
suggestions for China, in order to be able to be “escaping from the chaos market” (He and 
Chen, 2009: 2897). In the following, the configuration of a potential qualification struggle is 
outlined, i.e. a struggle for framing wind power as a reliable and sustainable power source.  
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Crisis of confidence and barriers to internationalisation 
The emerging quality issues have created an issue of lack of confidence in Chinese wind 
turbines. Indeed,   
“[w]ith respect to turbine development, China’s manufacturers are confronted with serious 
technological as well as quality problems and, especially for larger high-output turbines, rely on foreign 
technology. Obviously, industrial policies, technology transfer and success — even in knowledge-
intensive—production alone cannot provide the necessary conditions for developing cutting-edge 
technology and thus catching up with global technology leaders” (Klagge et al., 2012: 11). 
This means that there is “little confidence in turbine quality, despite the rapid increase in 
sales” (Yu et al., 2009: 5224), as these wind turbines ”are perceived as less reliable and of 
lower quality” (Int. 11, 2012). Also, as Chinese WTMs are increasingly looking to export 
wind turbines, due to overcapacity in the Chinese wind power industry, Chinese wind 
turbines are facing an issue of poor reputation. That is, the “weakness [of Chinese wind 
turbines] compared with [Western WTM] in the view of buyers is quality. They think we are 
new – we are young” (Int. 7, 2011). With lack of a track record and documentation of long-
term performance, investors are reluctant to invest in a Chinese wind project: 
“Then when they try to go overseas and sell them, they are like...you would like...even though they are 
inexpensive, they made so much less power that, you know, it was like - sorry...I don't wanna build like 
this bad project” (Int. 11, 2012). 
Lack of confidence in Chinese turbines makes the internationalisation of Chinese wind 
turbines highly uncertain (Ru et al., 2012: 67), and export figures are still low (Int. 18, 
2013)43. Thus, competing with foreign companies, ”price only gets you so far”; that is, even 
though a Chinese wind turbine may be less expensive, often a foreign wind turbine will be 
preferred ”because there's the idea of price, and then there's the idea of quality, [of] 
production” (Int. 11, 2012). Consequently, 
”it is tough to explain to Europeans that we can make good quality here in China, and that is one of the 
barriers of entering the European market because they have a preconception that if it comes from China, 
then it is bad quality” (Int. 22, 2012).   
Also Chinese investors prefer foreign technology due to the lack of experience and track-
records, e.g. in terms of proof of tested lifetime performance and other quality-related 
features (García, 2013: 138-139; Int. 15, 2012). Indeed, Chinese wind power is undergoing a 
                                                     
43 Nevertheless, this pattern is likely to gradually change. Thus, in year 2013, there was 
noticeable an increase in exports: 341 turbines totaling 692 MW, which were exported to 17 
countries, including the US, Italy and Australia (GWEC, 2014: 42). 
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qualification struggle, fighting to improve the framing of Chinese wind power as a reliable 
and sustainable power source: 
“The obstacle is about how you can change the perception […] You really need projects running in their 
backyard, in Europe, and let them see our solid promise. And then they say, oh, the numbers you showed 
me are real. It's not anything made [up]. […] [Nevertheless, the obstacle is] still the perception of the 
local companies. Still it takes time. You need to go through the process, to convince them” (Int. 23, 
2012). 
Accordingly, whereas Vestas for instance in 2012 considered Chinese WTMs as “serious 
competitors within 3-5 years, for sure” (Int. 1, 2013), in 2014, Vestas (at least officially in 
the media) did no longer fear the entrance of Chinese WTMs into the international market 
(Metal-supply.dk, Jun. 13, 2014). In this way, “[e]ven the perception of poor quality can 
severely limit market growth” (Lewis, 2013: 42). Further, the extensive focus on low price 
rather than quality has resulted in several foreign WTMs considering to leave or leaving the 
Chinese market, as it “is not suited for Western quality products” (Int. 24, 2013). However, 
the focus on quantity rather than quality has not only been detrimental to foreign companies 
who lose market shares in China, but also to Chinese WTMs, because the lack of incentives 
in terms of quality has resulted in under-performing Chinese wind turbines. Thus, 
”if you really wanted to help your Chinese companies, you would have gradually changed your 
competition rules, or the tendering rules, or your requirements, to meet international standards…to 
bring your Chinese companies up to a level where they could actually compete against international 
players” (Int. 1, 2013). 
Indeed, it seems to have become increasingly critical to raise the quality of wind turbines, as 
“[t]o build up an economical, efficient, and sustainable wind power market is crucial for the 
future development of wind power in China” (Wang et al., 2011: 140). Accordingly, there 
are recent indications that China’s wind power industry is moving towards higher focus on 
quality, i.e., that ‘new winds may be blowing’ in Chinese wind power (Børsen, Sep. 19, 
2014b). Amongst myriads of other initiatives, such potential quality turn is indicated in the 
theme of the annual grand wind power conference, China Wind Power 2013, which was 
quality: 
”The main topic is how to improve the quality, because we have fast growth of the quantity, now we have 
to put much more attention on the quality” (Int. 8(*), 2013).  
The pressure for such potential quality turn can also be seen in the way that grid companies 
who are facing the challenge of rapid increases in wind power shares in the grid system have 
started to demand higher quality. That is, grid companies are “demanding that larger 
requirements are put forth, for higher quality […] This is the entire new phase” (Int. 18, 
2013). The following chapters of the analysis inquire into whether and how such turn to 
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quality may be taking place in Chinese wind power, e.g. through changes in policies and 
incentive structures. 
Conclusion and theoretical considerations – emergence of a wind power-TEN in 
China? 
Chapter 6 has illustrated how a wind power-TEN is under construction in China. At the 
same time, it has been displayed how its translation has not yet been stabilised. Hereby, it is 
not possible to talk of the Chinese wind power market as stabilised. In the formative years of 
the (potentially) emerging wind power-TEN, the Chinese political pole has attempted to 
install itself as ‘translator-spokesperson’. That is, in order to mobilise the market, the 
scientific, and the technical poles, the political pole has employed i.a. targets, fiscal tools, 
and other incentive policies, as well as discursive and narrative interessement devices. As 
regards narrative interessement tools, the notion of China’s Sustainable Development 
towards a Harmonious Socialist Society, to be achieved largely through Scientific 
Development, denotes a temporal aspect of China’s development path. In the envisioned 
path, memories of China’s past and anticipations for its future renaissance and revitalisation 
are laid out. This narrative device is characterised by a sense of urgency in regard to 
ensuring indigenous innovation and industrial upgrading within strategic sectors, and in 
regard to becoming independent from foreign technologies. This urgency of indigenous 
innovation is particularly critical in terms of technologies, which are construed as ‘core’ to 
upgrading and catch-up as well as Sustainable Development. In this way, sustainability “is 
not only about sustainability per se – it is about continuing the founding project of modern 
China” (Christensen, 2013: 92), as it combines ideas about China’s sustainable development 
with “Deng’s modernization project through the ‘Scientific outlook on Development’” 
(Christensen, 2013: 92).  
The analysis has displayed how the narrative device of Sustainable Development is being 
constituted as a stem issue, as it is neither a “strictly (or primarily) political, [nor] economic 
or scientific issue” (Callon, 2009: 542). The political pole thus problematises the need to 
solve the stem issue of Sustainable Development and, in doing so, has succeeded in 
mobilising different concerned poles to help fragment the stem issue into distinct problems, 
such as the construction of a wind power market. A market pole (e.g. myriads of domestic 
and foreign WTMs and component suppliers as well as grid companies, power generating 
companies) has been assembled with a particularly high pace, resulting in a rapid rise in 
installed capacity. Paradoxically, the rapid emergence of a market pole threatens to 
destabilise the overall framing of the potentially emerging wind power-TEN, as the 
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emerging wind power-TEN has started to overflow. That is, as quality issues abound, 
resulting i.a. in wasted, curtailed wind power, the market pole seems increasingly unstable. 
For instance, while the grid increasingly resists wind power, foreign WTMs consider leaving 
the Chinese market, and Chinese wind turbines are met with resistance to exports. Framed as 
a unreliable, unviable power source, it is depicted how framing processes can have 
comprehensive exclusion effects. Linked to China’s comprehensive notion of sustainability, 
while wind power has been framed as sustainable in diverse policies and plans, the quality 
issues indicate that the framing of wind power as economically, technically, and 
scientifically sustainable is falling apart. That is, while wind power has been framed as a 
means of Scientific Development towards China’s ‘Sustainable Development’, there is a risk 
that Chinese wind power cannot be framed as such, as long as quality issues abound, 
revealing the lack of indigenous technical and scientific capabilities. If adopting the Chinese 
comprehensive notion of sustainability as linked to Scientific Development, the framing of 
wind power as i.a. technically, scientifically, economically, or even environmentally 
sustainable can thus be threatened. 
Facing a quality crisis, the potential wind power-TEN is undergoing a qualification struggle. 
That is, the framing of wind power as sustainable must be reestablished, if the potentially 
emerging wind power-TEN is to be stabilised. In the following chapters, the analysis 
inquires further into the issue of a potential turn to quality in the marketisation of Chinese 
wind power, looking into China’s ability to adjust to ”the ups and downs involved in any 
sustainability journey” (Garud and Gehman, 2012: 985). First, Chapter 7 inquires into 
indications of a potential turn to quality in the potentially emerging wind power-TEN. 
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Chapter 7. Winds of Change – on the Potentiality of a Turn to quality 
in China’s Emerging Wind Power-TEN 
 
My respondent pauses. His account of the volatile development of China’s wind power 
industry takes a twist as he continues his story. Whereas focus previously was on price and 
industrial growth in manufacturing,  
”this has [now] completely changed. They are gradually making it [quality] a priority in China. And 
they have moved fast to remedy the damages. Also, the rationale of having a lot of land for non-
performing wind turbines has totally changed. Nobody talks like this anymore, due to all the quality 
issues that have emerged. They knew too little about it back then, and now they have learned their 
lesson...the initial strategy resulted in enormous damages and accidents, very big damages and costs, 
and also conflicts, and everything… So now the goal has changed, and the mantra is quality […] What 
happened is that, after a while, they have decreased support, and they made it more difficult to meet the 
requirements, and then a consolidation is taking place between manufacturers. And this is what is 
happening now. I talked with a Chinese expert who predicted that it would take China ten years from 
around 2005…to reach this phase. So actually that fits pretty well with how it looks now. Already a while 
ago, they [the Chinese Government] intervened with requirements for the productivity of wind turbines 
and wind farms. And new restrictions keep coming all the time”.  
On my way home, I think about the development of China’s wind power industry, and how 
the story of boom and bust in Chinese wind power as a matter of pure scale-up may be more 
complex than at first sight. Are winds of change blowing in Chinese wind power? And is the 
story of Chinese wind power – and of China – changing in ambiguous and maybe 
paradoxical ways that we have not yet quite understood? 
 
Qualitative reconfiguring in China’s potential wind power-TEN? 
Chapter 6 has rendered an account of the potential genesis of a Chinese wind power-TEN, 
as a matter of rapid ‘boom and bust’, resulting largely from a focus on low-cost industrial 
scale-up. The rapid quantitative growth has had repurcussions for quality, however, and 
wind power is increasingly being qualified as a ‘troublemaker’. With technical issues and 
large shares of wasted wind, the framing of wind power as sustainable and as a means of 
Scientific Development towards a Harmonious Socialist Society risks being destabilised. In 
Chapter 7, the thesis inquires further into the ongoing qualification struggle in China’s 
potentially emerging wind power-TEN. First, the chapter points to seemingly changing 
means of the political pole in the construction of a market for wind power, indicating an 
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ongoing ‘turn to quality’. Second, the chapter illustrates how the emerging market pole in 
terms of Chinese WTMs and component suppliers are changing their business models and 
priorities. Third, it is illustrated how Chinese actors – while having upgraded rapidly – still 
tend to lag behind in terms of technologies, which are framed as ‘critical’ and ‘core’ to 
improving wind turbine quality and to framing wind power as technically and economically 
sustainable. 
Changing priorities and means of the political pole? 
As quality issues are increasingly threatening to destabilise the potential wind power-TEN, 
the Chinese Government now seems to “take [...] control because of the quality issues that 
we have seen. Simply – the market wasn’t well run” (Int. 1, 2013). For instance, the Chinese 
Government has started to “talk about higher quality turbines, reliable turbines, turbines that 
will not break down, turbines that are adjusted to the grid” (Int. 3, 2011). In the following 
sections, the chapter inquires further into the characteristics of potentially changing 
priorities and means of the political pole as a ‘quality crisis’ seems to be facing the potential 
wind power-TEN. 
Priority of Scientific Development for a sustainable development of wind power 
First, the chapter looks into the priorities of the Chinese political pole in terms of the 
‘sustainable development’ of wind power in China.  
China’s transformation from a large to a strong wind power nation 
Although the Medium and Long Term Plan for Renewable Energies (MLP RE, 2007) 
already emphasises the concern for the scientific and technological development of the 
renewable energy sector, it was only with the relatively recent 12th 5YP for the Scientific 
and Technological Development of Wind Power (hereafter, 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*)) 
issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2011 (MOST) that a dedicated plan for 
the scientific and technological development of wind power was issued. The plan outlines in 
detail particularly critical areas, which require upgrading and focus. Additionally, the 5YP 
S&T Wind Power (2012*) proclaims as its guiding ideology the doctrine of “scientific 
development” (5YP S&T Wind Power, (2012*) 3, 1), and accordingly adheres to the 
doctrine of independent/indigenous innovation and research (5YP S&T Wind Power 
(2012*), 2, 1(1); 1(1)). Hereby, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) explicitly brings itself in 
alignment with the principles of the general 15-year National Plan 2006-2020 for the 
Development of Science and Technology in the Medium and Long Term (2006-2020) 
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(MLP S&T, 2006-2020) as well as the 12th 5YP for the economic and social development 
of China (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 3, 1). With the inscription of the doctrines of 
Scientific Development and indigenous innovation into the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 
science and technology is construed as a critical means for achieving the sustainable 
development of China’s wind power industry (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*, 3, 1). Hereby, 
it is indicated that a main priority has become the issue of quality as a matter of ‘sustainable 
development’ of Chinese wind power.  
Further, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) is concerned with ‘transforming China from a 
large wind power nation into a strong wind power nation’, in order to ensure the goal of the 
‘healthy and sustainable development of China's wind power industry’ (5YP S&T Wind 
Power (2012*), 3, 1). To succeed in transforming itself from a ‘large’ to a ‘strong’ wind 
power nation, science and technology (S&T) and upgrading within core technologies are the 
key means. This concern for upgrading in S&T is further framed within a context of 
competitive pressures from leading international players (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 3, 
1). In other related plans, the concern for the relative backwardness of Chinese wind power 
is also raised as an issue (MLP RE, 2007; Energy Policy 2012). For instance, China’s 
Energy Policy (State Council, 2012) argues that China is lagging behind, e.g. due to a weak 
background in independent innovation and core technologies as well as due to dependence 
on foreign key technology and equipment: 
”China still lags behind the developed countries in this field [of basic scientific research and frontier 
technological research in the energy field], particularly marked by its flimsy basis for independent 
innovation, backwardness in core technology, and dependence on imports for some key technologies and 
equipment” (Energy Policy 2012, VII. Accelerating Progress of Energy Technology). 
Overall, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) ascribes priority to the development of a 
‘sustainable future’ for wind power in China and delegates agency to technology in terms of 
solving this matter of concern (most.gov.cn., May 4, 2012). Accordingly, the 5YP S&T 
Wind Power (2012*) outlines a long list of critical areas for further development of core 
technologies and frontier scientific areas, which are critical to the sustainable development 
of Chinese wind power.  
Means to achieving the emerging priority of quality 
The 12th 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) is the first plan devoted to the scientific (and 
sustainable) development of wind power. This can be seen to indicate a potential shift in 
priorities in the Chinese emerging wind power-TEN, since earlier focus was instead on rapid 
increases in installments of capacity. As priorities seem to gradually shift, the chapter in the 
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following dives further into potentially shifting means to achieve such turn to quality. This is 
done by looking into policies in regards to (1) certification and standardisation, (2) a 
potential shift from capacity targets (GW) to targets of generated electricity (GWh), (3) 
centralisation attempts, (4) rebalancing of priorities between cost and quality, and (5) media 
awareness.  
Raising quality by setting new access standards – wind power under encouraged development 
First, a means of raising quality and overcoming the relative backwardness in technologies 
is the introduction of industrial and technical standards. Amongst other things, by early 
2010, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) released a draft circular 
on Wind Power Equipment Manufacturing Industry Access Standards (Lewis, 2013: 57)44. 
These standards aim 
”[to] ’promote the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure of the wind power equipment 
manufacturing industry, enhance enterprises’ technical innovation, improve product quality, [and] 
restrict the introduction of redundant technology’ [to] ’guide the industry’s healthy development’” 
(MIIT in Lewis, 2013: 57).  
The access standards of the MIIT draft include requirements for WTMs that they should 
have the capability of producing a 2.5 MW or larger turbines, have at least five years of 
experience in a related industry, and meet various financial, R&D, and quality-control 
requirements (Lewis, 2013: 57-58). In addition, the 2011 edition of the so-called Guideline 
Catalogue for Industrial Restructuring by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) came into effect in June 2011. The 2011 edition of the guideline 
catalogue emphasises the role of access standards. That is, whereas wind power in 2011 is 
listed as an industry under ‘encouraged development’, which makes wind power eligible for 
preferential treatment, these preferential policies are not extended to companies producing 
wind turbines with a 2.5 MW capacity or lower (People’s Daily Online, May 11, 2011)45. 
                                                     
44
 In ”March 2010, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued a 
circular in which it asked for public opinion about the management of the country's wind power 
industry. In this document, the MIIT stated that new WTMs must have the ability to produce 
wind turbines with 2.5 MW power generating capacity or higher” (People’s Daily Online, May 
11, 2011). 
45
 In an earlier 2005 edition of the guideline catalogue, wind power was listed as a ‘new energy’ 
source, grouped together with traditional power sources. In the 2011 edition, wind power was 
instead grouped in a separate category of ’encouraged development’. This implies that 
companies behind an investment in a new energy project (e.g. wind power) can enjoy 
preferential treatment such as floating shares in the stock market, lighter requirements for new 
bank loans and tax breaks (People’s Daily Online, May 11, 2011). 
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Thus, in alignment with the MIIT access standards, the guideline catalogue’s preferential 
policies also seek to solve the issue of continued overcapacity of low-quality wind turbines. 
Accordingly, in order to spur independent innovation and restructuring in the Chinese wind 
power, the development of larger capacity wind turbines as well as components for e.g. 
control systems and converters for these turbines are promoted (People’s Daily Online, May 
11, 2011). This has led to predictions that following the NDRC policy guidelines, “China's 
wind turbine manufacturing industry will undergo significant changes” (People’s Daily 
Online, 11 May 2011). For instance, the China Wind Energy Association (CWEA) stated in 
2011 that  
"[t]he MIIT access standard is fairly high. No more than 10 of China' s 80-some WTMs can meet the 
standard" (People’s Daily Online,  May 11, 2011).  
Nevertheless, according to the NDRC,  
"[i]f we don't regulate these sectors, companies will encounter problems in production and management. 
This will hinder independent innovation and restructuring" (People’s Daily Online, May 11, 2011).  
Indeed, the progressively stricter guidelines and access standards can be seen as a means of 
”fine-tuning its [China’s] wind turbine manufacturing industry's policies, and that the 
production of outdated wind turbines will be eliminated” (People’s Daily Online, May 11, 
2011). Hereby, new access standards and construing wind power as an industry under 
’encouraged development’ are attempts to raise quality through technological capabilities.  
Technical standards to improve regulation of technology development – improving grid connection 
In addition, 18 new technical standards were issued by the National Energy Administration 
(NEA), also in 2011, to improve the regulation of technology development in the wind 
sector (Lewis, 2013: 58). This included e.g. a Notice on Strengthening the Management of 
Wind Power Plant Grid Integration and Operation and the Provisional Management Methods 
for Wind Power Forecasting (NEA, with the China National Standardisation Commission) 
(Lewis, 2013: 58). Concerned with improving grid connection and with “prevent[ing] 
further wind-related disruptions to the power grid” (Lewis, 2013: 58-59), the notice 
introduces a new grid code (Lewis, 2013: 74). In addition, the Provisional Management 
Methods for Wind Power Forecasting aims at improving wind power integration through 
better prediction, and consequently requires all grid-connected wind farms to install 
forecasting systems (Lewis, 2013: 74). The introduction of new grid codes includes e.g. low-
voltage-ride-through-capability (LVRT) (Wu et al., 2010; Basit et al., 2013), which ensures 
that wind turbines do not disconnect from the grid despite short disruptions in the voltage of 
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the grid. Overall, grid codes require wind power plants to have more or less the same 
operating capability as conventional power plants (Wu et al., 2010; Basit et al., 2013), and 
overall to ensure the security and reliability of the power system. This has become 
increasingly critical as the penetration of wind power into the power system has increased.  
With the myriads of new, smaller, and inexperienced WTMs, which have emerged since the 
REL in 2005, these standards are claimed to have altered the growth of new wind farms in 
China considerably (Korsnes, 2014: 187). Thus, with new stricter standards, the goal is to 
”facilitate consolidation within the country's wind turbine manufacturing sector” 
(Renewableenergyworld.com, Sep. 22, 2011). With new and stricter standards for turbine 
quality introduced again as late as in October 2014, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
Chinese wind power is moving away from its earlier focus on quantity rather than quality 
(Børsen, Sep. 19, 2014b; Børsen, Oct. 20, 2014). Overall, grid codes and other technical 
standards can be seen as an attempt to qualify wind power as more technically reliable and 
stable. In general, the construction of a strong testing and certification system and 
introduction of standard requirements are construed as critical means of meeting the need for 
higher quality46 and for a ‘sustainable development’ of wind power.  
Promoting generated electricity rather than capacity 
Second, a change in China’s wind power policies and regulations in terms of a potential turn 
to quality is seen in a gradual shift towards targets for generated electricity (GWh) rather 
than just capacity installations (GW). As indicated in the previous Chapter 6, the focus on 
targets of installed capacity (GW) has overflowed into issues of quality and lacking grid 
connection and wasted, curtailed wind power, since actors have not been encouraged to 
actually generate, dispatch, and transmit wind power. A move towards generation targets is 
considered to be an important incentive measure for raising turbine quality (e.g. in terms of 
turbine availability and turbine loading factor) (Yu et al., 2009: 5225; Gosens and Lu, 2014). 
Indeed, it seems to be widely recognised that if ‘feed-in electricity proportion’ had been 
quoted at the outset, instead of ‘installed capacity’, it could have created a “different but 
much more sensible picture” (Yu et al., 2009: 5224) for the development of Chinese wind 
power.  
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 E.g. mentioned in the Energy Policy (2012) as well as in the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) 
as a key priority. 
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Promoting wind power generation through the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
While recommendations abound, there seems to be an actual shift in policies to ensure 
generation of wind power. First of all, financial incentives have been changed, so that 
investors cannot receive subsidies for investment in new wind projects but can only receive 
a subsidy per kilowatt hour (kWh) generated electricity (Int. 18, 2013). In addition, a draft 
design of a Chinese Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) has been released in December 
2012 by the Chinese National Energy Administration (NEA) under the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and is currently in hearing (Bloomberg, 
2012)47. The RPS is expected to be introduced in 2014 (GWEC, 2014: 45). The drafted RPS 
will ”not boost project development further, but instead improve grid connection” 
(Bloomberg, 2012) and actual wind power generation. To ensure renewable energy 
generation, the RPS is meant to provide incentives for compliance, by rewarding power 
companies through Renewable Energy Credits (REC) for generating electricity rather than 
just installing capacity. That is, ”[w]ithin RPS programmes each MWh of electricity 
generated from renewable energy produces one Renewable Energy Certificate (Bloomberg, 
2012: 5)48. Importantly, the REC is only issued if electricity is actually generated, and not 
based on capacity installments. In this way, the approximately 25 per cent of renewable 
capacity, which is currently not connected to the electricity grid, would not be eligible to 
receive a REC (Bloomberg, 2012: 1).  
The RPS draft sets renewable energy quotas for electricity consumption, generation, and 
transmission for China’s provinces and key municipalities, top power generating companies, 
and grid corporations (Bloomberg, 2012: 1, 2). That is, power companies will have to ensure 
the capacity is built, while grid corporations will have to connect them to the grid, and local 
authorities will have to consume it (Bloomberg, 2012: 1). To some extent, the RPS 
resembles the ’Mandatory Market Share policies’ (MMS) outlined in Chapter 6, which as 
quantity-based mandated and demand enhancing schemes seek to oblige transmission 
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 The RPS includes wind, solar, biomass, marine, and geothermal as renewable energies. The 
NEA released a draft design for the country’s first RPS on 2 May 2012. A new draft was 
released in December 2012 by NEA and is currently in hearing. The first draft met resistance 
from power companies and grid corporations, however (Bloomberg, 2012: 1, 4; Interviews). 
48
 Whereas a RPS is usually combined with tradable renewable energy certificates (REC), so 
that suppliers can purchase renewable energy or renewable energy certificates (Cherni and 
Kentish, 2007: 3624; Bloomberg, 2012: 5), the NEA will issue non-tradable RECs to power 
entities for every MWh of electricity generated from renewable energy, which will become 
proof of renewable generation when the NEA evaluates the entity’s compliance (Bloomberg, 
2012: 5). 
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companies and governments to provide each facility with connection to the grid and to 
purchase all renewable electricity respectively (García, 2013: 132)49. Yet, in contrast to the 
RPS, the MMS did not consider the hourly generation of electricity, but only encouraged 
installed capacity. In addition, due to lack of compliance by grid companies and power 
companies (Bloomberg, 2012), the MMS policies led to the issue of idle capacity and a lack 
of grid connection. In this way, the  
“mandated market shares undoubtedly led to an increase in wind power investments. However, one 
downside was that the large power utilities only cared to fulfil their installed capacity criteria, and had 
less of an incentive to focus on the hourly production of electricity, which demanded more resources in 
terms of operation and maintenance” (Korsnes, 2014: 184-185). 
Overall, by moving from capacity towards a focus on generated electricity and thereby 
seeking to improve coordination, planning (Bloomberg, 2012: 4), and compliance, the RPS 
constitutes an indirect means to raise quality, and potentially also to stabilise the framing of 
wind power as sustainable, in terms of aligning it with qualities of technical and scientific 
upgrading.  
Readjusting the balance between autonomy and centralisation 
Third, another indication that the means of the political pole may be changing over time, 
adjusting to the overflowing, is the centralisation of approvals of new wind farm projects to 
counter overheated investment activities. That is, whereas larger projects above 50 MW 
(such as concession projects) have consistently been subject to central approval by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), smaller projects and government 
contracts (below 50 MW) have been approved by local governments (Development and 
Reform Commissions/DRC) (Yu et al., 2009: 5223; García, 2013; Korsnes, 2014)50. 
Consequently, numerous projects have been sized exactly at 49.5 MW. Further, as local 
governments tend to be motivated to spur local GDP growth, which is possible through wind 
farm installations regardless of electricity production, many of the large wind farms have 
been installed right next to each other, making the actual size much larger (Jiang, 2011 in 
Korsnes, 2014: 187) and exceeding demand. In addition, realising that the wind power 
industry suffered from overcapacity and overheating, the State Council listed wind turbine 
production as an ‘excess capacity sector’ in August 2009. This caused the Ministry of Land 
                                                     
49
 (1) Grid corporations should source at least 1 per cent from non-hydro renewables by 2010 
and 3 per cent by 2010, (2) large power generators should have 3 per cent of non-hydro 
renewable capacity by 2010 and 8 per cent by 2020. These goals were not met, as only 7 out of 
14 power companies and 2 out of 4 grid corporations met their targets (Bloomberg, 2012: 2). 
50
According to García (2013), this limit was not 50 MW, but 100 MW (García, 2013: 130). 
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and Resources to “reportedly deny all applications for new wind turbine manufacturing 
facilities in an effort to slow down growth in the sector” (Lewis, 2013: 57). As expressed by 
a foreign expert on wind power in China, 
”I guess it was in ’11…when administration practice was changed from the province approving wind 
farms below 50 MW…then they made like a call-in decision, where they at least had to get in hearing at 
NEA [National Energy Administration]. Above the 50 megawatt mark, it had been NEA always, which 
was supposed to approve of quite a lot of them…so they made this, kind of a decision to make a halt” 
(Int. 18, 2013). 
Further, as of 2011, decision-making was being centralised, and all wind projects – 
including those below 50 MW – were required to obtain central approval from the NEA 
under the NDRC (Korsnes, 2014; Interviews)51. Overall, the Chinese Governments seems to 
oscillate between what can be termed ‘decentralised fragmentation’ and ‘centralised 
authority’ in order to reach development targets (Korsnes, 2014). That is, decentralisation of 
authority was beneficial for the rapid growth of China’s wind industry, while centralisation 
of authority in 2011 was slowing growth in a period of severe overcapacity (Korsnes, 2014: 
196). This is reflected in how,  
“[u]ntil 2011, China’s wind industry saw a rapid expansion; yet, since 2011, there has been a slowdown. 
This slowdown is highly relevant for the governance of the wind sector; as coordination premised its 
rapid development in 2003, it was also coordination that led the expansion to a halt in 2011, by 
centralising the approval of new wind farms” (Korsnes, 2014: 186). 
The continuous oscillation is further indicated in a recent promulgation on the “Decision of 
the State Council on Cancelling and Delegating the Power of Approval of a Batch of Items 
Requiring Administrative Approval and Other Issues” in May 2013 (State Council Decision, 
2013). This decision seemingly removes a number of administrative approval items and 
delegates the power of approval to authorities at the lower administrative levels. Amongst 
other things, the list includes energy and power projects, in turn including wind power and 
power grid projects (Jun He Bulletin, 2013). Concern is raised, however, in an analysis on 
this issue that delegating ”power of approval for most of related energy projects […] to the 
provincial level or the local investment authorities [while] conducive to the development of 
the related sectors and [able to] lower the threshold for private enterprises [can] give rise to 
reckless investment” (Jun He Bulletin, 2013). Overall, the picture seems muddled, yet, what 
remains clear is that China’s wind turbine industry seems a case of alternating waves of 
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 The previously mentioned Notice on Strengthening the Management of Wind Power Plant 
Grid Integration and Operation (2011) also required all wind farms to obtain approval from the 
central NEA in order to receive the FIT subsidy (Lewis, 2013: 74). 
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consolidation and liberalisation (Korsnes, 2014; Jun He, 2013; lexology.com, Jul. 31, 2013; 
rieti.go.jp, 2013). 
Readjusting the balance between price and quality  
Fourth, in addition to changes in the above-mentioned policies and practices, price setting 
has also changed over time, increasingly moving towards higher focus on quality. In the 
following, the chapter briefly outlines how a shift may be taking place in terms of price 
setting. 
From lowest bid to more criteria and consideration of life cycle costs 
In terms of price setting, a shift from exclusive focus on competitive bidding for the lowest 
kWh price towards other criteria is witnessed in China’s concession projects. Whereas the 
first three rounds were based on price, criteria such as quality of inputs, management 
capacity, size of wind turbines, domestic content, overall capability, technical planning, grid 
price, and economic benefit (Korsnes, 2014; García, 2013: 130) have been added over time 
as well. Nevertheless, price still tends to remain the decisive factor (García, 2013: 130). To 
avoid unacceptably low prices, which have been detrimental to the quality of wind turbines, 
criteria changed in 2005 where the lowest price was set to weigh 40 per cent of the bid-win 
decision, and in 2006 further reduced to 25 per cent (Korsnes, 2014: 185). In the last round 
(the 5th) of concessions, the best price was redefined not merely as the lowest price, but as 
the price closest to the average offered by bidders (García, 2013: 130; Liu and Kokko, 2010: 
5524). In 2009, when the FIT was finally introduced, bidding was prohibited (Liu and 
Kokko, 2010: 5524; Wang et al., 2012; Korsnes, 2014; García, 2013).  
Having succeeded in rapid scale-up of the wind power industry, prices have been adjusted 
over time (finally resulting in the FITs), and as overflowing occurred, more quality criteria 
have come into play. In addition, whereas the overall focus has tended to be on the upfront 
investment in the MW capacity of the turbine, rather than the long-term life cycle costs and 
cost of energy (MWh), a gradual move of the political pole towards including life cycle 
costs seems to be noticed in the industry:  
“In the policies, there seems to be a gradual move towards an understanding of including the life cycle 
costs…This is interesting, as the Chinese wind turbine companies have successfully competed against 
Western wind turbines since the focus on the product costs [i.e. not on the life cycle costs per Megawatt 
hour, but the turbine in terms of Megawatt capacity] makes the Chinese products cheaper in the short-
term, but not in the long-term” (Int. 25, 2013). 
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Overall, the balance in priorities – and means of evaluating – between price and quality 
seems to be negotiated and changing. 
Controlling media 
Lastly, state-controlled media have gradually opened up to bringing stories on the quality 
issues within the Chinese wind power industry. Although quality problems had emerged 
prior to the downturn in 2011, stories about quality issues and poorly functioning wind 
turbines started surfacing in the largely state-controlled Chinese media only in 2011 
(Korsnes, 2014: 188-189). Only gradually allowing the media to highlight quality issues can 
be seen as a measure by the Chinese Government (and the CPC) to steer growth in Chinese 
wind power, as the largely state-controlled media serve to either legitimise or delegitimise 
the wind turbine industry (Korsnes, 2014: 188-189). Due to the central role of state-support 
in Chinese wind power, “To be sure, highlighting the challenges that the industry faces 
regarding turbine quality or grid connection issues is important for the overall performance 
of the industry” (Korsnes, 2014: 188-189). Increasingly, blogs on the development of 
China’s wind power industry have emerged as well, e.g. under the auspices of China’s 
National Renewable Energy Centre (CNREC) under the National Energy Administration 
(NEA)/NDRC, in which a variety of quality issues are outlined and discussed, e.g. the issue 
of grid connection. 
Reconfiguring China’s potential wind power-TEN? 
Along with changing priorities and goals of the political pole, China’s wind turbine industry 
seems to be reconfiguring as well, although subtly and gradually. Overall, it is widely 
acknowledged that a reorganisation and consolidation of the industry is taking place and will 
continue for some time, since it is predicted that the Chinese wind power market can only 
sustain a few major corporations (Interviews; e.g. Yu et al., 2009). However, although ”the 
Chinese customers are starting to pay more [for equipment] there is a long way from words 
to implementation in China. The quality discourse will take a long time before it gets into 
actual action” (Int. 24, 2013). For instance, it seems that the transition towards life cycle 
costs will take time before it is implemented: 
”We still need a shift in the policy. The price is still the most important factor. It should be the lowest 
price of Megawatt per hour and life cycle costs and not of Megawatt” (Int. 24, 2013). 
In the following, it is outlined how Chinese WTMs may be moving towards a higher 
concern for quality. 
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Adding intelligence to wind turbines – on forecasting tools, diagnostics, and main controls 
While priorities in Chinese policies and plans related to wind power gradually turn 
towards higher focus on quality, the Chinese wind turbine industry also seems to be 
changing priorities and strategies, i.a. moving towards the ‘intelligent’ turbine’ (Int. 2, 
2012; Int. 26, 2012; Int. 6, 2013)52. This emphasis on the intelligence of the wind turbine is 
a general trend, not just in China, but globally, as technologies are becoming more advanced 
and ‘intelligent’ (Int. 2, 2012). That is, in order to raise efficiency of wind power and 
reduce the cost of energy to improve its competitiveness against conventional fossil fuels, 
and to improve grid connection to make it act more like stable conventional power 
sources, which is relatively predictable (Int., 28, 2013; Int. 2, 2012), wind power experts, 
scientists, engineers, and other actors around the world are working on developing 
advanced ‘intelligent’ tools for wind turbines. Hereby, technical and industrial experts 
argue that “the pure technological solution, which is to define the future, that’s 
predictions…predictive systems” (Int. 2, 2012). Acknowledging the vast quality issues in 
the Chinese wind turbine industry, Chinese industry experts as well as manufacturers also 
seem to gradually focus on “increasing the turbine’s intelligence and adding other means 
etc. In reality, this is the general trend of the entire industry” (Int. 6*, 2013). In particular, 
the work on the wind turbine’s intelligence involves improvements in forecasting and 
predictive systems, smart diagnostics, and advanced control systems. Such tools can help 
predict the wind, optimise the turbine’s output, and make grid integration more ‘smooth’  
(Int., 28, 2013; Int. 2, 2012). Hereby, such advanced tools can help construe associations of 
‘intelligence’ and ‘grid-friendliness’ to wind power. The development and integration of 
advanced predictive systems, diagnostic tools, and sensors into wind turbines in turn raises 
demands on the computational capability of the main control, which functions as the ‘brain’ 
of the wind turbine. Through diagnostic and forecasting tools, as well as sensors, the 
“turbine actually can sense the change, get this information processed in a central controller, and you 
are adjusting yourself afterwards. It can do both things […] Like it has a brain. […] And all these things 
require a huge computational capability in the controller (Int. 27, 2012) 
In addition, forecasting systems are critical for increasing efficiency of wind turbines.  
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 Normally, ’intelligence’ in the wind power sector is referred to in terms of knowledge built 
into the blades, advanced predictive systems, meteorological systems, forecasting systems, and 
advanced sensors. In the thesis, the notion of ’intelligence’ refers to the high degree of 
’computerisation’ of wind power and the critical role of software programmes in these computer 
systems, such as forecasting tools, simulation tools, main controls etc. 
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“What will make a difference, that’s a predictive pitch system, which people have talked about, with a 
light laser system on top, and which predicts the wind maybe ten seconds ahead, in order that you can 
adjust accordingly. That is going to be huge. It will generate up to ten percent extra output from each 
turbine” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Together, such ‘intelligent’ systems can improve output and ease grid connection, which is 
crucial for the cost of wind energy to be reduced and for construing associations to wind 
power of economic and technical viability. If adopting the Chinese comprehensive notion of 
sustainability as linked to Scientific Development, increasing the intelligence of wind 
turbines can help frame wind power as economically, technically, as well as scientifically 
sustainable. 
New strategies? In search of a balance between cost and quality 
As policy priorities and means seem to be shifting, a change in strategy priorities of Chinese 
WTMs may thus come about as well. For instance, the introduction of new grid code 
standards has exploded the demand for low-voltage-ride-through (LVRT) technologies from 
foreign suppliers, and “in 2011, everybody could suddenly talk about LVRT” (Int. 18, 
2013). In terms of strategy and business models, one of China’s younger WTMs has 
consistently attempted to find the ’right balance’ or ‘trade-off’ between the Chinese cost-out 
strategy and concerns for quality, mainly focusing on developing software tools 
(Interviews). This is seen e.g. in a focus on investments in R&D and in hiring the ‘best 
talents’ within wind power and related fields (e.g. software) in order to produce a 
sustainable product (Int. 23, 2013): 
“I think that Chinese companies are very good at cost management. And not only just cost reduction…we 
want to find the best balancing point, between cost and quality. It's not only making a large investment - 
spending a lot of money - to make a very high-quality product…but it's hard to commercialise […] It is 
very important that you find the right balance… Because in the process, if you waste a lot of money...you 
want to have a very fantastic technology, spend a lot of money. But it's not sustainable” (Int. 23, 2013). 
The search for the ‘right’ trade-off between price and quality of Chinese WTMs also seems 
to spill over into supply chain management. In terms of governance of the supply chain, 
Chinese and foreign WTMs have in general used different technology sourcing models. That 
is, foreign WTMs have followed a component sourcing mode of vertical integration, 
internalising both design, production, and specialisation to ensure high quality (Interviews; 
Li, 2010: 1161). When sourcing specific core components, foreign WTMs tend to source 
from only one core supplier, engaging in a close relational mode of governance (Interviews). 
Consequently, key component suppliers of foreign WTMs have tended to follow their 
customers to the Chinese market, e.g. blade suppliers and control system suppliers 
(Haakonsson and Slepniov, forthcoming). Further, although many foreign component 
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suppliers have followed their customer to China, the falling market shares of foreign WTMs 
in China have implied that foreign suppliers increasingly supply to Chinese WTMs instead 
(Haakonsson and Slepniov, forthcoming). Whereas the technology management model of 
Western WTMs may result in easier control of quality and core technologies, this 
internalisation/insourcing model results in more costly products due to high internal 
investments in R&D. Consequently, in “the first half of 2010, the cost of imported wind 
turbines was roughly RMB 10,000 (USD 1,200) per kilowatt, about 50 per cent more than 
that of the domestic equivalent” (Klagge et al., 2012: 376).  
In contrast, Chinese WTMs have tended to externalise most of their components, acting 
more like ‘assembly companies’ (Interviews). The modularisation of the wind turbine also 
implies that it has been possible to have many different suppliers for the same component, 
which increases price competition amongst suppliers (Int. 1, 2013). In addition, there has 
been a tendency to consider internal R&D irrelevant within certain large Chinese WTMs 
(Int. 14, 2013; Int. 18, 2013). Whereas the Chinese model of component outsourcing may 
help reduce costs and investments in R&D, it has turned out to be risky in terms of quality, 
due to a lack of overview of the wind turbine. Thus, as some Chinese WTMs have acquired 
more experience over time, some of the leading Chinese WTMs have moved towards 
integrating more key technologies (e.g. Goldwind). Conversely, facing severe price-
competition from Chinese WTMs, Western WTMs experiment with more outsourcing of 
components (Int. 1, 2013; Int. 3, 2011; Int. 18, 2013), which implies that the technology 
sourcing strategies of Chinese and Western WTMs are gradually converging. 
Upgrading and catch-up of equipment manufacturers and reconfiguration of relations  
The above-mentioned changes in terms of moves towards more ‘intelligent’ turbines, a 
sustainable balancing between price and quality, and changes in the technology sourcing 
modes have come along with increased experience and capabilities of Chinese WTMs and 
component suppliers. In the following, the chapter inquires into how capabilities and 
upgrading are reconfiguring relations between Chinese and foreign actors in the potentially 
emerging wind power-TEN. In this account, the legacy of China’s wind power market as 
based on foreign technology licenses is taken into account.  
Upgrading of Chinese wind turbine manufacturers and component suppliers 
Since its beginning, China’s emerging wind power-TEN has realised a series of rapid 
technological advances and achievements, e.g. including larger turbine design with multi-
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MW capacities (1-5 MW) with variable speed, and attempts at moving into large offshore 
projects (Ru et al., 2012; Klagge et al., 2012; Lewis, 2013). For instance, whereas the 
maximum unit size developed by Chinese enterprises was only 750 kW in 2005, and MW-
scale wind turbines accounted for only 21.5 per cent of all newly installed capacity in China, 
today, larger Chinese WTMs, such as Goldwind, Dongfang, and Sinovel, have all developed 
MW-scale wind turbines, and the number of patent applications by Chinese actors has 
increased dramatically (Ru et al., 2012: 60). In terms of component equipment 
manufacturing, Chinese companies are claimed to be catching up, e.g. already boasting 
”auxiliary industries such as blade, wheel hub, gearbox, generation, yaw system and electric 
control systems specializing in the production of plant parts, though some key components 
are still heavily dependent upon imports” (Li, 2010: 1159). Overall, the number of local 
component suppliers has risen, and China did already by 2009 have 52 local Chinese blade 
manufacturers, 16 bearing manufacturers, 10 gearbox manufacturers, and 12 converter 
manufacturers (Zhao et al., 2012b). As regards control systems, Chinese component 
suppliers have particularly upgraded in hardware parts (e.g. control cabinets, programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs), and converters):  
“Of course the Chinese companies are catching up, starting out with the least complex components, 
towers, and major parts...and I think they are picking [catching] up from the gearbox...that’s also good” 
(Int. 5, 2012).  
These technological advancements are also pinpointed in the 5YP S&T Wind Power 
(2012*). For instance, the plan argues that due to support from the Chinese State, Chinese 
companies can now supply the domestic Chinese market with e.g. converters and control 
systems. In addition, Chinese companies are argued to have made advancements in key 
technologies for large-capacity wind turbines, including machine design, manufacturing, 
testing, certification and operation of such technologies, as well as within advanced control 
system technologies for pitch regulation and transmission (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*).  
A legacy of heavy industry and technology transfer 
The impressive pace of catch-up and upgrading within wind turbine technologies can find 
part of its explanation in China’s long legacy within heavy industry. Many of the areas, in 
which Chinese component suppliers have upgraded capabilities, have their roots in heavy 
industry. Thus, many of China’s WTMs already possessed know-how from related 
industries such as electric power generation equipment (e.g. coal power or hydro power 
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equipment manufacturing industry) or heavy machinery and equipment (Klagge et al., 2012: 
376; Liu and Kokko, 2010) when they entered the business of wind turbine technologies 53.  
While boasting a long experience within heavy industry, Chinese WTMs started out without 
specific knowledge and know-how on wind turbine technologies. In order to quickly 
develop capabilities within wind power, Chinese WTMs and China’s emerging wind power-
TEN in general has relied heavily on transfer of foreign technologies, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and cross-border technological learning in general. This strategy has made 
it possible to upgrade relatively fast. Hereby,  
“[i]n its early years (before the mid-1990s), China’s wind industry was rather weak in manufacturing; it 
mainly relied on imported equipment as well as on technical support through development aid for clean 
technologies, specifically from Denmark and Germany” (Klagge et al., 2012: 376). 
The strategy of attracting FDIs and ensuring technology transfer was i.a. seen already in the 
‘technology for market’ policy of the ‘Riding the Wind Program’ (Klagge et al., 2012; Li, 
2010; Lewis, 2013) (described in Chapter 6). Overall, the attraction of foreign technologies, 
know-how, and technology acquisition (Li, 2010: 1159) has been an integral part of China’s 
strategy for gradually building up a Chinese wind turbine industry:  
”Yes, it comes as a directive from the Government. There has been this rule that first of all…when the 
turbine industry started, then they wanted foreign technology to China in order to get started quickly. 
That’s the strategy” (Int. 2, 2012). 
The process and means of technology transfer has primarily taken place through acquisition 
of finished wind turbines and wind power technology, signing technology transfer contracts 
with foreign owners in order to obtain production licenses of mature technologies, and 
through imports of developed design drawings and technologies from foreign WTMs (Zhao 
et al., 2012b: 423; Lewis, 2007; Lewis, 2013; Lema et al., 2013; Klagge et al., 2012; Chen et 
al., 2014). In this way, 
”Import of equipment, licenses and FDI provided access to technology, know-how and skills, and 
consequently contributed to the fast development of China’s wind industry. With utilizing mature 
technology through licensing and thus avoiding high R&D expenditures, Chinese turbine manufacturers 
were able to produce turbines at much lower costs than their foreign counter parts” (Klagge et al., 2012: 
376). 
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 The three largest coal power equipment manufacturers, Shanghai Electric Group, Harbin 
Electric Corporation, and Dongfang Electric Corporation, which provide nearly all the advanced 
coal power equipment in China, all have subsidiaries in wind turbine manufacturing (Korsnes, 
2014: 191). 
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Imitation and reverse engineering – on being keen to learn 
In this way, Chinese WTMs have used design drawings from foreign wind turbine design 
firms to engage in imitation and reverse engineering (Zhao et al., 2012b: 423; Lewis, 2007; 
Lewis, 2013; Klagge et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014). This is by Chinese actors coined as a 
matter of being “very open to learn from outside. Chinese people are very keen to learn” 
(Int. 16, 2011). In the upgrading process, foreign suppliers of design licenses for mature 
designs such as the Austrian engineering firm Windtec54 or the German company Aerodyn55 
have played a critical role (Lewis, 2013). For instance, Windtec can design wind turbines 
from the ground up, but can also step in and help a company interested in building their own 
turbines to scale up for operation (Interviews; www.windsystemsmag.com). In addition, 
foreign certification bodies such as the international DNV GL (Det Norske Veritas-
Germanischer Lloyd)56 have played a central role in the build-up of expertise of Chinese 
WTMs, component suppliers, as well as China’s certification bodies. 
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 In 2007, American Superconductor (AMSC) acquired the Austrian engineering firm Windtec, 
which has provided technology and licenses to third parties who wants to manufacture their own 
wind turbines, establishing the subsidiary AMSC Windtec GmbH. Today, ”AMSC’s Windtec 
Solutions include a host of electronic controls and systems as well as wind turbine designs and 
engineering services” (amsc.com). AMSC has been selling electrical systems and core 
components such as its PowerModule power converters for wind turbines for many years, 
whereas Windtec has developed complete electrical and mechanical designs for wind turbine 
applications and has begun incorporating the AMSC systems into the wind turbines it designs 
(windsystemsmag.com). 
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 Aerodyn is a German company whose development activities focus on the design of entire 
wind turbines for onshore and offshore applications. It specialises in e.g. control system 
technology, load case calculation, rotor blade design, tower design, design of machine 
components, electrical engineering, and documentation for production and certification 
(aerodyn.com). The company can assist and support ”from the initial research done during the 
concept study to the end of commissioning of the prototype and, if required, even during the 
series production of the wind turbine” (aerodyn.com). 
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 In 2009, GL and Garrad Hassan merged into GL Garrad Hassan, and functioned as an 
international renewable energy consultancy based in the UK. GL was a certification society 
based in the city of Hamburg, Germany, while Garrad Hassan conducted consultancy work and 
developed software for renewable energies. In renewable energies, the merger of GL with 
Garrad Hassan provided a software solution set for turbine design (GH Bladed), wind farm 
design (GH WindFarmer), and a SCADA System (GH SCADA) that can integrate data from all 
major turbine manufacturers. In 2013, GL merged with Det Norske Veritas (DNV) (dnvgl.com; 
gl-garradhassan.com; Interviews). Today, DNV GL claims to deliver ”world-renowned testing, 
certification and advisory services to the energy value chain including renewables and energy 
efficiency [and] world-renowned testing and game changing expertise for the energy value 
chain, including renewables and energy efficiency”, such as wind power (dnvgl.com). 
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An assimilation and absorption strategy 
The practice of technology transfer and learning from foreign expertise is referred to as an 
‘assimilation and absorption strategy’ by Chinese actors as well as in Chinese policies (MLP 
S&T 2006-2020; Interviews). For instance, as explained by a Chinese research institution, 
”the software was bought from a foreign company, and then we have absorbed and 
assimilated it. For instance, in 1984, MOST [Ministry of Science and Technology] went to 
Europe, i.a. Denmark, where they saw wind turbines for the first time. Soon after you could 
find wind turbines in China” (Int. 16*, 2011). The assimilation and absorption strategy 
forms an integral part of China’s S&T strategy. For instance, as expressed in China’s 
Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Science and Technology (MLP S&T 2006-
2006), ”[i]ndigenous innovation refers to enhancing original innovation, integrated 
innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of imported technology, 
in order improve our national innovation capability” (MLP S&T 2006-2020, II,1). 
Collaborative innovation and mutual learning 
As Chinese actors have improved their capabilities rapidly within wind power, the 
traditional technology transfer mode of licensing is increasingly overtaken by more 
cooperative innovation through collaborative design and codevelopment, e.g. through joint 
ventures (Ru et al., 2012: 65). This reflects how collaborative relations between Chinese and 
foreign actors are shifting along with China’s upgrading in capabilities. In addition, Chinese 
WTMs increasingly engage in outward FDI, e.g. through mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
establishment of overseas R&D centers, and cross-border collaborative R&D linkages 
(Lema et al., 2013; Lewis, 2013; Klagge et al., 2012; Li, 2010; Ru et al., 2012). For instance, 
the Chinese WTM Shanghai Electric has engaged in a strategic alliance in the form of a joint 
venture with Siemens (Korsnes, 2014: 191). Further, in 2008, Goldwind acquired 
Germany’s Vensys Energy, and in 2009, XEMC Windpower took over Darwind (Klagge et 
al., 2012: 376; Lewis, 2013). The Chinese privately owned WTM, Envision, has established 
its Global Innovation Centre in Silkeborg, Denmark, engaging in various R&D 
collaborations with the Danish so-called ‘wind power hub’ (Andersen and Drejer, 2006), 
amongst other things working with Danish universities. With its headquarter in Shanghai, 
China, Envision has further set up facilities in Japan and the US and has succeeded in hiring 
high-level domestic and foreign employees from leading WTMs as well as related 
industries, e.g. software (Envision.com; Interviews).  
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Taking the example of the large domestic WTM Goldwind57, the company has adopted a 
variety of different modes for technology and know-how acquisition, along with processes 
of gradual learning. In 1989, Goldwind first helped to import and install 13 Danish Bonus 
150 kW turbines in Xinjiang, to form the largest wind farm in China at the time (Lewis, 
2013: 123). Later, in 1996, Goldwind bought a license from the previous German small 
WTM Jacobs Energie, which in 2001 merged with another company into Repower Systems 
Group, in order to manufacture 600 kW wind turbines (Lewis, 2013: 123). In 2001, 
Goldwind acquired a license from Repower Systems Group for a 750 kW turbine, and in 
2003, a technology license was acquired from the German wind turbine design company 
Vensys Energiesystems GmbH, for a Vensys (direct-drive) 1.2 MW turbine (Lewis, 2013: 
123-124). After its collaboration with the German company Vensys, in 2008 Goldwind 
acquired Germany’s Vensys Energy directly (Lewis, 2013: 124; Zhao et al., 2012b: 428; 
García, 2013: 139; Ru et al., 2012: 65). After its acquisition of Vensys, Goldwind has begun 
to jointly develop several new wind turbine designs in partnership with Vensys (Lewis, 
2013: 124). This has helped Goldwind to add 2.5 and 3 MW turbines to its production and 
later also 5 MW and 6 MW turbines for offshore applications (García, 2013: 139; Lewis, 
2013: 124). Overall, Goldwind has established a positive reputation amongst industry 
stakeholders based on this strategy of absorption and assimilation, and gradual learning:  
“Goldwind is a good story. They are one of the oldest WTMs. They used to be at an institute for wind 
energy in Xinjiang. So they know wind turbines from a very small size to a very huge size. So the 
development for Goldwind is knowledge and technology assimilation. First, they want to copy Bonus and 
Siemens and Vestas. Then they developed their own. So Goldwind is a good case” (Int. 10, 2012). 
Today, Goldwind’s wind turbines are almost entirely sourced within China, although some 
core technologies are still imported (Lewis, 2013: 124). Hereby, the strongest Chinese 
WTMs have been able to build capabilities and/or acquire technologies from an assimilation 
and absorption strategy, gradually involving mutual learning in increasingly equal 
partnerships (Silva and Klagge, 2013; Lewis, 2013; Chen et al., 2014). As the stronger 
Chinese WTMs are moving towards more indigenous and collaborative innovation, they 
gradually align themselves with the government agenda of acquiring core technologies and 
indigenous innovation capabilities. Hereby, wind power can be framed as a means of 
China’s Scientific Development towards achieving Sustainable Development. 
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 Goldwind, or, ‘Goldwind Science and Technology Company Limited’, has its origins in the 
Xinjiang Wind Energy Company (XWEC), which was established as the first Chinese WTM in 
1986 (Lewis, 2013: 122). 
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Learning from the Chinese – on shifting roles? 
As Chinese WTMs and component suppliers are building new capabilities, relations 
between Chinese and foreign actors in the emerging wind power-TEN are also changing. 
For instance, leading foreign WTMs recognise that they can learn from the Chinese cost-out 
strategy: 
“[Western WTM] can do a lot of improvements on innovation. First of all in terms of reducing the cost. 
[…] The question of outsourcing and insourcing is part of the answer. But it also has a lot to do with 
how to manage innovation and production. [Western WTM] has recently introduced lean concepts, but 
the company is not very lean. So the company has a lot to learn in terms of organising production more 
efficiently. Doing more cost-out. Chinese companies are more lean, good at cost-out strategies (Int. 31, 
2012).  
This indicates a general convergence between Chinese and Western WTMs in terms of the 
balancing of cost versus quality. Thus, Western WTMs are  
“learning from the Chinese. We always talk about how the Chinese are copying us, but the reality is that 
we should all learn from the Chinese…not copying poor quality, but copying a cost-out mentality. And 
that is definitely something where we should learn. Because at [Western WTM], we definitely had the 
mentality for many years to produce only a Mercedes Benz when it comes to turbines, and only the best 
quality in all parts of the value chain. But the reality – that is taking it a bit too far […] That’s [focus on 
cost-out] important for the company’s long term survival. So, taking learning from the Chinese is very 
important” (Int. 1, 2013). 
In addition, there is an increasing recognition of the danger of underestimating the Chinese 
WTMs (Int. 11, 2012).  
”But basically they can do what they have to do. So we learn something along the way. I think there are 
some prejudices that fall apart. And there are some Chinese companies who make something bigger than 
they are used to. And they learn something from it” (Int. 32, 2012). 
Overall, the respective roles and positions of Chinese and foreign WTMs seem to be 
reconfiguring. 
Reconfiguring relations – the case of control system hardware 
The reconfiguring of relations between Chinese and foreign actors is also seen in the case of 
the wind turbine’s electrical control system, this is considered one of the more advanced and 
critical components of the wind turbine (Interviews). Western control system suppliers 
started out delivering the entire control system – including both hardware and software parts 
– like a 'plug and play' module system for the Chinese customer.  
”What we brought to them in the beginning…if we go back five years, what we supplied was a complete 
system, which the Chinese needed. So we didn’t need to adjust anything, the Chinese just wanted it. And 
then they buy it, then they buy it in huge amounts” (Int. 15, 2012). 
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Increasingly, however, foreign suppliers only deliver specific smaller modules, as Chinese 
WTMs have established indigenous capabilities of building e.g. control cabinets (hardware) 
themselves: 
“There are many who have begun…well, the development, which has been there, is that from we 
delivered the entire cabinets, then now they have begun to only buy the modules and then build the 
cabinets themselves” (Int. 15, 2012).  
Some Chinese WTMs and component suppliers have hereby gradually learned to produce 
the hardware parts of electrical control systems. That is, while the quality was not so good in 
the beginning (Int. 33, 2012), 
“they [have] also learn[ed] many things – from us, [XX/foreign control system supplier], and from 
experience. So they are [im]proving themselves” (Int. 33, 2012). 
Such learning has often taken place through training and assistance from foreign component 
suppliers, design houses, and/or certification and testing bodies, and via collaborations with 
research institutes. For instance, the Chinese WTM, Windey, which has a long background 
in research due to its background as a spin-off from a Chinese research institute, has 
collaborated with Siemens on a test/experimental platform and has e.g. sent some of its 
employees to study in Germany. The company has also received training, advice, and testing 
assistance from DNV GL (formerly Garrad Hassan) (DNV GL homepage; Int. 17*; 2012). 
Today, Windey has developed “the electrical components [of control system cabinets] by 
ourselves [based on] own indigenous technological development” (Int. 17*, 2012) in 
addition to conducting research on control systems for ”the overall design” of the wind 
turbine. Furthermore, a number of Chinese control system suppliers have emerged, e.g. 
Corona Science and Technology Co. etc.58. As Chinese customers have built up own 
capabilities, some foreign control system suppliers gradually focus on only supplying 
software for the wind turbine control system(s), instead of the hardware parts (Interviews). 
Suffering from a short background in wind power 
With such rapidly rising capabilities, the ‘technology for market’ policy has had its benefits. 
In regard to some of the most advanced areas of wind turbine development, such as blade 
design and control systems, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) argues that ”[a]s regards 
blade design and control systems, China has achieved the basic level in indigenous design 
and the demonstration phase respectively” (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 1, IV, 2(1b)). 
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 Corona is a spin-off company of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) involved in 
aerodynamics, research and design, as well as production; further, CAS has its own industrial 
chain for electrical control systems.  
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Further, China has already engaged in design and production of MW-scale wind turbines 
and offshore wind turbines (Lewis, 2013; Chen et al., 2014). These advances are 
remarkable, as most of China’s WTMs and component suppliers did not engage in wind 
until after 2005. For instance, with more than 50 years in manufacturing in heavy-duty 
machinery and equipment (e.g. steam and hydro-turbine generators), the Central 
Government administered SOE Dongfang Electric (DEC), which is the largest steam turbine 
producers in China, only engaged in the wind power market in 2005, beginning cooperation 
with European turbine design companies (Korsnes, 2014: 191; Zhao et al., 2009). Also 
Chinese WTMs such as Sinovel, Mingyang, and Envision have only emerged since 2005 or 
later.  
While China has indeed made rapid advances, many young WTMs still tend to suffer from 
technological limitations both in manufacturing and in innovation, however (Li, 2010: 1161; 
García, 2013: 138). In general, China lags behind in e.g. design of MW-scale wind turbines, 
key technical R&D of wind turbines, manufacturing technologies of key components, as 
well as in testing and certification, equipment system design, integrated technology, and 
R&D in and design of key parts (Zhao et al., 2012: 4249). Accordingly, China’s 5YP S&T 
Wind Power (2012*) raises concern that China’s advanced wind power equipment design 
and independent innovation capability need to be strengthened (5YP S&T Wind Power 
(2012*), 2, 1(1)). Other  areas selected for improvement are e.g. the need to perfect basic 
data on wind resources and upgrading of key technologies, such as wind farm design, 
operation, and grid connection (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(2)). Amongst other 
things, the plan raises concern that China should improve its wind power standardisation, 
testing, and certification system (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(3)). Further, it argues 
for improved basic research in general within wind power in order to solve the issue of 
lacking independent innovation (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(4)). It is further 
mentioned that intelligent process manufacturing technologies and technologies of quality 
control are relatively weak. In the following, the chapter looks further into some of the 
implications of entering the field of wind power relatively late for Chinese upgrading. This 
is done by zooming in on a few advanced core components, which are construed as 
particularly critical to improving turbine quality. 
Entering wind power in a phase of increased ’intelligence’ demands 
As indicated above, in spite of the rapid pace with which Chinese WTMs and component 
suppliers have upgraded within a number of wind power-related fields, most of them are still 
lagging behind their Western counterparts in terms of the most advanced designs and core 
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technologies. This issue of lagging behind within core technologies tends to be exacerbated 
by the pressure for developing increasingly larger, advanced, and ‘intelligent’ wind turbines. 
Today, wind turbines are increasing in scale (MW) in order to extract more energy from the 
wind, with the largest models producing around 7.5 MW (Knight, 2010 in Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003). Yet, such larger designs require more robust turbine performance design and 
component production, e.g. as the rotor blade diameter increases (Garud and Karnøe, 2003). 
As a system for extracting kinetic energy from the wind and converting it into electricity, a 
wind turbine is a complex wind energy conversion system. This integrated system consists 
of myriads of subsystems and hundreds or even thousands of components, with the main 
components being blades, gearbox, tower, brake, generator, principal axis engine casing, 
bearing, yaw, and (electrical or hydraulic) control system (Zhao et al., 2012b: 429; Li, 2010; 
Interviews). The wind turbine nacelle houses all of the generating components in a wind 
turbine (i.e. generator, gearbox59, drive train, and brake assembly). Overall,  
”a turbine is not...it's a quite complicated machine, right, compared to what is seen from the outside. 
There are a lot of components, hardware, and also the software components, that control, manage, and 
monitor the turbine itself” (Int. 34). 
With myriads of components, a wind turbine requires interdisciplinary skills, e.g. within 
civil engineering, mechanics (e.g. gears), electronics (e.g. generators), wind site mapping, 
hydraulics, advanced materials, or aerodynamics (blades) (Li, 2010: 1164; Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003). In turn, this implies a need for a tight interconnection and collaboration 
between turbine design, manufacturing, installation and operation and maintenance (Li, 
2010: 1161). Whereas wind turbines previously were less ’intelligent’, wind turbines have 
now become high-tech assemblages of customised components (Garud and Karnøe, 2003). 
With increased penetration of wind into the power grid, modern wind turbines require a high 
degree of intelligence, not only to find ’smart’ ways to reduce cost of energy and increase 
the capacity factor, but also to make wind turbines more ’controllable’ and ‘grid-friendly’, 
and generally making wind farms more comparable to conventional power plants, which is 
crucial for the diffusion and deployment of wind energy (Int. 18, 2013). This requires that a 
great deal of knowledge is built into the increasingly computerised wind turbines, e.g. 
integrating knowledge into the blades through sensors and prediction tools, as also touched 
upon briefly above. Whereas early entrants such as Denmark could start with small-scale 
experiments for less advanced wind turbines (Garud and Karnøe, 2003), Chinese WTMs are 
                                                     
59
 Whereas most modern wind turbines contain a brake, a number of China’s WTMs (in 
particular Goldwind) have based their wind turbine design (Aerodyn design license) on a 
gearless design, i.e. a so-called direct drive.  
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facing new demands and pressures, as they enter the wind power industry in a phase of high 
technological and scientific complexity. 
Critical core components for raising the quality of wind turbines  
Evidently, all components within a wind turbine are crucial to its proper and optimal 
performance. That is, there are many aspects of the wind turbine system and its structural 
design that must be considered and carefully optimised before wind energy can be produced 
at a cost competitive price. Amongst other things, these include turbine siting, installation 
and foundations, manufacturing processes, design, operating and maintenance costs, and 
turbine payback periods (Interviews). In this way, ”a lot of things are important; that is, [for 
instance] the control system doesn’t make any critical difference, if you are not capable of 
producing a wind turbine which does not fall apart” (Int. 20, 2013). Nevertheless, some 
components are generally considered more ‘critical’ than others, in terms of raising quality 
as regards improved performance and a stable output. In the following, the chapter inquires 
into the role of the control system for raising quality and for stabilising a framing of wind 
power as technically and economically sustainable. 
The ‘master’ and his ‘slaves’ – on control systems 
Amongst its multiple components, a wind turbine contains different control system 
technologies with responsibility for controlling a specific system and/or component of the 
wind turbine. These distributed/decentralised control systems (‘sub-controls’) control – i.e., 
monitor and regulate – different components of the wind turbine. A critical sub-control 
system is found in the pitch control, which enables the pitching of the blades according to 
shifting speeds and directions of the wind. Above these decentralised sub-controls, the 
central main control, monitors and regulates the interplay of the various sub-controls. Since 
the main control contains the overall design principle of how the wind turbine and its 
components should be regulated, the main control is generally considered the most critical 
‘core’ part of the wind turbine’s different control system technologies, and also one of the 
most ‘core’ components of the wind turbine in general60. Overall,  
”the main control has something to do with output, but it is also related to security. Because…the turbine 
– if some dangerous situation occurs, then the turbine’s control system must react accordingly. Because, 
what’s the thing about a turbine, that’s…if you just let it spin freely when the wind blows – no turbine 
could ’survive’ that” (Int. 14, 2013). 
                                                     
60
 The specific design concept (‘regulation strategy’) of the wind turbine is i.a. dependent on 
whether it is a gearless/direct drive versus gear-based wind turbine, and whether it uses a 
hydraulic or electronic pitch. 
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One of the most critical functions of the main control is that is ensures the regulation of the 
pitch angle of the blades and the rotating speed of the generator, in addition to a number of 
other things, e.g. the yaw system, the start-up and closing down of the turbine, as well as 
turbine supervision and monitoring (Int. 35, 2013). In this way, “[e]verything in the turbine 
needs to be controlled by the main control system [as it] makes the mechanics work 
[together]” (Int. 2, 2012). As the centralised control, the main control receives information 
from the constituting distributed/decentralised control systems and sensors, communicating 
to different units through protocols, and in this way ensuring the proper exchange of 
information. That is, through the main control, the control system supplier or WTM 
“receives information from another unit and tells the other unit what to do” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Overall, the main control is framed as  
“the top component of the [turbine’s] intelligence, whereas the others [sub-controls] are the ‘slaves’. 
We [the main control (supplier)] are the master” (Int. 2, 2012).  
In turn, as indicated above, control system technologies contain both hardware and software 
parts. That is, the electronic and mechanical hardware parts (e.g. control cabinets such as 
industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs), converters, switches, and sensors) ensure 
the mechanical and electronic functioning of the wind turbine. In turn, the control system 
contains myriads of software programmes, basically consisting of thousands of lines of 
algorithmic codes. In general, hardware is framed as relatively ‘simple’, while the software 
parts are qualified as ‘key’ and the most advanced parts. That is, “it is not the control 
cabinet…this is very standard…but it is the control software systems, which are core. […] 
Software is key!” (Int. 31, 2012).  
Adding intelligence through software – framing software as ‘core’ 
As displayed briefly in the above, wind turbine designs have become increasingly complex 
over time. This, amongst other things, involves more advanced control systems – and in 
particular of its software parts. Apart from control system software, software tools for 
turbine design, such as simulation tools which simulate the aerodynamic forces from the 
wind on the blades, are critical to raising wind turbine performance through optimised 
designs. Further, advanced wind farm control system software is critical to raising and 
controlling the output of wind farms. Apart from conventional supervisory, control, and data 
acquisition control systems (SCADA) for wind farm monitoring and control, which help 
diagnose technical issues and minimise maintenance costs in the wind farm (Int. 2, 2012), 
wind farm simulation and forecasting tools to avoid destabilisation of the grid have become 
increasingly critical along with the larger penetration of wind into grid systems. As wind 
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turbines have become increasingly ’intelligent’ or ”computerised” (Lewis, 2013: 28), R&D 
for modern wind turbines is “focused on continued design improvements to increase the 
resilience and the efficiency of the turbines, as well as on improved power electronics that 
facilitate smoother integration with the power grid” (Lewis, 2013: 28). Overall, particular 
components such as software tools seem to be framed as ’critical’ and ’core’ to constitute 
wind power as a reliable power source, and thus not only for improving quality, but also for 
associating wind power with technical and economic sustainability.  
A potential transition towards quality – and the need for ‘catch-up’ within software 
It has been indicated above how China still lags behind in particular within ‘key 
components’ for advanced wind turbine designs above the MW-scale (Li, 2010: 1161; 
Klagge et al., 2012). Additionally, although several Chinese WTMs increasingly claim their 
designs to be indigenously developed, according to foreign wind power experts (i.e. 
engineers and scientists), these designs often rely on foreign core components such as 
critical software tools. This makes a foreign expert claim that ”there is still not one single, 
completely Chinese indigenous design” (Int. 36, 2013). While there may exist differing 
viewpoints on this issue, there is no doubt that Chinese wind turbine designs and control 
systems are generally framed as less advanced (and ’intelligent’) by foreign experts, 
suppliers and WTMs. In this way, China is construed as ‘lagging behind’ in terms of all the 
‘soft areas’, such as siting and design, intelligent forecasting systems, and control (Int. 1, 
2013). A central matter of concern of the political pole is consequently that Chinese actors 
should upgrade within those core technologies and become independent from foreign 
technologies (MLP RE, 2007; 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*); MLP S&T 2006-2020). 
Facing overflowing from poor quality turbines, the issue of upgrading within core 
components such as software tools – as well as independence from foreign technologies – 
seems critical to increasing the ’intelligence’ of new large-scale turbines and to building 
associations of e.g. quality and sustainability in comprehensive terms to China’s potential 
wind power-TEN. With the seeming ‘turn to quality’ in Chinese policies of the political pole 
within wind power, upgrading within specific components is still a growing concern. 
Conclusion and theoretical considerations – a turn to quality in the wind power-
TEN? 
Together, Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated rapid emergence of a potential Chinese wind 
power-TEN and its following quality crisis, as well as pointed to a potential ‘turn to quality’. 
Below, figure 12 illustrates some of the different actors of the different emerging poles 
within the wind power-TEN. 
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Figure 12: Examples of actors in poles of emerging wind power-TEN 
 
Source: Own design 
While Chapter 6 focused on the rapid growth in Chinese wind power, Chapter 7 has focused 
on the potential ‘turn to quality’ evolving in the emerging wind power-TEN. To contain the 
overflowing of the emerging wind power-TEN, a variety of new means – policies, plans, 
standards, targets, and regulations – have been employed. This indicates that not only are the 
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priorities of the Chinese leadership in transition, but also the means. Amongst other things, 
there are indications that the political pole seeks to spur quality, indirectly, by encouraging 
generated electricity (measured in GWh) rather than just installed capacity (GW). In turn, 
the issue of raising quality is framed as a matter of upgrading within core technologies, as 
well as a matter of enabling a transformation of China from a ‘large’ into a ‘strong’ wind 
power nation. In this way, the potential turn to quality is coupled with the concern for 
China’s sustainable development through Scientific Development. Largely led by the 
political pole, the chapter has displayed how a potential market pole seems to be shifting its 
strategies, moving away from an exclusive focus on low prices towards higher focus on 
quality, e.g. through improving R&D capabilities. Indeed, winds of change, although 
ambiguous, have started to blow in the potentially emerging wind power-TEN. The chapter 
has also displayed how Chinese WTMs have upgraded rapidly within a variety of scientific 
and technological fields related to wind power. In particular, based on an assimilation-and-
absorption strategy, a number of Chinese WTMs have engaged in collaborative relations in 
China and abroad with both domestic and foreign partners. Further, as Chinese actors have 
upgraded, relations between Chinese and foreign WTMs and component suppliers are being 
reconfigured, which e.g. involves increased mutual learning. While the potential wind 
power-TEN so far primarily has been illustrated through the rapid emergence of a market 
pole, mobilised through the interessement devices of the political pole, the increased focus 
on quality may induce an increased focus on the strengthening of the scientific and technical 
poles, which can be translated into the potentially emerging wind power-TEN.  
When it comes to components framed as ‘core’ and thus critical for raising the quality and 
‘intelligence’ of wind power, such as advanced software tools, Chinese actors are still seen 
as lagging behind, however. Thus, the political pole has begun to problematise the need for 
actors to assemble into scientific and technical poles, which may solve the quality issues. 
Entangled in increasing demands for ’intelligent’ turbines and an ongoing quality crisis, core 
technologies (e.g. software programmes) are increasingly being constituted as critical for the 
requalification of wind power as sustainable and for aligning the potential wind power-TEN 
with the overall framing of Scientific Development. Having indicated how certain 
components of today’s complex and highly computerised wind turbines are being 
constituted as critical, particularly software tools, for the qualification of wind power as 
sustainable, Chapter 8 inquires into the potential emergence of a software-TEN in Chinese 
wind power. 
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Chapter 8. Emergence of a Software-TEN? 
 
Later, I recall another talk I have had earlier with an industry expert on the case of China 
and wind power. According to him, the development of China’s market is a matter of 
foresight:  
“What is characteristic about China is that they always have some hidden plan. Nothing comes as a 
surprise for them. They have this idea about where they want to go, and they see everything in that light. 
And that’s why they began with joint ventures…they want to let someone in who doesn’t run away with 
everything, but where some knowledge is transferred […] It’s about technology, it’s also about 
management and know-how etc., and that’s how they started out […] It’s learning and know-how and 
technology transfer and experimentation with some economic model compared to what they had before. 
That’s simply…they have had this perspective the entire time”. 
Pondering this hidden plan of China, I wonder how China’s catch-up strategy will play out 
within core technologies, such as software, in the current qualification struggle that faces 
China’s wind power market. 
 
Qualifying wind power as sustainable through software? 
The two previous Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the rapid increase in installed capacity of 
wind power in China, the overflowing quality issues from the focus on manufacturing scale-
up, as well as the potential ‘turn to quality’ in the potentially emerging wind power-TEN in 
China. Further, it has been depicted how China has upgraded within a host of wind turbine 
components, yet, still lags behind in terms of more advanced software programmes. These 
software tools are ‘core’ to the qualification of wind power as ‘intelligent’, which can align 
wind power with the doctrine of China’s Scientific and Sustainable Development.  
To inquire further into the potential quality turn in the emerging wind power-TEN, Chapter 
8 zooms in on the critical component of software and its role in framing the potentially 
emerging wind power-TEN as sustainable. Depicting how a potential software-TEN is being 
constructed, the chapter begins by outlining the role of different critical software tools for 
framing wind power as sustainable. Next, the chapter depicts the matter of concern for the 
Chinese political leadership to ensure the establishment of indigenous innovation 
capabilities within core technologies such as advanced and ’intelligent’ software tools to 
qualify wind power as sustainable. This leads on to a mapping of different poles in a 
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potentially emerging software-TEN. The chapter concludes by illustrating how relations 
between foreign suppliers and Chinese WTMs are being de- and reconfigured and 
negotiated, as roles and positions are contested when Chinese actors have improved 
capabilities. In this way, the emergence of a ’competitive catch-up game’ is being 
illustrated. In this catch-up game, concerns – and potential controversies – on issues of 
intellectual property right(s) (IPRs) and standardisation related to core software algorithms, 
are indicated in the configuration of the potential software-TEN. 
The role of software tools for framing wind power as sustainable 
In the following section, the chapter outlines how different software tools are construed as 
’core’ to the technical and economic performance of wind power.  
Framing the main control as the wind turbine’s brain – and the main control core algorithm as 
spine 
First, communicating with the various different sub-control systems, the wind turbine’s main 
control is critical to the functioning of the wind turbine: 
”It is known as the king of the wind turbine. Because it is very…the nerve centre. The other parts are all 
some of the hardware parts, but in regard to the extent of the entire turbine’s intelligence, or the size of 
its power output, this depends on the big brain. And we are the suppliers of the big brain” (Int. 2*, 
2013). 
The main control system’s software contains thousands of lines of algorithmic codes, so-
called source codes. Moving all the way down through the different layers of source code, 
“you get down to the bottom where the core algorithm [of the main control] is, [which] 
connects all the information of the different parts” (Int. 2, 2012), e.g. containing the pitch 
regulation strategy and the regulation strategy for how the turbine should react when the 
frequency of the grid suddenly changes (Int., 2, 2012; Int. 15, 2012). The main control’s 
core algorithm is hereby framed as “the spine in the system” (Int. 2, 2012). Additionally, 
“on top of that source code we have something called the pitch algorithm, which controls 
the blades”, together with a range of other algorithms for different functions/components 
(Int. 2, 2012). Overall, ensuring the interplay of different components, the main control is 
being framed as a critical core component. In particular, the core algorithm of the main 
control’s software is being constituted as ‘critical’ to wind turbine performance. 
The ‘critical’ quality of the main control is related to the way in which the main control 
system contains the principles of the wind turbine regulation. Previously, the dominant wind 
turbine design was stall-regulated, while today’s advanced wind turbines tend to be pitch-
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regulated. Compared to the stall-regulated turbine design, which was marked by constant 
speed and involved higher loads on the tower and blades from the forces of the wind, pitch-
regulated wind turbines can through smarter design61, e.g. longer and thinner blades and 
pitching of blades to obtain the optimal effect from the wind, reduce the cost of energy, and 
reduce the load on the turbine. While optimisation of the pitch-regulated wind turbine can 
lower the cost of energy, developing a control system for pitch-regulated turbines is 
relatively complicated. As an integrated system, the regulation strategy of the main control 
must be prepared for a number of different abnormal situations in the environment, e.g. 
typhoons and other extreme climatic conditions, to ensure stable functioning of the wind 
turbine:  
”Because the wind turbine is closely related to the external environment, to the wind. But if the wind 
constantly changes, then the wind turbine must adjust to this new status of the different external 
environmental conditions. In this way […] it must have a control system inside, which can adjust and 
protect, making it more reliable and ensuring its safety” (Int. 37*, 2013). 
In this way, the functioning of the different control system technologies and sensors are 
important to the functioning of the turbine, because if: 
”you don’t trust in the sensors, if you don’t trust in the measurements, and don’t trust whether the pitch-
control works as it should, then you have to close it [the turbine] down, and a lot of different 
things…like…to make sure that things don’t get out of control because something is wrong, which the 
main control did not capture properly. So there has to be a number of different layers catching these 
issues” (Int. 35, 2013).  
Not only is the main control/regulation critical to the performance of wind turbines, but also 
some of the subsystems, in particular the pitch control, are critical to wind turbine 
performance. As expressed by a foreign control system supplier, ”they [the Chinese 
WTM/the customer] don’t want to tell us what happened [when the turbine collapsed]. But 
we know very well what can make a turbine collapse…that’s the pitch system” (Int. 9, 
2012). Hereby, poor quality of control systems in wind turbines – and in their software – can 
lead to damages as well as unstable output, which results in the destabilisation of the grid.  
Simulation programmes for wind turbine design 
Second, related to the issue of the reliability and performance of wind turbines are also 
software programmes used in simulation tools, when new or modified advanced wind 
                                                     
61
 In regard to the pitch control of the blades, there exist two types of blade regulation, namely a 
design based on an electric pitch control regulation and one based on a hydraulic pitch 
regulation. Depending on whether the blade/pitch regulation is electric or hydraulic, the flow of 
the main control system will differ (Interviews). 
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turbine and blade designs are to be tested and certified. The simulation tool, consisting 
basically of ”computational calculations telling you how to simulate a turbine” (Int. 14, 
2013), must contain the main control’s core algorithm, which reflects the turbine’s overall 
“regulation principle”, e.g. how to regulate the blade (Int. 14, 2013). 
”When you calculate [simulate] the turbine, then…how you regulate the turbine, that is part of the 
overall modelling of the turbine, right. Modelling…when you develop the simulation [tool], right, then 
you must describe the [regulation of the] turbine” (Int. 14, 2013). 
That is, the simulation tool must e.g. ”know how to pitch the blades [e.g. to reduce the load 
on the blades from the forces of the wind], how much to turn up or down for the generator. 
And for this we have the control system, whereas [the simulation tool] is just simulating the 
model of the turbine” (Int. 38, 2013). The core algorithm of the simulation tool is an 
aeroelastic code for the modelling of the pitching of the blade, ensuring the optimal relation 
between the aerodynamic forces and mechanical loads on the blades (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 32, 
2012). Modern, advanced wind turbine designs involve highly complex aeroelastic design of 
the blades. For instance, as blade structures have become more elastic with flexible fibre 
structures, the influence on the aerodynamic forces and loads on the blade, when blades are 
pitched, have become more complex.  
Overall, as simulation tools are needed in order to certify and document new wind turbine 
designs and assist in the development of ‘elegant’ high-performing structural designs, they 
are critical in terms of reducing the cost of energy of wind power. That is, ”all this is in the 
end measured through cost of energy. How many kroner [DKK] does it cost. How much 
does it cost to produce one kilowatt hour produced by this turbine” (Int. 38, 2013). In this 
way, simulation tools are important calculative devices, employed to optimise and ’prove’ 
the performance of wind power, and thus also potentially to ascribe associations of technical 
and economic sustainability to wind power.  
Predicting and controlling wind farm output and grid connection 
Third, apart from being critical to wind turbine performance and optimal design, software 
tools also play a critical role in wind farm control and grid connection (Int. 2, 2012). That is, 
“you have a whole range of controls, all the way out to [the consumer]…it’s not only in the 
wind farms…and we don’t even talk about wind farms anymore – now they are ‘power 
plants’. And internally in this power plant, and internally in the main turbine [the wind 
turbine, which collects data from all other wind turbines in the wind farm], and internally in 
the yaw, you find control systems” (Int. 2, 2012). With higher wind power penetration 
ratios, high quality wind farm controls have become more important to improve grid 
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connection, and was introduced as a new requirement by the Chinese Government in 2011. 
In this way, grid companies can 
”send you [the wind farm] a Megawatt target, and you need to control your whole wind farm to meet 
that requirement, so those are [some of] the examples of what they [the Chinese Government] came up 
with as requirements to all the wind farms, before they [wind farms] can in fact integrate with the grid” 
(Int. 34, 2012). 
Through advanced park power control systems, for instance, the wind farm operator can 
adjust the output up and down, as needed, and as requested from the grid operator. This 
makes the wind farm operate as an integrated utility, and 
“heigthens the quality of the produced electricity in every single park…it becomes much, much higher, 
and grid compliance of course becomes much, much better” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Other systems, such as SCADA systems and their condition monitoring systems, can help 
identify problems in the wind farm, by sending 
”warnings coming from the equipment, and we are going to display them on the computer screen, so that 
the operation people [the wind farm operators] can see if something is going wrong…then they need to 
take action, or they need to schedule, you know, maintenance, or checking, or things like that. So that's 
the foundation of the, from the IT-side, about running a wind farm” (Int. 34, 2012).  
To be able to control the output from the wind farm, advanced forecasting tools and other 
advanced tools are also increasingly needed, as the share of wind power into the grid has 
become larger. That is, in order to schedule the operational work of the wind farm and the 
routine maintenance of the equipment,  
“one must know as much as possible about the wind for the next 24 hours, or even after the next 10 
minutes. The forecasting is critical for the grid to manage the integration of the wind farms to the power 
system, as they need to allocate power generation based on the load, at different times of the day, and to 
do the allocation, they also need to know what kind of forecasting and how much you are going to 
produce, and whether the grid needs so much or not” (Int. 34, 2012). 
These forecasting tools can help increase shares of wind power in the grid without 
destabilising it, since, sometimes, “you are not producing electricity...and sometimes very 
high, sometimes very low...but this also depends on the wind, the wind coming in” (Int. 27, 
2012). Further, through advanced forecasting tools curtailment rates may be reduced, as it 
becomes possible for grid companies to adjust the power load in the grid in time, according 
to the forecasted wind power, by regulating conventional power plants and wind farms. 
Apart from reducing the amount of wasted, ‘overflowing’ wind power, forecasting tools can 
raise revenues of wind farm operators, as these are dependent on generated electricity. 
Overall, wind farm controls are critical to construe associations to wind power of 
predictability, reliability, and profitability. Hereby, by improving control and predicting the 
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output of all wind turbines in the farm, which is crucial to the stability of the grid as well as 
to minimising curtailment and rising revenues, a variety of intelligent wind farm controls 
and predictive programmes – including their software algorithms – play a crucial role in 
qualifying wind power as economically and technically sustainable. 
Constituting core technologies as a major political concern 
Facing a ‘quality crisis’, which threatens the framing of wind power as a sustainable 
renewable energy power source, components such as software tools are being constituted as 
a critical qualifying means, or calculative framing tool, to stabilise wind power as 
sustainable. In the following section, the chapter dives further into how upgrading within 
core technologies is being constituted as a matter of concern for the political pole.  
Upgrading within core technologies as matter of concern 
In general, indigenous innovation capabilities within core technologies play a central role in 
China’s catch-up and upgrading strategy. This was most explicitly outlined in China’s MLP 
S&T (2006-2020). However, the concern over core technologies in the energy and the 
renewable energy sectors is also reflected in the Energy Policy 2012 and the MLP RE 
(2007), respectively. These two plans articulate concern that China is lagging behind in 
terms of science and technology and suffers from the dependence on foreign core 
technologies. Thus, a central goal in the Energy Policy 2012 is to advance indigenous 
innovation in key technologies and equipment (Energy Policy 2012, II. Policies and Goals of 
Energy Development). However, it was only with the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) that a 
plan dedicated to the scientific development and development of core technologies, such as 
software tools within wind power, was issued, and where development of a number of 
carefully selected technologies and research areas were outlined in-depth. As previous 
plans, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) is concerned with how China is lagging behind 
in core technologies and in areas of basic research, such as software, aerodynamics, 
simulation tools, and advanced control systems. For instance, the plan emphasises how 
China lags behind in terms of independent research and development of advanced 
operational control (systems) and in regard to wind power prediction systems for wind farm 
operation and optimisation (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(2)). 
Software as core technology – control system and simulation tools 
In terms of modern large-capacity wind turbines, key technology directions in the 5YP S&T 
Wind Power (2012*) include i.a. turbine design, manufacturing, testing, certification, 
independent pitch, new transmission technologies, and advanced control systems (5YP S&T 
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Wind Power (2012*) 4, 2). In addition, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) articulates 
concern that China is lacking indigenous intellectual property in regard to software tools for 
wind turbine design (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 1, IV, 2(1a)). The plan accordingly 
problematises how dependence on foreign design tools has been detrimental to China’s 
capabilities in developing indigenous wind turbine design adapted to Chinese environmental 
conditions, and thus emphasises the need to reduce China’s dependence on imports of 
foreign core technologies such as design tools. Overall, this reflects how software is 
positioned as a core technology for the sustainable development of wind power. The MLP 
S&T (2006-2020) already mentioned the role of software as central to China’s upgrading; 
however, this is not being linked to wind power. In the case of the manufacturing sector, of 
which the wind power equipment industry forms part, the MLP S&T argues that China’s 
manufacturing industry must be upgraded through IT and software, as well as through 
intelligent design approaches and technologies, computer-aided engineering analysis, and 
process design and integration technologies (MLP S&T (2006-2020), III, 4(27)). This 
reflects an overall concern for upgrading within IT and software to enable upgrading within 
China’s manufacturing (MLP S&T III (2006-2020), 6(40, 42, 43). Accordingly, IT and 
software (termed the ‘Information Industry and Modern Service Industry’) are also 
categorised as a ‘main area’ for prioritised development, and the plan lists a number of IT 
and software related ’frontier technologies’ (MLP S&T (2006-2020), V, 2 (6, 7, 8)).  
Algorithms, core mathematics, and aerodynamics as ‘frontier’ areas 
To improve capabilities within software tools and indigenous design, the 5YP S&T Wind 
Power (2012*) outlines a number of basic research areas to be promoted. Since software is 
composed by thousands of lines of algorithmic codes, upgrading of software tools is closely 
related to basic research in algorithms and core mathematics, such as aerodynamics and 
aeroelasticity. For instance, aeroelastic codes within simulation tools require algorithmic 
codes based on in-depth basic research in aerodynamics, which demands high capabilities 
within mathematics. The need for general upgrading in algorithmic mathematics is already 
indicated in the MLP S&T (2006-2020), which mentions core mathematics and its 
application in cross-disciplines as one of a number of ‘frontier scientific basic research 
issues’ (MLP S&T (2006-2020) VI, 2(4)). It argues that to improve the scientific basis of the 
development of IT,  
”[p]riorities will be given to studying new algorithms and basic software theory; mechanisms of virtual 
computation environment; theory and methods for mass information processing and knowledge mining; 
interactive theory; network security and credible and controllable information security theory” (MLP 
S&T (2006-2020) VI, 2(10)).  
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Although not directly related to the wind power sector, a concern for cross-disciplinary 
excellence within mathematics and algorithmic codes for software programming is 
indicated, which is critical to developing and optimising software tools in the emerging wind 
power-TEN. With the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), aerodynamics is mentioned directly 
as a central research area for wind power. That is, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) 
emphasises a number of areas for basic research, which e.g. include research in blade 
design and aerodynamics, including development of software simulation tools and testing 
equipment (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5(II,4)). According to the plan, China must 
foster indigenous capabilities in the development and application of technology for blade 
design. The plan emphasises wind turbine aerodynamics, theoretical modelling and 
simulation of wind turbines and key components, as well as wind power systems 
engineering theory to be the most critical basic research areas for wind power (5YP S&T 
Wind Power (2012*),4,1). Overall, a central concern of the political pole is i.a. the 
development of simulation tools and software tools, e.g. for aerodynamic simulation (5YP 
S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5, 2(4)). 
Core technologies for large-scale wind farms and grid connection – forecasting systems 
The 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) further highlights the need for research in control 
system technologies to ease grid integration of large-scale wind farms, without destabilising 
the grid (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5, 2(6)). That is, the plan is concerned with 
promoting basic research in the design, construction, and operation of large-scale wind farm 
development, which amongst other things requires development of wind farm design and 
optimisation, as well as software systems adapted to China’s environmental conditions (5YP 
S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5(II,5)). Accordingly, the plan emphasises the urgent need for 
developing technologies and improving independent research in advanced operational 
control (systems) and wind power prediction systems for wind farm operation and 
optimisation (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(2)). Closely related to the issue of large-
scale wind farms is the concern for grid connection. In this area, core technologies, such as 
wind farm power prediction research, active/reactive power control regulation, wind farm 
control strategy optimisation techniques, integrated power prediction, and LVRT key 
technologies, should be developed and improved to ensure stable and reliable interaction of 
large wind farms to the grid (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5 (II,5)). 
Intellectual property rights and testing and certification technologies 
Above, it has been illustrated how software tools are framed as critical to wind turbine 
performance, design, and to wind power integration, and to the development of indigenous 
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innovation capabilities and the attempts at reducing dependence on foreign technologies. 
The 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) accordingly emphasises the issue of developing 
independent intellectual property rights (IPRs) in regards to wind power design tools and 
software systems, which are in accordance with China's environmental and topographic 
conditions (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*), 2, 2(3)). Lastly, core technologies for testing 
and certification, in particular for turbine and blade design as well as for large-scale wind 
farms, are mentioned as critical tools for the upgrading of China’s potentially emerging 
wind power-TEN. In turn, improvements of China’s standardisation system and its 
adaptation to local conditions hinges e.g. on improvement of certified wind power 
equipment software tools (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5, 5(2)). 
Mobilising poles of a potentially emerging software-TEN 
The previous Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the rapid mobilisation of a potential wind 
power-TEN, in particular the rapid mobilisation (and overflowing) of a market pole by the 
political pole. In turn, Chapter 8 has illustrated how the political is positioning itself as 
translator-spokesperson on behalf of potentially emerging scientific and technical poles as 
well, e.g. by enlisting frontier technologies and scientific areas for basic research. Further, it 
is displayed how the political pole is problematising the need to establish a software-TEN 
within wind power, which can help qualify the potentially emerging wind power-TEN as 
economically, technically, and scientifically sustainable. That is, with an overarching goal of 
China’s Sustainable Development through Scientific Development, the ‘core technology’ of 
software (and a potential software-TEN) is being constituted as a critical means to 
potentially frame the emerging and overflowing wind power-TEN as sustainable. In the 
following, the chapter inquires into how poles of a potential software-TEN may be enrolled. 
Core technology collaboration and the sustained, stable growth of the wind power-TEN 
Apart from framing specific technologies such as software as ‘core’ to the stabilisation of 
wind power’s overflowing framing, the political pole also articulates concern for the 
construction of collaborations on software technologies. While the MLP S&T (2006-2020) 
and the MLP RE (2007) have already highlighted the need for such collaborations, the 5YP 
S&T Wind Power (2012*) links the issue of such collaborations directly to the ‘sustainable 
development’ of wind power. That is, to ameliorate some of the challenges and areas of 
backwardness of China’s potential wind power-TEN, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) 
encourages the deepening of targeted joint development or cooperative research and 
development with foreign international organisations, research institutions, as well as 
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technical cooperation with enterprises. In particular, collaborations on e.g. wind turbine 
design and manufacturing, design and operation of wind farms, and on wind power grid 
access technologies is emphasised (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 5(VII, 2)). In terms of 
international S&T cooperation, the plan highlights specific basic research areas for 
encouraged international S&T cooperation, e.g. within wind resource assessment (5YP S&T 
Wind Power (2012*), 5(VII, 1)). In addition, in terms of interdisciplinary collaboration in 
areas where China is lagging behind, the plan promotes collaboration between science and 
the manufacturing industry of key components. That is, in order to achieve technological 
breakthroughs and synergies between industry, academia, and research, the plan encourages 
cross-disciplinary research within advanced software tools for wind turbine and blade 
modelling and simulation, for wind farm design, and for grid connection (5YP S&T Wind 
Power (2012*), 2, 2(3)). 
In this way, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) is employed as an interessement device to 
motivate interested parties to engage in collaborations on core technologies such as 
software. In addition, the plan frames cross-disciplinary collaboration as a key means for 
optimisation and development of independent design, and “overall help to protect the 
sustained, rapid and steady growth of China's wind power industry” (5YP S&T Wind Power 
(2012*), 2, 2(3)). Hereby, optimisation and independent design of China’s equipment 
manufacturing as well as cross-disciplinary – and potentially international – collaborations 
are being linked to the sustainable development and scientific development of China’s 
potential wind power-TEN. Hereby, while mobilising technical and scientific poles in the 
emerging wind power-TEN, the political pole at the same time attempts to institute itself as 
translator-spokesperson of a potential software-TEN. 
Nascent scientific and technical poles of an emerging software-TEN? 
In regard to control system software, large foreign WTMs like the Danish WTM Vestas and 
foreign control system suppliers have had decades to develop and optimise their software 
systems62, main controls, and control algorithms. In contrast, most Chinese WTMs have 
emerged by basing their wind turbines on mature foreign design licenses, and have often 
based their control systems on relatively mature control system technologies (hardware and 
software) acquired from foreign suppliers. Increasingly, however, Chinese control system 
suppliers have emerged, as have Chinese research institutions with capabilities in the field of 
control software. For instance, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese 
                                                     
62
 Several of the foreign control system suppliers have only recently entered the wind power 
business from other businesses such as the marine industry, however. 
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Academy of Science and Technology for Development (CASTED) conduct research in 
control systems. CAS has a spin-off producing electrical control systems and is engaged in 
collaboration with Chinese WTMs, who often buy control systems (co-)developed by CAS.  
In addition, in regard to both control system and simulation software, China is witnessing 
the emergence of a comprehensive testing, certification, and standardisation system. This is 
e.g. seen in the work of China General Certification (CGC) and China Electrical Power 
Research Institute (CEPRI) of the State Grid. CEPRI conducts research on a number of 
software tools and grid codes in regard to grid connection. For instance, research is 
conducted in regard to generation, grid connection, prediction, and dispatch and operation 
for renewable energy (Interviews). Further, the CGC is involved in the development of 
indigenous simulation tools, which are important for the certification of new wind turbine 
designs (Interviews). In the process of building capabilities within software in Chinese wind 
power, myriads of international collaborations have emerged over time as well (Interviews). 
Amongst other collaborations on certification and standardisation, collaborative research 
activities have been established between CEPRI, CGC, and CAS. Further, as regards grid 
connection, i.a. the Technical University of Denmark/Risø (DTU) has for many years 
collaborated with and assisted CEPRI in developing the Chinese grid codes (e.g. the low-
voltage-ride-through (LVRT) standard), i.a. by offering courses and technical assistance 
(Int. 20, 2013; Int. 37*, 2013). CEPRI and CGC have also been involved in collaborations 
under the Sino-Danish Wind Energy Development programme (WED) as well as under the 
World Bank CRESP programme (Int. 14, 2014; Int. 20, 2013; Int. 37*, 2013; Int. 19*, 2013; 
Int. 21*, 2013). In addition, certification companies such as DNV GL and foreign design 
companies have offered technical assistance and training to Chinese actors i.a. in regard to 
software. 
Increased acknowledgement of the need for advanced control systems 
Above it has been illustrated how concerns on quality issues and the proposed means of core 
technologies such as software to contain the overflowing are translated into nascent 
scientific, technical, and market poles of a potential software-TEN within Chinese wind 
power. Still lagging behind in the most advanced control system technologies, and 
increasingly recognising their importance for quality, trans-national customer-supplier 
relations on control system technologies have become increasingly critical in the 
qualification of Chinese wind power as sustainable. Thus, in the explosive growth phase of 
China’s potential wind power-TEN, Chinese WTMs tended not to pay much attention to 
control systems. While foreign design licenses have required that Chinese customers buy 
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specific foreign control systems, Chinese customers have been focused on getting 
independent from such foreign and often more expensive control systems as soon as possible 
(Int. 15, 2012)63. With lack of experience of Chinese control system suppliers, this has 
however had detrimental to the quality of Chinese wind turbines: 
”Well, overall they need some proper control systems, right. Regulation systems. But, overall, they are 
way too simple. And they have been built on a philosophy of being cheaper” (Int. 18, 2013). 
As priorities are shifting from low prices to quality in the ongoing (potential) ‘turn to 
quality’ in China’s wind power-TEN, Chinese WTMs have gradually acknowledged the 
complexity of wind turbine technologies, realising the need for strong and advanced control 
systems:  
”The Chinese very much looked at wind turbines as some simple technology, so they were surprised at 
how complex it is, and how wrong it can go. The control systems are central in this, but this only dawned 
on them very late” (Int. 24, 2013). 
A change in attitude towards the importance of control systems can hereby be noticed 
amongst Chinese actors in the wind power-TEN. For instance, Chinese investors in wind 
farms sometimes “actually require that some key components are foreign, e.g. control 
systems, converters, bearings” (Int. 39, 2011) due to the higher stability of foreign 
components (Int., 1, 2013).  
Increased demand for retrofit – an emerging market pole for software 
Over time, an increased demand for advanced quality control systems can be noticed as the 
emerging wind power-TEN is facing a quality crisis. This can e.g. be seen in the increased 
demand for retrofitting of wind turbines, which means that already installed wind turbines 
are having their (failing) control systems changed. Thus, demand for advanced control 
technologies for grid compliance, park control, retrofit, and forecasting etc. has increased 
(Int. 34, 2012; Int. 2, 2012): 
”Well, right now all forecasts are positive, very, very positive, and it’s exactly going in the direction, 
which I had imaged…what we are to do now…we are to work on Smart Grid, park control, retrofit” (Int. 
2, 2012). 
This increased demand for retrofit is linked directly to the new concern for and mantra of 
quality in the industry:  
                                                     
63
 For instance, a variety of Chinese WTMs have based their wind turbine design on an Aerodyn 
design license, which has listed the Danish control system supplier Mita Teknik’s electric 
control system as a mandatory component. 
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”This will be the market for the coming years. I’m sure they will continue focusing on it, but also that 
they will increase focus in order to…quality, quality, quality! There’s no point in constructing a new 
turbine, when you’ve got 10,000 out there, which are not working” (Int. 2, 2012). 
As new policies on park control and new grid codes demanding i.a. LVRT technologies 
have been introduced, foreign control system suppliers are increasingly getting a more 
positive outlook on the Chinese wind power-TEN, after a number of challenging years in 
China: 
”And we just have to be ahead, and we are. There are thousands, thousands of turbines, which we can do 
this with, take out the old control system and then install a park control system” (Int. 2, 2012). 
While foreign control system suppliers frame themselves as being ‘ahead’, several Chinese 
WTMs and component suppliers have begun experimenting with developing their own 
indigenous software tools. As Chinese WTMs and control system suppliers are gradually 
building indigenous capabilities within control systems, demands by Chinese customers to 
foreign suppliers of control system technologies are changing. For instance, foreign control 
suppliers face increased pressure to supply increasingly better, smarter, and cheaper control 
systems, which are adjusted to the Chinese environmental conditions: 
”Grid compliance, Smart Grid, park control, retrofit…and then of course still new control systems for 
new turbines…but it must be updated, and it has to be…it has to become smarter, and cheaper, and 
cheaper” (Int. 2, 2012). 
”But then the market changes. Now it’s a question of giving them what they need and not…well, what 
they need at the present moment […] And that’s something new. That’s not, what we’ve got. We may 
have it in some sort of shape, but we need to adjust it. In order that it works out here” (Int. 15, 2012). 
As Chinese actors are increasingly building their own capabilities, Chinese WTMs and 
control system developers and Western main control suppliers have started to compete. 
Increasingly, Western suppliers acknowledge that their present role in the Chinese wind 
turbine industry is going to change in the coming years, and that they risk losing their 
market share, if not consistently changing their technology platform: 
”I don’t think that we have got a role…on our existing platform, we don’t have a role out here more than 
10 more years. And that’s basically how it is, because we also have to develop and adjust, and we try to 
do that through our strategic collaborations. And then we have to make it so attractive for them to keep 
our system so that it can’t pay off to make their own. But of course they will try to anyhow. But if we 
don’t keep that in mind all the time, then we will lose…then we will lose the market at some point” (Int. 
2, 2012). 
While Chinese actors are indeed upgrading rapidly, “they have difficulties with that [the 
main control]. Because that’s where you have to have it all linked together. And you [they] 
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don’t have any experience” (Int. 9, 2012). On the other hand, while the control system may 
still be an obstacle to upgrading, Chinese WTMs are in general convinced that ”we will 
catch-up, because we are integrating lessons from our global resources” (Int. 27, 2012):  
“I am sure that this will happen, surely. In the not too far away future, Chinese companies will be able 
to...reach the level of European companies, and become stronger” (Int. 17*, 2012). 
In the above, it is indicated how relations, positions, and roles of Chinese and Western 
actors are under negotiation, being increasingly contested. At the same time as Western 
actors are attempting to ’stay ahead’, ”you can sense that they [the Chinese WTMs] want a 
larger and larger slice of the pie” (Int. 15, 2012). Hereby, Western actors are acknowledging 
that they must “administer this [advantage] properly, right? In order that you can…also in 
the companies…there is no guarantee that a company just keeps on being ahead” (Int. 35, 
2013). 
An emerging competitive space 
Having indicated the de- and reconfiguring of relations between Chinese and foreign actors, 
the last section of the chapter inquires into how a so-called ‘competitive space’ is emerging 
between Chinese and foreign actors in the potential software-TEN within Chinese wind 
power. This competitive space construes a boundary between developed and developing 
countries and technologies, and constitutes core algorithms as critical actors. 
Competitiveness as a matter of core algorithms 
In the competition on prices, Western wind turbines are more expensive in up-front 
investments. Yet, in the longer run, they are less expensive due to their long-term 
performance and lower cost of energy (Int. 35, 2013). Unable to ”compete on prices” in 
terms of up-front investments, Western WTMs, suppliers, and research institutions thus 
emphasise the need to conduct basic research and R&D, constantly “generating new 
knowledge”, so they can constantly “stay some generations” ahead (Int. 35, 2013). That is, 
Western actors struggle to remain cheapest in terms of cost of energy through generating 
new knowledge on the continuous optimisation of wind turbine performance. This can i.a. 
be done through optimised control systems and simulation design tools. In contrast, Chinese 
actors are often framed as lagging behind, as they have not had a tradition of generating new 
knowledge themselves (Interviews). In this way, “the Vestas turbine will have beaten this 
[Chinese] one in terms of cost of energy. And then the Chinese are forced to buy licenses” 
(Int. 35, 2013).  
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Issue of Intellectual Property (Rights) and certification and standardisation 
In the struggle to keep ahead and lower cost of energy, core algorithms in critical software 
tools are framed as the most critical. Thus, “there are two ways to differentiate your 
company and technology, that is, through the blades [implying aeroelastic codes in the blade 
simulation tools] and the main control algorithm” (Int. 22, 2012). While critical to wind 
turbine performance, core algorithms are the cornerstone of control system companies (Int. 
2, 2012). As foreign main control system suppliers have longer experience and better 
expertise within main control software, they protect the core algorithms as much as possible. 
Indeed, this is 
”simply a factor of competitiveness. Of course they [the Chinese] want this knowledge [on main control 
algorithms]. If they have a supplier, then they want to see how much they can get out of him of these 
things, and that’s because in the back of their mind they want to be able to produce it themselves, or to 
give it to another supplier who can do it cheaper. Well…a lot of people want our source codes for our 
programme [simulation tool]. But we don’t give it away” (Int. 35, 2013). 
Hereby, the essential intellectual property (IP) contained in the core algorithms of the main 
control is being framed as critical to competitiveness. At the same time, this intellectual 
property is being ‘black-boxed’, as a matter of IP protection, sometimes through legal IPRs, 
and sometimes through other means. There is great concern amongst foreign actors, 
however, that Chinese actors will finally succeed in accessing these core algorithms from 
foreign suppliers: “If the Chinese companies ever gain access to the core algorithm”, ”and 
they are keen to do that” – at least “they are trying hard!”, then Chinese companies would be 
able to install the software on other controllers and systems. However, ”if they get there, 
then the race is over for the rest of us, I’m sure” (Int. 2, 2012). In addition to main control 
software, Chinese customers do not have access to aeroelastic codes of foreign simulation 
design tools, which are critical tools in the certification of new wind turbine designs. 
Largely reliant on foreign design tools, Chinese actors are struggling with understanding the 
underlying aerodynamic principles of the simulation tool, and thus for indigenously 
improving and certifying own wind turbine designs.  
A competitive space entangled in a zero-sum game of catch-up 
Overall, a competitive space around core technologies, in which algorithms are being 
positioned at the very centre, seems to be emerging. In this competitive space around core 
algorithms, concerns over IPRs and certification and standardisation are evolving in the 
emerging software-TEN. While foreign actors are afraid of losing their competitive 
advantage, Chinese actors are concerned with how traditional technology transfer may 
produce barriers to China’s development of indigenous innovation capabilities. This concern 
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is also reflected in various Chinese policies and plans, which pinpoint that ”core 
technologies cannot be purchased” (MLP S&T (2006-2020)). This is explained at length in 
China’s MLP S&T (2006-2020): 
”[O]ne should be clearly aware that importation of technology without emphasizing assimilation, 
absorption, and re-innovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous R&D capability, which in turn 
widens the gap with world advanced levels. Facts have proved that, in areas critical to the national 
economy and security, core technologies cannot be purchased. If our country wants to take the initiative 
in the fierce international competition, it has to enhance its indigenous innovation capability, master 
core technologies in some critical areas, own proprietary intellectual property rights, and build a 
number of internationally competitive enterprises. In a word, the improvement of indigenous innovation 
capability must be made a national strategy that is implemented in all sectors, industries, and regions so 
as to drastically enhance the nation’s competitiveness” (MLP S&T 2006-2020, II,1).  
Also the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*, 2,1) argues that ”compared with the international 
advanced level, there are still large gaps [between Chinese and foreign actors in the wind 
power sector]” (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1). These concerns for owning core 
technologies are further reflected in President Xi Jinping’s speech on S&T in June 2014. 
Urging “Greater Innovation in ‘Core Technologies’, Xi Jinping argues that “Only if core 
technologies are in our own hands, can we truly hold the initiative in competition and 
development” (Sinosphere, Jun. 10, 2014). Construing core technologies as a matter of 
competitiveness and development, the speech refers back in time ”to China’s past as a 
victim of invasion and subjugation as a lesson in the price of scientific backwardness” 
(Sinosphere, Jun. 10, 2014). Emphasising, how “[w]e cannot always dress up other people’s 
yesterdays as our own tomorrows” (Sinosphere, 10 June 2014), Xi Jinping emphasises that 
“[s]cience and technology are the foundation of national strength and prosperity, and 
innovation is the soul of national advancement” (Sinosphere, Jun. 10, 2014). Hereby, 
“[i]n a certain sense, scientific and technological strength determines changes in the world balance of 
political and economic power, and determines the fate of every nation” (Sinosphere, Jun. 10, 2014). 
Going back and forth in time, and employing a comprehensive framework of discursive and 
narrative devices on China’s Scientific Development, science and technology is being 
framed as a critical means for China’s development, upgrading, and catch-up. As control of 
core technologies is framed as a matter of deciding “the global economic and political 
winners and losers of coming decades” (Sinosphere, 10 June 2014), the emerging 
’competitive space’ within the software-TEN and wind power-TEN seems entangled in a 
zero-sum game of catch-up. 
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Conclusion and theoretical considerations – emergence of a software-TEN? 
Chapter 8 has illustrated how a potential software-TEN is being assembled, constituted as a 
partial solution to the qualification of the emerging wind power-TEN as technically, 
economically, and scientifically sustainable. In figure 13 below, some of the many actors in 
the potential software-TEN are shown. 
 
Figure 13: Examples of actors in poles of emerging software-TEN 
 
Source: Own design 
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Construed as ‘core’ to improving the quality of wind turbines and minimising overflowing, 
in terms of i.a. curtailed wind power, software tools and their core algorithms have been 
constituted as particularly critical entities. That is, core algorithms are emerging as what 
may be termed an obligatory passage point for industrial upgrading and for catch-up, as they 
create passage (or not) for acquiring indigenous IPRs and international certification. 
Meanwhile, core algorithms in advanced software tools tend to be ‘black-boxed’ in 
collaborative relations between Chinese and foreign actors. These seemingly socio-technical 
barriers to accessing core algorithms can potentially threaten the framing of wind power as a 
means of China’s Scientific Development.  With the conclusion of Chapter 8, the first three 
chapters of the analysis have provided a background for understanding the volatile 
development of the potentially emerging wind power-TEN, characterised by rapid growth in 
capacity installments, subsequent overflowing, and a potential shift from quantity to quality. 
Intent on rapid catch-up, and already having upgraded within numerous fields with 
tremendous pace, it has been shown how relations between Chinese and foreign actors are 
being reconfigured, as Chinese actors gradually increase their capabilities and fight against 
the framing as ‘laggards’. That is, framed as a catch-up country, a boundary has been 
construed between China as a newly industrialised country and Western developed 
countries, as well as between inferior and superior quality technologies. However, Chinese 
actors seem to refuse this framing, as they seek to “carve out for themselves a degree of 
autonomy from the network prescriptions” (Murdoch, 1998: 363).  
 
Having provided an historical background for understanding the disruptive development of a 
Chinese wind power-TEN, along with the construction of a software-TEN, the analysis in 
the following dives into the mappings of the different controversies which unfold, as a 
qualification struggle takes place in Chinese wind power. Having illustrated the 
configuration of a competitive space taking shape around core algorithms, and how these 
produce concerns over IPRs and standardisation, Chapters 9 and 10 zoom in on 
controversies over IPRs and certification and standardisation respectively, i.e. looking into 
the dynamics of the pacification of goods. These controversies are unfolding around core 
algorithms in critical software tools (the main controls and simulation tools) in the 
potentially emerging software-TEN within Chinese wind power. 
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Chapter 9. Controversy over Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Emerging Software-TEN 
 
We meet in the middle of the Kingdom of Denmark, in an office at a train station, right in-
between our respective residences, after we talked briefly over the phone yesterday. Pouring 
a cup of coffee, he starts explaining the development of the Chinese wind power industry: 
Figure 14: Controversy over IPR 
 “As I see it, now the second phase is coming, now that they have 
realised that it was too poor quality…it was cheap, the prices have 
been pushed all the way to the bottom, which has harmed the 
Western manufacturers, because they couldn’t sell their turbines. 
They had decided that the price level per kilowatt had to be this 
low. But nobody can sell a quality turbine at that price. And then 
around one and a half years ago, the government went in and 
changed their standpoint. ‘Okay, now we have to recognise that 
they are not good enough. They are not as they are supposed to be, 
so we have to do…focus on quality’…And that’s actually the 
situation that we are witnessing now. So, two things could happen 
now. The first thing is that you continue buying licenses in the 
West, and that you just continue looking at what the license tells you. The other thing could be that you 
start paying what it costs to produce a quality turbine… Eh, I don’t know whether that’s the way they are 
going. I’m not sure. Because the Chinese want to do it themselves, just as the Danes want to do it 
themselves. What I think will happen is that they will focus more on [research and] development [R&D]. 
They will focus more on innovation. They will focus more on leveraging knowledge. And start to 
understand what’s going on. And start designing their own turbines. Personally, I think that’s what will 
happen”. 
On the train on my way home, I wonder whether and how this potential transition from low 
price and high quantities to quality may create new complex dynamics in regard to issues of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in Sino-foreign collaborations around core technologies.  
 
Concerns over IPRs to core algorithms 
In the previous Chapters 6-8, the historical backdrop for understanding the current 
qualification struggle taking place in China’s potentially emerging wind power-TEN has 
been rendered. To qualify wind power as economically, technologically, and scientifically 
sustainable, in alignment with the narrative of China’s Sustainable and Scientific 
Development, the construction of a software-TEN has been constituted as critical. Having 
233 
 
displayed the fragile framing of China’s emerging wind power-TEN and the entangled 
construction of a potential software-TEN within wind power, Chapter 9 conducts an 
‘algorithmic controversy-mapping’, zooming in on the configuration of relations around 
control system software algorithms in the potential software-TEN. Below, this is indicated 
in figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Zooming in on controversy over IPRs 
 
Source: Own design 
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Set into the context of China’s WTO accession in 2001 and China’s emphasis on IPRs in its 
innovation strategy, Chapter 9 will in other words map an emerging controversy over IPRs, 
which configures around access to core algorithms in control systems. China’s emerging 
wind power-TEN has been founded on a ’trade market access for technology’/’technology 
for market’ policy (Lewis, 2013: 115; McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of 
Commerce, 2009). That is, ”[t]echnology transfer has always been the key priority in 
China’s wind energy sector”, e.g. by the use of license agreements and joint venture 
partnerships (McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 33). Taking 
this into account, the analysis hereby narrows down the inquiry into the potential 
construction of a software-TEN to a particular part of the potentially emerging software-
TEN within Chinese wind power, namely dynamics of customer-supplier relations between 
Chinese WTMs and foreign suppliers of control system software. Overall, the chapter 
hereby dives into dynamics of the pacification of goods in the marketisation of Chinese 
wind power, namely by looking into the employment of the framing tool of IPRs and the 
controversies it produces.  
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – and the role of IPRs 
In the first part of the chapter, the analysis inquires into the conventional perspective on the 
role of IPRs in international trade and technology transfer, and China’s attempts at World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) compliance since its WTO accession in 2001. That is, China 
seems to “have come increasingly to the view that greater linkages to globalization 
processes through access to technology and information is critical for growth and that 
stronger IPRs can play an important role in providing that access” (Maskus, 2002: 146). 
This is e.g. reflected in China’s MLP S&T (2006-2020), which states that 
”[p]rotecting intellectual property rights and safeguarding the interests of IPR owners is not only 
necessary for perfecting the nation’s market economy system and promoting indigenous innovation, but 
also important for establishing the nation’s credibility and image in international cooperation (MLP 
S&T, VIII, 4). 
When it comes to wind power (and software tools), the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) also 
emphasises the importance of a stronger IPR system for the sustainable development of 
Chinese wind power (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*, 5, 7 (4(6)).  
The role of IPRs for international trade and innovation 
Internationally recognised standards and regulations on the protection of IPRs (namely 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets) are generally considered to play a critical 
role for encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer (Maskus, 
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2002). That is, IPRs such as patents serve to protect technological inventions64  by giving 
exclusive rights to the inventor of the invention. In this way, a patent for technological 
inventions functions as a ‘limited monopoly’, which is granted by a national government to 
patent holders on their inventive ideas, and typically lasts for 20 years (Kaya, 2007: 45, 51). 
In addition to patents, copyrights serve to protect original65 works (fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression), such as novels, films, and computer programs, by preventing people 
from copying or commercially exploiting them without the copyright owner's permission 
(Kaya, 2007: 49). Consequently, firms that hold IPRs, and which consider to invest i.a. in an 
R&D facility abroad, will have to pay attention to IPRs in the respective country, to ensure 
that its IPRs will be protected (Mansfield, 1994, 1995 in Maskus, 2002). 
Due to the limited monopoly right that IPRs grant to inventors, IPRs are furthermore 
conventionally perceived to encourage technology transfer. That is, the patent owner can 
license the patent through patent licensing agreements, which are contracts in which the 
patent owner (the licensor) agrees to grant the licensee the right to make, use, sell, and/or 
import the claimed invention, in return for a royalty or other compensation (Kaya, 2007: 44). 
In addition to furthering international trade and technology transfer, IPRs are generally 
perceived to further investments in R&D and innovation, since the inventor’s guarantee of a 
monopoly right to the idea of the invention for a certain period secure compensation for 
his/her investment in R&D, as IPRs minimise the risk of immediate copying by others 
(Maskus, 2002: 144; Liebeskind, 1996, 1997 in Spencer, 2003: 217; Kaya, 2007: 64). That 
is, IPRs (e.g. by filing a patent) serve to ensure a return on investment and recouping of 
development costs (Kaya, 2007). This rationale is also seen in the Chinese wind turbine 
industry:  
“To me, patents are a complete pain...but to me, they are almost mandatory to innovation, because 
otherwise you have no business reason to innovate, because someone could just take it from you” (Int. 
11, 2012). 
Acknowledging the critical role of IPRs in furthering international trade, IPRs were already 
introduced into the WTO in 1995 with the signing of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)66. By then, ”[intellectual property rights] 
                                                     
64
 as well as utility models and industrial designs 
65
 Copyrights work by granting the creator of an original work the exclusive rights to its use and 
distribution, and they last during the creator's lifetime and a minimum of 50 years after his/her 
death (Kaya, 2007: 44, 50). 
66
 At that time (1994), negotiations took place within the framework of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1995, GATT was reorganised into today’s World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  
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became, on the part of WTO member states, obligations of commercial policy that cannot be 
escaped” (Maskus, 2002: 135). Setting minimum standards for different forms of IPR 
regulation in WTO countries, the TRIPS introduced a new standard for IPR protection in 
international business (Yang and Clarke, 2005: 549).  
Lax Chinese IPR enforcement – the case of wind power and software 
After 15 years of negotiations, China entered the WTO in 2001 (Yang and Clarke, 2005; 
McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009; Wang, 2004: 258). 
According to the TRIPS Agreement, any developing country compliant to the TRIPS 
Agreement must introduce and enforce IP protection of the same standard as developed 
countries within a period of five years following the accession (Zheng, 1996 in Bosworth 
and Yang, 2000: 461). Working consistently on building an IPR system in accordance with 
the TRIPS agreement (Yang and Clarke, 2005: 549; Wang, 2004)67, China has now 
succeeded in creating the ”laws and tools necessary to have respectable IPR protection” 
(McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 24).  
However, China still suffers from lax IPR enforcement, as well as from weak IPR regulation 
and implementation (Liu, 2005; Yang et al., 2004: 459; Wang 2004: 253; Bosworth and 
Yang, 2000). As “there is widespread counterfeiting of nearly every type of product in the 
PRC” (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009: 309), foreign companies in general consider IPR 
infringement an ‘inevitable curse’ of doing business in China (Yang et al., 2004: 459). 
Hereby, foreign companies often express concerns about bringing their “crown jewels”, i.e. 
core technologies, to China, as they risk seeing their own technology coming back at them 
from Chinese competitors (McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 
2009: 7). In the following, the chapter inquires into concerns and consequences of such lax 
IPR enforcement in China in general, as well as within Chinese wind power and software in 
particular. 
Risk of losing Intellectual Property in Chinese wind power 
Despite considerable improvements in China’s IPR system, IPRs in China are generally 
constituted as ‘weak’ by foreign actors (Int. 11, 2012). From the perspective of Western 
companies, China’s ‘technology for market’ approach in the construction of a wind turbine 
                                                     
67
 A member of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) since 1980, China has 
since then ratified many IP-related international treaties and conventions, e.g. on trademarks, 
patents, and copyrights (Bosworth and Yang, 2000; Yang and Clarke, 2005; McGregor/APCO 
Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 24; Wang, 2004; Yang, 2003).  
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industry is often framed as a matter of Chinese WTMs being intent on ‘reaping’ foreign 
technologies. That is, according to a Chinese expert, 
“you know, when China is not able to do something, then they want to, you know, work on the foreign 
companies, to come here and you can get a better treat[ment], and we will reap your technology, ha 
ha!” (Int. 5). 
The so-called Chinese strategy of ‘reaping foreign technologies’, e.g. through licensing 
agreements and joint ventures, is often being framed as a Chinese means of “always pushing 
for the ’crown jewels of technology from companies that want access to China’s exploding 
marketplace’” (GE executives in Lewis, 2013: 115). So even when the intellectual property 
of Western MNCs has been protected through means of formal IPRs, the risk of IPR 
infringement persists. Accordingly, it is argued that Western WTMs ”will actually become 
even more protective” in China (Int. 11, 2012): 
”I think a lot of companies are hesitant to come here to share knowledge, because China has not 
demonstrated the ability or desire to protect intellectual property” (Int. 11, 2012). 
Hereby, the issue of IPRs in China “is really stifling innovation collaboration in the country. 
Not just in our company, just in general” (Int. 11, 2012). To protect their ‘crown jewels’, i.e. 
core algorithms, foreign control system companies within wind power will often – instead of 
doing real R&D in China – instead tend to only localise sales offices in China and/or 
establish offices, which do redesign or product improvements of older platforms 
(Interviews). Lax implementation and enforcement of IPRs as well as a historically 
relatively weak R&D capacity (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009; Chow 2002: 339) is often 
being explained as a matter of China’s cultural background, in both the Confucian tradition 
of ‘rule of man’ rather than ‘rule of law’68 (Bosworth and Yang, 2000: 457; Zimmerman and 
Chaudhry, 2009) and in the communist so-called rule by law (Keyuan, 2006), which both 
tend to view IP as public property69. Culture is also employed as an explanation in the case 
of wind power and the propensity to copy rather than innovate: 
                                                     
68
 Lax implementation of rules may find an explanation in the tradition of the rule of man (人治) 
as opposed to the rule of law (法律) (Chow, 2002: 339). The rule of man is founded in 
Confucian philosophy, where relationships are contextual, hierarchical, interpersonal, and 
reciprocal. In this context, obedience by the subject towards the ruler depends on the fulfilment 
by the ruler of his obligations, and not of a universally acknowledged set of rules. Hence, 
obedience to law owes more to informal constraints than formal law (Chow, 2002). 
69
 Confucianism requires control of information, and a traditional Chinese belief is that 
inventions draw on past knowledge that belongs to all citizens (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 
2009: 309). Consequently, ”[t]he concept of IPR has always been at odds with the teachings of 
Confucianism. On the one hand, IPRs are government-sanctioned monopolies that seek to 
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”Why is innovation not so good in China? Cultural issue. IP is a problem. We are used to copying – we 
copy everything from the US, Facebook, Apple…we lack the capabilities. It’s a huge challenge” (Int. 
40*, 2012).  
When it comes to the specific case of software, additional complexity is added to the issue 
of IPRs, however, as the adoption of legal means to protect intellectual property may turn 
out to be more dangerous than abstaining from legal means. In the following, the analysis 
therefore looks further into the specific case of IPRs in regard to software.  
Ambiguity of IPRs in regard to software – on trade-offs between patents, copyrights, and trade 
secrets 
The issue of IPR is in particular ambiguous and sensitive in regard to software. While 
software invention requires considerable investment in time and money, it is easily copied, 
and how to protect it further remains a contentious issue within the TRIPS Agreement 
(Kaya, 2007). Copyrights and patents are the two main intellectual property forms, under 
which computer software might be protected (Kaya, 2007: 44). While the TRIPS agreement 
places computer programmes under the copyright section, the question of whether or not 
computer programmes can be patented has not been solved, however (Kaya, 2007), and it is 
instead to be decided by the individual signatory countries (Kaya, 2007: 46, 56).70 In 
addition, it might be considered safer to abstain from filing patents on software by software 
developers. In the following, the chapter inquires into the ambiguities of IPRs on software, 
and the trade-offs between patents, copyrights, and trade secrets that companies are facing, 
when choosing specific means of IPR protection of their software. 
The algorithmic nature of software 
The ambiguity of patents on software is related to the way in which software lies at the very 
borderline of copyrights and patents. Basically computer software is ”an algorithm or a 
mathematical formula” (Kaya, 2007: 64). In turn,   
                                                                                                                                                                          
protect, by forbidding free copying, the ‘original thought’ of the IP-owner. On the other hand, 
Confucianism considers that learning takes place through copying and that imitation is a form of 
flattery” (O’Connor & Lowe, 1996 in Bosworth and Yang, 2000: 457). In addition, Communist 
tradition views IP as public property (Bosworth and Yang, 2000: 453; Zimmerman and 
Chaudhry, 2009). 
70
 Based in a debate on the ‘the common good’, opponents to software patents emphasise how 
software patents will put limits to competition, as competitors are excluded, and stifle further 
software development. In contrast, proponents in favour of patent protection for computer 
software argue that it promotes investment in software development (Kaya, 2007: 45).  
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”[a]n algorithm is a series of steps to solve a problem and a computer program is an implementation of 
that algorithm, which is like an implementation of the mathematical equation E=mc2” (Kaya, 2007: 64). 
Software code can be written in different classes of computer languages, one which more 
qualifies as an original expression (qualifying for copyrights), and another which qualifies 
more as a functional work of technology (qualifying for patents). That is, source code is the 
category of computer language instructions, which is most frequently written and read by 
software programmers. This automatically qualifies for copyright protection. In contrast, 
software in object code can be argued to qualify for patents. This is due to the way in which 
object code, which is the software code readable by the computer (basically consisting of 
numeric codes), gives the computer instructions on what actions to execute, i.e. which 
functional tasks to perform. Since patents have always been available for functional subject 
matters, object codes (constituting a functional work of technology) could qualify for patent 
protection (Kaya, 2007). However, whether a line of object code qualifies for a patent, 
remains an ambiguous issue, as expressed by a foreign control system supplier: 
”It is possible to take a patent on some software, but it is a bit tricky…it’s easier with the hardware stuff, 
which is something that you can see. Where it’s possible to see that somebody else has done the same 
[copied]…with software, it’s very, very difficult to prove [the ‘newness’ of the invention]” (Int. 41, 
2013). 
While there is international disagreement on the patentability of software, software 
companies at the same time are facing a strategic dilemma in their choice of IPR of 
software. In the following, the chapter inquires into the strategic considerations of software 
developers of whether or not to file for a patent in the case of software.  
To lay algorithms open or not lay open, that is the question – patenting software or not 
First of all, companies must decide whether it is worthwhile the money and time that it 
requires to file a patent application for software, or whether a copyright, which is automatic 
and free, is to be preferred instead (Kaya, 2007). Second, another more critical difference 
between patents and copyrights is the way in which patents require a higher degree of 
openness as to the contents of the invention or the original work. In Latin, patere means "to 
lay open", thus, the meaning of patent is basically to make it available for public inspection 
(Kaya, 2007: 45). This means that the inventor filing for a patent must describe the invention 
in detail and make it public (Kaya, 2007: 51). In the case of software, this implies that to file 
for a software patent, the software inventor must lay open the software algorithms. 
However, development of new software is time-consuming. Taking the case of companies 
developing software for control systems in China, for instance, “we used forty years to 
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develop it [the main control]. And all the others [foreign companies] have also done that” 
(Int. 2, 2012). If just laying open the source codes and/or object codes, software companies 
will hereby see their company’s competitive advantage depleted. Thus, foreign software 
suppliers for main controls and control systems are worried about opening up their core 
algorithms, as this would imply that they ”give away the entire business for free” (Int. 2, 
2012). Consequently, most foreign software developers for control systems do not take out 
patents on the software of the controller, neither in China, nor elsewhere: 
“Sometimes it’s actually better, when you talk about software, not to take out a patent on it, because then 
nobody can see it…because when you take out a patent, then you write…then you actually 
make…how…[…] Then you write in details how it functions. Then you give it all away. Then it’s actually 
better simply not to say anything about it” (Int. 41, 2013). 
In addition to this precaution, patents on software in China are not legally possible. That is, 
as indicated earlier, patent regulations in regard to software differ between countries. Thus, 
while patents on software are e.g. widespread in the U.S., they are less widespread in the 
European Union (Kaya, 2007: 46), and in China only copyrights can be taken out on 
software (Interviews). Having illustrated the inherent risks of patenting software, the 
following inquires into alternative ways of protecting software. 
Ambiguous and weak protection of software through copyrights – and the alternative of trade 
secrets 
In contrast to patents, copyrights are free and automatic and do not require companies to lay 
open software codes, since copyrights do not require a formal application. The only thing 
required, is that the work is fixed in a physical medium of expression. In this way, software, 
both the source code (in human readable form) and the object code (in machine readable 
form), automatically qualifies for copyright protection (Kaya, 2007: 44). As expressed by a 
Chinese WTM involved in developing software indigenously:  
“For our software modules, we don't give source codes to customers […] That is our intellectual 
property rights […] All the software modules we produce, we get copyright” (Int. 34, 2012). 
However, copyright laws are ambiguous and only offer partial protection for software. That 
is, the scope of protection is limited compared to patents. This is due to the way in which 
copyrights only offer protection against direct copying of an original expression, while the 
idea itself (or the procedures, methods of operations, or mathematical concepts) is not 
protected (Kaya, 2007: 44). In turn, the framing of ‘original expression’ is itself 
ambiguously defined. In the TRIPS agreement, it thus remains a “major question in 
connection with computer programs […] whether and how far copyright protection should 
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extend to the nonliteral or functional elements of  the programs, such as program behavior 
and structure, or if these aspects of the programs should be protected by another form of IP 
rights, specifically patents” (Kaya, 2007: 57-58). Consequently, copyright protection for 
source and object codes of the programmes cannot prevent second comers from imitating the 
functional aspects of the programme: 
”The problem of protecting copyright is that although the object code exists as written text, it serves a 
utilitarian function which is traditionally protected by patents. Therefore, copyright cannot prevent 
second comers from recreating the same work or producing similar work using different expression. In 
other words, there is no copyright infringement when a competitor uses the same idea in constructing 
his/her work provided that his/her creation is independent” (Kaya, 2007: 44).  
Not providing an effective means of protection for the functional aspects of computer 
programmes, competitors can, through reverse engineering practices of the programme and 
without access to the source code of the programme, imitate the programme’s functional 
elements (Kaya, 2007: 50-51). In addition, copyright protection in China is considered 
particularly weak (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009: 309), making copyright a risky 
strategy.  
Lastly, an alternative IPR option to patents and copyrights in regard to software protection is 
trademarks and trade secrets. Trademarks make it possible to claim exclusive properties of a 
product or service, by use of a sign, which is capable of distinguishing the goods or services 
of one enterprise from those of other enterprises (wipo.int (a)). In turn, a trade secret is any 
confidential business information, which provides an enterprise with a competitive edge. 
The unauthorized use of such information by persons other than the holder is regarded as 
IPR infringement. As the trade secret is kept intentionally confidential, e.g. through different 
technical black-boxing means, the owner can enjoy unlimited monopoly rights on the 
invention without limits in time. To keep the information on the trade secret confidential, i.a. 
non-disclosure agreements between the involved parties might be signed to prevent 
information leakages such as breaches of confidentiality and corporate espionage (Kaya, 
2007; wipo.int (b); wipo.int (c)). Trade secrets are generally not protected by law in the 
same manner as trademarks or patents. Trade secrets are protected only when the secret is 
not disclosed, and the key disadvantage of a trade secret is consequently its vulnerability to 
reverse engineering and leakage (Kaya, 2007).  
Having outlined some of the concerns over IPR protection in China in general, within wind 
power, and in regard to software in particular, the following section inquires into the 
configuration of relations between foreign developers of software for control systems and 
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Chinese WTM customers in the potentially emerging software-TEN, with a focus on the 
issue of IPRs.  
Controversy over IPR in the potential software-TEN – the case of main control core 
algorithms 
In the following, the analysis first outlines how control system software from foreign 
suppliers is transferred through technology licensing. This leads to an account of strategies 
used by foreign control system software developers in order to protect core algorithms 
through legal and non-legal means and of the implications for Chinese customers in terms of 
upgrading potential. This provides the basis for an inquiry into the de- and reconfiguring of 
relations, as a controversy over IPR, entangled in concerns over technology transfer and 
limits to Chinese upgrading, unfolds in the emerging software-TEN.  
Technology transfer and technology licensing of software in Chinese wind power 
As depicted in earlier chapters, China’s emerging wind power-TEN was in the early phase 
founded on a strategy of ‘trade market for technology’, and thus based on conventional 
technology transfer. Technology transfer often takes place through licensing of technology, 
which is a means to protect the IPRs to the technology. Licenses contain provisions which 
e.g. allocate rights, restrictions on the use of the technology and software (e.g. in terms of 
geographical boundaries), liability, warranty, and responsibility to the different parties. 
According to license agreements in which drawings of a wind turbine design are provided, a 
Chinese WTM might for example be obliged to buy and sell a certain amount of wind 
turbines based on the license and pay royalties as a percentage of the sales. When a specific 
controller (and the software it contains) is written into a wind turbine license, the supplier of 
the controller is thereby formally protected by patents, copyright, and/or trademarks and will 
receive a share of the royalties from the number of sold turbines.  
In terms of technology transfer of foreign control systems and their software contents, these 
are often included into foreign design licenses for a full wind turbine:  
“In the case of a full technology transfer, the transfer typically comes with some IPR in the context of a 
license arrangement for either components or a full turbine in the context of a license arrangement for 
either components or a full turbine model to be manufactured locally” (Lewis, 2013: 110). 
When the design license contains a list of recommended or obligatory suppliers, e.g. of 
foreign control systems, the Chinese WTMs are often ’forced to buy hardware’ from the 
listed suppliers, for a specific number of wind turbines, in accordance with the design 
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license (Int. 43, 2013). An example of this is the Chinese WTM Dongfang Electric, which 
has been engaged in a manufacturing process license with the German company REpower. 
In this license contract, a number of conditions about technology transfer, learning, and 
rights to manufacture in accordance with the REpower design license have been signed. In 
addition, it involves a component list, which demands Dongfang to use specific control 
system suppliers (Int. 44, 2013). At other times, control system suppliers may sell a software 
license directly to the Chinese WTM71. When licensed, the software will most often be 
proprietary (and not free or open source) licenses, implying that the end user is not allowed 
to distribute or copy the software to other wind turbine controllers, but instead bound by 
non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) (Interviews).  
The use of black-boxing locks of software codes 
In addition, foreign control system companies also adopt trade secrets as a way of protecting 
their IPRs to the software (Interviews). In particular, the very ’spine’, i.e., the core algorithm 
of the wind turbine’s main control, is protected through different technical locks and 
cryptations, which black-box its contents. As technical locks and cryptations can help black-
box the core algorithm and its source codes, it becomes impossible to copy it: “How it is 
technically protected, I don’t know, I just know that it’s protected and that’s there’s nothing 
they can do about it” (Int. 2, 2012). Another way to protect the most ‘core’ algorithms of the 
control system can be to sell parts of the object code, but not the source codes of the 
software. That is, fearing copying of the source codes, software developers for controllers 
“normally just send this as a binary file [in object code]. And that’s just some numbers of 
zeros and ones. You can’t see what it is. That’s what they got [in the initial phase]” (Int. 41, 
2013).  
Non-legal means of intellectual property protection  
In addition to the above-mentioned legal means of IPR protection, as well as technical 
black-boxing, software developers of controllers may consciously choose not to localise 
software R&D activities and/or the main algorithm in China in order to protect their 
intellectual property (Interviews). For instance, the American control system producer, 
American Superconductor (AMSC), which produces ”computer systems that serve as the 
electronic brains of wind turbines” (and its software affiliate, Windtec) (Riley and Vance, 
2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek), has sequestered its software abroad, meaning that the control 
                                                     
71
 A typical software license grants permission to use one or more copies of software in a way 
which, without a license agreement, would otherwise have constituted an infringement of the 
software owner's exclusive rights under copyright law. 
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system software sits on a secure server abroad, which is not accessible from the Internet in 
order to prevent attacks from hackers. This is based on the idea of ”dividing up the 
intellectual property part of the content and not having them in China” (Riley and Vance, 
2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek).  
Lastly, another non-legal form of IP protection in China is close personal relationships. As 
argued by a foreign actor, ”we have an NDA [non-disclosure-agreements]. We have the 
IPRs. And then again, we’ve got all that, but I think that when the light is turned off, I’d 
prefer having a close relationship” (Int. 13, 2013).  
Concerns on protecting the core algorithm – and Chinese interest in accessing the ‘gold’ 
As already indicated, what in particular is a concern for Western suppliers of control 
systems is how to protect the ‘core algorithm’ or the so-called ‘spine’ of the main control. 
Consequently, “the very control part, the core [core algorithm] we have closed, locked, and 
sealed in any possible way” (Int. 2, 2012). Protecting and black-boxing the core algorithm 
through means of a trade secret, effectively by means of technical locks, is framed as vital to 
the survival of foreign control system companies. Conversely, if another party gained access 
to the core algorithm, the software would be possible to transfer to another controller: 
”They cannot get into this system yet, but if they could…they would like to…then they would be able to 
install our software on another controller, on another system” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Due to the risk of ‘losing their entire business’, foreign control system suppliers abstain 
from engaging in a new customer-supplier (or any other) partnership with Chinese WTMs, 
when they sense that the only interest on the part of the Chinese partner is technology 
transfer:  
”Because…when we talk controllers, then you also talk about software, and then you talk about source 
codes, and the source codes, that’s our ’gold’, I would say” (Int. 43, 2013). 
Conversely, as software is still the “the component where it’s most difficult” to upgrade (Int. 
9, 2012) for Chinese WTMs, component suppliers, and research institutes, and as software is 
being constituted as a critical component in the potential ‘turn to quality’ in Chinese wind 
power, access to source codes has over time become more central in negotiations between 
Chinese and foreign collaboration partners:  
”Well, in general, they would like to get everything [during negotiations]. They would like to get some 
source codes […] Source codes are defined by how things have been done” (Int. 41, 2013). 
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The interest from Chinese customers in regard to source codes (Int. 43, 2013) is seen already 
during negotiations as Chinese customers “ask[ed] about them [source codes] directly. 
‘When can we get them?’” (Int. 43, 2013). This creates a concern amongst foreign software 
developers of control systems that Chinese customers will leave them, as soon as they have 
found a way to copy the software: 
“He [the Chinese customer] only has one interest. And as soon as he has got that, then he won’t use us 
anymore” (Int. 43, 2014). 
”I know the Chinese well enough to know that this [buying the controller] is not the only thing they 
want!” (Int. 9, 2012). 
The increased interest from Chinese WTMs in source codes as a way of becoming 
independent from foreign suppliers is at the same time founded in a Chinese concern for 
getting access to cheaper controllers and controller software. That is, foreign suppliers 
acknowledge that ”as soon as they [Chinese customers] have got something, they will try to 
find something cheaper” (Int. 43, 2013). While having focused so far on the perspective and 
concerns of foreign suppliers, in the following, the analysis dives into the perspective of 
Chinese actors in regard to accessing software core algorithms.  
Difficulties faced by Chinese companies when algorithms are closed 
In the following, the difficulties faced by Chinese WTMs when algorithms are closed by 
means of IPR and non-IPR protection, are illustrated.  
The legacy of foreign licenses – contested roles of the ‘student’ and the ‘teacher’ 
Chinese WTMs are struggling to reduce their dependence on foreign suppliers and wind 
turbine design license suppliers. That is, based on a legacy of foreign design licenses, 
Chinese WTMs “are students who learned from a teacher” (Int. 45, 2013). Yet, today, 
Chinese WTMs “have chosen to start designing their own turbines. So they are ready to 
design a new technology and to get independent from the old one” (Int. 13, 2013). Striving 
to design their own wind turbines, Chinese WMTs not only want to become independent 
from foreign design houses and consultancy firms “who have sold them their license” (Int. 
35, 2014), but increasingly also “want to develop the software themselves” (Int. 9, 2012), 
and thus they “want to get rid of them [control system suppliers]” (Int. 10, 2012): 
“They have produced the turbines based on a license, and that means that they have to pay for every 
turbine that they produce for that company. Of course they want to get out of that. So they want to 
develop their own turbines. That is what matters for Chinese turbines […] Simply. That’s what it’s all 
about. They want that technology transferred, and then…” (Int. 35, 2014). 
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As Chinese customers seek independence from foreign technologies, contracts (e.g. 
licensing agreements and NDAs) which have been employed as framing tools in customer-
supplier relations have also become insufficient, since 
“the Chinese are not as loyal to a components’ list as in other countries. Well, it’s written that there 
should be an [X]-controller and stuff like that. The Chinese look at it immediately and think: How can we 
get rid of this?” (Int. 9, 2012). 
In the above, it has been indicated that Chinese WTMs have started to contest their role as 
‘student’, wanting to redefine their own role. 
Rapid service and localisation – the double-edged sword of protection 
The heavy protection on software algorithms has destabilised relations between foreign 
suppliers and Chinese customers. This is partly a result of how lack of access to algorithms 
results in delays in the service that Chinese WTMs can offer their Chinese customers, i.e. 
wind farm owners and/or generating companies, when technical issues occur in the wind 
farm (Int. 10, 2012). In the perspective of the Chinese WTM, such slow service “will just 
create a very bad impression in the mind of the [WTM’s] customer”, i.e. the wind farm 
owner and/or generating company (Int. 12, 2013*), and has resulted in some Chinese 
customers leaving their foreign control system supplier in favour of someone else (Int. 12, 
2013*; Int. 46, 2012*; Int. 10, 2012). In addition, relations between Chinese and foreign 
actors have been destabilised over time as foreign control system suppliers often do not 
localise R&D-activities in China due to fear of losing IPRs. Yet, in the perspective of 
Chinese customers, investment “in local design” and adaptation “to the customers' demands” 
is important (Int. 10, 2012). Acknowledging this, some foreign control system suppliers 
have changed strategy over time, gradually localising development activities in China to 
make their relations with customers more stable, and opening up some of the software to 
local employees (Int. 31, 2012; Int. 46, 2012*). Other control system companies have 
engaged in joint ventures with Chinese control system companies. Yet, as most foreign 
control system companies are considered too “tough on protection”, protection of algorithms 
seems “a double-edged sword” (Int. 40*, 2012). That is, it is “also very risky not to share 
anything” (Int. 31, 2012).  
Dissatisfied Chinese customers – sweet relations gone sour 
With improved capabilities and ambitions of Chinese WTMs, closed algorithms have 
created dissatisfaction amongst Chinese customers – making ‘sweet relations go sour’ – as it 
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makes it impossible for the Chinese customer to make adaptations to the control system 
software in accordance with local environmental conditions: 
”All the software for the wind farm...now the Chinese customer becomes more and more know about the 
industry...so they have their own ideas. They say, why not we can...because the low wind speed issue [in 
China making adjustments necessary]...they want to talk to [control system supplier], they want to 
change, but [foreign control system supplier] says no. We are...I heard from the customer” (Int. 10, 
2012). 
Dissatisfied with higher prices of foreign control systems, with lacking flexibility and access 
to software codes, some Chinese WTMs have gradually attempted to change their suppliers 
as collaborations have gone sour (Interviews):   
“Their product and service is too expensive, they charge for everything, and very closed, not sharing 
anything. So the collaboration was closed. Apart from being closed, they are also too slow, their service 
is bad, and their control technology was old, not very fast and adaptable” (Int. 44, 2013).  
Another way of becoming independent from foreign control system suppliers is sometimes 
sought through reverse engineering practices. Thus, 
”I am convinced that the moment you sell them a prototype [for a controller], they will disassemble it 
and start analysing what they can do to make this one. And they are working on that still, and they have 
not succeeded yet [although] they are trying hard anyhow” (Int. 2, 2012). 
However, reverse engineering is complex and can easily go wrong, and in terms of the 
software part of control systems, reverse engineering is not possible as long as it is 
efficiently protected (Interviews). Yet, there have been cases of IPR infringement of control 
system software. This is e.g. the case of the much-debated ”red-hot smoking gun example” 
of IPR infringement and industrial espionage (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek) 
between the Chinese WTM Sinovel and American Superconductors (AMSC). AMSC has 
served as Sinovel’s largest supplier for several years, yet, after Sinovel ”abruptly and 
inexplicably” turned away AMSC shipments in 2011, it was soon discovered that  
”[t]he Sinovel turbine appeared to be running a stolen version of AMSC’s software. Worse, the software 
revealed that Sinovel had complete access to AMSC’s proprietary source code. In short, Sinovel didn’t 
really need AMSC anymore” (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek).  
In addition, computer logs and messages showed that Sinovel had blackmailed one of 
AMSC’s employees working at AMSC’s research facility in Klagenfurt – who has since 
pleaded guilty and been sentenced to 12 months in jail – to quit AMSC and to help in China 
to  
”create software that could go on existing turbines as quickly as possible, using source code taken from 
AMSC’s server in Austria” (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). 
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This case has resulted in filings in a Beijing copyright infringement case, one of four theft-
related cases filed by AMSC in China, where there is ”evidence that the stolen code was 
already in more than 1,000 Sinovel turbines by July” 2011 and many more since (Riley and 
Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). Hereby, Sinovel had ”succeeded in copying their 
[AMSC’s] control concept like crazy” (Int. 9, 2012), which made it possible for Sinovel to 
adjust the software and make it fit any kind of controller, i.e. reducing dependence on 
AMSC:  
”They did not have the software. Or they had it, but they were not allowed to have it […] And Windtec 
[AMSC’s software company] said, you cannot get that” (Int. 9, 2012).  
In many ways, this seems a case of Sinovel being unsatisfied with being dependent on 
AMSC controllers. Wanting to develop and adjust the software themselves, and having 
signed a multi-year contract with AMSC, AMSC’s products accounted for a growing share 
of Sinovel’s turbine cost, which can explain ”the motivation to acquire that technology” 
(Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). 
Reconfiguring relations between customers and suppliers 
So far, the chapter has inquired into how foreign control system (i.e. software) suppliers 
protect their core algorithms, as well as how Chinese customers react to closed algorithms. 
In the following, the chapter looks into how relations between foreign and Chinese actors in 
the emerging software-TEN over time have been de- and reconfigured, and how software 
algorithms – and their corresponding IPRs – have seemed critical in this de- and 
reconfiguration. As illustrated above, access to software algorithms is becoming 
increasingly negotiated between Chinese WTMs and foreign control system suppliers. 
Dissatisfied with lack of access to core algorithms, sometimes due to legal, and sometimes 
due to non-legal means of IPR protection, Chinese customers have started leaving their 
foreign suppliers. For instance, the Sinovel-AMSC case can be seen as a case of how IPRs, 
as a normal framing device, have started to overflow as Chinese actors contest the exclusion 
from algorithms and seek to upgrade capabilities by circumventing the framing device of 
IPRs. This is also seen in the way that Sinovel, in its attempt to become independent from 
AMSC, has apparently attempted to make a Chinese power converter company into “the 
Chinese version of AMSC” (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). Involved in the 
creation of this company in 2010, the IPR infringement case with AMSC revealed how the 
AMSC power converter had been reinstalled by Sinovel with ”a nearly identical one made 
by Guotong [the Chinese power converter company]”, and was ”running on a version of 
AMSC’s control system software obtained the year before by Sinovel and decrypted by its 
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engineers” (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). According to foreign actors, this 
case can be seen 
“from different perspectives. I would also…if I were Sinovel, I would also have been angry due to that 
arrogant way of handling things […] Actually, I can see it from Sinovel’s side. And they just couldn’t get 
access to anything, so it’s understandable that they did as they did” (Int. 9, 2012). 
That is, Chinese actors “want to have their own strengths built up. Sooner or later you want 
this, you need to do this, so they try some...try some change on these IPR issues, which 
irritate [AMSC]” (Int. 10, 2012). While Chinese WTMs in the initial phase did not request 
access to source codes, this is a consistent request today. This indicates that Chinese WTMs 
have upgraded capabilities as well as changed their ambitions and priorities, e.g. by 
increasingly requiring access to see the source codes (and not just the object code). 
”Because they think that when they buy something, then they want to see it…it’s clear, then they want to 
be able to work on it [the codes] themselves […] With object codes, they don’t know what’s inside the 
box, but just hope that it works. That’s how it [the object code] is. But we could sense that 
others…nobody really wanted to buy anything unless they could get this” (Int. 41, 2013). 
In this way, relations, positions, and relative roles start to become contested and negotiated, 
as Chinese WTMs aspire to work on the codes themselves. In the attempts to upgrade in the 
potential transition of the Chinese wind power-TEN from quantity to quality, source codes 
have become framed as critical to make Chinese WTMs independent from foreign 
technologies, and thus also for building indigenous innovation capabilities. Accordingly, 
relations have become destabilised between Chinese WTMs and suppliers of software, when 
suppliers are framed as ‘closed’; instead, more flexible and ‘open-minded’ suppliers have 
been chosen as suppliers. In turn, most foreign control system suppliers are gradually 
acknowledging that “a reputation for being closed” (Int. 2, 2012) can be detrimental, and 
that a competitive space is being opened up between different foreign software suppliers for 
controllers, where the key is to be framed as relatively ‘open’. Realising the shifting 
relations, several suppliers of software for controllers are experimenting with opening up 
some of their source codes to associate themselves with ‘openness’. In the following, the 
chapter looks into how customer-supplier relations are being reconfigured around source 
codes.   
A new competitive space around source codes – ‘no pain, no gain’ 
Acknowledging a new ‘competitive space’ opening up around source codes, some foreign 
suppliers stay protective around source codes, while others are experimenting with how far 
down into the ‘spine’ or ‘nervous system’ they dare to go, without threatening their own 
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existence. Acknowledging that to the Chinese customers, “source-codes – that is everything” 
(Int. 45, 2013), different strategies of gradual opening up are applied in order to get orders:  
”We have to give something for free, free of charge, open the technology, some of the algorithms. […] It 
is worthwhile to give. No pain, no gain. If you give me more, then they [foreign suppliers] get more 
orders (Int. 45, 2013).  
As Chinese customers are evaluating the ‘quality’ of their control system suppliers, 
primarily in terms of how much they open source codes, foreign companies have e.g. 
engaged in modularisation of their control system software. This modularisation “makes it 
easier to control” what the Chinese customers get access to, and what they do not gain 
access to (Int. 43, 2013). That is, modularisation of software enables suppliers to bracket and 
disentangle the ‘core’ from the ‘non-core’. Hereby, framing certain algorithms as ‘core’, the 
‘less core’ can be opened and sold as source code modules by engaging in exclusivity 
agreements with Chinese customers (Int. 45, 2013). By building the software as customised 
modules, Chinese customers can get access to some of the software source codes which are 
less core, while the core layer (the operational layer), which connects the different layers, 
will stay closed. Hereby, Chinese customers can buy selected software modules, while 
developing other modules themselves, as long as it is written in the same code. Hereby, the 
ability to share ‘openly’, while protecting and black-boxing the most ‘core’, becomes an 
important parametre of keeping Chinese customers in the Chinese market.  
”But when it comes to exactly this product, this is very attractive to them, because no one else has dared 
to open up the source code in such an extensive way as we have, and that’s probably related to how the 
others can’t protect theirs…they cannot protect the most important” (Int. 2, 2012). 
At the same time, as the only way to differentiate themselves is through the key algorithm 
and how the source codes have been built to regulate the wind turbine, foreign control 
system software companies find themselves in an ongoing struggle to find the limits as to 
how much can be shared without losing critical proprietary property, while maintaining or 
building new relations with Chinese customers.  
Negotiating algorithmic boundaries 
According to some foreign suppliers of control system software, they have now 
“reached the limit, we are into the source code, where we…the only thing we lack is to give them access 
to the central nervous system [..What] they are getting access to, that’s all the different [sub-control 
systems], which are specific for the individual products, but the very main control, the core [algorithm] 
is protected” (Int. 2, 2012).  
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While limits to sharing algorithms are critical to the survival of Western suppliers, access to 
source codes is central to the upgrading of Chinese WTMs. That is, knowledge on source 
codes can provide knowledge on the regulation of the wind turbine, the interconnected 
nature of the myriads of turbine components, and reduce dependence on foreign 
technologies. This makes the boundaries of sharing algorithms – the ‘algorithmic 
boundaries’ – consistently negotiated and contested. 
”It’s pretty obvious, that they are expecting us to open up to all the knowledge that we’ve got. That’s 
kind of the basic assumption. That’s a given. And that’s one of the interesting tasks, I’d say, to find out 
how to do it without harming yourself, but at the same time making sure that they find it a reasonable 
partnership between customer and supplier. And that’s a challenge” (Int. 13, 2013). 
Accordingly, customer-supplier collaborative relations seem to be producing an ambiguous 
space of simultaneous collaboration and competition, which take shape around the 
boundaries of algorithms and corresponding limits to collaborations. 
Competition around algorithmic boundaries 
As a competitive space opens up around ‘algorithmic boundaries’, foreign suppliers of 
control system software at times mobilise the media, when new agreements are made, in 
order to frame themselves with associations of ‘openness’. An example of this is e.g. how 
the Danish control system supplier Mita Teknik has recently engaged in a partnership with 
Sinovel. While the two companies have had collaborative relations on technical 
development since 2008 (Wind Energy and Electrical Vehicle Review, Apr. 22, 2012), a 
new strategic partnership signed in 2012 has had quite a bit of resonance, since source codes 
have now been opened up more than ever, buying access to source codes (Interviews; Wind 
Energy and Electrical Vehicle Review, Apr. 22, 2012). According to the press release, in 
connection with a co-hosted press conference by Sinovel and Mita-Teknik at the China 
Wind Power 2012, 
”Mita-Teknik has made all data from the control system available to Sinovel, allowing the Chinese 
company’s engineers to create unique solutions for their customers. One of the key features of the 
platform, which the Danish company said would boost its market appeal around the world, is the 
parametric grid object, which enables Sinovel turbines all over the world to connect using local grid 
codes” (Wind Energy and Electrical Vehicle Review, Apr. 22, 2012).  
What has attracted notable interest in the media as well as amongst industrial actors is, in 
particular, how Sinovel under the agreement ”owns the intellectual property rights to the 
modified and upgraded versions of the software and source code, as well as the right to use 
the initial version in all products the company produces” (Wind Energy and Electrical 
Vehicle Review, Apr. 22, 2012; www.sinovel.com). This   
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“can strongly support Sinovel to develop more advanced control system platforms and solutions. Under 
the agreement, Sinovel will also purchase PLC hardware and the software with source codes of the 
control systems from Mita-Teknik. Sinovel can utilize, copy, modify and upgrade the control software 
and source code of the initial version delivered by Mita-Teknik, and will own the intellectual property 
rights of the modified and upgraded versions. Based on the contract, Sinovel can apply both original and 
modified versions to all its product lines” (Sinovel Managing Director of Sinovel Europe, 
www.sinovel.com). 
Having redefined the ‘algorithmic boundaries’, the partnership has created a large amount of 
interest from other Chinese WTMs in entering into similar agreements with Mita-Teknik. 
Damage control – and aspirations for experimental learning 
Making this type of agreement possible is, allegedly, the way in which Mita-Teknik and 
other control system suppliers have built up their systems as modules and use technical 
locks, and in this way still protect the ‘most core’. Over time, the ability to deliver modules 
rather than closed code, which enables the Chinese customer to make adaptations to the 
programme themselves, has become more central. That is, as Chinese customers have built 
capabilities, they increasingly demand room for maneuvre to learn and experiment. Furhter, 
as a matter of protection of the intellectual property contained in control system software, 
opening up source codes only takes place on older platforms, which means that foreign 
control system suppliers already have a newer and more optimised control system, which 
nobody can get access to:  
”This product that I am selling the source codes to, that is kind of old-fashioned. In that way the 
potential damage is limited” (Int. 43, 2013). 
Further, the source codes can still not be installed on another controller without engaging in 
copyright infringement, e.g. due to technical locks. Hereby,  
“a lot of them become disappointed because they find out that they won’t be able to install the software 
on another controller” (Int. 2, 2012). 
However, even when foreign suppliers have opened up source codes, there may be obstacles 
facing Chinese WTMs. 
Challenges for Chinese companies after gaining access to core algorithms 
As described above, Chinese customers have gained increasing access to source codes 
through ongoing negotiations. Hereby, some Chinese customers are gradually gaining access 
to make some, though limited, adjustments to the software in a running wind turbine; if they 
have not invested in acquiring parts of the source code, however, they will still be dependent 
on the assistance of the control system software supplier for all minor and larger adjustments 
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to be made (Int. 2, 2012). At the same time, even when having acquired access to parts of 
the source code, such access requires the capability to absorb it, because ”if you don’t know 
about it, then you don’t know what to ask for” (Int. 9, 2012). Sometimes, foreign control 
system suppliers are 
“in doubt, whether the source codes…and what they [the Chinese WTMs/customers]…whether they 
actually know what it is that they want. I’m not sure. Because, I’m not sure whether they know what it is 
that they are working with” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Having heard about its ‘critical’ role to a wind turbine’s quality, access to source codes has 
become framed as ‘the mother of all solutions’:  
“And then, it’s probably what we need to get […] just as if it was the Mother of all Solutions, right. But it 
might not be that” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Accordingly, some claim that the absorptive capacity of Chinese customers is still limited, 
as some of them ”don’t know what they can use it [the source codes] for. So, actually, it’s 
safe enough to sell it to them, because they don’t know what they are doing” (Int. 42, 2012). 
An example of this is that when one Chinese WTM had been given source codes from a 
foreign supplier, it took the Chinese WTM two years even to realise that the core algorithm 
had been hidden. In addition, software codes can be full of errors and are generally in need 
of continuous optimisation in order to follow the trend for high-efficiency intelligent 
turbines. Hence,  
”[t]here’s a good thing about software, namely that it’s full of errors. And if you don’t understand how 
it’s built, then it doesn’t have any particular value” (Int. 15, 2012). 
In this way, while ”not a matter of who has the best brain” (Int. 9, 2012), the extent to which 
it is possible to share codes is related to “when you are ready to absorb it” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Open it – and don’t change a thing, on limits to absorption and reverse engineering 
Even though Chinese customers increasingly ask for access to the source codes, when they 
finally succeed in buying the source codes, which are much more expensive than the binary 
object codes, often, they do not make changes to the acquired source-codes. As expressed by 
a foreign control system supplier: 
”None of our customers dare to do anything yet, haha […] I actually think they were kind of 
overwhelmed by it” (Int. 43, 2013). 
Overwhelmed by ”its complexity” (Int. 41, 2013), as a change in the codes will change the 
parametres for everything else, often “the codes just lie there, but they call us [X] anyhow 
[...] because they are afraid of making a mistake” (Int. 43, 2013):  
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”You could imagine that if the blades are to be longer, then the tower also has to be taller, but that 
changes the load on your tower, right. And then you have to put in some new parameters. And we have 
not been willing towards opening that up. And maybe that has been a mistake. But now we have started 
opening up, so they can make these calculations, and then they can find out which parameters have to be 
adjusted in the software” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Hereby, by changing source codes, there is a potential to “mess up everything” (Int. 48, 
2012). This makes the gradual opening of source codes a mutual learning process, where 
foreign control system suppliers must learn to set limits as to where the ‘core’ is, while 
teaching their customer how to use the increased access to source codes, but equally, the 
Chinese customers must engage in learning (Int. 41, 2013). Overall, this makes it evident 
that technology transfer of source codes only has value when matched with the experience to 
be able to absorb it, which again requires basic research. 
”This can give them a lot of other problems. They should…there’s a reason why we have built it, as we 
have. And if they start changing a lot of the foundation, then it might all fall apart. Then it’s kind of 
better first to build up some understanding of the different areas. I can be in doubt whether the Chinese 
have the insight and understanding for all of this…and, in reality, maybe also lacking the kind of 
patience that is needed” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Hereby, there seem to be barriers to reverse engineering, even while having access to source 
codes. For instance, when the Chinese customers have attempted reengineering, it 
sometimes turns out that it does not work in the exact same way: 
”So we have made…it was some guesswork, like I’ve never seen it before…and then we had to go to the 
wind turbine, the existing turbine, take out the existing system, and then by trial and error, trial and 
error […] But they just have no clue what they are doing. But they can see, that it’s not working exactly 
like the other one” (Int. 42 2012). 
Yet, reengineering seems necessary in order to adjust and optimise the wind turbine 
software to the specific Chinese, environmental conditions:  
“In [Chinese WTM] we also want to do these kinds of things [reverse engineering]. For example, since 
the wind conditions for Chinese and foreign wind turbines are not the same, then we will only get 
suboptimal results, if we copy the European mature core algorithms. If we instead learn from the Danish 
experience combined with China’s experience with reverse engineering, then we can get some 
unexpected results for China’s real conditions. When these results are applied elsewhere, we can become 
very successful (Int. 49*, 2012). 
Legacy of foreign licenses and a tradition of copying  
Overall, Chinese WTMs seem to face a barrier in terms of utilising their access to the source 
codes. This is being linked to China’s legacy on foreign licenses. This has largely led to 
lacking experience in basic research. That is, the Chinese WTMs are lacking ”knowledge 
255 
 
and experience. They have not made enough mistakes. They simply haven’t learned enough 
yet” (Int. 32, 2012). Dependence on foreign technologies means that they 
”don't know the reason behind it. So if you want to change it, then you have no idea, because it's not you 
who developed it. But if you have 20 years, or 40 years like Vestas, you started from zero, then you 
actually know why you ended up with this number, and how we should change it. So that's the 
experience” (Int. 5, 2012).  
According to a foreign control system supplier, ”they can’t reengineer. They open 
everything. They only know how to copy” (Int. 42, 2012). Yet, access to the key algorithm 
of the controller does not help, if Chinese actors do not “know the key technology” (Int. 48, 
2012), in particular, the aerodynamics of the turbine and the aeroelasticity of the blades. 
That is, the main control (and the pitch control) contains critical information on how to 
regulate the blades. However, optimising a turbine design to local conditions requires an 
”abstract way of thinking; you need to know what it [the coding] is based on [regulation principle]. One 
thing is to have some numbers delivered, which you must do your calculations on, and then you get a 
result. That’s not how it’s functioning. You need to know the dynamics [behind the codes/regulation 
principle]” (Int. 2, 2012). 
The issue of worthless source codes – on lacking experience with aerodynamics 
If lacking knowledge, experience, and basic research on the aerodynamics lying behind the 
source codes, the ’critical’ key source codes are becoming ’worthless’ as they are to no use: 
”In regard to the controller…[…] if they don’t understand the aeroelasticity…then they can have all the 
source codes delivered that they want to […] Well, the source code for the main control…it takes into 
account the aeroelasticity of the wind turbine, and if you don’t understand the basic behaviour of the 
turbine, then you don’t know why [a control system supplier] has written the regulation code in this 
way…so it is kind of a peculiar place to start out…when they are attempting to gain knowledge, because 
they need to understand the turbine first. And maybe they don’t. I don’t know the Chinese…but if you 
don’t understand what a turbine is about, then you can’t…” (Int. 35, 2013). 
In this way, if long-term basic research lacks on the aerodynamics (aeroelastic codes) 
contained in the source codes, access to the “source code is not of any use” (Int. 35, 2013). 
Hereby, the case of software codes in control systems indicate how ”[s]tealing [or buying] 
information, however, is not the same as being able to use it” (Riley and Vance, 2012, 
Bloomberg/Bizweek). 
The ultimate interests of the game – an emerging controversy over IPR in the 
software-TEN 
In the above, the contested boundaries of algorithms have been outlined. Overall, a ‘game of 
interests’ (Int. 40*, 2012) is being construed, as both Chinese and foreign actors in 
customer-supplier and joint venture relations want their “own voice”. “It's [like] two big 
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animals wanting to dance together, haha, it's not easy to coordinate” (Int. 10, 2012). 
Whereas foreign control system suppliers are afraid of opening up too many codes, Chinese 
companies are keen to ‘change the IPRs’ in order to reduce dependence on foreign core 
technologies: 
“These are the ultimate interests of the game, the reason why the Chinese companies ask the Danish 
companies to open the source. Chinese companies do not want their own control system controlled by 
others, they hope to change the ownership rights, to optimise [/make adaptations to the codes]” (Int. 
40*, 2013). 
Entangled in a qualification struggle of the potential wind power-TEN, in which capabilities 
as well as goals and priorities of the Chinese WTMs have changed, roles and positions start 
to become negotiated between Chinese and foreign actors around control systems in the 
emerging software-TEN. In the following, the chapter inquires further into a potential 
controversy configuring over IPRs to core algorithms, which takes place in the emerging 
software-TEN in Chinese wind power. 
The emerging software-TEN configuring a zero-sum ‘catch-up game’? 
In the above, it has become evident how the transition from quantity to quality in the 
emerging wind power-TEN is neither smooth nor automatic, but rather stumbles upon socio-
technical barriers to a ‘turn to quality’, such as IPRs, technical locks, and aeroelastic codes. 
These barriers to a potential ‘turn to quality’ are at the same time linked to socio-technical 
barriers for upgrading and to building indigenous innovation capabilities, which is not only 
linked to the role of IPRs and technical locks, but also to a background in technology 
licensing. Stumbling upon the exclusion effects of framing devices such as IPRs and 
technical locks, the emerging software-TEN is being destabilised, which is e.g. reflected in 
destabilised customer-supplier relations and infringement of IPRs. As illustrated in earlier 
chapters, the software-TEN is entangled in a concern for achieving China’s Scientific and 
Sustainable Development. In this way, the issue of access to core algorithms to build 
indigenous innovation capabilities seems entangled in a ‘zero-sum game’ construed between 
Chinese foreign companies:  
”If you look at the Ministry of Science and Technology, MOST, and their thoughts on this, their Medium 
and Long Term Plan for…the MLP [S&T 2006-2020], as it is called…Well – if you read it closely, 
then…where it really gets critical, that’s regarding core technologies, and their analysis of this is...that 
it’s a zero-sum game. You cannot buy core technologies, you have to develop them yourself” (Int. 51, 
2010). 
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In an emerging game of interests, in which losers and winners are delineated in a ‘zero-sum’ 
game, Chinese and foreign actors are framed as either front-runners or laggards, in an 
intense struggle of Chinese WTMs to catch up: 
“Take the field of wind energy. Denmark is in the front globally within the field of wind energy; a lot of 
accumulated experience, in many cases there will be a lot of creative ideas. A relative late starter, China 
is still in the learning phase. But sometimes we can do reverse innovation” (Int. 49*, 2012). 
Overall, Chinese actors are increasingly contesting their role as pure ‘imitators’. However, 
there are barriers to reverse engineering, or, for that matter, other ways of technological 
“leap-frogging.  
The last (and most difficult) mile – on construing a competitive game  
These barriers are e.g. a matter of how “aerodynamic design may not be so advanced here” 
in China (Int. 4*, 2011). A matter of complicated mathematics (Int. 2, 2012; Int. 39, 2011; 
Int. 36, 2013), it is necessary to develop capabilities of developing, defining, and optimising 
algorithms; yet, 
“luckily, they [the Chinese customers] have huge problems learning that. Well, it would surprise me if 
they could. How long have we had a prime time for the wind power industry out here? Five years. That 
they should have been able to learn this [in such a short time], which the rest of us have spent forty years 
to learn [would be surprising]… What we are good at in the West, and what they find a little more 
difficult out here, that is ‘thinking outside the box’…to see things from another perspective. Here they 
know how to calculate. If you have an equation, they can solve it and get the right result. But you must 
know how to define the equation” (Int. 2, 2012). 
This leaves foreign control system suppliers assured that they are ‘ahead’ in the catch-up 
game, at least for the time being. However, the position of foreign actors as ‘front-runners’ 
is not stable, but constantly re-negotiated. For instance, expressed by a Chinese supplier, 
Chinese companies will eventually “seize the market”, despite some minor setbacks along 
the way, as Chinese actors get  
“better very slowly and step by step. That means, OK, you [the Western companies] started out 30 years 
earlier. To give an example, like China's high-speed rail, the Japanese did that already a few decades 
ago, so for China, you’ll see in a few years, in less than 10 years, we will also have developed like that. 
Although you may suffer and experience some setbacks, like the EMU [Chinese high-speed rail] 
derailment, which happened last year or the year before, this does not at all affect the development of 
core technologies of local Chinese companies” (Int. 12*, 2013). 
Gradually, a competitive ‘catch-up’ race seems to be construed. Overall, it is widely 
recognised that Chinese companies are moving fast(er), making foreign companies 
acknowledge that they must protect themselves and also move faster in terms of 
technological development: 
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”It is one hundred per cent certain [that the Chinese will catch up]. And how we will tackle that market 
situation, when we reach that – that’s one of the big headaches at home” (Int. 2, 2012).  
”They [foreign WTMs] don’t have a chance. Everybody knows that the Chinese want to make it 
themselves” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Acknowledging the rapid catch-up of Chinese companies, Western companies tend to focus 
on having to ”be a little bit better. We always have to be. You can say that they are faster 
than us, so they’re catching up, but we also know that the last mile is the most difficult one” 
(Int. 15, 2012). A way to stay ahead is still considered to be through IPRs such as patents 
(Int. 12*, 2013), or through other legal and non-legal protective means. In this way, foreign 
companies are trying to stay ahead, e.g. through IPRs and by licensing out only older 
technology platforms (Int. 36, 2013), as well as through investments in R&D in 
continuously more ‘intelligent’ solutions (Int. 35, 2013):  
”Yes, we do that for certain [develop continuously]. We move forward rapidly and do everything we can 
to put aside resources for that [R&D]. But of course, they will find out something at some point, which 
can substitute for our system, but when we get to that, then [we will have developed something new, 
hopefully]” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Ascribing value to software 
This competitive race is being construed as if the value of software had risen over time. 
While software codes were not treated as strategically important in the initial phase by 
Chinese actors, instead being treated as ”freeware all of it” (Int. 41, 2013), associations 
qualifying software have changed over time, raising the value of software. Traditionally, 
Chinese “people don't want to pay that much for software” (Int. 34, 2012):  
“Chinese customers think the software is relatively unimportant, worthless. We don’t focus on software, 
don’t emphasise software. So we have to understand the idea of the Chinese customers, Chinese 
customers value the hard things, not soft things” (Int. 40*, 2012). 
The lack of appreciation of the value of software is, in addition, being linked to the level of 
experience and the length of the company’s R&D-background: 
”If you meet a newly established customer in China, then they don’t understand that it [software] costs a 
lot of money, but the large ones, they understand. So even though they try to push you, they 
know…there’s a reason why they are sitting there, I don’t know how many hundreds of people, looking at 
some nitty-gritty stuff…so they know” (Int. 41, 2013). 
In the gradual process of upgrading, Chinese actors seem to have started out by building 
indigenous capabilities within the least complex components, as well as within the 
components, which are taking up the largest share of the turbine’s cost structure. 
Consequently, Chinese actors have only relatively late started to focus on the main control 
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software, as this is one of the most advanced components, and a component which does not 
take up the largest share of the cost structure.  
”Like the components with most intelligence built-in, this is what can be protected more easily, right. I 
guess this is how companies have looked at it. They have seen that and concluded, well, we’ll start out 
with the tower. Produce it from the knowledge that we have. Blades…now coming into focus. That you 
are producing something also means that you are building up some knowledge. Somebody must 
understand why it must be done like this, and then…you are building up knowledge” (Int. 35, 2013). 
Over time, as a quality crisis has been produced over time, and as Chinese actors have built 
own capabilities, the focus of Chinese customers has increasingly turned towards control 
systems and software (Int. 15, 2012). 
Producing matters of concern in the potential software-TEN 
In the above, some of the socio-technical barriers to reverse engineering have been 
indicated. Further, it has been indicated that a struggle for access to source codes is critical 
for the attempt to upgrade by Chinese WTMs. Stumbling upon barriers to source codes, i.a. 
due to the boundaries and framings set up by IPRs, relations have become unstable. In the 
following, the chapter dives further into some of the matters of concern that the software-
TEN is producing, as a controversy is configured over the ‘pacifying’ framing tool of IPRs. 
This controversy can even be mapped in light of international debates on IPR and China’s 
innovation strategy and legacy of technology transfer. First, matters of concern of Chinese 
actors are outlined, which leads to an outline of matters of concern of foreign actors in the 
emerging controversy over IPR. 
Matters of concern for Chinese actors and the stem issue of China’s sustainable 
development 
As indicated earlier, there seems to be socio-material resistance to the development of 
indigenous innovation capabilities of Chinese actors, e.g. as there are barriers to reverse 
engineering of software. Hereby, the framing of the potential wind power- and software-
TEN, as means of Scientific Development towards China’s Sustainable Development and a 
Harmonious Socialist Society, risks to be destabilised. In the following, the chapter looks 
into some of the issues and concerns by Chinese actors within wind power, as they face 
potential limits to upgrading from technology sourcing.   
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Limits to conventional acquisition of technology and capabilities 
Facing barriers to reverse engineering of software problematises China’s legacy of a 
‘technology for market’ strategy, as the issue of software makes the continuous dependence 
of many Chinese WTMs on foreign licenses and software technologies visible. This concern 
is e.g. expressed by the political pole in the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*). That is, while 
“[E]arly on, our wind turbines relied mainly on the introduction of foreign design techniques 
or on joint design with foreign agencies” (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(1)), China 
has upgraded in various fields. However, Chinese new wind turbines still suffer from 
insufficient capacity, e.g. as China lacks software tools for wind turbine design with 
independent intellectual property rights, and as China lags behind in terms of conducting 
independent design and R&D according to the environmental wind resource conditions 
(5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(1)). Improving these areas is framed as critical to 
improve wind power equipment performance, ”and to protect the Chinese wind power 
industry’s sustained, rapid, and steady growth” (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 2, 1(3)). 
Further, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) states that China is 
“[f]ocused on solving the key scientific and technological issues associated with the ability of 
independent innovation. Based on the status quo and trends facing the development of wind power in 
China, key technologies of wind power with independent intellectual property research should be 
promoted” (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), 3,2). 
Here, a narrative of China’s victory and victimisation (by foreign patents) seems to be 
indicated. This narrative device of China’s subjugation is also reflected in the earlier MLP 
S&T (2006-2020), which states that “experience shows that developed countries are 
unwilling to transfer core technologies in China” (MLP S&T 2006-2020). Hereby, “the 
importation of technologies without emphasizing the assimilation, absorption and re-
innovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous research and development capacity" 
(MLP S&T, 2006-2020). Consequently, the MLP S&T “warns against blindly importing 
foreign technology without plans to transform it into Chinese technology”  
(McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 4). Accordingly, 
stressing the importance of “[i]ndependent [indigenous] innovation” as the essence of 
China’s innovation strategy (chinaipr.gov.cn, Jun. 10, 2014), the Chinese President, Xi 
Jinping, has recently stressed that China strives towards “important breakthroughs in key 
technologies, and [towards] master[ing] crucial technologies into our own hands" 
(chinaipr.gov.cn, Jun. 10, 2014). This concern for owning core technologies seems to have 
been translated to customer-supplier relations around controller software: 
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”We have this discussion on source code. But it’s the decision of the Government, that now they need to 
have their own IPR, that is to say…they have to own the source code (Int. 42, 2012). 
As focus seems to have moved gradually from absorbing technology to owning and 
developing it indigenously, the present analysis, however, has illustrated that there may be 
socio-technical barriers to indigenous innovation. While ‘Scientific Development’ and 
indigenous innovation has been framed as an ‘elixir’ of the Chinese Government to realise 
‘the great renaissance of the Chinese nation’ through ‘innovation with Chinese 
characteristics’ (in McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 3), 
the thesis may have displayed some of the overflows, or the ‘bitter taste’, of this ‘elixir’. 
That is,   
“the ’Trade Market for Technology’-policy, didn’t work as expected. They have spent more than 20 
years to attract foreign companies and learn, but there is still not one single completely indigenously 
designed Chinese wind turbine. When there’s some, the core technology, the software, is foreign. Or the 
capabilities have been bought, through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and foreign employees” (Int. 
36, 2013). 
The concern for indigenous innovation as part of China’s sustainable development is 
producing a controversy over IPR in the software-TEN, which is entangled in concerns over 
China’s legacy of technology transfer and technology sourcing. In this controversy, relations 
between Chinese WTMs and foreign control system suppliers are being continuously de- 
and reconfigured around negotiated ‘algorithmic boundaries’.  
New business models for technology transfer? 
Whereas the depicted customer-supplier relations engaged in conventional technology 
sourcing/technology transfer licensing agreements seem increasingly unstable, it appears 
that Chinese companies are in the process of experimenting with new business models, 
including more transfers of IPRs. In regard to China’s wind turbine industry,  
”[t]he other business model that appears to have proven successful is one in which both technology and 
IPR were transferred from a foreign company to a Chinese company and ownership was fully in the 
hands of the Chinese company” (Lewis, 2013: 111). 
For instance, Chinese WTMs increasingly engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to 
upgrade their capabilities and to acquire full ownership of IPR (Lewis, 2013: 111). This is 
e.g. seen in the case of Goldwind and its acquisition of a 70 per cent stake of Vensys in 
2008. ”Becoming the controlling owner of the company, gave Goldwind more power over 
the direction of Vensys’s R&D activities, as well as fewer constraints on access to its 
intellectual property” (Lewis, 2013: 124). Goldwind now has R&D facilities in China and 
Germany and has built R&D capacity through collaborations with universities and research 
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institutes in China and overseas, e.g. with DNV GL and Aerodyn (Lewis, 2013: 122-126). 
However, due to the high cost of M&As, smaller companies and component suppliers are 
still engaged in traditional technology transfer (Lewis, 2013: 113). As regards acquisition of 
software companies, this is   at the present stage still largely considered too costly by 
Chinese WTMs: 
”There was someone asking me yesterday: ‘If we want access to all of it, what would the price be?’ Then 
I said, ‘I guess that it will cost you two billion, and then you acquire X [foreign control system 
supplier]’. ‘Well, that might be a bit too much at the moment’ [they replied]” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Lacking long-term experience and basic research in aerodynamics and algorithmic 
mathematics, moving ahead in terms of control system software and indigenous wind 
turbine design “won’t”, according to some, “happen until the day when they buy some 
company” (Int. 42, 2012), however. 
Wider matters of concern of foreign actors in China 
While Chinese actors are concerned about limits to reconciling the two innovation strategies 
of technology sourcing and indigenous innovation, the potentially emerging software-TEN 
in Chinese wind power is also entangled in wider concerns of foreign companies in China. 
Foreign companies tend to be concerned about the lack of protection of IPRs and the 
protection of Chinese wholly or partly state-owned companies. Taking the case of the 
Sinovel-AMSC trial, 
“the whole world is just looking at this case, because the evidence is so obvious. It's like, there are 
emails, there is money...it's like, I did this, it's so obvious that it happened, but it's still in trial. And I 
think the rest of the world is looking at this very seriously, as like...okay, this is as obvious as it can 
possibly get, it is completely obvious that it happened, everyone knows that it happened - does China 
actually penalise that? I think if they do, it will be a very good and important moment in China's history, 
but if they don't, it will be equally as damaging. It's like even with an email saying ’I'm doing this’, you 
can showcase them the money, and they took the thing, they sold the codes...It's like, I can't even 
protect…something that obvious..and I think companies will actually become even more protective” (Int. 
11, 2012). 
The seeming weak enforcement is considered to make it difficult to ‘find the smoking guns’ 
(McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009). These concerns link up 
to wider concerns that China’s official strategy of “enhancing original innovation through 
co-innovation and re-innovation based on the assimilation of imported technologies” (MLP 
S&T, 2006-2020) is a way of “tweaking foreign technology” in order to “create its own 
intellectual property and proprietary product lines” (McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. 
Chamber of Commerce, 2009: 4). In this way, the controversy configuring over IPRs 
between customers and suppliers of control system software seems entangled in 
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international concerns over China’s so-called techno-nationalism, in which the strategy of 
indigenous innovation is sometimes framed as a Chinese “blueprint for technology theft on a 
scale the world has never seen before” (McGregor/APCO Worldwide, U. S. Chamber of 
Commerce, 2009: 4, 6).  
Entangled controversies – and China’s exclusion from the ‘good international club’ 
Overall, the controversy over contested algorithms seems to be entangled in wider 
international controversies over IPRs as well as over China’s upgrading and catch-up. 
Taking the case of the AMSC-Sinovel IPR infringement case, the ‘international’ nature of 
the dispute can e.g. be seen in how the American Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) has 
been drawn into the investigation of the incident, and how Chinese spy agencies and 
buildings of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are suspected to be involved, due to China’s 
”far-reaching industrial espionage campaign by Chinese spy agencies” (Riley and Vance, 
2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). As stated in an article by Bloomberg regarding the AMSC-
Sinovel case: 
“In terms of outright theft of intellectual property, there is growing evidence that China’s intelligence 
agencies are involved, as attacks spread from hits on large technology companies to the hacking of 
startups and even law firms” (Riley and Vance, 2012, Bloomberg/Bizweek). 
In turn, such foreign fears counter Chinese fears for barriers to upgrading and catch-up. In 
the construction of such competitive zero-sum game, the space for Sino-foreign 
collaboration becomes unstable. For instance, the lack of trust in IPR enforcement in China 
has produced processes of exclusion: 
“China is not received, they are not being full participants...they are not even being allowed to be full 
participants in the innovation community, because people are proactively not including them, because, 
I'm nervous about sending them things, like sharing my innovation, because I don't have confidence that 
they are going to be protected” (Int. 11, 2012). 
Not being ‘received’ into the ‘good international club’, Chinese WTMs are predicted to face 
difficulties when going abroad, as “the trust level is simply not there” (Int. 11, 2012). In this 
way, while China also frames the issue of IPRs as a matter of ”establishing the nation’s 
credibility and image in international cooperation” (MLP S&T, VIII, 4), and of ensuring the 
‘sustainable development’ of wind power (5YP S&T Wind Power), IPRs, as ‘pacifying’ 
framing tools, not only include, but often also exclude in the case of marketisation in 
Chinese wind power.  
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Conclusion and theoretical considerations – controversy over IPRs 
Due to the critical role of China’s legacy on foreign licenses, Chapter 9 has traced one part 
of the emerging software-TEN, namely customer-supplier relations around main control 
software. In the analysis, a controversy over IPRs, which configures around core algorithms 
of the wind turbine’s main control within the potential software-TEN, has been mapped. In 
the marketisation processes, IPRs are seen as important framing devices, as they confer 
ownership on specific entities to the exclusion of others (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 7), 
and thereby help ‘stabilise’ and ‘pacify’ the boundaries of ownership.  
However, the analysis illustrates how the pacification of goods through IPRs can engender 
controversy. That is, rather than pacify, the framing tool of IPRs seems instead to have 
destabilised relations in the potentially emerging software-TEN, as IPRs (as well as i.a. 
algorithms and capabilities) create a seeming socio-material resistance to upgrading within 
software. In turn, such destabilised relations may threaten to destabilise the framing of wind 
power as technologically, scientifically, and even developmentally sustainable. Hereby, 
IPRs seem to produce a controversy as Chinese actors refuse the proposed framing of 
ownership to algorithms. That is, with new emergent ‘identities’ of Chinese WTMs and 
other actors, the framings of IPRs and technical locks, deployed by foreign software 
developers for control systems, are increasingly rejected. With shifting ambitions and 
agendas, this has made collaborative customer-supplier relations around control systems 
highly fluid and contested, rendering the boundaries of ownership (e.g. through IPRs) highly 
negotiable. 
In the potential transition and move from quantity to quality in China’s emerging wind 
power-TEN, software algorithms seem to be transformed from an intermediary into a 
mediator/actor (Callon, 1991; Latour, 2005a), as they come to have an effect on the 
networks that they co-configure by de- and reconfiguring relations. In addition, IPRs have 
emerged as actors, as they produce controversies. In turn, the depicted emerging software-
TEN around control systems is entangled in an ‘international’ controversy over IPRs and 
China’s indigenous innovation policy. Overall, the potential software-TEN configures a 
‘global’ zero-sum game. This ‘competitive space’ increasingly constitutes a ‘hybrid forum’ 
(Callon, 1998: 260), as myriads of unforeseen actors, such as core algorithms, aeroelastic 
codes, agents, buildings of the People’s Liberation Army, cyber wars, and encryption 
devices are being enrolled. In this way, the analysis indicates how there is no 
straightforward opposition between the realm of technology and the realm of politics - or 
between technology and human and social capacities (Barry, 2001: 7-8). Having illustrated 
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the dynamics of one central component in China’s innovation policy, namely IPRs and 
patents in relation to main control software, Chapter 10 looks into a controversy over 
another framing device, namely standardisation and certification, which forms a central 
component of China’s innovation policy as well as of the emerging wind power-TEN’s 
qualification struggle. 
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Chapter 10. Controversy over Standardisation and Certification in the 
Potential Software-TEN 
 
On my way to the next interview, I wonder how the potential qualification struggle may play 
out in terms of testing, certification, and standardisation. My respondent – a foreign wind 
turbine manufacturer – gives me part of the answer. Indeed, the qualification struggle also 
takes place through standards. 
Figure 16: Controversy over certification  
and standardisation 
                                                                 “And they [the Central Government] take control, because of 
the quality issues that we have seen. Simply – the market 
wasn’t well run. And you can see the outage in the grid 
system – for China it was a wake-up call. We suddenly see 
the entire grid falling out, because of the poorly 
connected wind turbines. Then Beijing needs to take 
control – and rightly so. And they should have done so a 
long time ago, because now they are finally putting in 
standards and requirements for a higher quality. 
Standards and requirements for other [things] than just 
[installing] Megawatts into the ground, and that means 
that I am a bit hopeful again”. 
Conversely, other foreign actors in China question 
this qualitative shift. That is, “quality products are 
not the scope for the market right now. So there’s 
no scope for foreign quality products. Maybe this will change, but I’m not sure it will – or at 
least it will take a long time”. Indeed, something new might be happening in China’s 
emerging wind power-TEN and the potential software-TEN, but what and how remains 
somewhat of a riddle to me. 
  
Standardisation and certification and the case of aeroelastic codes in simulation tools 
The previous four Chapters 6-9 have displayed how a ‘turn to quality’ seems to be taking 
place in the emerging wind power-TEN in China. In Chapter 9, an ‘algorithmic’ 
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controversy-mapping was undertaken. This was done by inquiring into a controversy 
produced by the framing tool of IPRs, which configured around software algorithms. 
Hereby, the analysis looked into the controversies that the pacification of goods can 
engender in the struggle to qualify wind power as sustainable. The overflowing from the 
pacifying framing tool of IPR has destabilised collaborative customer-supplier relations 
around control systems, simultaneously producing a competitive space, which renders the 
emerging software-TEN unstable. Diving further into dynamics of the pacification of goods, 
Chapter 10 in the following conducts another ‘algorithmic’ controversy-mapping. This is 
done by diving into another part of the potential software-TEN, namely mapping a potential 
controversy over certification and standardisation, which configures around algorithms in 
simulation tools used for simulating and certifying turbine designs. This is indicated in 
figure 17 below.  
Improvements of China’ certification and standardisation system constitute, along with the 
IPR system, critical parts of China’s innovation strategy of indigenous innovation, in 
particular since WTO accession. 
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Figure 17: Zooming in on controversy certification and standardisation 
 
Source: Own design 
Firstly, the chapter provides a general overview of the performative role of standards for 
international trade and upgrading, as standards function by (temporarily) stabilising qualities 
associated to wind turbines. Abiding by the definition, one amongst many, of a standard “as 
a rule for common and voluntary use, decided by one or several people or organisations” 
(Brunsson et al., 2012: 9), the thesis focuses primarily on China’s attempts at compliance 
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with open,72 international, de facto (as well as de jure)73, technical standards74 (Ernst, 2013: 
4-5) for wind turbines, in which testing and certification according to a specific standard is 
needed. Secondly, the chapter looks into the case of China’s emerging wind power-TEN and 
the emergence of actors of a potential software-TEN, configuring around the issue of 
standardisation and certification in China. Thirdly, the emergence of such a network around 
certification and standardisation is linked to the potential turn to quality taking place in the 
potential wind power-TEN. Fourthly, to look at how attempts at upgrading through 
international certification are unfolding in practice, the chapter dives into an algorithmic 
controversy-mapping, which focuses on collaborative relations around critical simulation 
tools. This renders an account of how relations between Chinese and foreign actors are being 
de- and reconfigured, as roles and positions are being contested. Lastly, this provides a basis 
for an illustration of how an emerging controversy over standardisation and certification is 
entangled in a struggle for defining ‘quality’ as well as in a global trade conflict on 
protectionism in which issues of both IPR and standardisation are entangled.  
The role of standards for international trade and innovation 
Apart from regulatory standards, such as IPRs in the form of the TRIPS Agreement 
(Maskus, 2002: 139) having an impact on international trade within the framework of WTO, 
international and domestic industrial and technical standards also play an important role in 
WTO in terms of their impact on international trade (Maskus 2002: 144) as well as on 
innovation (Ernst, 2013). To set the context for understanding the ‘qualifying’ and 
‘pacifying’ role of standards in marketisation of wind power, the chapter first looks into the 
conventional lens on the role of standards for international trade and, subsequently, for 
innovation.  
                                                     
72
 Standards can be distinguished i.a. in terms of whether they are proprietary, implying that 
they are owned by a company that may license them to others, or open, which means that they 
are available to all potential users, usually without a fee (Ernst, 2013: 4-5). 
73
 Another distinction is the difference between de facto standards, which are being adopted 
through a standards competition amongst rival standards consortia and de jure, which are being 
adopted through consensus, sometimes expressed through industry committees of formal 
standards organisations (Ernst, 2013: 4-5). 
74
 In addition, standards can e.g. be distinguished by being either international or national in 
nature, or by constituting industrial or technical standards. 
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The qualifying role of standards – identify your ruler! 
Since standards basically work to “ensure the quality and safety of products, services and 
production processes” (Ernst, 2013b: 1), standards are seen as important tools for furthering 
international trade, FDI, and technology licensing (Maskus 2002, 144). That is, standards 
and standardisation help establish trust in products and trade, as standards are basically 
providing shared, consensus-based codification and certification schemes for how to 
measure and evaluate the quality of a product (Espeland and Stevens 1998 in Brunsson et 
al., 2012: 19; Star and Griesemer, 1989 in Stark, 2009: 194; Bowker and Star, 1999: 33: 32). 
Thus, certification works to confirm compliance of a product or service with defined 
standards/requirements (Germanischer Lloyd (GL) (2010b): 2). As they contribute to 
making things comparable, standards enable value calculations of the product. That is, 
”standard setting produces shared rules that guarantee that products will be compatible. This 
process facilitates exchange by making it more certain that products will work the way they 
are intended” (Fligstein, 2001: 35). In order to make things comparable, a host of 
measurements and tools must be used to reduce the potentially multiple and conflicting 
‘qualities’ (and values) of a product. That is, standardised testing and certification 
procedures help to quantify, classify, codify, and categorise (Brunsson et al., 2012: 5; Ponte 
and Cheyns, 2013: 461; Bowker and Star, 1999; Thévenot 2009: 808; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005: 15) in a comparable manner. As expressed through the analogy of a Chinese expert in 
the wind power-TEN, standards provide consensus on a common ‘ruler’, just as when 
(centi)metres are measured: 
“A standard is used to detect a ‘ruler’. It is to guide the foundation of your work, your basis for certified 
testing […] Do you have a ruler…this job [of certification] could not be done without a ruler” (Int. 21*, 
2013). 
By providing a common ‘ruler’, trust in the qualities of a product can more easily be 
established, which in turn facilitates market transactions (Fligstein, 2001; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005: 15, 8; Thévenot, 2009: 802; Brunsson et al., 2012: 4, 17-18; Ponte 2009; Ponte and 
Cheyns, 2013: 461). Hereby, standards are critical framing tools, which function to pacify 
the quality of the emerging good in processes of marketisation (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b).  
International standards within wind power 
In terms of wind power, an international standard series for wind turbine design 
(type/model) certification (the IEC-61400-22 standards series) by the International Electro-
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Technical Commission (IEC) – an international standard-setting organisation for all 
electrical, electronic, and related technologies75 - has been developed over the last decade(s) 
to unify national certification programmes and demands and promote free trade (CRESP, 
2005: 61). In addition to standards for turbine design (Type Certification), standards also 
involve i.a. wind turbine and project certification for complete wind farms as well as 
components to enable subsuppliers to enter the market (Germanischer Lloyd (GL) (2010b: 
2). These standards have been gradually  
“accepted, so it’s actually de facto. It’s very good to have just one, instead of having all these national 
standards to consider…so these are the standards that everybody is navigating by” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Construed as ‘de facto’ standards, many countries have gradually aligned their national 
standards with international IEC standards; that is, “a lot of them have been turned into 
national standards, and also in China. As well as in Germany, and in Denmark” (Int. 14, 
2013). That is, over time, a “complex” of harmonised standards 
”has been developed gradually through the last ten years. It was [beginning] around the year 2000, I 
think. But it’s only within the last five or six years that it has really played out. Before that, it was 
national standards. In the ‘80s and ‘90s, right, then there was a standard in Denmark, one in Germany, 
and one in the Netherlands” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Also certification procedures are being gradually aligned across national boundaries, ”so 
now you fulfill [the standards]…or you certify in accordance with these international 
standards, and then there might be something additional…And then it will be approved in 
Denmark also, and in Germany as well” (Int. 14, 2013). Hereby, ensuring that the product 
can be approved across borders, standards and certifications co-perform international trade:  
“Certification of wind farms, turbines or components is state-of-the-art and a must in most places 
around the world. Furthermore assessment to harmonised regulations is an active support of export and 
eases market entries” (Germanischer Lloyd (GL), 2010b): 1). 
Overall, international standardisation of wind turbines is “a guarantee of confidence in the 
international market” (Int. 14, 2013).  
                                                     
75
 Certification of important components and complete machine is included in type certification 
(CRESP, 2005: 62). Type/model certification implies coherent evaluation of new types of wind 
turbines via design evaluation, tests, and field inspections (CRESP, 2005: 60), e.g. including 
design assessment, foundation design assessment, performance test, type test, production quality 
control (CRESP, 2005: 59). 
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Establishing trust in wind turbine quality through standards 
In this way, international standards act as an obligatory passage point in terms of building 
relations to customers, national authorities, and financial institutions, since “if the Chinese 
companies do not have an international certification, nobody will finance it, and no local 
authorities will approve it” (Int. 32, 2012). Providing a guarantee that the turbine has been 
designed and manufactured according to design conditions and appointed standards, and that 
wind turbines are installed, running, and maintained according to the demands of the design 
documents (CRESP, 2005: 60), the design standard IEC 61400-1 works as a framing device, 
ascribing associations of i.a. performance (e.g. power curves and power output), safety, 
reliability (related to the downtimes/faults of wind turbines), and availability to wind 
turbines. That is, standards serve as a calculative framing tool, which can establish 
calculative agencies, which make it possible to calculate e.g. maintenance costs, lifetime 
cost of energy, suitability for on-site wind conditions, adaptability to special environmental 
conditions, and to grid compatibility (Vestas-CWEA, 2011).  
First and foremost, a certified wind turbine implies a guarantee of a turbine-specific power 
curve. This creates certainty of output (and economic performance) from the wind turbine, 
which in turn is dependent on the optimisation of the relation between loads, aerodynamics, 
and the control system/controller (LAC) during simulation and testing. By producing a 
power curve, the certification acts as a warranty for the owner, as it offers “a guarantee for 
the owner of the power curve, which again has a financial impact for the owner” (Int. 11, 
2012):  
”If you can guarantee 99 per cent [of the power curve], that has a bigger impact on the operator’s 
budget, than taking a little off the price [in the price negotiation]” (Int. 11, 2012).  
Apart from power curves as a guarantee of ‘performance’, metrics for availability and 
reliability refer to whether or not a turbine is “ready to run” and, thus, capable of producing 
electricity and revenues (when the turbine is not curtailed, that is) (Int. 22, 2012). Further, 
safety is considered ”the key point” of the standardisation process in China, that is: ”[t]hey 
all have to be constructed in a way that ensures that they don’t fall down” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Lastly, standards for power output can produce associations of ‘smoothness’ to the quality 
of wind power output, minimising the risk of grid disturbance  (Int. 36, 2012; Int. 52, 2013). 
When turbines conform to consensus-based standardised measures, they help stabilise a 
framing of wind power as technically and economically sustainable, potentially reducing 
resistance against wind power. 
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The tested and documented certification triangle in accordance with standards 
The basic function of a standard is that the standard guarantees that the design is 
documented, and “that you have used a renowned standard to control it” (Int. 14, 2013). In 
turn, certification of a wind turbine design consists of recursive processes of (1) computer 
calculations with a software simulation tool, (2) testing, and (3) documentation in what may 
be termed a ‘certification triangle’ (Int. 14, 2013): 
”You can say it’s like a triangle. You simulate the turbine, and then you find out, aha, I want a turbine 
which regulates [controls] like this” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Put simply, certification is a process of proving/demonstrating to accreditation bodies that 
what you calculated/simulated was right (Int. 14, 2013). 
”Actually, it’s not so complicated. First, you must make a code [for simulation]. And then you have to 
make it [build a prototype and test it]. And then you must find out whether it works […] And, if it doesn’t 
work [as calculated/simulated], then you must re-enter the code and find out how things [work]” (Int. 
14, 2013). 
As the simulated/calculated turbine design must include the principle of the turbine 
regulation (controller/main control), certification involves an intricate interplay between a 
simulation tool and the controller. When having gone through all three steps of the 
‘triangle’, the turbine should be “pretty optimised” in terms of the proper relation between 
load, aerodynamics, and control (LAC) (Int. 14, 2013). Finally, after having conducted 
iterative calculations, tests in a myriad of wind scenarios, and calibrations, the turbine’s 
performance must be documented and inscribed into a host of certification documents, 
documenting how  
”the turbine will not fall down, right. You can do that on the basis of load calculations, showing that 
when the wind blows this much, then the load on the turbine will be like this, and then the tower will 
bend, and then…and then what they do is asking, ‘well, what about if something else happened? What if 
the one blade fell off, what then!? What if one blade cannot pitch, what then?! What about the other two 
blades then? How can you prove this?’ And then you have to document how…all these cases” (Int. 9, 
2012). 
Through standardised certification processes, written into thousands of documentation 
pages, (temporarily stable) associations of technical and economical ‘quality’ and 
sustainability can be ascribed to the wind turbine. Hereby,  
“[c]ertificates and signs of certifications awarded by the certification organizations are authority 
guarantee of products’ quality, which are independent of the both sides of supply and demand. 
Consumers can diff[erentiate] good products from bad ones according to certificates and signs of 
certifications, thus improve[ing] purchase confidence” (CRESP, 2005: 57). 
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The role of standards for innovation 
Apart from its impact on international trade, another widely held viewpoint is that 
”standards are the lifeblood of innovation in the global knowledge economy” (Ernst, 2013b: 
5). As international standards are spreading, this is argued to lead to the proliferation of 
specific knowledge, ideas, and inventions, e.g. as nations, which aspire to conform to the 
standard, must seek to develop technologies to support the standard (Ernst, 2013b: 7). Thus, 
”technical standards contribute at least as much as patents to economic growth. As a key 
mechanism for the diffusion of technological knowledge, technical standards contribute to 
productivity growth” (Ernst, 2013b: 1). Conventionally, a well-functioning standardisation 
system and strategy is thus framed as a critical catalyst for industrial development and 
independent innovation (Wang et al., 2010: 12; Ernst, 2013b). 
Certification spurring research and development of Chinese wind turbine designs 
The role of standards for industrial innovation is also recognised within wind power in 
China (CRESP, 2005: 54-55). For instance, the process of adapting the largely European-
based standards to Chinese conditions is seen as a matter of technological development:  
“In fact, the development of technology also includes standardisation, so, that is to say, if future 
standardisation is made well, then it will also promote the development [of the wind turbine industry]” 
(Int. 21*, 2013). 
Certification in accordance with international standards has e.g. spurred modified designs, 
which fit China’s particular climatic conditions where typhoons and low-temperature 
conditions are common. Pushing to comply with international standards, while modifying 
standards and writing their own standards, Chinese actors (research institutes, certification 
bodies, test laboratories, WTMs etc.) are thus claiming to upgrade (indigenous) capabilities 
and support the progress of the wind turbine industry. For instance, 
“in case of low temperature problems, we may want to write our own standards, but we must certainly 
first comply with the international [standards] for the large core [components]…unless you have some 
special circumstances, such as typhoons, which are not prevalent in Europe […] I use this example to 
say that standards, testing, and certification also support technical progress of the industry, leading the 
development of the industry” (Int. 37*, 2013). 
Further, since certification according to standards requires a lot of documented data, it is 
also recognised that after collecting the necessary data, the data will 
“guide your revision of the standards, guide your research, guide your technological progress, so this 
[data  and certification] work we are doing…we have established a large data collection center, and 
then run all the data collected, pooled it. I think after doing this, it will not only raise the quality of 
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China's wind power equipment development, but also have a great role in promoting global 
development” (Int. 37*, 2013).  
Overall, certification is linked to China’s upgrading of indigenous innovation capabilities as 
well as to the promotion of Chinese and global wind power. Due to its role in raising quality 
of wind turbine equipment and indigenous capabilities, certification and standardisation can 
thus serve to stabilise (and pacify) associations to wind power of technical and even 
scientific sustainability, and thus align with the overall means of Scientific Development 
towards China’s Sustainable Development. 
Upgrading of wind power technology through standards – and lagging behind latest 
editions 
Overall, as wind turbines have become more advanced and ‘intelligent’ over time, as well as 
scientifically complex, and as wind power takes up larger shares of electrical grid systems, 
certification and standardisation (and its gradual alignment across borders) has become 
increasingly important to the continuous, sustainable development of global wind power. 
Levels of certification tend to reflect the technological and scientific level of national wind 
turbine industries. With a longer history of their wind turbine industries in Europe and the 
US than in China, it is widely recognised that the certification and testing systems in Europe 
(and the US) are at a more advanced level than in China (CRESP, 2005: 55). Facing quality 
issues and lagging behind the most advanced turbine designs (and their certifications), the 
current potential shift towards a larger focus on quality in China’s potentially emerging wind 
power-TEN has led to an increased focus on the importance of certification and 
standardisation. Having displayed some of the processes of standardisation of wind turbines, 
the following sections provide an insight into standardisation by specific organisations. 
Involved actors in standardisation and certification 
In the above, the analysis has inquired into the role of standards for international trade and 
innovation. To certify according to standards, a variety of different actors are involved. In 
the following, the chapter therefore briefly looks into the international actors involved in 
IEC standard-setting and certification. Overall, the IEC complex is: 
”a series of standards, which describes both…both how to certify it – that is, what is the certifying 
institution supposed to do, when they certify. And then there is a series of standards, which specify how 
you are supposed to document it technically, how you should calculate it and things like that…and how 
you should test this and this and that... So it’s like an integrated system” (Int. 14, 2013). 
First of all, in accordance with international practice, national accreditation institutes are 
granted the right to accredit certifications, certifying institutions, and test laboratories, 
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“looking after that they [certifying institutions, test laboratories] are doing it right. And that 
they are accrediting according to a standard” (Int. 14, 2013). Further, because “you cannot 
approve of what you have done yourself” (Int. 14, 2013), accreditation, testing, and 
certification processes cannot be undertaken by the same institution. Only a few 
internationally recognised certification bodies have been accredited to certify according to 
the IEC standards, among those Germanischer-Lloyd (GL) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV). 
These two have recently merged, also including a merger with the consultancy company 
Garrad Hassan (GH), as mentioned in earlier chapters. Together, the three organisations 
constitute DNV GL. In addition, GL (now DNV GL) has developed “the most authoritative 
and widely used criterion” for wind turbine system certification (CRESP, 2005: 61). In 
addition to certification bodies, test laboratories must be accredited to conduct accredited 
tests in accordance with IEC-standards. For instance, among internationally accredited test 
laboratories are the Technical University of Denmark (DTU/Risø) and COWI in Denmark 
(Interviews). 
Gradual development of international wind turbine standards 
The complex of the international wind turbine design standard series is continuously 
evolving. For instance, IEC working groups, constituted by i.a. test laboratories, certification 
bodies, research institutions, nations, WTMs, design houses, and component suppliers, are 
negotiating and developing new and adapted standard editions. The standard of the overall 
turbine design employed in wind power is the International Standard IEC 61400-1, which 
encompasses around 22 international general wind turbine-specific standards. This design 
standard has been published in three editions (Int. 14, 2013; IEC, 2005). Despite attempts at 
harmonisation across countries, the requirements by certain editions of standards still differ, 
even between European countries (Risø DTU, 2008; DNV, 2011; Germanischer Lloyd, 
2010b; Germanischer Lloyd, 2010a; IEC, 2005). Whereas the first edition of the IEC 61400-
1 standard is considered outdated, the second edition from 1999 (‘IEC 61400-1:1999’) is 
still serving as national standard in some countries, including China. Some countries (i.a. 
Denmark) require the third edition from 2005 (‘IEC 61400-1:2005’) (Germanischer-Lloyd, 
2010a; IEC, 2005; Interviews). Focused on safety issues, the latest standard pays more 
attention to large turbines and includes more critical load cases, i.a. emphasising the 
inclusion of turbulence simulations in the load calculations and extreme load extrapolation, 
which have not been foreseen in the second edition (Int. 14, 2013; IEC, 2005: 5; DTU Risø, 
2008). Still using the second edition, China is “still one step behind the IEC standard” (Int. 
53, 2013), which is “bad news for the Chinese wind energy industry and WTMs”, as WTMs 
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and wind turbine developers abroad are in general very active in this regards (Int. 53, 2013). 
As IEC standards are gradually updated, certification schemes for design assessment (GL) 
have been updated and harmonised accordingly. Today, GL’s Guideline for the Certification 
of Wind Turbines (GL 2010) has become a widely used international certification standard, 
and test laboratories such as DEWI and DTU Risø follow these (Interviews). Hereby, 
certification ensures compliance with IEC standards in terms of various security and quality 
criteria for specific type certifications (Germanischer Lloyd, 2010b).  
Lagging behind international standards - and Chinese concerns about upgrading 
In the following, it is illustrated how the lack of a long track record, a poor reputation in 
terms of turbine quality, along with a short tradition of certification and standardisation as 
domestic wind turbines and components have not been subject to obligatory certification 
(García, 2013: 138-139) in China, have had implications for China’s export ambitions. This 
leads to an inquiry into the potential turn to quality in China’s emerging wind power-TEN 
and an outline of an emerging network for certification and standardisation in China. 
Standards as trade barrier to Chinese wind turbines – and the increasingly critical 
issue of exporting  
Only following the second edition of the IEC 61400-1, Chinese turbines are excluded from 
the most mature and developed wind power countries (Interviews), and most Chinese wind 
turbine exports have so far been to less advanced wind power regions (Interviews). Overall, 
exports of Chinese wind turbines is still remarkably low (Int. 1, 2013; Wang et al., 2010: 6). 
Even though China has succeeded in building a certification and standardisation system 
within only a few years, in compliance with IEC-standards, Chinese WTMs still have 
problems selling their turbines on the international market (Interviews). This is linked to the 
way in which “certification in China is de facto not a requirement” since “it is only required 
that they simulate the design, not the prototype” (Int. 54, 2012). The lack of obligatory 
certification (García, 2013: 138-139) and the short background within certification and 
standardisation within wind power is argued to have resulted in a large amount of turbines 
with an unsustainable design (Int. 54, 2012). However, to be exported,  
”they must be certified. How to do that, they have to find out themselves. And then [when they have 
succeeded] they can become suppliers to some of the international projects. But if they cannot get them 
certified, then they cannot become suppliers” (Int. 20, 2013). 
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Often lacking certification, and often producing a lower output than foreign wind turbines, 
foreign investors, customers, financial institutions, and insurers are claimed to lack 
confidence in Chinese wind turbines (Interviews),  
“because this is a risk-infused business. With enormous up-front capital expenditures. Will they take that 
bet? […] You need a fully GL certified, proven, and tested Chinese turbine before any serious utility will 
put their money out there. I guarantee you that. I am not saying it isn’t coming. It just isn’t there now” 
(Int. 1, 2013).  
Hereby, “certification is a matter of attempting to gain confidence from customers” (Int. 32, 
2012). Chinese WTMs acknowledge that they, when compared with more mature, foreign 
wind power markets, lack a long track record and history of standardisation, certification, 
and testing in wind power. As Chinese WTMs “just started” (Int. 21*, 2013), Chinese wind 
turbines ”are perceived as less reliable and lower quality” (Int. 11, 2012). Further, they are 
not considered competitive, that is, “they're not good [economic] performance, basically” 
(Int. 11, 2012). Acknowledging this, Chinese WTMs state that “we don’t know the 
international market […] For the European market, we need local research to develop the 
right standards for Europe in order to meet the requirements” (Int. 7, 2011). Standards, in 
this way, constitute a trade barrier to Chinese wind turbines: “You need some certification 
and also you need some track record…that is a problem for us” (Int. 7, 2011).  
While the limits to exports were not considered a critical issue during the initial growth 
phase within Chinese wind power, the current oversaturated Chinese market for wind 
turbines has made it necessary for Chinese WTMs to shift their focus increasingly to foreign 
countries (Int. 7, 2011; Int. 29, 2011; Int. 30, 2012). That is, ”now the industry is squeezed, 
yeah. Eh, suffering” (Int. 5, 2011); “there are no profits, no money, so now we focus on 
foreign markets” (Int. 17*, 2012). In this way, it has become increasingly critical that ”the 
overseas market is out of reach for most Chinese wind turbines manufacturers, who are 
largely unfamiliar with international market rules and legal environments” 
(Windpowermonthly.com, May 10, 2011). Hereby,  
“the market barriers they are facing in terms of standards, in terms of all requirements, is actually quite 
extensive when you are entering from a Chinese setting into a developed market. You know, the 
standards in Denmark…for 30 years…are quite high, and you need to be able to prove that you can live 
up to those standards” (Int. 1, 2013). 
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From domestic to international market, and from quantity to quality – towards greater 
appreciation of certification? 
As China’s potential wind power-TEN is facing a ‘quality crisis’, and as Chinese WTMs 
“are increasingly looking outside of China […] they are recognising that they have to make 
different products for the international market” (Int. 11, 2011). Hereby, Chinese WTMs are 
claimed to begin  
“to learn from the international market, ‘oh – now I’ve got it, it’s a completely different playing field out 
here! Now we need to have standards here. And we need to compete on something completely else’” (Int. 
1, 2013). 
In this way, a gradual process of learning and upgrading is indicated. A number of the most 
capable Chinese WTMs have, accordingly, gradually built up capabilities of certification:   
”Yes, of course they want to, and they are in the process. There are also some GL-2010-certified 
turbines in China. And that’s…well, yes, some have been sold to Europe” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Sometimes, these attempts at international certification take place through demonstration 
projects abroad (Int. 43, 2013), setting up Chinese wind turbines for testing in Europe or US. 
Increasingly, Chinese wind turbines are thus complying, i.e. being “in line with international 
[standards…while] some are unique to China” (Int. 21*, 2013). Thus, according to a 
Chinese expert in wind power, “as far as I understand it, some models of domestic 
manufacturers also get a certificate from foreign certification bodies, including DNV GL, 
but there are also other certification bodies [than GL DNV]” (Int. 37*, 2013). Further, 
China’s certification body for renewable energy, China General Certification (CGC), which 
was established in 2003, is committed to the implementation of the IEC standards. That is, 
working on aligning ‘imported standards’ with Chinese standards, CGC firstly “imported the 
[foreign] standards” (Int. 21*, 2013), and over time more “foreign advanced standards, such 
as [open] IEC standards” were used. Over time, China has now developed own national 
basic standards for the wind turbine industry, which “are at par with the international 
standards, with the IEC standards” (Int. 21*, 2013).  
Driving the industry through certification and standardisation – a gradual qualitative 
shift and the choice to certify or not  
While certification did not constitute a critical matter of concern in the expansive years of 
increasing wind power installations (GW), China has, over time, “found out that if the 
Chinese ever wanted to get a chance to sell a turbine outside of China, then there was no 
other way than going through this [international certification]” (Int. 14, 2013). Yet, 
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certification is costly and time-consuming (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 20, 2013). In particular, the 
needed investment in basic research required for certification still creates reluctance in the 
emerging Chinese wind power-TEN. That is, this 
”is an investment, which they are not really taking on themselves, to get it done. And maybe they don’t 
trust themselves to be capable. So there are like all these opportunities…but it’s a choice that they have 
to make… […] This is a huge investment, it takes a lot of work. In particular, if they are not sure that 
they have what is needed to get it certified (Int. 20, 2013). 
Overall, certification, testing, and standardisation require investments in basic research, in 
particular in aerodynamics. As the current ‘quality crisis’ facing the emerging wind power-
TEN has gradually resulted in shifting priorities and means of the political pole – e.g. 
reflected in the introduction of “standards and requirements for higher quality” (Int. 1, 2013) 
– there is also increasing focus on the need to invest in building capabilities for certification 
and standardisation. This is e.g. reflected in the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) and China’s 
Energy Policy (2012). Accordingly, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) raises the issue of 
certification and standardisation as a critical means of ensuring the “sustainable 
development of China’s wind power industry research system “(5YP S&T Wind Power 
(2012*), 5, 7 (4 (6)). Recognising China’s position as a relative latecomer, the plan thus 
argues that China’s public testing system, wind power standards, testing, and certification 
system for wind power must be improved further (5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) 2(1c)). 
The role of certification and standardisation for the development of wind power in China 
was not a priority area in the early growth phase, but has only emerged as an emergent 
matter of concern of the political pole, as the Chinese industry has grown, and as quality 
issues have emerged over time:  
“When we set out to build a wind power industry, having in mind to develop this industry, that this was 
the future direction, China did not talk about it [i.e. certification and testing]… that in order to move 
forward China's wind power industry…But we also believed that standards, testing and certification 
were very important work, but at that time, we did not have our own industry, in 2003, right… back then 
the industrial technology was still weak (Int. 21*, 2013). 
A turn to quality along with improving capabilities is here indicated, in which the 
assembling of a network around certification, testing, and standardisation has become 
increasingly important. As expressed by a Chinese expert: 
“I think, if we can continue to implement this work, the quality of China's wind power equipment will be 
improved, it will play a big role. I think it is truly now a critical point […] I think that in the future of 
China's industrial rise, we must do this part of the job [certification] well […] And now I think that the 
standards, testing, and certification should precede the industry, because then you can drive the 
development of the industry” (Int. 21*, 2013).  
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As certification and standardisation are framed as important tools to drive the development 
of the wind power-TEN, certificates and standards emerge as critical pacifying framing 
tools, in the struggle to qualify wind power as technically and scientifically sustainable. In 
the following, the chapter looks briefly into traits of an emerging Chinese network for 
standardisation and certification in the Chinese wind power–TEN. 
An emerging network for certification and standardisation within wind power in 
China? 
In the above, it has been indicated how processes of certification and standardisation over 
time have been constituted as a critical means of qualifying wind power as sustainable, as 
well as for industrial upgrading. In the following, the chapter looks into the seeming 
emergence of a network around certification and standardisation in the potential wind 
power-TEN, which also produces a potential software-TEN.  
Alignment with WTO – and with the strategy of indigenous innovation 
Acceding the WTO in 2001, today China has achieved “the skeleton for standardization 
strategy thinking” (Wang et al., 2010). That is, in accordance with the WTO Technical 
Barriers to Trade agreement (TBT), member states must accept the Code of Good Practice 
for Standardisation, and China has consequently been working hard to make its standards 
meet the TBT (Wang et al., 2010: 3). The Standard Administration of China (SAC) is in 
charge of ensuring compatibility with i.a. ISO- and IEC-standards (Ernst, 2011a: 29). 
Further, to ensure WTO compliance, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
has in particular since 2002 been involved in the promotion of a Chinese certification and 
standardisation system. For instance, MOST wrote a couple of reports, which took outset in 
China’s then relatively new doctrine of a ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ (Wang et al., 
2010), arguing that standards “are conducive to building a harmonious society” (Wang et al., 
2010: 5). These reports by the MOST formed the basis for the Outline of China’s 11th 5YP 
Development Plan for Standardisation in 2006 (SAC) (Wang et al., 2010: 7; Ernst, 2011a: 
20) as well as for a proposal for China’s National 11th 5YP Scientific and Technical 
Development Program in 2007 (MOST), which included an IPR and technical 
standardisation strategy (Wang et al., 2010: 7). Hereby, ”a standardization strategy with 
Chinese characteristics began to take shape” (Wang et al., 2010: 1). Intent on developing a 
standardisation strategy ‘with Chinese characteristics’, China’s standardisation strategy is 
equally intended to align with international standards as well as to spur indigenous 
innovation. The latter is to be achieved e.g. through promoting ‘homegrown’ standards as 
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well as turning Chinese domestic standards into international standards (Ernst, 2011a; 
2011b; 2013; Wang et al. 2010). That is, while it is  
“important to adopt international standards, it is more important to turn independently developed 
technologies into international standards” (Wang et al., 2010: 5).  
This strategy is also reflected in the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*), which argues for the 
need to adapt international standards to China’s unique environmental conditions and its 
industrial base (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*). However, much work on certification and 
standardisation still remains to be done within wind power. Although China already became 
a member of the IEC in 1957 (Wang et al., 2010: 2), and China has adopted the IEC wind 
turbine system certification system (CRESP, 2005: 59), there was still no integrated turbine 
equipment certification system in China by 2005 (CRESP, 2005: 58). That is, while growth 
rates in Chinese wind power exploded around 2005 when the Renewable Energy Law (REL) 
was issued, most wind turbines were still imported models (CRESP, 2005: 58), and most of 
these  
“have GL or DNV certification. One of the important reasons for which there are still no native 
established quality supervision or certification for several years is that most wind turbines generator 
systems are not made in China. On the other hand, because there is still no complete certification system, 
native wind turbines generator systems development has been affected” (CRESP, 2005: 58). 
China’s relatively short background within wind power in general and within certification 
and standardisation (i.a. in regard to wind power) has produced concerns over the potentially 
detrimental impact of China’s legacy of technology transfer and imports of foreign 
technologies on China’s indigenous innovation and certification and standardisation 
capabilities. Accordingly, the 5YP S&T Wind Power (2012*) raises concern that China is 
largely reliant on foreign testing and design techniques. For instance, China’s test systems 
(e.g. for blades) and simulation tools are to a large extent dependent on foreign technologies 
(5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*: 2(3); 2(1c)). Hereby, the plan argues that China must 
improve its capabilities for independent innovation, e.g. in terms of wind power equipment 
design and innovative capabilities (5YP S&T Wind Power, 2012*: 2(1a)); 2(1), 1). Despite 
rapid improvements and upgrading within certification and standardisation since the growth 
phase around 2005, certification and standardisation in the emerging wind power-TEN is 
still in a relatively nascent stage, and in particular the political pole has increasingly 
problematised China’s relative backwardness. In the following, the chapter inquires into 
how different actors have responded to this problematisation of needed upgrading within 
certification and standardisation. 
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Responding to problematisation 
Whereas a market pole quickly emerged in the potential wind power-TEN during the initial 
growth phase, scientific and technical poles have tended to emerge at a slower pace. Yet, as 
the political pole of the Chinese leadership has increasingly voiced concerns over the 
sustainable and scientific development of wind power, facing a quality crisis, the technical 
and scientific poles, increasingly, seem to be surfacing, e.g. configuring around the issue of 
certification and standardisation. In the following, the chapter inquires into the seeming 
emergence of different poles engaging in the translation of a wind power-TEN, namely 
actors engaged in standardisation, accreditation, certification, and testing. As regards 
standardisation within wind power, the China National Certification and Accreditation 
Administration/Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA) (CRESP, 
2005), which was founded in 2004 by the State Council and placed under the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China (AQSIQ), is 
responsible for the accreditation of certification organisations, test organisations, and 
laboratories, and for certifying the eligible certification organisations (CRESP, 2005: 56-57; 
Ernst, 2011a). Below, figure 18 shows some of the major actors in China’s standards, 
testing, certification, and accreditation management framework for wind power.  
Other direct affiliates of AQSIQ are China National Accreditation Service for Conformity 
Assessment (CNAS) with authority to accredit certification agencies and test laboratories for 
wind power, and the Standardisation Administration of China (SAC). In addition, the 
standard committee for wind power is the National Wind Mechanic Standardization 
Technology Council under the supervision of the National Standardisation Administration 
Committee (CRESP, 2005: 46; Interviews). 
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Figure 18: Structure of China’s standardisation, certification, and accreditation system 
 
Source: Directly adapted from CGC, 2013: 3. 
 
As regards certification, the China General Certification Center (CGC) was established in 
2003, with the aim of “build[ing] up capacity to test the turbines and to certify them like 
Germanischer-Lloyd and DNV and Garrad [now DNV GL], like a national competence. 
And there were no requirements [back then] in China that they had to be tested or certified 
or anything” (Int. 14, 2013). Testing products of manufacturers, certifying the eligible 
WTMs, and allowing WTMs to put certification marks on their products (CRESP, 2005: 57; 
cresp.org.cn), CGC is the only certification centre in China, approved by CNCA to certify 
equipment for renewable energy sources (CRESP, 2005: 57). In terms of test laboratories, 
for instance the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has a wind tunnel and a blade test 
centre (Interviews). Whereas CGC is concerned with wind turbines and components 
certification and testing, the China Electrical Power Research Institute (CEPRI) under the 
285 
 
State Grid works with standards in terms of grid connection, and has different test 
laboratories connected to it. CEPRI is, amongst other things, undertaking research on grid 
connection standards as well as on power quality. Further, CEPRI’s new test site (in 
Zhangbei, Hebei Province) is a wind farm test facility serving to verify grid performance. 
This demonstration project was built in 2012, and while not mandatory for Chinese wind 
turbines to pass the testing, now ideally all wind turbines in China should pass through its 
grid performance test (Int. 19*; 2013; Int. 18, 2013; Int. 20; 2013; Int. 53, 2013). 
Myriads of collaborations on certification 
The gradual build-up of capabilities and the emergence of poles within testing, certification, 
and standardisation have taken place within a short time frame, often in collaboration with 
international partners. Capacity building through international assistance has a long 
background in China’s wind turbine industry, where e.g. foreign research institutions such as 
Denmark’s DTU Risø has assisted since the 1980s (Int. 20, 2013; Int. 8, 2013). For instance, 
CEPRI and CGC have been involved in Sino-Danish collaborations – often with Denmark’s 
DTU Risø – under the Sino-Danish Wind Energy Development Programme (WED) (2009-
2013). This has e.g. involved assistance to CEPRI in developing China’s grid codes (Int. 20, 
2013; Int. 19, 2013). Further, under the Sino-Danish Renewable Energy Development 
Programme (RED) (2009-2013), which is a programme jointly developed by the Chinese 
and Danish governments that include two components (namely the development of the 
China National Renewable Energy Centre in Beijing and joint Sino-Danish renewable 
energy projects), projects for e.g. testing and certification have taken place (Interviews; 
ens.dk). In addition, the China Renewable Energy Scale-up Programme (CRESP), which is a 
World Bank-sponsored programme for renewable energy development in developing 
countries, has conducted a project by the name of the Establishment of Wind Turbine 
Certification Capabilities from 2008 till 2011 (worldbank.org; cresp.org.cn; Interviews). 
Helping the “CGC to establish fully the certification technical capacity of wind turbine, 
through improving quality management system, compiling the certification guidance 
documents, purchasing the software and hardware equipments used for certification, and 
staff capacity building, etc.” (cresp.org.cn), CRESP has helped building the institutional and 
technical capacity for testing and certification (Int. 21*, 2013). Today, CGC is engaged in a 
myriad of international collaborations to comply with IEC standards, e.g. receiving training 
in the usage of simulation software tools, jointly certifying new wind turbine designs, 
developing a database in accordance with IEC standards for wind condition surveys, and 
testing of blades (through a new blade test centre), among others with DTU Risø and DEWI 
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(German Wind Energy Institute) (Interviews). Lastly to be mentioned, China Electrical 
Power Research Institute (CEPRI) under the State Grid has extensive and fruitful 
collaborations with foreign research institutes and test laboratories, i.a. Denmark’s DTU 
Risø on the wind farm test site in Zhangbei under CEPRI (Int. 19*, 2013; Int. 20, 2013). A 
variety of WTMs are also engaging in such collaborations. Amongst many others, the 
Danish WTM Vestas has produced a report with recommendations and evaluation criteria 
for investment decisions in public procurement, such as wind power projects based on the 
design standard IEC 61400-1 (e.g. 61400-12, parts 1, 2, and 3 for evaluating power curves) 
with the Chinese Wind Energy Association (CWEA) (Vestas-CWEA, 2011). 
Algorithmic case study – a potential software-TEN in the qualification struggle of 
the emerging wind power-TEN 
Having illustrated the role of certification, testing, and standardisation in the qualification of 
the potentially emerging wind power-TEN as sustainable, the chapter now dives into an 
‘algorithmic case study’. That is, first the chapter shows how a potential software-TEN is 
configuring around software tools for simulation in the work of certification, i.e., diving into 
the ‘certification triangle’. Second, the case moves on to a case study of Chinese attempts at 
upgrading in certification and standardisation, in regard to simulation tools. Here, two 
accounts are offered on upgrading capabilities, configuring around software algorithms. 
Lastly, this results in an inquiry into how relations between Chinese and foreign actors have 
been de- and reconfigured over time. 
The potential emergence of a software-TEN around simulation tools for certification 
First, the case study inquires into the work of assembling a software-TEN around simulation 
tools for certification. 
Step 1: Developing a simulation software tool – a matter of loads, aerodynamics, and control (LAC) 
In the so-called ‘certification triangle’, a software simulation tool must first be developed to 
simulate the wind turbine design. Its role is to ensure that the structural dimensions of the 
tower can withstand the loads from the aerodynamic forces of the wind.  
”The basic tool to design a turbine, that’s the simulation. And that’s where you calculate what loads that 
you want to design the turbine for, right. Well, it’s like…when you are dimensioning a tower…and that 
goes all the way through…well, then you must know how strong it should be, and you need to know the 
loads that will be put against it. You calculate that through a [software] programme. Well, in the good 
old days, it was easier, then it was more like just sticking your finger into the air” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Developing simulation programmes involves a complex interplay between the forces of 
loads, aerodynamics, and the main control/regulation (LAC) (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 57*, 2013). 
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In turn, this involves complex mathematics, where a number of power curves must be 
calculated:  
”What is required in the certification is that you must do a load calculation. That is, first you have to 
calculate a power curve…that is, how much does it produce, and the other thing is to measure the 
different actual loads. And loads etc. also have very much to do with how you regulate it [the turbine] 
(Int. 14, 2013).  
Overall, turbine developers are attempting to calculate how the turbine ”should look, how it 
should act, if designing it like this and this” (Int. 14, 2013). For instance, the Danish WTM 
Vestas engages in “LAC R&D”, which involves teams, which “use state-of-the-art 
simulation and design tools constantly optimising the operation of Vestas wind turbines in a 
trade-off between loads and production” (Vestas job-offer website). Likewise, Chinese 
certification bodies such as CGC engage in a host of experiments, e.g. load calculations 
using simulation tools to evaluate the turbine’s compliance with the standard requirements, 
i.a. looking at its power load, fatigue strength, performance, and strength (Int. 21*, 2013). In 
this way, software plays a central role already in the first step of the certification triangle. 
Aeroelastic code for load calculation – describing the turbine mathematically  
Since the simulation tool involves a complex interplay between the LAC forces, the 
simulation programme, firstly, requires simulation of the mechanical loads (Int. 32, 2012). 
Further, it must contain an aeroelastic code, which is the ‘core algorithm’ of the simulation 
tool. The aeroelastic code of the simulation tool contains the interplay of mechanical Load 
calculations (L) with the Aerodynamic forces of the wind on the blade structure (A), and 
with the specific turbine Control regulation (C):  
”Well, this turbine can be described mathematically, something about structural rigidities, how heavy it 
will be per metre, or something like that. And then the blades are normally described in terms of how the 
forces - the aerodynamic forces - how they are being influenced by the movement [e.g. the pitching] of 
the blades, right. And the movement of the blade and the wind coming in are giving like…all this you put 
into a model, where you have some numbers for this, and then you can put it into some software, some 
aeroelastic software, and then you can simulate it…” (Int. 38, 2013). 
Apart from research institutions (and companies) involved in ongoing basic research into the 
development of new optimised aeroelastic codes for new sizes and types of turbines, there 
exist myriads of aeroelastic codes, some of which are sold commercially. For instance, the 
simulation tool Bladed is a commercial load calculation tool (Int. 41, 2013) used in 
mechanical simulations, which is developed and sold by Garrad Hassan (now DNV GL) 
(Int. 43, 2013). Bladed is considered “the industry standard integrated software package for 
the design and certification of onshore and offshore turbines” (gl-garradhassan.com). Other 
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simulation tools – or so-called optimisation tools – are e.g. Flex (models for wind turbine 
design) and HAWC2 (an aeroelastic code), which have been developed by the DTU Risø, 
which are considered as research tools rather than engineering tools (such as Bladed) (Int. 
20, 2013; Int. 35, 2013; Int. 38, 2013; vindenergi.dtu.dk; Risø DTU, 2010).  
Finding the optimal algorithm – on the interplay between simulation and control to optimise 
output 
The simulation tool, basically consisting of software codes, i.e. ”computational calculations 
telling you how to simulate a turbine” (Int. 14, 2013), is crucial, as it models the turbine and 
how it should be regulated. In this way, simulation serves as a tool for turbine development 
and optimisation of turbine design, and forming the basis for a ‘competitive’ design, since 
“based on these things, you can design a better regulation [main control/controller], eh, than 
it was before […] Whose loads will be better, for instance” (Int. 35, 2013). The close 
interplay between simulation and regulation is related to the way in which the simulation 
tool must contain the so-called “regulation principle” of the wind turbine’s main 
control/controller, i.e., it contains the core algorithm of the turbine’s main control.  
”Well, the controller, that’s also a regulation system. It’s of course something about monitoring the 
turbine, but also when it observes something, the controller, e.g. when the wind blows a lot, then it 
should do like this [e.g]. regulating, pitching the blades and things like that. So, first you simulate that 
when you construct a wind turbine. That means that you will find the algorithm, which you think is the 
optimal one. And then you have to put that one into the controller. And then you measure the turbine, 
install it and say, okay, how is it acting…does it act as we predicted [calculated/simulated]? And it’s not 
everything that is possible to predict. So then you have to trim and calibrate it” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Due to this ”interplay between simulation and the regulation/control” (Int. 14, 2013), when 
mechanical design houses calculate the length of the blades and the size of the tower, they 
need to know how the main control and the pitch control are working in order to be able to 
simulate and optimise loads. Overall, optimisation of turbine design aims to raise power 
output (in a safe way), which can e.g. be achieved through flexible, modern blades in 
combination with optimised regulation strategies (main control system algorithms), as these 
together can reduce the performance-load ratio. When the performance-load ratio is reduced, 
the same turbine structure can have a bigger rotor and by that raise its output while lowering 
the cost of energy. Hereby, simulation tools for calculating i.a. mechanical loads such as 
Bladed help optimise output, and potentially also to construe associations of economic, as 
well as technical and scientific sustainability.  
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Step 2: Building a mechanical prototype – testing and trimming the turbine 
When a simulation programme has been developed, which can simulate the turbine, the 
second step of the ‘triangle’ is to build and test a mechanical turbine prototype/model. That 
is, it is assessed whether the in situ measurements of the actual loads on the prototype 
perform as the calculated loads in the simulation programme. Sometimes, performance of 
the turbine can e.g. be improved through a new rotor and through regulation strategies of the 
control system, as well as the identification of new components, where needed. This 
involves continuous ’trimming’ of the turbine. To do this, a programme must be developed 
to measure whether the turbine actually functions optimally.  
“You make some measurements [tests] and say, well, if the loads on the turbine fit your calculations, 
then it’s actually good enough, and then it actually doesn’t mean anything what the algorithms look like. 
You just try to compare those two situations” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Following this process, the turbine and the programme for measurement must be trimmed. 
That is, a programme must be developed to measure, test, and trim the turbine, as well as 
develop and trim the measuring programme to check whether it acts as planned, or whether 
something should be adjusted (Int. 14, 2013). After this, three-dimensional drawings of the 
blade together with a report, e.g. containing the loads of the structural design and displaying 
the statistical calculations of the different components, can be made (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 32, 
2013). This finally leads to an accredited measurement, which “is what you need to deliver 
for certification” (Int. 14, 2013).   
Step 3: Theoretical documentation for certification as basis for an accredited 
measurement 
Having demonstrated the design and how test measurements comply with the calculated 
simulations, the wind turbine design can be delivered to a certification agency, such as DNV 
GL, or CGC, for an accredited certification. The turbine design is thereby being documented 
through drawings, specifications, and calculations according to a standard. This last part of 
the certification ‘triangle’, the theoretical documentation, is made in order to adjust the 
deviations between the test results and the simulated calculations (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 21*, 
2013; Int. 37*, 2013; Int. 32, 2012).  
”In order that the certifying authorities can certify, they must see documents demonstrating how we have 
done the calculations in the different systems, the likely faults. And those fault cases you must document 
according to the certification. They cannot approve it, if the turbine cannot sustain dangerous situations 
[…] And you must show simulations of how it will act in 100 years and all that – actually, it’s quite 
complicated” (Int. 32, 2012). 
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Aeroelastic codes producing a ’competitive edge’ 
Having described the three steps in the certification triangle, it has been illustrated how 
optimisation of wind turbine design is related to the reduction of loads while optimising 
power output, which requires the development of ‘elegant’ designs and more flexible blade 
structures. 
”It’s not just a matter of production [power output], that is, the power curve…you can say that 
previously, you looked at how much you could optimise the power curve in relation to the rotor 
squaremetre. If you had a large rotor, how much power could you extract from that? And what you look 
at now, when you design, is how much energy that it can extract in relation to the loads on the turbine 
[…] And that is more complex, than where you are just looking at how much kilowatt per square metre 
that you can extract, right” (Int. 14, 2013). 
As wind turbines have become more advanced and ‘intelligent’, turbines are increasingly 
being distinguished in terms of their power-load performance, i.e. the reduction of cost of 
energy:  
”You can say that…a wind turbine, even though they look alike, they can be more or less advanced. A lot 
of what we are working at, that is actually building knowledge into the blades. Or into the entire wind 
turbine. To ensure that it has the best aerodynamic solution of all. The best response possible” (Int. 35, 
2013). 
In the end, intelligent design “is being measured in terms of cost of energy. How much 
money does it cost? How much does a kilowatt hour produced by the wind turbine cost?” 
(Int. 38, 2013). In this way, aeroelastic knowledge and research is being framed as a 
”parametre of competitiveness” (Int. 35, 2013), as it helps construe associations of ‘elegant’, 
‘advanced’, and ‘intelligent’ design. That is, associations of ‘competitiveness’ is about  
”all these things…which you cannot really see at first... Because…it’s possible to make some…how to 
say…some simple blades. Or something like that. And it may run okay” (Int. 35, 2013).  
While running ‘okay’, optimisation of aeroelastic codes help produce associations of a 
‘competitive edge’, bracketing and framing the more advanced from the less advanced 
research institutions and WTMs into their respective places.  
Into the turbine’s stomach – and distinguishing the advanced from the less advanced 
In regard to this framing, Western actors tend to be framed as ‘superior’, while Chinese 
actors are being framed as ‘inferior’. For instance, aeroelastic analysis requires complicated 
mathematics (Int. 14, 2013) of both dynamic and static values on the blade, and these 
calculations are not described in the standards. Instead, “it’s actually something, which 
is…it’s not really described in the standards, how you do it…it’s kind of a…it’s a pretty 
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tricky issue” (Int. 14, 2013). With a relatively long background in basic research, Western 
research institutes have pushed Western companies to move forward, trying 
”all the time to push the boundaries of the possible […] So we try to like put in an extra parametre all 
the time, putting as much knowledge into the system as possible. Because then you can produce larger 
turbines and stuff like that” (Int. 35, 2013). 
For instance, the DTU Risø has long-term experience with developing advanced aeroelastic 
tools, thereby knowing ‘the stomach’ of the wind turbine. For instance, the simulation tool 
HAWC2 
”corresponds to Bladed, apart from that it is more advanced, and that we have developed it ourselves. 
We have some people here…we are all the way down into the algorithm, we are all the way down into 
how everything is fitting together…so we kind of know the ’inner workings’ of Bladed…it’s not Bladed of 
course, but HAWC2, and we know how it functions inside the stomach. And we also know how to use and 
apply it. So therefore, we have much deeper knowledge than the users have” (Int. 20, 2013). 
At the same time, HAWC2 is a better tool for research and optimisation, whereas Bladed is 
more of a mechanical engineering tool, which does not enable further research and 
development (Int. 20, 2013). Conversely, Bladed is more ‘generic’, and nobody (apart from 
GL Garrad Hassan) has access to its core algorithms. Instead, “Bladed has the advantage 
that it is very user-friendly” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Construing ‘algorithmic quality’ and a competitive space around aeroelastic codes – with 
no guarantees given 
Overall, the simulation tool’s aeroelastic codes and the integrated source codes of the main 
control are being constituted as ‘core’ to the optimisation of wind turbine performance. 
Hereby, simulation tools and their algorithmic ‘stomach’ may be claimed to produce 
associations of algorithmic quality. Performing algorithmic quality, and delegating ‘inferior’ 
and ‘superior’ roles and positions to different actors, in terms of more less advanced 
simulation tools and their aeroelastic codes, a competitive space is being construed around 
critical core algorithms. That is, indigenous simulation tools help produce associations of i.a. 
low cost of energy, long-term performance, continuous development, and ongoing learning 
and upgrading:   
”It might be that if you take a X-turbine [Western WTM] now and then a Chinese turbine at the side…it 
might be that the Chinese turbine is cheaper, but if they don’t…if they don’t generate any new knowledge 
by themselves, then the next generation of X turbines will have beaten this one in terms of cost of energy. 
And then they need to buy licenses from…so the only way they can make sure to have the lowest cost of 
energy, that’s by staying some generations ahead” (Int. 35, 2013). 
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As Chinese actors struggle to upgrade in the area of simulation tools, the framing of inferior 
and superior actors is not given, however. This is recognised by Western actors, which state 
that they must continuously “develop and focus on development all the time…this is what is 
to keep us ahead” (Int. 35, 2013).  
Two accounts of Chinese algorithmic upgrading – contested roles in the emerging 
software-TEN? 
In the above, aeroelastic codes have emerged as ‘core’ components in simulation tools for 
certification. The analysis has indicated ongoing work of assembling a potential software-
TEN configuring around simulation tools in the qualification struggle of China’s potential 
wind power-TEN. In the following, the chapter dives into an account of how roles, 
positions, and relations are being configured around simulation tools in the potential 
software-TEN, looking at this from two competing perspectives, and with an emphasis on 
prospects of upgrading. This is used as an illustration of how roles, positions, and identities 
of actors are being negotiated and contested. 
Algorithmic barriers to upgrading – an issue of black boxes within black boxes and 
IPRs within standards 
While algorithms of simulation tools are critical in the process of optimising and certifying 
new turbine designs, the core algorithms (aeroelastic codes) are locked. That is, Garrad 
Hassan’s (now part of GL DNV) simulation tool Bladed (gl-garradhassan.com) is more like 
a ”black box, meaning that nobody actually knows how it calculates” (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 35, 
2013). That is, customers cannot see what it contains, what it does, but they can use the tool” 
(Int. 14, 2013; Int. 35, 2013). Thus,  
”when you use Bladed, then it has some built-in standard routines, which Garrad-Hassan [now DNV 
GL] has built in, you have a pitch regulation, and then you have different things. And then there is a 
control regulation algorithm in Bladed. It is black-boxed” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Likewise, the algorithms of the HAWC2 and Flex are not open to others (Int. 35, 2013). 
Established largely on foreign design licenses, most Chinese WTMs, most Chinese research 
institutes, and certification bodies have acquired and adopted the commercial simulation tool 
Bladed from Garrad Hassan (now DNV GL) (Int. 7, 2011; Int. 29, 2011; Int. 30, 2012). Yet, 
since the simulation tool is closed, “they don’t know how it calculates. They don’t. And 
that’s actually, I would say, a core issue” (Int. 14, 2013). Further, since the simulation tool 
contains the regulation principle of the main control, whose core algorithm is locked, as 
shown in the previous Chapter 9, relying on simulation tools without having developed a 
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simulation tool indigenously “involves some black boxes” (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 58, 2012). 
That is, without access to the key algorithms of both the simulation tool (the aeroelastic 
code) and that of the main control’s regulation, which is built into the simulation tool, the 
simulation tool becomes a matter of “black boxes within black boxes” (Int. 14, 2013). That 
is, “you also have the regulation built into it, that is, what the main control looks like! So 
that’s the crux of the matter!” (Int. 14, 2013). In this way, the issue of certification, testing, 
and standardisation indirectly seems entangled in an issue of IPRs; that is, a simulation tool 
is needed to obtain an accredited certification, while that same simulation tool may contain 
black-boxed algorithms, not necessarily by patents, but rather through technical locks and 
cryptations. 
Lacking capabilities of documenting black boxes 
Without access to the simulation tool’s aeroelastic code and its built-in regulation 
concept/main control algorithm, it becomes difficult to document how the different systems 
and algorithms fit together in the final step of the triangle according to international 
standards:  
”This [the aeroelastic code being black-boxed] is one part. Then there is the other thing. Then they go to 
buy a main control from X [foreign control system supplier], and it contains an algorithm. How that 
algorithm functions in relation to the one in the simulation tool…That’s actually…how can you actually 
document that?” (Int. 14, 2013). 
In this way, the issue of black-boxes within black-boxes complicates the third step in the 
triangle of international certification, where ”those developing the turbine, they must 
document it. That is, they must calculate, and then they have to conduct a complete 
calculation and tests and everything…And then those certifying it have to say, well, the 
documentation is okay and also make a parallel calculation in order to verify that it’s okay” 
(Int. 14, 2013). In order to properly document that simulations/calculations (step 1) align 
with actual measurements during testing (step 2), parallel calculations must be performed by 
using two different codes, as a matter of control of the simulation tool: ”And that’s what 
constitutes the control. It’s obvious that if you come up with results which differ widely on 
critical points, then you must dive into the issue of how to explain this. But this is the 
control” (Int. 14, 2013). In addition, the standard states that those who certify must make 
their own control calculations:  
”Well, it is stated in the [IEC] standard that, well…you must simulate how the turbine functions with this 
kind of code. It doesn’t say which one [code]…but…and then it states that the certifying authority must 
make their own parallel calculations. Which…and this constitutes the control of the calculations that are 
delivered [as documentation for certification]” (Int. 14, 2013).   
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Further, it is stated in the standard that the same code cannot be applied by those applying 
for certification and the certifying body. That is, two different codes should be employed 
since a potential mistake in the calculations otherwise can be repeated without being 
detected. However, in China there has been a lack of indigenous simulation tools, which 
implies a risk of dependence on the same tools (Interviews).  
Lack of basic research in aerodynamics and quality control – barriers to reverse 
engineering 
The issue of dependence on commercial simulation tools and locked core algorithms is in 
turn entangled in the legacy of foreign design licenses in Chinese wind power. In the initial 
years of building a Chinese wind turbine industry, focus was not on investments in long-
term basic research into aerodynamics and advanced aeroelastic codes. Hereby, ”although 
some Chinese actors are working with aerodynamics, they still need to develop an 
aeroelastic code” in contrast to “other countries who have been occupied with wind power 
[and] have had research in this field, and have developed those codes themselves” over 
decades (Int. 14, 2013). Having followed a strategy of component technology sourcing, 
Chinese WTMs risk losing the overview of the wind turbine, and its ‘stomach’, which is 
critical to optimising aeroelastic codes. Thus, while Chinese actors are increasingly able to 
work with aerodynamic codes, another issue is to understand them and/or how to optimise 
then (Interviews).  
”If we say…we start to develop a new turbine…then we simulate it in Bladed, but in reality they don’t 
know what’s inside of it…maybe they have an algorithm, which works, but they don’t know whether it’s 
the optimal one. And then they will get a main control from X [foreign control system suppplier], and 
there’s a standard…and then they have some third-party to test it, and then they find out, well, it is 
actually not functioning according to how we calculated it…and then they think about that – but they 
don’t know what’s optimal” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Further, software tools always contain a number of mistakes, but when core algorithms are 
closed, it is not possible to detect these or to change them without assistance from the 
simulation tool provider. That is, ”they can’t change the code without asking [the foreign 
certification body], telling them that they would like to do this and that…and then they [the 
foreign certification body] has to change the code, so you [the Chinese] can calculate” (Int. 
14, 2013). Overall, black-boxed algorithms seem to create barriers to optimisation and 
reverse engineering, which in turn may create associations of ‘less advanced’ and ‘less 
intelligent’ turbines. In turn, this may threaten the framing of wind power as technically and 
economically sustainable, but also as scientifically sustainable. 
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Dependence on suboptimal codes – on copycatting and lack of indigenous design 
Dependent on closed simulation tools, adapting turbine designs to Chinese conditions 
becomes difficult (Int. 8, 2013), since without understanding the aeroelasticity of the wind 
turbine design, “they can’t…they can’t adapt it…if they encounter a problem” (Int. 38, 
2013). In addition, Bladed is not considered the most advanced code, or the best tool for 
optimisation or research and development (Int. 20, 2013; Int. 14, 2013). ”Bladed is an 
aeroelastic code. But not particularly advanced” (Int. 14, 2013). What Chinese actors get 
from Bladed is a “kind of a standard package” for common situations, “but if you get into 
the more refined issues, then you have some weaknesses [in the code]” (Int. 14, 2013). 
However, Chinese actors tend to trust Bladed, even though “it might not be the best 
[simulation tool], and they may not know how it calculates” (Int. 14, 2013). The same 
applies for the control system algorithm, which foreign control system suppliers have largely 
developed from other industries, in particular the marine industry, and only lately having 
applied to wind power. In this way, many control system suppliers are 
“not experts on wind turbines. That means…what’s the optimal algorithm? It’s not X [foreign control 
system supplier] you should ask about this. They can develop an algorithm which works. And you can tell 
them that you want the turbine to work like this, and then they can make it work like that, in a good and 
reliable manner. Hardware and stuff like that. But X [foreign control system supplier] doesn’t make wind 
turbines themselves. […] When I say that the aeroelastic code is where you calculate…when you 
simulate…what will I do, if I do like this and this…X [foreign control system supplier] does not have an 
aeroelastic code. They cannot make simulations of how the control actually functions” (Int. 14, 2013).  
Apart from the risk of being dependent on suboptimal codes for Chinese environmental 
conditions, the locked algorithms create socio-technical barriers to optimise and adjust codes 
according to the specific environmental conditions. Further, Chinese actors risk becoming 
dependent on advice from actors, which are not offering independent advice, e.g. as Garrad 
Hassan (and their tool Bladed) has become part of the merged certification body GL DNV 
(due to the merger and acquisition). That is, ”Garrad Hassan has been acquired, and then 
you have a certification body, which sells consultancy services within the same company. 
And that’s not so wise” (Int. 42, 2012). These seeming socio-technical barriers to reverse 
engineering in the development and optimisation of new turbine designs have delayed the 
entrance of Chinese WTMs on the international market. That is, Chinese WTMs are working 
on  
“getting GL certification, they need to do their 3,000 hours run…let’s see, it will probably come, but I 
think it is a lot slower than what we have seen, and what we had anticipated a couple of years ago” (Int. 
1, 2013).  
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Accordingly, in 2014, Vestas proclaimed that they did not fear the entrance of Chinese 
WTMs into the international market in the near future any longer, but rather saw a possible 
expansion of their own market share in China (metalsupply.dk, Jun. 13, 2014). Further, it is 
widely recognised that while some of the best Chinese WTMs have acquired foreign design 
houses and smaller WTMs, “it’s still something they have bought. That is, we still lack 
seeing a proper Chinese design, which has been developed from the ground [and which] 
they have done properly, and where you can say that they have made it all from A to Z” (Int. 
14, 2013). Hereby, while it is often claimed that there is still no purely indigenous Chinese 
wind turbine design (Int. 14, 2013; Int. 20, 2013; Int. 36, 2013), it is also claimed that most 
Chinese turbines “are just based on existing [foreign] designs, which could be optimised” 
(Int. 57*, 2013), as they have been acquired from design houses and consultancy firms who 
have largely licensed mature technologies “in order to keep ahead” themselves (Int. 36, 
2013). 
Risk of useless control system source codes – limits to leapfrogging 
Lacking overview of the wind turbine’s ‘stomach’, needed for developing indigenous 
designs, the much-desired source codes of the main control (as shown in Chapter 9), risk 
becoming useless, even when Chinese actors may gain access to them : 
”Well, I’d say, if they don’t master this [the aeroelasticity], then I’d think that they cannot use that 
source code for anything at all” (Int. 35, 2013). 
Indeed, certification and wind turbine design – and control system algorithms – seem 
intricately entangled and require long-term investment in learning and basic research. Before 
that, it will not be possible to use more advanced design codes such as Flex or HAWC2, or 
even to develop indigenous codes, since other design codes such as Flex “require that you 
can understand all the things…what do they mean […] So you can say it is a long process” 
(Int. 35, 2013). Consequently, there seems to be no easy way of leapfrogging in terms of 
developing indigenous wind turbine designs. Indeed, particularly for modern intelligent 
turbines, building certification capabilities is “a huge task for the large turbines […] it’s a 
huge task. Because the quality requirements are really…extremely hard…20 years ago, 
Boeing couldn’t build a wind turbine at two Megawatt. And now they [WTMs] have to build 
one at six or ten [megawatt] to be competitive” (Int. 20, 2013). 
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Transformative upgrading – gradual learning of ’the new student’  
While the above account depicts a somewhat bleak perspective of Chinese capabilities of 
certification and indigenous design due to the critical role of simulation tools, another 
competing account seems to be emerging, which offers a transformational perspective of 
upgrading. This account of gradual learning and upgrading reflects how Chinese 
certification bodies, universities, and research institutes have increasingly engaged in R&D, 
e.g. spurred by the Chinese Government to develop aeroelastic codes. Accordingly, CGC is 
claimed to work on “developing them [the codes], they are learning...only ten years old. 
They have to learn and learn” (Int. 8, 2013).  
Building certification capabilities and learning from Bladed 
Working on and improving knowledge on aeroelastic codes, CGC has now technical teams 
dedicated to understanding and translating international standards and standard 
specifications, to conducting simulations and testing, and to developing and adapting 
standards to local conditions. One of the most difficult things in this work is to interpret and 
understand ‘the meaning’ behind the standard specifications, which requires several years of 
studying for China as a ‘new student’:  
”For us new students, so to say, it’s very important, because we have to check with a lot of literature 
[…] Why is this, what is this principle, why should it be like this, right? And a lot of it may be completed 
after the data have been forgotten, it’s not [regarded as] important, but for us in this new school, it is 
very important, [otherwise we have to] check a lot of literature” (Int. 21*, 2013). 
In regard to simulation tools, CGC, research institutes, and Chinese WTMs have largely 
been dependent on Bladed since “in the field of simulation everybody internationally uses 
their [Garrad Hassan’s] simulation tool for load calculations” (Int. 21*, 2013). The Bladed 
tool has served as a basis for ”accumulating technological capabilities” (Int. 21*, 2013), e.g. 
through training by e.g. Garrad Hassan/GL DNV, i.e. the developers of the Bladed tool (Int. 
21*, 2013; Int. 37*, 2013). Even though Bladed is “not open”, 
“it will have some interfaces, so we can make some development on the surface. We can use some 
programmes to help us to improve the software [and] if there is need to, they [Garrad Hassan] can 
provide some software support, but normally we will be able to do it ourselves now” (Int. 37*, 2013). 
Yet, acknowledging its limits, increasingly Chinese actors are also experimenting with other 
simulation tools, e.g. Flex, as well as experimenting with developing indigenous codes.   
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Turbine design for typhoons – being forced to be creative 
As eager ‘students’, Chinese actors in the emerging software-TEN configuring around 
certification and standardisation seem spurred on by a desire to conduct ‘indigenous 
innovation’ as well as to abide by international standards. To succeed in indigenous 
innovation of standards, pure copycatting of international standards is not enough, as 
international standards have largely been developed to European conditions. Instead, 
reengineering is needed. Chinese WTMs are therefore also increasingly attempting at 
conducting reverse engineering of software tools. Increasingly engaging in aerodynamic 
research with a dedicated control system department working on algorithms, CGC adopts 
different software tools for turbine design and claims to gradually have developed its 
indigenous ‘own software’ and its ‘own new tools’, e.g. for when a typhoon is coming (Int. 
21*, 2013; Int. 37*, 2013; Int. 49, 2012). 
“That means we are also studying how to generate this typhoon model…after hitting the blade, how 
much load it can bear from the wind?…then we hope to develop a model of a typhoon and a typhoon 
simulation tool […] Yes, an emulator [simulator], which can guide the design of the typhoon blade that 
you want in the future” (Int. 21*, 2013). 
This is reflected in an official CGC presentation, where it is stated that CGC engages in a 
”[s]erious certification process”, which involves  
”[t]racing back to the source of turbine load diverge[nce]. We do not only concentrate on load 
assumptions and results; independent simulation of control algorithm capture[s] the impact of every 
detailed modification; strength analysis covers every bolt of the turbine; we check the design 
assumptions in the field” (CGC, 2013: 9). 
Overall, Chinese actors are gradually building indigenous capabilities for design, as they 
engage in reverse engineering, e.g. adapting turbine designs to typhoon conditions (Int. 21*, 
2013). In this way, adaptation of turbine design (and simulation tools) to local conditions 
“forces you to be creative, there are no innovative people to give it to you, as others do not 
have these problems, isn’t that right? (Int. 21*, 2013). In this way, China upgrades 
capabilities in certification, which “drives technological advancement of the entire industry” 
(Int. 21*, 2013). 
De- and reconfiguration of collaborative relations 
The two competing accounts of ‘algorithmic barriers’ to upgrading and transformative 
upgrading,  respectively, in the ‘algorithmic case-study’ above provides a picture of some of 
the negotiations taking place in the potential software-TEN around simulation tool 
algorithms. That is, the case illustrates how capabilities, and thereby also roles and positions, 
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of Chinese actors are being negotiated. In the following, the chapter inquires further into 
how the negotiation of roles and positions of Chinese actors are de- and reconfiguring 
relations and identities of actors. This leads to the last section, which maps a potentially 
emerging controversy around certification and standardisation in the software-TEN. 
Collaborative relations in certification and standardisation 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of wind turbine development and certification, in 
particular of aerodynamic research, there exist a myriad of collaborative relations between 
different types of actors in the market, technical, and scientific poles working on issues 
related to certification. In particular, in mature wind power regions like Europe and the US, 
there exist multiple ‘formalised’ and ‘less formalised’ collaborative relations, e.g. between 
developers of aeroelastic codes and the users (Int. 14, 2013). In these (often ‘informal’) 
collaborations, different actors engage in the work of comparing simulation codes and test 
measurements, since “this is the only realistic way to verify the codes [of the simulation 
tool] and to improve them” (Int. 14, 2013). That is, it is only “by working with those 
codes… that’s where you gain the understanding” (Int. 14, 2013). Likewise, as regards the 
main control for a specific turbine design, WTMs and control system suppliers in Europe 
and the US often engage in collaborations: 
”Well, it is an interplay between the wind turbine manufacturer and the control system supplier […] 
Then the [wind turbine] manufacturer says they would like the turbine to regulate like this and this, and 
then they [control system supplier] programme it [the control system] accordingly and produce some 
software, which can do that and stuff like that” (Int. 14, 2013). 
In addition, WTMs may ask test laboratories for assistance, when it comes to simulation 
tools and understanding why, for instance, the Flex or HAWC2 programmes are acting 
unexpectedly. However, it requires a considerable amount of knowledge and experience to 
be able to ask research institutions and test laboratories (what is framed as) ‘informed 
questions’ (Int. 14, 2013: Int. 20, 2013; Int. 35, 2013): 
”Some of the clever companies, the people…they know…they have a pretty good idea of what’s going on 
inside and can ask some pretty clever questions about…’why – when they are running this…why did it 
act like this? That seemed pretty’…And [then we (test laboratory/research institute] think, ‘well, oups! 
We have to ask our developers’, and then we have to say, ‘well, that’s a really good question, I’ll go and 
check. I think you are right, it might be that in the future, in the next update…or that the manual should 
be written a little more clearly, so you don’t misunderstand…why it acts like this, when you actually 
thought that that would be impossible’” (Int. 35, 2013).  
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These collaborative relations between i.a. WTMs, control system suppliers, certification 
bodies, design houses, and/or test laboratories are often based on personal connections, e.g. 
as wind turbine engineers often shift jobs within the wind power-TEN. As expressed below,  
”if you know these people who work in Garrad Hassan on a friendly level, you can make some 
suggestions, and then it’s sometimes an advantage to speak Danish etc. If you have been playing 
together for a long time, you have some confidentiality. You can just call them, even in the evening, and 
get some support. And you can’t do that if you sit in China and get in contact with the service department 
of Garrad Hassan” (Int. 32, 2012). 
Thereby, ‘knowing somebody’ can help actors optimise the codes e.g. in Bladed, because 
”of course it has its limitations. But then you can make some customer-specific changes, if 
you know somebody who knows somebody in GL [DNV GL/Garrad Hassan] (Int. 32, 
2012). In Denmark, for instance, collaborations are taking place in the so-called ‘Denmark 
Wind Valley’ or “Wind Power Hub [where] there’s a lot of learning across [company 
borders]” (Int. 32, 2012), as ‘everybody knows each other’ (Int. 32, 2012; Int. 9, 2012; Int. 
2, 2012). In this “dynamic international community [of learning], research collaboration is 
very much like ’give-and-take’” (Int. 14, 2013). When personal relations associated with 
trust (based on ‘informed algorithmic knowledge’) have been established, parts of the source 
codes may be shared, enabling code adjustments (Int. 14, 2013).  
Exclusion from collaborations in the ’good international club’ 
With a background in foreign design licenses and still suffering from a framing of Chinese 
wind turbines as ‘poor quality’, Chinese actors face barriers when attempting to join these 
‘innermost research circles’, since it is “often like, ‘can’t you develop a blade for us?’” 
rather than an issue of ‘give-and-take’ (Int. 35, 2013). That is, “this dynamic community 
does not include China. There is no serious research in aeroelasticity [in China]” (Int. 14, 
2013):  
“The Chinese would very much like to join – how to put it…join the inner circle of the good international 
club. They would love that, but then they must be able to give something. This thing about saying that we 
want to participate…but if they only think about what they can gain themselves, but not about how they 
could give something in return…in that respect, they are pretty poor partners” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Consequently, Chinese WTMs and others are often excluded from collaborations i.a. in 
regard to optimising the interplay between the simulation tool and the regulation/control 
algorithm. Instead, the control system supplier and foreign design turbine designer/license 
provider may collaborate directly, instead of involving the Chinese WTM:   
”But when they get X [the foreign license provider], who is very active in China to deliver [the 
design]…then they deliver a turbine [design], and then they will also deliver an algorithm. And then it’s 
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probably XX [the foreign control system supplier], whom they are talking to regarding how to design the 
regulation algorithm. The [Chinese] wind turbine manufacturer does not need to know anything about 
this” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Overall, it seems that algorithms as calculative tools produce inclusions and exclusions, and 
in this was may be transformed from ‘innocent’, mundane intermediaries into actors, as they 
come to have an effect on the relations they de- and reconfigure. 
Issues of lacking recognition – lost in the limbo of (lacking) confidence 
Although CGC has been accredited as certification body, and should also be recognised 
internationally, there still seems to be a lack of recognition of ‘mutuality’, as they are often 
not regarded as being ‘at the level of DNV GL’. Instead, it is predicted that it will take years 
for them to gain sufficient confidence outside China (Interviews). Hereby, it is “widely 
acknowledged that the Chinese institutions, which are young in this field, might have 
problems in being accepted at the same level as the well-known European institutions, but it 
is their goal” (Int. 14, 2013). Consequently, even though the ’formal’ part, in the form of 
certified and accredited calculations, may be delivered from China to obtain European 
accredited certification, these calculations will sometimes not be trusted (Interviews): 
”Because when you do this kind of work, then there’s always two parts…the one thing is the 
formal…bambambam, have they calculated this, this, and that?” […] ”and then there’s the second part: 
do you think that what you’ve got is okay?” (Int. 14, 2013). 
Lost in a limbo of lacking confidence, the ideal of the certification system in which national 
accreditation institutions should recognise each other mutually, does not always function 
properly, as Chinese actors are ‘not being recognised’ (Interviews). To overcome this, basic 
research in algorithms (i.a. aeroelastic codes) is a “pre-requisite for the development of their 
own technologies, but also for being included in international networks in regard to these 
things  [since] if they don’t do research themselves and don’t make anything, which is 
relevant for others, then they won’t get anything the other way. That’s how it works” (Int. 
14, 2013). Again, algorithms are emerging as actors in the formation of relations in the 
emerging software-TEN within Chinese wind power.  
Fighting resistance and contesting their own inferiority 
As Chinese certification bodies and WTMs have increasingly built capabilities and 
experimented with development of simulation tools and aeroelastic codes, the role and 
position of Chinese actors as ‘inferior partners’ is increasingly being contested. That is, 
Chinese certification bodies want 
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“to reach an equal status, like DNV and Germanischer-Lloyd [DNV GL], right? [They] want to be 
internationally accredited. But I think that’s the way towards the goal. The alternative is that the Chinese 
bring their turbines over here to DNV, make some agreements with DNV or Germanischer-Lloyd and 
have them certified” (Int. 20, 2013). 
As Chinese certification capabilities are now “fully in accordance with international 
standards, and we are participating in international exchanges of these international 
institutions” (Int. 21*, 2013), Chinese actors argue that their ‘platform’ has changed, and 
that they have now reached ‘a platform to do something’ (Int. 21*, 2013). This indicates that 
Chinese actors are contesting their framing of being ‘inferior’ to and excluded from others. 
At the same time, Chinese actors recognise that there has been, and sometimes still is, a lack 
of trust in Chinese wind turbines and certification capabilities. This was in particular the 
case in 2003, when China had just started out within wind power: 
“A lot of people were questioning it…that is, a lot of people were not agreeing with…because you 
[China] do not have any industry, the manufacturing industry is also very weak. When writing standards, 
they also think you [China] are just translating foreign standards. You don’t have any people to make 
wind turbines, so how should you write standards? So there is still some resistance” (Int. 21*, 2013). 
Consequently, even though CGC may have certified a Chinese wind turbine, it might be 
necessary to certify the wind turbine several times, since “in Germany, no! We need GL 
[DNV GL]” (Int. 8, 2013). Hereby, the ‘pacifying’ tools of standards and certificates do not 
always work to pacify associations and qualities to the emerging good of wind power, but 
rather risk destabilising it. 
Negotiating identities in collaborations – construing associations of mutuality  
Increasingly, to overcome these barriers and to construe associations of ‘trustworthiness’, 
Chinese WTMs and certification bodies have worked on upgrading and on developing 
simulation tools through diverse collaboration, i.a. with design houses (Int. 43, 2013; Int. 
37*, 2013; Interview 21*; 2013). As Chinese actors have upgraded capabilities, relations 
and positions between Chinese and foreign actors in the emerging software-TEN are 
becoming increasingly negotiated: 
“Owners in other countries say, we want the certification from GL, not only from CGC. So they have to 
negotiate. Now things are getting better, because the basic is that CGC must conform to international 
standards, in order to certify...and your certification will be checked by all other certifications...it's no 
problem. This is basic. The quality is first, second is to try to get more recognition from other 
organisations, yeah” (Int. 8*, 2013).  
In this way, as Chinese actors strive towards writing new indigenous standards, relations are 
being transformed, involving more “learning from each other, promoting each other” (Int. 
21*, 2013). For instance, Chinese ideas for adapted standards seem to be increasingly 
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internationally recognised (Int. 21*, 2013), and CGC is increasingly involved in different 
working groups within the IEC Wind Turbine Certification Advisory Committee (CGC, 
2013: 17; Interviews). 
An emerging controversy over certification and standardisation? 
As China struggles for recognition and for qualifying Chinese wind power as sustainable, 
certification, testing, and standardisation have become a critical obligatory passage point. In 
the above, it has been illustrated how relations, positions, roles, and identities of Chinese 
and foreign actors seem to be reshuffled in the ongoing qualification struggle facing the 
wind power-TEN. In the last section of the chapter, before concluding, the analysis inquires 
further into a potentially emerging ‘controversy’ over certification and standardisation, or 
what may be termed a ‘standardisation war’, which is entangled in myriads of issues of e.g. 
catch-up, IPR, and protectionism. Indeed, standards increasingly include IPR and has 
become a hotly debated issue (Ernst, 2011a; 2011b; Ernst, 2013b: 1). Firstly, the matter of 
concern of international standards is shown, and secondly, the matter of concern over 
domestic standards, seen from a Chinese and Western perspective, respectively. 
Matters of concern over international standards – struggles of defining quality 
The negotiated nature of roles, positions, and identities in the potential software-TEN 
around simulation tools for certification and standardisation is entangled in matters of 
concern over upgrading and catch-up, and thus over China’s Scientific Development. In this 
regard, obtaining international recognition in terms of indigenous standards has become 
increasingly critical, as the Chinese potential wind power-TEN is facing a quality crisis. In 
the following, the chapter first looks into the ’standardisation war’ unfolding in regard to 
international standards, which in many ways is related to a fight for the right to define 
quality. 
Harmonisation of standards as constituting free trade and healthy collaboration 
Facing a quality crisis and the quest for Scientific Development, as well as the need to turn 
towards the international market in the oversaturated wind power-TEN, China has become 
more actively engaged in the work of harmonisation of international standards, working in 
different IEC committees (Int. 55, 2013). This serves to prevent “creating technical barriers 
to trade […] hoping to achieve a global access for certification, so that everybody is not 
doing it differently” (Int. 21*, 2013). Further, this work serves to give China a stronger 
voice in the international wind community (Int. 21*, 2013). That is, China ”should be a very 
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important core member of this work [of developing a] unified approach, with a correct 
understanding of IEC standards etc.” (Int. 53, 2013). In this context, standards are construed 
as critical framing tools to build associations of ‘free trade’ and ‘healthy collaboration’ (Int. 
21*, 2013): 
“Actually, we follow principles in line with international standards in the whole testing process, 
believing that the wind power is a transnational and international industry. It must rely on free trade, we 
must rely on the cooperation between countries, so that global cooperation can develop soundly. That 
you cannot rest complacently on the laurels of certification, each country not being engaged with each 
other, that is not conducive to the development of global trade, so we should unify the world, which is a 
basic principle” (Int. 21*, 2013). 
Negotiated quality and barriers to leapfrogging – no such thing as the best turbine, algorithm, or 
standard 
In the struggle for harmonisation of standards, standards and turbine quality constitute 
contested issues. For instance, each adaptation of existing or formulation of new standards 
must be negotiated. This is e.g. seen in the adoption of the third edition of the IEC 61400 
standard, which has been met with a great degree of resistance (Germanischer-Lloyd, 2010a: 
6). Turbines acquire what may be termed associations of ‘algorithmic quality’ through 
certification, as alignment of simulations/calculations and tests are being documented. 
However, as indicated earlier, even the quality of algorithms, by itself, is also negotiable, 
since there is no such thing as ‘the best algorithm’, and as they are always ‘filled with 
errors’. Rather, algorithmic quality is situational, as “there's no such thing as the best 
turbine. It really depends on what kind of project” (Int. 11, 2012). For instance, the 
calculation of cost of energy is project-specific, being related to the project ”terrain, and also 
the wind conditions, and the turbulence” (Int. 23, 2012). Overall, standards, their metrics, 
and the calculative agencies they produce can become constituted as situational and 
debatable. Accordingly, new standard formulations and the process of harmonising 
standards often constitute a contested issue, as different actors will promote their own 
metrics and calculative devices. This makes it impossible to write into the standards how the 
simulations and testing should be conducted, as there is even disagreement within standard 
committees, which are constituted by market, scientific, and technical poles.  
”In the standard…there are some points…I guess this is the critical point, that is, you have to do this and 
this. But not how one should do it. And this is also related to the fact that those people who make these 
[standards], they are researchers and some from industry etc., who sit in these committees. And to make 
a standard, they must agree that now you can do like this…otherwise it cannot be included in the 
standard, right. And they aren’t [agreeing]. And that means that as long as they don’t agree [these] 
explanations cannot be included in the standard” (Int. 14). 
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As standards do not explain ‘the hows’, this also constitutes a barrier to rapid leapfrogging 
for Chinese actors, “because, first they [the standards] should be translated […] Second, you 
have to understand these standards, and then also understand why they have developed in 
that way, and why it is in this way…what principle is this based on” (Int. 21*, 2013). Yet, as 
outlined earlier, access to this kind of data is not open. In the above, it is indicated how a 
‘negotiated’, or even an emerging ‘competitive space’, is being construed around standards, 
their calculative tools, and the calculative agencies they construe. As expressed by a foreign 
WTM, while willingly providing assistance and raising recommendations on Chinese 
standards, ”when it comes to standards, that is where we start to become competitors again” 
(Int. 1, 2013). 
China’s two-track approach and entangled controversies over standardisation and IPRs 
The quest for a stronger voice in IEC negotiations (and in the definition of quality) is in the 
meantime entangled in matters of concern of the Chinese political pole. That is, China is 
attempting to transform itself from being a mere standard-taker “to become a co-shaper, and 
in some areas a lead shaper, of international standards” (Ernst, 2013: 2). This is being 
referred to as a ‘two-track approach’ in China’s standardisation strategy, which involves 
both adaptation to international standards and developing their own domestic standards 
(Ernst, 2011a: v). This has recently been expressed by the new political leadership in China, 
in a speech on innovation by President Xi Jinping. Thus, fighting China’s 
‘victimised/inferior position’,  
“focus on China possessing its own core technologies did not exclude international cooperation. But, he 
said, China would demand a bigger say in the rules and standards that govern global science and 
technology innovation” (President Xi Jinping in Sinosphere, 10 June 2014). 
With an aim to become a lead shaper of standards, China is claimed to shift from a catch-up 
approach to an upgrading-through-innovation strategy (Ernst, 2011a: v-vi). That is,   
”domestic innovative capacity is considered to be the key to a sustainable transformation of its economy 
beyond the export-oriented ”global factory” model. To achieve this goal, China’s government is very 
serious in its aspiration to move from being a mere standard-taker to become a co-shaper, and in some 
areas a lead shaper, of international standards” (Ernst, 2011a: 2). 
With its roots in the MLP S&T (MOST, 2006-2020) and the doctrine of Scientific 
Development, which positions standards as a tool for indigenous innovation (Ernst, 2011b: 
6), standardisation is entangled in the stem issue of construing a Harmonious Socialist 
Society through Scientific Development. In this potentially transformative struggle, the 
upgrading of China’s standardisation system is positioned as a critical means to lessen the 
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“control of foreign advanced countries over the PRC”, especially “in the area of high and 
new technology” (Ernst, 2011b: 4). As expressed in President Xi Jinping’s speech,  
“[o]n the traditional competition field of international development, the rules were set by other people 
[…] To seize the great opportunities in the new scientific-technological revolution and industrial 
transformation, we must enter early on while the new competition field is being built, and even dominate 
some of the competition field construction, so we become a major designer of the new rules of 
competition and a leader on the new field” (Sinosphere, 10 June 2014). 
That is, standardisation also becomes a matter of reducing dependence on foreign 
technologies (and license fees), and of introducing own sometimes patent-worthy 
technologies into global standards (Ernst, 2011b; Wang et al., 2010). Hereby, the emerging 
controversy over standardisation becomes entangled in another controversy, over IPRs: 
”China is working within the international system with the long-term goal of creating patent-worthy 
technology essential to global standards. By including Chinese technology into global standards, China 
seeks to strengthen its bargaining power and to reduce its exposure to high royalty fees. At the same 
time, however, China seeks to use its increasing geopolitical influence to promote new sets of rules for 
international standardization, and hence to transform the international standards system itself” (Ernst, 
2011a: v). 
At the same time as China is seeking to remain abreast with international standards, such 
work is a costly affair (Ernst, 2013b: 7). Thus, as a ’latecomer’ China must consider whether 
to adopt the international standard or whether it is better (and/or cheaper) to create a new 
domestic standard (Ernst, 2013b: 7). Apart from the already depicted attempts at doing 
reverse engineering of standards by i.a. the CGC, e.g. developing a wind turbine for 
typhoons, China has also introduced a China Compulsory Certification mark (CCC) for 
safety approval of technological and industrial products (US Chamber of Commerce, 
McGregor, 2011: 23), which requires testing and recertification of many foreign products in 
China (US Chamber of Commerce, McGregor, 2011: 23). In this way, China’s political 
leadership is claimed to encourage domestic standards by pursuing a government-led, yet 
ambiguous and fragmented, approach to standardisation (Ernst, 2011b: 5), which does not 
resemble what is conventionally framed as (the American-style) market-led, voluntary 
standards model (Ernst, 2011b: 2). That is, rather than letting standards develop by 
competition, the Chinese ”government will continue to play an important role as a promoter, 
enabler, and coordinator of an integrated standards and innovation policy” (Ernst, 2011a: 1). 
Overall, the dual-track approach is engendering what may be termed a ‘standardisation war’. 
In the last section of the chapter, before the conclusion, the analysis maps part of this 
emerging controversy. 
307 
 
The configuring of a ’standardisation war’ 
The dual-track approach seems to engender controversy on an ’international scale’, since it 
is entangled in concerns over i.a. upgrading, catch-up, subjugation, protectionism, and trade 
war. Hereby, the emergence of a potential software-TEN around simulation tools for 
standardisation configures a ’competitive space’, or what may be coined a ‘standardisation 
war’, in the process of qualifying wind power as sustainable. In the following, this 
standardisation war is first explored from a Chinese viewpoint, thereafter from the viewpoint 
of foreign actors, the different viewpoints underlining the importance of the controversy.  
International standards as trade barriers – on Chinese subjugation to foreign technologies  
Rather than automatically pacifying the qualities of wind power, standards for wind power 
seem to produce multiple and contested qualities, and to engender a competitive space 
between Chinese and foreign actors. This is entangled in wider concerns that China, as a 
late-comer in certification and wind power in general, is being excluded from collaborations 
and foreign markets. Thus, whereas ”China had considered technical standards a means to 
facilitate world trade” upon WTO-accession in general, “it turned out that the first barrier it 
encountered when its products entered the international market was technical regulations 
and standards” (Wang et al., 2010: 7). Hereby, standards are seen to function as 
conventional trade barriers. Indeed, it is generally held that “certification and testing regimes 
can be formidable tools of protectionism” (US Chamber of Commerce, McGregor, 2011: 
23). In wind power, Chinese actors tend to find that they struggle with ’protectionism’ in 
foreign markets, due to a lack of trust in China’s certification:  
”We have made a lot of preparations for exporting, but there are some issues with the trust by foreign 
markets in Chinese certificates, they want to test them themselves. They don’t trust [Bu xiangxin 
/不相信].This is a misunderstanding, we can do anything, so it is just an export barrier. It’s 
protectionism, a trade barrier [maoyi de tiaozhan/贸易的挑战]. There are also troubles with anti-
dumping” (Int. 44(*), 2012).  
Overall, the potentially emerging software- and wind power-TENs produce controversies 
over standardisation, entangled in the grand narrative of China’s catch-up through 
indigenous innovation and control of own intellectual property and definition of own as well 
as international standards, and thereby aligning with China’s Sustainable and Scientific 
Development. In this account, ”it is not okay that key technologies come from outside. We 
should control core technologies. China thinks in this way. But in the West, the MNCs 
control the key technologies, often through standards” (Int. 59, 2013).  
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The critical framing tool of certification and standards in China’s wind power-TEN 
Simultaneously, the Chinese ambition to meet and even set international standards could be 
an indication of the rising capabilities of Chinese WTMs and of the potential ‘turn to 
quality’ in China’s emerging wind power-TEN. That is, ”you have to reach a certain stage, 
before you can actually manage internationally and start beginning to see an advantage [of 
standardisation]” (Int. 18, 2013). Hereby, the gradually rising focus on standards in Chinese 
wind power – both domestic and international – can be seen as a matter of an upgrading 
strategy and process. Thus, in the initial growth phase, Chinese domestic standards were set 
intentionally low in order to make sure that domestic WTMs could meet the standards. 
Further, with an interest in satisfying the domestic market, emphasis was not on 
international standards. In this way, rather than being an issue of technical barriers, some 
claim that if Chinese WTMs had wanted to invest, they ”could be approved [internationally] 
without any problem. There’s nothing to it […] It’s just an approval process” (Int. 15, 2012). 
Summing up, today’s increased focus on international quality standards is a “very new 
trend” (Int. 18, 2013). That is, as capabilities have risen, and as overflows have become 
ubiquitous, emphasis on quality through standards and obtaining international standards has 
become increasingly critical, which is particularly visible in the current potential turn to 
quality.  
Chinese standards as a protectionist tool against foreign technologies 
Having displayed the account of China’s dual-track approach from a Chinese perspective, in 
the following, the analysis looks into how it is being framed from a Western perspective. 
Construing a hot topic of standardisation and trade barriers 
China’s introduction of domestic standards and the mandatory Chinese Compulsory 
Certification-mark (CCC) are often seen as a tool of Chinese protectionism by foreign actors 
(Ernst, 2011a: 37; Ernst, 2011b; U.S. Chamber of Commerce/McGregor, 2011: 23; 
Interviews). China largely sees protection through domestic standards as a necessary means 
since WTO accession, as WTO accession constructed ’a policy vacuum’ due to the 
reduction of other trade restrictions (licensing requirements, tariffs, and import quotas) 
(Ernst, 2011a: 4). Conversely, from the perspective of Western actors, the introduction of 
domestic standards within wind power is being seen as an obstacle, or trade barrier, to 
foreign companies (Interviews), and the CCC mark has produced fears of Chinese industrial 
espionage, in particular in terms of software and encryption testing, which requires the 
sharing of source code encryption keys (Ernst, 2011a: 37; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
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McGregor, 2011: 30; Interviews). Further, the CCC mark postpones market entrance of 
foreign products as  
“they haven’t been geared towards working with this in any professional manner. And then a barrier 
is…there are only few centres capable of certifying. That’s a huge problem. So it’s also this thing about 
that you can’t bring international certificates to China and have them directly approved […] And it’s not 
so easy to have them tested these few places [in China]” (Int. 18, 2013). 
The issue of the dual-track approach is hereby being constituted as a “hot topic in U.S.-
China economic relations” (Ernst, 2011b: 1). The issue of standardisation adds to 
“contentious disputes about exchange rates, trade, and foreign direct investment. 
Standardization, as well as intellectual property rights and government procurement, are at 
the center of this conflict” (Ernst, 2011b: 2). Framed as “trade weapons used to discriminate 
against” foreign products (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, McGregor, 2011: 22), Chinese 
domestic standards are entangled in discussions of international trade within the WTO. For 
instance, concerns have been raised that China’s standardisation strategy (and its innovation 
policy) does not comply with WTO rules, since China is promoting the ”creation and 
application of a large number of national standards in China, as opposed to use of existing 
international standards” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce/McGregor in Ernst, 2011: 3-4). 
Overall, processes of standardisation seem to configure a ‘standardisation war’ or hot topic – 
or what may be termed a ‘hot situation’ where “everything becomes controversial” (Callon, 
1998: 260) – as a myriad of heterogeneous actors, such as IPRs, government procurement 
regulations, encryption keys, exchange rates, FDI, and trade weapons, and algorithms, are 
assembled.   
Exclusion processes from standards – a competitive space with no welcoming hands  
As foreign companies mobilise concerns regarding their exclusion from the Chinese market, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is also being mobilised as an actor into the emerging 
wind power-TEN. This is not only due to the introduction of Chinese domestic standards, 
but also due to a Chinese list of public government procurement for large infrastructural 
projects such as wind power (‘the buy-China-plan’), which has produced concerns over 
protectionism (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, McGregor, 2011: 19; Int. 1, 2013;  Int. 51, 
2010).  
“China has some unique regulations in place that I haven’t seen anywhere else, that are really – in my 
view – deeply skewed towards promoting their own companies. ..In face of WTO regulations, which they 
are not compatible with” (Int. 1, 2013). 
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Domestic standards and procurement lists favouring China’s large, state-owned so-called 
‘National Champions’ are claimed to establish a ’discriminatory’, “trade-distorting ploy to 
challenge American supremacy in the global knowledge economy” (Ernst, 2011a: 2-3). A 
shift in the treatment of foreign companies has thus been noted over time. While foreign 
companies were treated with ‘welcoming hands’ in the initial phase, enjoying preferential 
treatment, this has changed, as wind power was designated a strategic industry. Treated as 
such, the wind power-TEN is heavily protected by the Chinese state and largely remains 
state-owned. Thus, 
”that [preferential treatment of foreign companies] all came to a halt quite suddenly, when the market 
changed. And that was actually when we were officially designated a strategic industry…then the market 
changed rapidly (Int. 1, 2013). 
To overcome these exclusion mechanisms of standards as well as public procurement lists 
requiring indigenous innovation product accreditation, which is seen as an attempt at 
“discriminating against the source of IPRs” (Int. 51, 2010), foreign actors have engaged in 
work on assisting Chinese in terms of certification and standardisation. While seeming 
somewhat paradoxical at first sight, this can be seen as a matter of “risk mitigation” (Int. 1, 
2013): 
”We need to know what is coming, so that we can adapt our products accordingly. We have seen in other 
areas that [Chinese] standards can also be used as protectionist measures. So you [China] will put in 
place standards which fit local or national producers, but exclude foreigners” (Int. 1, 2013). 
While foreign actors reject the exclusion mechanisms of Chinese standards, in the Chinese 
perspective, China as a ‘latecomer’ faces the ‘dual challenge’ of barriers to entry in foreign 
markets, while they have opened their markets to international trade following accession to 
WTO (Ernst, 2013: 8-9). Hereby, China’s emerging wind power-TEN seems entangled in 
the confrontation between simultaneous forces of interdependent markets characterised by 
extending boundaries and organisations such as the WTO, and of forces of its own national 
‘community economy’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 42). As these forces merge and coexist, 
hybrid and evolving configurations take shape as they do so (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 
45), which produce ‘power struggles’ between Chinese and foreign actors in the emerging 
wind power-TEN. These power struggles take shape as framing devices such as standards 
tend to both include and exclude. Thus, for instance, Chinese “players who want to go 
abroad” “will not find a lot of welcoming hands around the globe, I guarantee you that” “if 
they cannot open up their own markets (Int. 1, 2013). Overall, the potential turn to quality in 
the ongoing qualification struggle in Chinese wind power, which involves pacification of 
goods is highly controversial.  
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Conclusion and theoretical considerations – controversy over standardisation 
Chapter 10 has dived into the work of the pacification of goods, i.e. the work of pacifying 
the framing of wind power as a sustainable renewable energy source through the 
employment of standards. Chapter 10 displays the potentially controversial dynamics of the 
pacification of goods, namely, as standards and their calculative devices, e.g. simulation 
tools and algorithms, become contested and overflow, due to the way in which they produce 
contested mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion. While standards ideally serve as 
pacifying calculative framing devices, which can construe calculative agencies and 
calculative agents, e.g. by construing a boundary between superior and inferior turbines, 
such framing is often “brutally contradicted” (Callon, 1986b: 25). That is, as something will 
always reside outside the framing, the overflowing can make the wind power-TEN fall to 
pieces, if only for a brief moment, since the proposed framing is rejected by hostile entities, 
which dissociate themselves from the framing. In this way, “[t]ranslation becomes treason, 
tradutore-traditore” (Callon, 1986b: 25).  
The analysis shows how standards threaten to destabilise the framing of Chinese wind power 
as scientifically and technically sustainable, as Chinese wind turbines tend to be framed as 
‘inferior’. As Chinese actors oppose their framing as ‘inferior’, a controversy unfolds over 
certification and standardisation, in which seemingly mundane artefacts, such as the 
calculative devices of software simulation tools, are transformed into actors. In this way, 
otherwise black-boxed simulation tools, constituted as black boxes within black boxes, seem 
to fall apart, revealing the multiple entities (and algorithms) that must be assembled to hold 
them together. Algorithms create power struggles, as they are framed as critical for 
upgrading and for requalifying wind power as sustainable, which in turn produces exclusion 
mechanisms. While standards constitute an obligatory passage point for exports, algorithms 
in simulation tools for testing and certification function as an obligatory passage point for 
certification. Further, algorithmic knowledge tends to constitute an important means of 
establishing collaborative relations on R&D and basic research.  
Overall, the chapter displays an emerging competitive space, where positions, roles, and 
identities of actors are being negotiated. The emerging competitive space construed by 
standards and their simulation tools is, in turn, entangled in a wider controversy over trade 
barriers and protectionism within WTO. In this struggle, Chinese actors gradually attempt to 
define their own domestic standards, construing alternative metrics of what constitutes 
quality, e.g. by adapting to local conditions of typhoons, and thus attempting to ascribe own 
turbine designs with qualities of ‘indigenous design’. Such domestic standards can help 
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construe associations of technological and scientific sustainability to wind power. Overall, 
the chapter maps an emerging ‘standardisation war’, which is entangled in China’s goal of 
sustainable development and construction of a Harmonious Socialist Society through 
Scientific Development. The analysis has further shown how the emergence of so-called 
global interdependent markets and trans-organisational networks, characterised by vague 
and fluctuating borders, which are based on principles of free circulation of people and 
knowledge, e.g. in the form of software, standards, and algorithms, simultaneously produce 
multiple exclusions and relations of domination (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a).  
While the previous two controversy mappings have dived into the dynamics of the 
pacification of goods in Chinese wind power, the following two chapters will zoom in on the 
dynamics of price-setting in the marketisation of Chinese wind power. This is done, firstly, 
in Chapter 11 by diving into a controversy over money (i.a. liquidity issues) as part of the 
qualification struggle in the emerging wind power-TEN, which is entangled in a so-called 
Chinese ‘system problem’ characterised by a large degree of state-control and -ownership. 
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Chapter 11. Controversy over Money and China’s ‘System Problem’  
 
Finally! I have managed to set up a meeting with one of the ‘grand old men’ in Chinese 
wind power, whom I’ve heard so much about. Sitting in the office, I am beginning to suspect 
a point is missing in the rhizomatic account materialising in my fieldwork in China, namely 
the issue of China’s ‘system problem’. According to my Chinese respondent, this system 
problem 
“is the core issue of China's total industrial system…so why did it cause these problems? So I think it is 
not a pure market economy…and therefore you see overcapacity in many Chinese industries […] In 
China everybody is competing for life on lower prices, and finally this led to damage…so nobody is 
doing well. I think the market mechanism is not established yet”. 
Figure 19: Controversy over money and system problem 
Stumbling upon the issue of 
China’s ‘system problem’, my 
account begins to change shape, as 
I try to depict the thick mesh of the 
Chinese ‘spiderweb’ that it 
constitutes. Later, in a noisy 
Chinese hotel lobby, another ‘grand 
old man’ within Chinese wind 
power outlines some of the 
workings of this ‘system problem’, 
and how this has had implications 
for the development of China’s wind power market: 
“This is the problem...it's also the ‘system problem’ for China – you know, the state-owned enterprises. If 
you are a decision-maker, you are making the selection of the wind turbines dependent on the 
bidding...when you select the lowest price of the turbine, and when you have the largest installed 
capacity… that's your achievement. You are not responsible for the future, or for the turbine not 
working. You are only...maybe three or four years in your possession. Later, it's not you...so [you’re] not 
so worried about that...but this is not only for wind, it's for everything”. 
It is particularly his last comment that stays with me, as I leave the hotel lobby: “But I'm 
worried about the basic system, it's not the driving force to improve”. 
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Follow the money! Tracing ’Chinese characteristics’ of marketisation in wind power 
The historical background for understanding the ongoing qualification struggle in China’s 
wind power-TEN was laid out in Chapters 6-8. After this, two ‘algorithmic’ case studies 
were conducted in Chapters 9 and 10 on dynamics of the pacification of goods involved in 
marketisation processes within Chinese wind power. This was done by following and 
mapping controversies unfolding around the framing tools of IPRs and standards. The 
analysis has hereby displayed some of the dynamics of the controversial qualification of 
Chinese wind power as sustainable. To shed further light on the ambiguous turn to quality in 
the ongoing qualification struggle, the two final controversy mappings in Chapters 11 and 
12 look into processes of price-setting, which is another critical component in marketisation.  
In Chapter 11, this is done by ‘following the money’, namely rendering an account of how 
money (liquidity issues) are configuring a controversy in the wind power-TEN and 
software-TEN, which is entangled in China’s so-called ‘system problem’ of a largely state-
controlled power-TEN. In this way, displaying how the software-TEN and wind power-TEN 
are entangled in a Chinese state-controlled power-TEN, and vice versa, the analysis dives 
further into some of the ’Chinese characteristics’ of green marketisation. This may help shed 
light on some of the paradoxical dynamics of simultaneous collaborative and competitive 
relations between Chinese and foreign actors hinted at in earlier chapters.  
To inquire into the controversy over money, the chapter first inquires into the so-called 
‘system problem’, which is largely a matter of ongoing restructuring attempts in China’s 
power-TEN, in particular since China’s WTO accession. This is indicated in figure 20 
below. Second, a case study on how money configure a controversy between Chinese (often 
state-owned) customers and foreign control system suppliers is outlined. Third, this leads to 
an account of the de- and reconfiguring of relations, as roles, positions, identities, and also 
qualities are negotiated. Lastly, this concludes with a mapping of the construction of a 
potential ‘nationalistic game’, entangled in multiple agendas of i.a. ‘opening up’, upgrading, 
catch-up, and how these sometimes conflicting agendas may affect the potential turn to 
quality in the emerging wind power-TEN. 
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Figure 20: Zooming in on controversy over money and system problem  
 
Source: Own design 
Challenges of ‘opening up’ – and the role of the political pole as regulator, 
operator, and manufacturer in Chinese wind power 
China’s process of ‘opening up’ since the influential ‘Open Door Policies’ introduced by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1978 has gradually opened China to foreign companies and foreign direct 
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investments (FDI), and in many ways can be said to have culminated formally with China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001. Apart from requiring reforms within IPR and 
standardisation, corporate governance reforms have formed part of WTO requirements for 
China’s accession (Wei, 2003; Oi, 2005)76. Accordingly, China has worked consistently on 
establishing a so-called ‘relatively perfect modern corporate system’ and has introduced 
regulations regarding corporate governance and the rule-of-law as well as numerous 
corporate restructuring reforms in order to improve the profitability of China’s often ailing 
SOEs (Oi, 2005: 135; Wei, 2003: 101). In the following, the chapter first briefly lays out 
processes of corporate restructuring in China and attempts at reforming corporate 
governance, which takes place along with China’s overall so-called ‘capitalist transition’ 
from a ‘planned economy’ to a ’socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ 
(McNally, 2006: 20; Wong, 1999: 105; Meidan et al., 2009: 592). This is done with a focus 
on China’s power sector, or what the thesis treats as a potential power-TEN, in which the 
Chinese State (the ‘political pole’) tends to operate as regulator, operator, and equipment 
manufacturer (Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5528). That is, through SOEs,  
“the Chinese state participates directly in the wind power sector in several ways by commissioning wind 
power projects, operating wind farms, and producing equipment for the wind power industry” (Liu and 
Kokko, 2010: 5523).  
With an aim to dive into the way in which the Chinese political pole acts as regulator, 
operator, and equipment manufacturer in the marketisation of wind power, potentially 
constituting a so-called Chinese system problem, the chapter first inquires into China’s 
iterative corporate restructuring processes in tandem with China’s overall ‘capitalist 
transition’, or what is also described as China’s ‘emergent capitalism’ (McNally, 2006). This 
provides a backdrop for understanding the ongoing restructuring in China’s power-TEN, 
which co-constitutes and is co-constituted by the emerging wind power-TEN.  
China’s cautious ’transition’ – and restructuring in the power sector 
China’s development has since China’s Open Door Policy (1978) been marked by what is 
conventionally termed a cautious ‘transition’ from a planned to a market-based economy in 
iterative waves of liberalisation, with pauses in-between and extensive administrative 
                                                     
76
 Corporate governance is broadly defined as “the system or process by which companies are 
directed and controlled” (Cadbury Definition 1993, Tam, 1999: 7), or as the set of processes, 
customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered 
or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many 
‘stakeholders’ involved (shareholders, management, board of directors; in addition, other 
stakeholders are employees, suppliers, customers, banks, lenders, regulators, the environment 
and community at large), and the goals for which the corporation is governed.  
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reorganisation (Meidan et al., 2009: 593). In particular, since the early 1990s, state-led 
corporate restructuring/corporatisation and privatisation has taken place along with China’s 
attempts at market reforms, involving the transformation of enterprises (also state-owned) 
into shareholding companies (Oi, 2005: 120; Brødsgaard, 2012a). In the first Company Law 
(1993/1994), three categories of company ownership structures were laid out, namely 
wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (non-marketised firms), joint-stock companies 
(marketised SOEs and community-owned enterprises), and limited liability companies 
(private firms) (Chang, 2005; Oi, 2005; McNally et al., 2007). Non-marketised SOEs tended 
to be protected within the state redistribution system, in close cooperation with the Central 
Government. In turn, marketised SOEs and community-owned enterprises tended to enjoy 
the support of local governments, due to their impact on local government income (Boisot 
and Child 1996; Nee 1992 in Chang, 2011: 325). Finally, private firms tended to suffer from 
lack of support from government and from government-controlled banks (Chang, 2011: 
325). Although already experimenting with the development of a private sector since late 
1970s, in particular since the early 1990s, a range of private sector company-types has been 
introduced, over time resulting in private companies gaining more currency (McNally et al., 
2007), hereunder involving the introduction of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, joint 
ventures with foreign firms, and even venture capital firms (Chang, 2005: 325).  
Nevertheless, the bias towards SOEs still seems to be prevalent (Chang, 2005: 327; 
Interviews). 
In addition, in order to improve effectiveness and competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, 
so-called business groups (qiye jituan企业集团) have become a prominent corporate 
business structure in China (Keister 1998: 404, 434; Brødsgaard, 2012a). In a qiye jituan, 
the core company77 is usually an SOE (Keister, 2000)78, which has been turned into a limited 
liability company, and where the state continues to play a dominant role as majority 
shareholder. In this way, the Chinese State can assert partial control and/or influence over 
the other business group members, which are partly or fully owned by the core company 
                                                     
77
 Termed ’parent company’, ‘head company’, or ‘mother company’, dependent on the ties and 
structure of the business group (Keister, 1998; 2000). 
78
 There are two forms of business groups (Keister, 2000: 68-69). The most prevalent is known 
as qiye jituans, which are vertically organised and centred around a core company (often a large 
SOE). Another type is business groups consisting of small privately owned firms, which are 
formed voluntarily, are horizontally organised, and are comparatively loosely integrated 
(Keister, 2000: 68-69). In large business groups, a number of specialised firms exist, such as a 
finance company, a marketing company, an R&D facility etc. In smaller business groups, all 
members use the core company’s specialised divisions (Keister, 2000). 
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(Keister, 2000; Keister, 1998). Business group members are connected through interlocking 
directorates, cross-shareholding, debt and financing relations, as well as production and 
management relations (Keister, 2000; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013).  
Building the National Team – and the ’SASAC list’ 
Chinese corporate restructuring reforms have been undertaken in order to promote the 
development of a private (or non-state) sector, price liberalisation in the domestic market, 
relaxation of government control and central planning, privatisation of SOEs, and the 
development of a legal framework for private enterprises (Fan Gang in McNally, 2006: 20). 
Yet, SOEs in many ways still enjoy protection and preferential treatment compared to 
private companies (Chang, 2005; Interviews). Under the slogan of ’grasping the large, let go 
of the small’ of the early 1990s (Nolan, 2001: 18; McNally et al., 2007: 3), a central 
ambition of the Chinese political leadership is to build strong domestic ((partly) state-
owned) companies, which can compete internationally. Today, China boasts the second-
largest number of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 
697). Most of these79 are SOE business groups, which are supervised by an organ of the 
Chinese Central Government, i.e. the government agency SASAC (State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Republic of China), and which 
are controlled by different organs of the Central Government within critical industries (Lin 
and Milhaupt, 2013: 699). The SASAC is the ultimate controlling shareholder of these large 
corporations (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 697). This group of large, powerful SOEs has been 
formed around former state plants in China’s pillar industries, or old ministries, e.g. 
electricity generation, machinery, and electronics (Nolan, 2001: 17-18), and is referred to as 
the ’National Team’ of China’s so-called National Champions (Nolan, 2001; Brødsgaard, 
2012a; Lin and Milhaupth, 2013). With a total list of 117 National Champion corporations 
on the ’SASAC list’ (sasac.gov.cn), these corporations have acquired enormous strategic 
influence, e.g. by holding ”huge resources as they only hand over a small percentage of their 
profits to their nominal owner, the state” (Brødsgaard, 2012b: 4). In addition, these National 
Champions hold an  
”administrative rank at vice-ministerial level, and some of them have CEOs at ministerial rank. This 
means that even government ministers have difficulties issuing orders to the large SOEs” (Brødsgaard, 
2012b: 4). 
                                                     
79
 More than half of the Chinese companies in the 2012 Fortune Global 500 were SOE business 
groups supervised by SASAC and controlled by organs of the national government in critical 
industries (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 699). 
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According to the SASAC interim regulations, the regulations for the critical and central 
SOEs administered by the SASAC aim at 
“establish[ing] a State-owned assets supervision and management system that suits the needs of socialist 
market economy, better run State-owned enterprises, push forward the strategic adjustment to the layout 
and structure of the State economy, develop and expand the State economy, and realize the preservation 
of and increase in the value of State-owned assets” (SASAC, 2003, Interim Regulations on Supervision 
and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises, article 1).   
Forming part of the ambition of China’s political leadership to build ”a group of globally 
competitive large, multi-plant corporations” (Nolan, 2001: 16), at the same time as these 
SOEs receive considerable state support, they are contractually bound to promote the 
policies of the state. That is, ”[t]he core company coordinates the group’s activities and 
transmits business policy to group members, who are contractually bound to promote the 
policies of the state” (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 700). The National Champions are ”nested 
within vertically integrated [business] groups [where e]ach company’s majority shareholder 
is the core (parent) company of the group – which is itself 100% owned by SASAC, i.e. by 
the Chinese state” (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 700). Overall,   
”[i]ndividual corporate groups are often linked through equity ownership and contractual alliances to 
groups in the same or complementary industries, to provincial-level business groups, and even to 
noneconomic state-controlled institutions, such as universities” (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 700).  
Although many former SOEs have been formally privatised, i.e. turned into limited liability 
companies and often listed, the de facto privatisation process is often limited, as the Chinese 
State continues to hold the majority of shares. Hereby, while China’s Company Law 
(1993/94) ”promotes shareholder centralism and a two-tier board structure” (Wei, 2003: 
112; Tam, 1999: 48), and the Property Law (2007) seeks to introduce a modern system of 
property rights (McNally et al., 2007: 4), property rights and ’boundaries of the firm’ are 
often considered extensively ’blurred’ in Chinese companies (Meyer and Lu, 2005: 63; 
McNally et al., 2007). For instance, while the Chinese State holds the shares in wholly state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), it also holds the majority of shares in many joint stock-
companies80. Sometimes, it even holds shares in limited liability companies (Oi, 2005: 121-
127; Meyer and Lu, 2005: 63).  
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 As regards joint-stock companies, only a partial listing of assets takes place, meaning that it is 
seen neither as a traditional SOE, nor a private firm. The state still holds the majority of shares 
in these as well as in the wholly SOE – and has at times shares in limited liability companies as 
well. Such companies are often referred to as ‘partially listed companies’ (Oi, 2005: 121-127; 
Meyer and Lu, 2005: 63). 
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SOEs as black-boxes – and the entangled mesh of poles of emerging TENs in wind power 
As outlined briefly above, the Chinese Government continues to constitute a majority 
shareholder not only in large SOEs, but also in many partially listed companies, and even at 
times in privatised companies, with de facto state-owned banks “often directed by various 
levels and sections of the government to provide loans to SOEs” (Tam, 1999: 143). Further, 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) often retains control over companies through 
appointments of CPC ‘cadres’ to key positions (Tang and Ward, 2003; Keister, 2000). This 
relates to China’s so-called bianzhi and nomenklatura systems. Bianzhi translates as 
“establishment of posts” (Brødsgaard, 2002), while the related nomenklatura system implies 
the “list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of 
each office” of political cadres. Together, the bianzhi and nomenklatura systems play a 
decisive role “in governing China at the central and the local level” (Brødsgaard, 2002), as 
they ensure the control of the positioning of provincial governors, local and central officials 
in the Party, and government cadres (Brødsgaard, 2012a).  
Overall, China can be claimed to have adopted a prescriptive and legalistic approach to 
corporate governance (Tam, 1999: 91), e.g. as the so-called ‘three new committees’ (boards 
of directors, supervisors, and shareholders’ meetings) are functioning alongside the 
traditional so-called ‘three old committees’ of Chinese companies (i.e., the branch 
committee of the CPC, the Workers’ Representative Council, and the Labour Union), which 
have not yet been completely phased out in Chinese companies (Tam, 1999: 52; Tang and 
Ward, 2003: 68-104). So while China on paper seems to move towards what in conventional 
corporate governance parlance is termed ’shareholder capitalism’ (Gilpin, 2000) and an 
‘outsider-based’ model of corporate governance (Mayer 1994, 1995 in Tam, 1999: 91), in 
which shareholders’ profits and management autonomy can be ensured through so-called 
’external markets’ of ‘arms-length’ transactions and contracts (Tam, 1999: 27), Chinese 
corporate governance in many ways de facto resembles what is conventionally termed an 
’insider-based model’ (Mayer 1994, 1995 in Tam, 1999: 91). This means that ‘insider 
stakeholders’ of the Chinese political leadership retain control (Wei, 2003: 19-20; Morrison, 
2001: 93-96). Hereby, rather than reflecting conventional shareholder capitalism, this 
displays traits of what might more properly be termed ‘stakeholder capitalism’ (Gilpin, 
2000: 150) or, perhaps more prevalent, ‘state capitalism’ (cf. e.g. Lin and Milhaupt, 2013).  
One of the reasons why relieving state control of China’s SOEs remains challenging is 
linked to the extended ‘social responsibilities’ of Chinese SOEs. Rather than (just) focusing 
on improving profits for shareholders, a large number of China’s SOEs face ‘social’ 
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obligations. These obligations have an historical background in the work unit danwei (单位) 
system, which formed an integral part of China’s former ‘command economy’. This was 
characterised by a ‘dual economy’, namely a non-state sector and a dominant state sector 
heavily burdened by social responsibilities (Lieberthal, 2004(1995): 184-186). In the danwei 
system, the SOE was in effect both a production unit and a social welfare unit, constituting 
the so-called ‘iron rice bowl’ (Oi, 2005: 115; Wong, 1999: 129-130). Constituting basically 
a self-governed mini welfare state, as it provided public social welfare for its employees, 
this danwei system has now been formally dismantled. Nevertheless, despite many years of 
restructuring and privatisation, the state still remains a main owner, and although the number 
of China’s SOEs has fallen in the statistics (Oi, p. 115), China’s often debt-ridden SOEs still 
face various informal social duties (Oi, 2005: 116). Hereby, China’s SOE reforms can be 
characterised as “Draining the water before the tunnel is ready” (Cai, 2004: 329), implying 
that a social security network is still lacking to overtake the responsibilities of the ‘iron rice 
bowl’ of the danwei system (Oi, 2005: 116). 
The above has illustrated what seems a thick mesh of relations of the Chinese government, 
CPC, and (state-owned) companies, where “the organizational structure and governance 
characteristics of the SOE groups” largely seems a “black box” (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 
697)81. With such tight ‘spiderweb’ of relations, it begins to seem impossible to completely 
disentangle poles of the emerging TEN within wind power, e.g. as the political pole and 
market are likely to be intricately interwoven. 
Current attempts at ’comprehensively deepening reforms’ – or disentangling poles 
Recognising how China must reinvigorate its restructuring reforms, China’s current and still 
relatively new political leadership (5th generation (Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang)) has currently 
embarked on a path towards ‘comprehensively deepening reforms’. This is e.g. evidenced in 
the recent issuance of ‘The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms’ (ultimo 2013)82, which emphasises market-based policies and 
restructuring, governance and market mechanisms, and the fight against corruption 
(china.org.cn, Nov. 16, 2013). Overall,   
                                                     
81
 The seemingly “contradicting forces for further enterprise autonomy and continued central 
control that characterizes the evolving relationship between business groups and the Party-state” 
has by Brødsgaard (2012a) been framed as a matter of “integrated fragmentation” (Brødsgaard, 
2012a: 624). 
82
 Adopted at the close of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee 
(www.china.org.cn, 16 Nov. 2013) 
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”[t]he general purpose of deepening its all-round reform is to develop socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, to advance modernization in the State governance system and governance capability” 
(3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Nov. 2013: I-Significance and Principles, 2). 
As part of these reforms, it is stated that the Chinese Government should ”effectively shift 
its role by building itself into a service-type government that bases its functions on the law”, 
and reduce the Central Government’s role over market operations to a minimum level 
(Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Nov. 2013, IV-government role, 15). 
In addition, to ensure market operations, China is to ”[p]erfect a mechanism where prices 
are determined by the market”, and to ensure that ”[a]ny price that can be affected by the 
market must be left to the market” (3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 
Nov. 2013, III-Modern market system, 10). Amongst other things, this implies that within 
’natural monopoly industries’ such as power utilities, the functions of different SOEs should 
be better defined, e.g. through continuous improvement of corporate governance and 
investment accountability, and by separating government and enterprises: 
”In the natural monopoly industries held by State capital, the separation of government and enterprises, 
of government and funds, and of franchise operation and government supervision are the main thrust of 
the reform. Further break all forms of administrative monopoly. Improve coordinated and effective 
corporate governance structures. Establish a professional management system. Establish long-term 
incentive and restraint mechanisms, strengthen SOE’s investment accountability and explore ways to 
publicize important information, including SOEs’ financial budgets. State-owned enterprises should 
reasonably increase the proportion of market-oriented recruitment, reasonably determine and strictly 
regulate SOE executives’ wage levels, and position benefits, consumption and business spending” (3rd 
Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Nov. 2013, II-Basic economic system, 7). 
The recent attempts at ‘comprehensively deepening reforms’ reflect how the Chinese 
political leadership i.a. seeks to reinvigorate China’s corporate restructuring and corporate 
governance reforms, emphasising the need to disentangle the market from the government. 
Or, in the terminology of the present inquiry, it seems that the Chinese political leadership 
continuously attempts at disentangling the political pole from the market pole.  
Zero tolerance towards corruption and the role of guanxi 
Another central part of the current attempts at ‘comprehensively deepening reforms’ is the 
heavy emphasis on fighting corruption (3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee, Nov. 2013, X Supervision of power, 36), displaying ’zero tolerance’ towards 
corruption (Xinhuanet, Mar. 13, 2014). In China, the scale of corruption is considered to 
constitute an increasing problem (Brødsgaard, 2012b). Further, it involves greater amounts 
of corrupt money and higher level officials than in the past and is worst in sectors with 
heavy state-involvement (Chang, 2011), but is also prevalent in private companies, since 
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engagement in ‘political’, ‘informal guanxi networks’ is considered critical for firm survival 
(McNally et al., 2007: 1). The issue of corruption is often coupled to a Confucian tradition in 
China for nurturing inter-personal relations, so-called guanxi (关系), which has become 
increasingly critical in relations between companies and government officials along with 
Chinese economic reforms (Chang, 2011). These reforms have made the so-called 
‘accessing form of guanxi’, that is, the forms of guanxi which are nurtured in order to access 
critical resources from government officials, more central (Chang, 2011).  
Restructuring in China’s power sector  
Having outlined China’s process of corporate restructuring, in the following the chapter 
looks into how restructuring has taken (and is taking) place within China’s power sector. 
This provides the context for the following case study on the de- and reconfiguration of 
relations in a liquidity-constrained wind power sector.  
Unbundling powerful companies within power generation and transmission 
China’s restructuring process has also had an impact on China’s power sector, which 
constitutes one of China’s traditional ‘pillar industries’. Although starting out with 
comprehensive power sector reforms already in 1993, it was only by 2002 that the power 
sector underwent a radical restructuring (Meidan et al., 2009). This restructuring involved 
the unbundling/disentanglement of electricity/power transmission from the generation of 
power. Such unbundling is conventionally considered important for ensuring regulated, fair 
competition, and an orderly and open electricity market (Shi, 2012; Meidan et al., 2009: 
592). However, while it is often also considered recommendable to unbundle power 
transmission from distribution to ensure competition, China’s power grid system is 
responsible both for transmission and distribution. As briefly outlined in Chapter 6, the 
unbundling of generation from transmission was ensured by splitting up the pre-existing 
China State Power Corporation into the ‘Big Five’ separate power generators (Yu et al., 
2009: 5223) as well as into two grid companies (the State Grid Corporation of China and 
China Southern Power Grid Corporation). In addition, an extensive administrative 
restructuring was undertaken in regard to the power sector, e.g. rendering the Energy Bureau 
under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) i.a. with responsibility 
for wind power (Liu and Kokko, 2010; Lema and Ruby, 2007). 
While the five large power generation enterprises (the ‘Big Five’), carved out of the State 
Power Corporation, are predominantly owned by the Chinese Government through main 
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shareholder ownership, these five companies also have majority shareholdings in consortia 
with other private and state-owned power investors in generation assets, which extend their 
reach well beyond the assets/capacity that they were given during the 2002 reform 
(OECD/IEA, 2006: 36). Further, although the Big Five only account for 40 per cent of the 
installed total power capacity in China, “ownership of the remaining generating capacity 
(outside of the big five) is widely spread among industrial and financial enterprises, but 
remains largely with the state in various forms” (OECD/IEA, 2006: 36). As regards the two 
grid companies, these are owned entirely by the Central Government. Reflecting their status 
as strategic assets for the Chinese political leadership, both grid companies as well as the 
Big Five generating companies are listed on the SASAC list. This marks how these state-
controlled corporations are all powerful actors in China’s power sector and in general; for 
instance, the State Grid Corporation’s director “is a minister, so in this way they [State Grid] 
are higher in the hierarchy than the National Energy Administration (NEA) under the 
NDRC” (Int. 8, 2013).  
“And there are also the generators, the Big Five, right, which also have an enormous power. And the 
coal lobby [of which they are part] is really powerful” (Int. 18, 2013). 
The power sector’s irrational industrial structure – and limits to price liberalisation 
Another central part of the process of restructuring China’s power sector is the pricing 
mechanism. While electricity prices are set by the State, the Chinese State aims to ”[p]ush 
ahead with price reforms of water, oil and natural gas, electricity, transportation and 
telecommunication” (3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Nov. 2013, 
III-Modern market system, 10). In this way, the Chinese State aims to take ‘proactive 
efforts’ in regard to “the pricing mechanism of electricity to gradually let the market decide 
the prices of electricity generated and marketed, while the prices of transmission and 
distribution are to be decided by the government. The state will regulate the prices of coal 
for electricity generation and prices for electricity marketed, and explore ways to set up a 
renewable energy trading mechanism” (Energy Policy 2012, VIII. Deepening Institutional 
Reform in the Energy Sector).  
In this way, when it comes to ‘naturally monopolised’ public utilities for electricity 
generation and transmission, the government still sets prices (3rd Plenary Session of the 18th 
CCP Central Committee, Nov. 2013, III-Modern market system, 10). Thus, the Chinese 
Government still plays a decisive role in setting electricity prices and in electricity resource 
allocation. According to China’s Energy Policy 2012, which adheres to the principle of 
’comprehensively deepening reform’, 
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”[t]he energy pricing mechanism is yet to be perfected, and industrial management is still weak. The 
overall service level needs to be enhanced. Overall, restraints of the current systems and mechanisms 
have seriously hindered the national development of the country’s energy industry” (Energy Policy 2012, 
I. Current Energy Development).  
Nevertheless, despite multiple and ongoing attempts at reform, China’s power sector is still 
claimed to suffer from an ‘irrational industrial structure’ and energy mix (Energy Policy 
2012, I. Current Energy Development). This can be claimed to 
reflect how China’s power sector as a pillar industry is highly 
politicised, involving many different actors and divergent interests 
and objectives, and thus also how the CPC is still the ‘glue’ that 
changes and dictates the direction of development (Andrews-Speed 
2011 in Korsnes, 2014: 180) Hereby, while China’s power sector 
has been restructured and forced to take a more commercial 
approach to their operations several times, it remains under tight 
state control and ownership (Meidan et al., 2009: 602). While the 
iterative and somewhat schizophrenic moves of both liberalisation 
and reaffirmation of state control (Meidan et al, 2009; Korsnes, 
2014; Yeh and Lewis, 2004; García, 2013; Shi, 2012) have resulted 
in reforms sometimes being stalled midways, they also reflect how ”[g]overnance of the 
energy sector is high-level politics in China” (Korsnes, 2014: 180).  
The role of ‘National Champions’ in China’s wind power-TEN – benefiting from 
entangled relations with parent company 
In the above, the ongoing de- and reconfiguration of a Chinese power-TEN - along with 
ongoing power sector reforms - has been outlined, illustrating how the political and market 
poles are tightly entangled. This sets the background for an inquiry into how the wind 
power-TEN in turn is co-constituted by and constitutes the power-TEN. Listed as a ‘new 
energy’, wind power has been nominated a ‘national strategic emerging industry’ in the 
State Council’s 12th 5YP for National Strategic Emerging Industries and gradually receives 
more attention within the power sector (china-briefing.com; Jun. 1, 2012). The wind power-
TEN is part and parcel of the overall power-TEN, e.g. as wind farms are owned and/or run 
by the five state-owned generators (the ‘Big Five’). Further, it was the ‘Big Five’, which 
obtained the vast majority of concession project tenders during the concession project 
(described in Chapter 6). In addition, while there exist both private and state-owned Chinese 
WTMs, all WTMs must have close relations with state-controlled generating companies (the 
‘Big Five’) in order to be able to sell their turbines in China (Interviews). Although not 
Text-box 1: Managing – or 
caught by - the spiderweb? 
Interviewer: Yeah, it’s 
maybe like navigating a 
spiderweb. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, exactly. 
And sometimes you feel 
like…as we talked about 
earlier…in a way you feel 
like caught in it in a way! 
It’s crazy! 
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listed (directly) on the SASAC list, some state-owned WTMs are part of large business 
group corporations listed on the SASAC list. For instance, Guodian United Power 
Corporation, which since its establishment in 2007 has become the fourth largest Chinese 
WTM (in 2011) and is now one of the fastest growing companies in wind power (Li et al., 
2012 in Korsnes, 2014: 190-191), has benefited from its unique position of its parent 
company, namely the power generating company China Guodian Corporation. China 
Guodian Corporation is one of the ‘Big Five’ listed on the SASAC list (Korsnes, 2014: 190-
191). In addition, one of Guodian Corporation’s subsidiaries is the wind farm developer 
Longyuan Power, which is responsible for Guodian's renewable energy assets (Interviews). 
Hereby, the WTM Guodian United Power, is at the same time being ’wholly-owned by 
China Guodian Corporation, a generating company, and linked to the wind farm developer, 
Longyuan Power’ (Korsnes, 2014: 190-191). Thus, the supplier of wind turbines, the WTM 
Guodian United Power, in a way sells turbines to ‘itself’, i.e., to its own mother company 
and one of its subsidiaries. Another example is the state-owned WTM Dongfang, which 
forms part of the large SASAC-listed business group, Dongfang Electric Corporation 
(DEC), which is engaged in multiple businesses and industries83 (dongfang.com.cn). In this 
way, large state-owned WTMs are often very influential companies, which can benefit from 
a unique position as subsidiary of a parent company from related industries such as 
machinery and equipment manufacturing, and which often have direct links with electric 
power utilities (Korsnes, 2014: 190-191). In other words, the wind power-TEN is tightly 
entangled in the overall power-TEN.  
Managing the Chinese ’spiderweb’ – a case study on trust in a liquidity-constrained 
wind power-TEN 
Having provided the context for understanding how the wind power-TEN and the power-
TEN form part of China’s overall corporate restructuring, a case study on the de- and 
reconfiguring of relations in China’s wind power-TEN is rendered in the following. This is 
done by diving into the potential software-TEN, which co-constitutes and is co-constituted 
by the wind power-TEN, as well as by zooming in on the current quality crisis and 
consolidation phase within Chinese wind power. As the consolidation starting around year 
2011 produced a liquidity crisis in the wind power-TEN, due to a downturn in new wind 
farm projects, the case provides insight into how the quality of relations between Chinese 
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 i.a. power generation, substation and transmission, railways and transportation, environmental 
protection, financing, investment, and general electric and machinery (within e.g. fossil fuels, 
nuclear, and renewable energies). 
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WTM customers and foreign suppliers of control systems has shifted over time, from the 
time of rapid growth around year 2005 and till around year 2012/2013. With entangled 
relations between the power-TEN, wind power-TEN, and software-TEN, and between their 
constituting poles, foreign control system suppliers find their work of nurturing customer-
supplier relations – and of handling postponed payments during the liquidity crisis – in 
China’s emerging software-TEN overly   
”complex. There’s a lot of common pockets and blurred boundaries. How to find out, who it is that 
doesn’t pay [us] the money?…For instance, when X [Chinese wind turbine manufacturer] doesn’t pay, 
then it’s likely because Y [wind farm owner] doesn’t pay, and then in the end it’s because the State Grid 
and the state don’t pay!” (Int. 48, 2012). 
This time not focusing on the role and agency of algorithms or controversies over IPRs or 
standards, the analysis now follows the money, i.e., mapping a controversy over money 
(liquidity), which is entangled in China’s so-called ‘system problem’ – and a ‘spider-web’ 
(see Text-box 1) – and which has produced concerns over trust. 
Liquidity issues in China’s wind power-TEN 
To conduct such controversy-mapping on the issue of money, the chapter first outlines the 
liquidity issues facing China’s wind power-TEN.  
Chain debts trickling down in Chinese wind power 
In the current consolidation phase, Chinese WTMs lack liquidity and have suffered from 
falling profits. In 2013, Sinovel and Goldwind reported an unprecedented fall in profits in 
the beginning of 2013, by as much as 163 percent in Sinovel's case 
(www.windpowermonthly.com, Apr. 16, 2013). The financial troubles for Chinese WTMs is 
entangled in so-called “chain debts in the Chinese wind power industry", which have 
severely restricted the Chinese wind industry during consolidation 
(Windpowermonthly.com, Apr. 16, 2013): 
”[T]he government owes subsidies to wind farm developers, the developers owe payment to turbine 
manufacturers, and turbine makers owe payment to component suppliers” (Windpowermonthly.com, 
Apr. 16,  2013). 
One of the reasons for these entangled chain debts is an insufficient renumeration (feed-in-
tariff (FIT)) for wind power projects, which is only equivalent to that of thermal power 
plants  (Windpowermonthly.com, Apr. 16, 2013). The insufficient renumeration (García, 
2013: 140) in turn finds part of its reason in China’s Renewable Energy Fund introduced in 
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the Renewable Energy Law (REL), which is supposed to cover the additional costs of wind 
power through a FIT subsidy (Windpowermonthly.com, Apr. 16, 2013; Interviews): 
”So this [Renewable Energy Fund] system they have - with payment of this feed-in tariff, that’s too poor 
and too slow. And then…it’s a problem…I don’t think it’s like a conscious stalling of payments, it’s just 
that this system, which they are running, is too bureaucratic and ineffective…the reporting must, well, 
yeah, run on a yearly basis, and then a year after you sent in [your report], then you can maybe get your 
money back. There’s a very long delay in this process, in the approval procedures, which basically is 
based in the defects of classic Chinese administration” (Int. 18, 2013). 
As the Renewable Energy Fund does not function efficiently, and requires a technically 
advanced cross-provincial management system, ”there have been years, where they [wind 
farm developers] couldn’t get the money out, and then they haven’t been able to pay for the 
turbines. And then the banks have financed it, because they knew that the province was 
obliged to pay for it…but that payment has just been pushed and pushed and pushed” (Int. 
20, 2013). Yet, over time, as control of wind farm installments has been centralised, also the 
state-owned banks have started to limit their credits (Int. 9, 2012, Int., 20, 2013), as a matter 
of stalling growth in wind power. Overall, all SOEs involved in wind power are being 
“squeezed in terms of liquidity” (Int. 15, 2012). As banks  
“won’t lend them money, that’s how it [the rapid growth] has been halted. And then there’s only one 
[way] to do it. And that’s to stop your own payments down the chain” (Int. 15, 2012).  
In addition, power generating companies and wind farm developers have been squeezed 
from lost profit margins and potential revenue, due to rising unit costs of wind power 
generation from high curtailment rates (Windpowermonthly.com, Apr. 16, 2013; 
Bloomberg, 2012: 5). Lastly, while electricity prices have been stable, rising coal prices 
have implied that generating companies “are actually losing money – at least they claim so – 
from producing electricity from coal. And then they have no money to pay for the wind 
turbines, they’ve got. And then they [the wind turbine component suppliers] don’t get paid 
by [X or Y or Z] [Chinese WTMs]. You know them all. I’m just saying, they are all lacking 
money” (Int. 9, 2012).  
Secured by common pockets – and foreign suppliers as the last to get paid 
These entangled debt chains of tightly connected SOEs in Chinese wind power have had an 
“effect all the way down” to foreign sub-suppliers (Int. 47, 2013): 
”Chinese companies are linked closely together like in a chain. If the state-owned banks lack money, 
then the State Grid, the power generating companies, the wind farm owners, and the WTMs lack 
liquidity. And then, in the end, there is no money for the European suppliers. They need some money in 
order to be able to pay” (Int. 45, 2012). 
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The entangled nature of Chinese SOEs has resulted in lacking and/or postponed payments 
from Chinese customers to i.a. foreign control system companies as the Chinese WTMs 
“simply don’t have the money. It’s as simple as that. Their customer hasn’t paid [them]. And 
that’s true” (Int. 47, 2013). Yet, the entangled nature of both smaller and larger SOEs in the 
power-TEN, who all have “the same owners” (Int. 2, 2012) makes it difficult for foreign 
suppliers to detect the one holding back payments in the chain in the first place. Another 
issue is that while foreign companies are preoccupied with lacking profits and liquidity, their 
Chinese state-owned customers do not seem as urgently concerned with solving the liquidity 
issues. Instead, Chinese customers (WTMs) of foreign suppliers tend to feel more or less 
‘secured’ by their mother company, their ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ (Interviews) and the so-
called “common pockets” between the many state-owned actors in the entangled business 
group structures, and thus “see no big deal whether the money are in one box or the other” 
(Int. 15, 2012). Rather than fighting for larger market shares or profits, SOEs are guaranteed 
a certain market share (Int. 15, 2012), and when facing financial troubles in wind power, the 
business group may temporarily reduce engagement in wind power, instead turning towards 
other business group activities (Interviews). In contrast, foreign companies ”are not at all 
thinking in the same terms. It’s a totally different way of thinking” (Int. 15, 2012). Overall, 
finding themselves at the bottom of the debt chain, foreign suppliers have had troubles 
surviving in the Chinese market during consolidation (Interviews). As expressed by a 
foreign component supplier, where Western companies would 
”say, ‘we need to stop, we don’t have more money’, they are not closing down, as the rest of us would 
maybe do…Because they say, ‘the one who owes me, is my brother. I’ll get them’. And they don’t have a 
board of directors asking you, ’are you sure of that?!’” (Int. 9, 2012). 
While private companies have difficulties surviving during consolidation, SOEs are 
currently “driving the market. All the private ones, most of them still exist, only few have 
gone bankrupt, but it will come. Because they cannot continue like that. […] A lot of the 
private ones are disappearing, but the large state-owned ones, they will be driving the 
market. Of course that’s a focused strategy from the government, I’m sure” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Already, the consolidation phase has resulted in a reduction in the number of WTMs, from 
around 80 to “now less than 30” (Int. 45*, 2013), and is seen by Chinese and foreign actors 
in the emerging wind power-TEN as a strategy of the Chinese Government to reduce the 
total number of WTMs to only a handful (Interviews).  
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Soft budget constraints and irresponsible SOEs in Chinese wind power 
While primarily the smaller private WTMs are going bankrupt, the SOEs “still do not want 
to give up” even though they are losing money (Int. 62, 2012). The way in which SOEs 
seem capable of continuing business even in times of consolidation, reduced profits, and 
liquidity constraints, is being linked to the ’soft budget constraints’ rather than hard budget 
constraints facing SOEs in terms of financial performance (Liu and Kokko, 2010: 5527; 
Konai 1980 in Chang, 2011: 322)84. For instance, state-owned generating companies are 
claimed to focus more on market share and reputation than on profits:  
”But they [SOEs/generating companies] want to have...wind power, we have the new energy. Haha. 
They want the reputation. Reputation's better than the profit, and at that time, coal power was still 
profitable. So the wind projects lose a little bit of money, [but] the coal power still has profit. So no 
problem” (Int. 8, 2013). 
Hereby, ‘soft budget constraints’ – largely founded in a legacy of the ‘iron rice bowl’ – tend 
to prevail in the power-TEN and wind power-TEN, where strong dominance of the State in 
both electricity generation and equipment manufacturing has resulted in a focus on local 
objectives such as employment, development of local industry, public control (or even 
ownership) over the power sector, tax revenue, and local growth rates, rather than just profit 
maximisation (Zhao et al., 2012a: 224; García, 2013).  
In turn, this is argued to be one amongst other reasons for the overcapacity problems and the 
financial insolvency of many wind farms (Zhao et al., 2012a: 224). Hereby, SOEs tend to be 
framed as “irresponsible”, as they “have a sort of attitude that Megawatts are more important 
than the dollars or Euros, [or] whether it's connected to the grid or not” (Int. 11, 2012). As 
“everybody is state-owned, -financed, or –controlled, they have no financial interest in 
delivering electricity. They are cross-financed, with common pockets” (Int. 22, 2012). In 
this way, a sharp distinction is being established between Chinese private and state-owned 
companies. While private companies are framed as ”fast” (Int. 33, 2012), SOEs are 
conversely framed as slow and inefficient, and marked by bureaucratic structures as well as 
more or less opaque guanxi with the CPC and the government (Int. 33, 2012; Int. 5, 2012).  
”When you are a director of e.g. a large [state-owned] company…they are being appointed in the Party, 
and it’s kind of an apprenticeship – to be director for a company is like an apprenticeship – and then 
                                                     
84
 This in spite of the fact that China’s market reforms have aimed at restructuring the central 
redistribution system and the governance of SOEs, which is supposedly causing both local 
governments and SOEs to gradually switch from ‘soft budget constraints’ to ‘hard budgets’ (Lin 
2006 in Chang, 2011: 322). 
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they will become politicians. And that means, they are crappy leaders – it’s [wind power] not their baby, 
right?” (Int. 15, 2012). 
Accordingly, as directors of large SOEs often aim for a political career within the 
nomenklatura system, SOEs are claimed to be characterised by a “big boss philosophy that 
government is very important, so we need to flatter the officials, and then we will get orders. 
That's good enough” (Int. 5, 2012). Apart from being framed as inefficient, SOEs are 
sometimes also associated with ‘corrupt governance structures’ (Int. 33, 2012). It is widely 
acknowledged that the Chinese wind turbine industry is marked not only by uncertainty 
regarding laws and regulations, protectionist industrial policies, limited human capital, but 
also by insufficient financing, bureaucracy, and corruption (Klagge et al., 2012: 376). These 
issues are in turn often linked to the corporate restructuring process, during which some of 
the WTMs for instance have been listed. According to several respondents, some of the 
many new companies have been ‘fake shell companies’, in which a number of well-
connected ‘happy go lucky’ managers were ’installed’ through their guanxi (Int. 42, 2012): 
“You had this euphoria, which has been there in all these Chinese companies – with shares to buy… 
Now it has cooled down a bit. Because they are all fake companies – it’s business people, who turn up 
and behave like they are masters…then they buy some shell companies, put them on the stock 
exchange…and then they get a lot money back, right into their own pockets” (Int. 42, 2012). 
Potentially an example of such ’hot air balloon’ companies, Sinovel (also see Chapter 9) 
was established in 2006 and has focused on “rapid and relentless growth” 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). In this way, Sinovel became the second-largest 
turbine maker in the world, after the Danish manufacturer Vestas within less than four years 
(windpowermontly.com), and the world’s largest WTM by 2011. However, in order to 
establish Sinovel, the founder Han Junliang85 
“didn’t do it alone. Sinovel is one of the best-connected clean energy companies in China. Among its 
major investors is the private equity group New Horizon Capital, co-founded by Wen Yunsong, also 
known as Winston Wen, son of China’s [former] premier, Wen Jiabao. Han [Junliang] was also close to 
Zhang Guobao, until recently head of China’s powerful National Energy Administration [NEA]” 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012).  
Allegedly, Sinovel’s relation to the former head of the National Energy Administration 
(NEA) “may have given him [the founder] an early look at yet-to-be-published government 
                                                     
85
 With a background in the ranks of a SOE, Dalian Heavy Industry Group, which builds steel-
rolling equipment and other massive machinery, and within its electrical equipment division, the 
founder and president of Sinovel, Han Junliang left Dalian Heavy in 2006 to start Sinovel. 
Meanwhile, Dalian Heavy is among Sinovel’s major shareholders and its biggest benefactor 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). In addition, Han Junliang left himself with “a 13.3 per 
cent stake in Sinovel” (Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). 
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regulations and given Sinovel preference in the kinds of turbines chosen to power the state-
planned wind farms. When China finalized bids for a mega-wind project in 2008, Sinovel 
won 47 per cent of the deal, by far the biggest share of any manufacturer” 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). In this way, Sinovel’s founder “seems to have ridden 
the wave just perfectly” (Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012).  
Overall, the explosion in the number of WTMs is claimed to have “looked way too nice and 
impressive, and it happened in no time. When something goes this fast and looks so nice, 
then it’s often because somebody was going to earn some quick money on an IPO 
[international public offering]. And now political focus has been turned towards this issue 
[of corruption]. It looks like a lot of pure hot air – a lot of fake contracts on fake projects in 
order to sell some stock options. That’s illegal and should be punished” (Int. 24, 2013). In 
turn, the current attempts at ‘comprehensively deepening reforms’ of the Chinese political 
leadership imply that “a lot is happening behind the scenes right now in connection with the 
clean-up during consolidation” (Int. 24, 2013) in the emerging wind power-TEN.  
Liquidity issues entangled in a Chinese ‘system problem’ – no good for the country 
The dominance of SOEs in Chinese wind power is in turn by Chinese actors framed as a 
comprehensive Chinese ’system problem’ of China’s overall ‘industrial system’, and is used 
as an explanation for the current quality crisis: ”This is the problem...it's also the system 
problem for China...you know, the state-owned enterprises” (Int. 8, 2013). In the following, 
the chapter looks into how this ‘system problem’ co-performs the ongoing qualification 
struggle in Chinese wind power, producing concerns over i.a. money (e.g. prices, generating 
costs, liquidity) and quality. 
Measured almost exclusively on low prices, successful bidders in concessions and wind 
farm projects have predominantly been Chinese SOEs, which with soft budget constraints 
have been prepared to sacrifice short-term profitability in order to win the projects (Yu et al., 
2009: 5223). That is, “most of the state-owned enterprises not so care of the cost, haha. They 
only want to win the bid - win the bid is their achievement, their reputation, haha...that 
is...so the problem is they offer the price...is extremely low, the price...making the project 
not profitable” (Int. 8(*), 2013). Although the preference and support of large SOEs by 
banks and government has been successful in reducing turbine prices, creating scale 
advantages, and rapid growth, the preference of SOEs by banks “could lead to a lack of 
project evaluation behind credit decisions” (Korsnes, 2014: 193). In turn, the price-bidding 
and ‘target-madness’ (i.e. focusing on GW) has resulted in quality compromises, as bidders 
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have had to keep wind turbine costs as low as possible. That is, “in the current stage, it’s not 
so much about the quality, it’s the price” (Int. 62, 2012). This compromise of quality is 
possible for state-owned bidding companies as they are only measured on  
“the largest installed capacity, that's your achievement. You are not responsible for the future…[for] the 
turbine not working, haha. You [generating company] are only...maybe three or four years in your 
possession. Later, it's not you...so [you will] not [be] so worried about that [quality]...but this is not only 
for wind, it's for everything [in China]” (Int. 8(*), 2013). 
In this way, targets and incentives such as bidding criteria have overflowed into quality 
problems in the long term, which is e.g. reflected in higher generating costs (Int. 8, 2013; 
Int. 20, 2013; Int. 21*, 2013): ”Because high quality must be high price, high cost. But for 
the generating cost, depending on the high quality. For twenty years. I call it the wind 
turbine fatigue...that's the machine, you've got loads, very high...but nobody takes care about 
them” (Int. 8, 2013). As “quality is long term” and is not visible right after the installation, 
but only “after three years, five years” (Int. 62, 2012), “nobody cares about quality, and no 
authority is saying ‘this is good, this is bad [quality]’” (Int. 21*, 2013). In turn, this 
comprehensive system problem of SOEs squeezing prices beyond the limit is being 
constituted as ”a political problem” (Int. 8, 2013) and an issue of China’s ’overall industrial 
system’ (Int. 21*, 2013):  
“So this is the core issue of China's total industrial system. What caused this problem? I think, it is 
caused by the lack of a pure market economy, and therefore you see China’s overcapacity in many 
industries. You know, overproduction. But I think, production overcapacity is a good thing for the 
industry, you can choose the best one. That is, overcapacity is a good thing…If there is only one person 
selling, then prices will be high, and the quality may not be good. So if there are two, competition will be 
better. But in China, it is often not a healthy competition making price competition better…Instead the 
price is getting more and more whatever [lower]… In China we are all low price fighters, and this 
finally led to abuse […] and everybody is doing bad. I think, it is because the market mechanism has not 
been established” (Int. 21*, 2013).   
Above, it is indicated how notions of China’s overall ‘industrial system’ and the lack of 
proper ‘market mechanisms’ of a ’pure market’ are being employed as discursive devices to 
explain why “everybody is competing for life on lower prices” regardless of quality and 
profits as well as how this has “led to damage, so nobody is doing well. I think the market 
mechanism is not established yet” (Int. 21*, 2013):   
“[It is] not the Chinese government's strategy, it’s the result of China's entire economic system. That 
means that excess capacity is like the development of the survival of the fittest, which could contribute to 
good actors emerging to do the job. In China, however, people buy things in a market, which is not pure, 
so he will not buy the best, he will buy the cheapest, and therefore we don’t have people to make any 
good products” (Int. 21*, 2013). 
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To reiterate, the thick mesh of entangled relations of state-owned actors in Chinese wind 
power are being constituted as a comprehensive ‘political problem’, which reflects China’s 
lack of ‘pure market mechanisms’ in its entire ‘industrial system’. These issues have been 
framed as a Chinese ‘system problem’. The system problem produces concerns over i.a. the 
financial sustainability of Chinese wind power and over myriads of quality issues. That is, 
“the preference for low-quality, state-owned projects induced by government investment, is 
potentially destructive” (Korsnes, 2014: 193) for the framing of Chinese wind power as 
‘sustainable’. According to industry experts, the system problem constitutes ”a big trouble 
for the future. No good for the people, no good for the country. With a system like this […] 
I'm so worried about it, because in this way…no driving force for manufacturers to improve 
their quality” (Int. 8, 2013). In this way, the system problem creates potential socio-technical 
barriers to a potential turn to quality, since the “market can still not finance good quality” 
(Int. 24, 2013), but has “still got to change” (Int. 8, 2013). With its equivocal nature, the 
‘system problem’ potentially constitutes an overflowing ‘stem issue’, which forms part and 
parcel of the ongoing qualification struggle in China’s potentially emerging wind power-
TEN. Against this backdrop, the chapter dives into how the concerns over money (liquidity), 
entangled in China’s corporate restructuring and system problem, have de- and reconfigured 
the quality of relations over time between Chinese WTMs and suppliers of control systems.  
Changing quality of customer-supplier relations and issues of money and trust  
Having set the backdrop for understanding the money (e.g. liquidity) issues in the entangled 
wind power-TEN and power-TEN, the chapter dives into an account of how a controversy 
over these issues have de- and reconfigured relations in the emerging software-TEN. This is 
done by focusing on customer-supplier relations around control systems. First, the analysis 
looks into how foreign suppliers of control systems have dealt with lacking payments from 
Chinese customers. This leads to an inquiry into the emergence of new actors, so-called 
‘agents’, which act as ‘lubricators’, when relations have ‘gone sour’. Finally, an account of 
the transformation of customer-supplier relations over time, as well as between subsidiaries 
in China and Danish headquarters, is rendered. 
Riding off the storm together – and never (ever!) break your relations 
During the consolidation within Chinese wind power, foreign suppliers of control systems 
have increasingly faced the dilemma of how to tackle postponed payments from their state-
owned customers, while keeping on good terms. Due to the entangled nature and ‘common 
pockets’ of Chinese SOEs in Chinese wind power, foreign suppliers fear that they will lose 
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their customer if they stop their deliveries of control systems and/or services when payments 
are lacking: 
”We can’t just close down, because then X [a Chinese wind farm developer] won’t understand why the 
turbines are not running as they are supposed to, and then Y [a Chinese state-owned WTM] says, that’s 
those stupid people from Z [a foreign component supplier], and then we’ll have a bad relationship with 
X [the Chinese wind farm developer], and then we will be put down at the bottom of the list. Out here 
you need to ride off the storm together” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Consequently, aiming at ”keep[ing] on good terms with the [wind farm] owners”, some 
foreign suppliers have chosen to continue delivering service because “we have this rule that 
everything which is related to the end-user, we will do that, as we have done all the time” 
(Int. 9, 2012). Otherwise, if not continuing service, ”I’ve spoiled the relation, that I wanted 
to keep, because then I have created a bad reputation in regard to service. So we decided 
instead to stop delivering [control systems] to new wind turbines” (Int. 9, 2012). In this way, 
suppliers “say, ‘well, hrmf, then we’ll have to ride the storm off together’, haha, even 
though…that’s difficult to get through…through eight months…to say, we need to stick 
together in this…but you have to” (Int. 9, 2012). This practice is framed as a matter of being 
patient and displaying trust in the Chinese customer, because “then a year passes by, and 
then it [payments] slowly starts to roll again” (Int. 9, 2012). Hereby, instead of starting to 
’make trouble’, it is important to ’stay the same’, patiently waiting for the market to turn 
around, even though 
”it’s beyond criticism, and they also say…when I ask them, what the heck, when will things 
change?…’Just relax, it will come. Just keep staying the same, then everything will be fine’. And then 
they keep an eye on you. They really keep an eye on you, how you behave…and they reward you for 
it…Because if you start to make trouble, then they will put you right back to the bottom of the list. Then 
you will never get your money back, that’s for sure” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Conversely, other foreign suppliers have adopted a no-tolerance practice towards delays in 
payments, and e.g. require pre-payment from the customer before shipping deliveries, 
which, however, counters ’normal business practice’ in China (Interviews). 
Treating the culprit nicely – the entangled nature of actors 
The need to keep the ‘end-customer’ satisfied is, as indicated, intricately associated with the 
‘common pocket issue’ of the wind power-TEN. That is, “it’s the government generating the 
problem” with liquidity, as the stallment in payments “has been a way [of the Chinese 
Government] to stop the train. It was like saying, ’now we stop the money flows and 
regulate the banks, so they [WTMs and others] cannot borrow money’” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Hereby, foreign suppliers find themselves in a dilemma, acknowledging that ”it’s not their 
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[the customer’s/WTM’s] fault” that payments are delayed (Int. 9, 2012), but rather the 
Chinese government (and next in line, the Chinese wind farm owners). Yet, as ‘nobody can 
take the Chinese State to court’ (Int. 9, 2012), foreign suppliers must keep on good terms 
with the wind farm owner in order to keep their Chinese customer:  
“That’s actually wrong. Because they are the ones who are guilty, because they are the ones, who have 
not paid X [a Chinese state-owned WTM]. Well, it’s…actually, you support the one, who is the reason 
for the problem, right. Actually, we do that. And that’s…in terms of how we tackle this normally, then it’s 
totally wrong” (Int. 9, 2012). 
On the other hand, by displaying tolerance towards delayed payments, and “treating the 
culprit nicely” (Int. 9, 2012) - ‘acting somewhat as a bank, which offers credit to their 
Chinese customers’ (Interviews) – foreign suppliers show that they have comprehended the 
entangled nature of the Chinese wind power-TEN.   
Emergence of agents and ’go-betweens’ 
As profits have been dwindling, chain debts have become ubiquitous, and as payments have 
been delayed in the emerging wind power-TEN, a new kind of Chinese actor has emerged to 
‘smooth’ out relations between Chinese customers and foreign suppliers. That is, it has 
become increasingly impossible to conduct business in Chinese wind power without having 
an ‘agent’/service company in-between customer and supplier. Such agents are “often the 
cousin of some government official” (Int. 9, 2012) and function through their guanxi with 
government officials whom they can ‘butter up’ (Interviews)86. That is, ”now the market has 
dropped, and then it turns more corrupt” (Int. 15, 2013). In the following, the case study 
inquires further into the multiple ‘qualities’ of the agent. This analysis forms the basis for 
looking at the development of ‘trust-based’ relations between customers and suppliers over 
time, in what increasingly seems to constitute a rhizomatic ‘spiderweb’. 
The agent as buffer and ‘lubricator’  
First of all, agents help with prepayments to the supplier, thus acting as a ‘buffer’ guarantee 
of future payment, as well as of continued orders: 
”Actually, he is useful, because – I ask the other way around. I need to be able to explain this the other 
way around [to the headquarters]. So, I need a 30 per cent prepayment. An agent in China doesn’t just 
need good relations, he also needs to have lots of money. He needs to be a buffer for the payment. 
Instead of waiting for the money for nine months, we’ll get them in three months. So we reduced the risk” 
(Int. 9, 2013). 
                                                     
86
 It is often unclear how agents emerge, and how they obtained the guanxi and money in the 
first place; however, this is largely being explained as a matter of having been born into 
(extended) families with political guanxi. 
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In addition to acting as a buffer for payments, the agent eases communication, as they often 
have previous professional experience with international collaborations. According to one 
agent, for instance, they are ”very strong at negotiating. I know foreigners very well. I can 
translate Chinese needs and foreign needs, make them meet – not word by word. But making 
things work” (Int. 45, 2013). In this way acting as a ”lubricant” (Int. 45, 2013), the agent 
assists the foreign companies who “are just like a baby, and I’m like a mother for them, so I 
deliver the results for them” (Int. 45, 2013). Helping communication between the Chinese 
customer and foreign supplier, the agent may be said to engage in guanxi in an ”embedding” 
form, which is prevalent in China primarily in business relations, as it implies a ”cultivation 
of trust and understanding in mutually beneficial connection, with an instrumental aim to 
promote cooperation and increase future benefits” (Chang, 2011: 319). 
Knowing the ‘right people’ to get orders – the need to cultivate the soil and the lack of the 
philosopher’s stone 
Second, it is necessary to get assistance from an agent and his guanxi in order to find 
customers and supportive officials ”at the highest political local level, nurturing the soil both 
politically and commercially…talking to the right people, finding out who are the real 
decision-makers…securing that they at least know a little about us. In order to open up for a 
meeting with the right people” (Int. 13, 2013). This is important for foreign companies, 
since ”it’s only the Chinese who actually know who’s in charge” in China (Int. 13, 2013). 
The construction of such guanxi and the use of agents are consequently framed as critical to 
the survival of foreign companies in the Chinese wind power -TEN: 
“And I should say, I don’t have the philosopher’s stone, nobody has the philosopher’s stone, but in my 
personal opinion, I think that the closer ties you can create, in relation to the customers that you work 
with, and the closer you can get to the top of the company…now I’m talking about personal 
relations…the closer you can get to the political top and developing this network…then you can…I don’t 
dare to say to a Party member…but that you come so close to the decision-makers, so they can see that a 
collaboration can give them something. In that case, I think that the risk of getting sidetracked both 
financially and technically becomes smaller for a Western partner” (Int. 13, 2013). 
Establishing such relations with government officials and Party-members requires that the 
agent is ‘paid a few more percentages’, in order that he can ‘butter up’ the relevant people, 
acting as a hybrid middleman. While some foreign suppliers pay some ‘extra dividends’ for 
the services provided, others ‘pay’ through investment in time and money to build personal 
relations (Interviews). Possessing valuable connections to the political system, agents have a 
reputation for ’knowing a couple of tricks’ in terms of buttering people up upwards in the 
system, both at the local and the central level (Interviews). This makes it  
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”quite funny to know these people, because they know, they really can do things…it’s not just empty talk, 
they can…they can…a lot of them really know some tricks, that’s… […] they know some people and can 
tell them to buy this” (Int. 2, 2012).  
In this way, with the entangled nature of SOEs in Chinese wind power, ”the better the 
network, the closer you’ll be to the right decision-makers…And having the right relations, I 
think that’s the best form of security” (Int. 13, 2013). By ”knowing the right people”, the 
agent plays a critical ‘bridging’ role (Burt, 1992 in Chang, 2011: 318), i.e. using guanxi to 
link groups that are otherwise not connected, “usually to benefit his or her own interests” 
(Burt, 1992 in Chang, 2011: 318).  
Receiving market intelligence  
Third, agents assist in lifting some of the tasks that foreigners do not have the resources to 
do, because ”we don’t have the connections for that. We have the connections to those who 
have the connections. And that’s what we have to exploit” (Int. 13, 2013). For instance, 
State Grid and wind park owners do not offer market intelligence on “where the market is 
moving”, “what kind of regulations have been introduced, and what impact they have” to 
their foreign suppliers (Int. 2, 2012): 
”They would never tell us anything in the first place, I can guarantee you that. That kind of information – 
you won’t get…what’s…what market they are working in, and their…that part out here, that’s one 
hundred per cent closed to us. That means that the requirements that park owners get from some grid 
company, a grid code, whatever…what they are basing that on, they won’t tell us. We just get the 
specifications and then we must fulfill it” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Lacking unofficial market intelligence – and with official data often 
not considered trust-worthy in China – foreign companies must thus 
cultivate relations with agents in order to get access to market 
intelligence, which is critical “to make sure that you understand what’s 
going on. Many things take place behind the curtains here, and nobody 
can really see what’s happening” (Int. 15, 2012). In this way, by 
cultivating guanxi, or ’employing guanxi as strategy’, foreign suppliers 
can reduce uncertainties of e.g. resource allocation, information 
transmission, and market competition (Chang, 2011: 320). That is, 
foreign suppliers try to minimise associations of uncertainty and 
complexity of Chinese wind power market, “by establishing 
relationships with local partners who can offer relevant information, 
advice, and support” (Boisot and Child, 1999 in Chang, 2011: 328). In 
this way, guanxi seem to emerge as a critical intermediary, relating 
Text-box 2: Grasping the 
simplicity and complexity 
of relations 
Interviewee:”There’s 
something about this, 
which makes it incredibly 
easy. Because in a way 
it’s so simple. In its own 
overall complexity, it’s 
pretty simple to grasp that 
this is all about…” 
Interviewer: “Relations?” 
Interviewee: “Yes! If 
you’ve got them, 
everything is possible!” 
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actors together. 
Outsourcing part of the spiderweb – and relations as a source of agency 
Lastly, as an intermediary, the agent links actors through material means such as cigarettes, 
money, beer, wine etc. That is, the agent handles the relation to the Chinese customer 
himself and ”smokes the necessary cigarettes and drinks the proper amount of beer and 
wine” (Int. 2, 2012) with central or local government officials and/or state-owned 
developers and grid companies. In this way, ”it’s also a matter of outsourcing relations and 
the related drinking and smoking” (Int. 24, 2013), i.e. the time and money invested in 
networking and lobbying.  
”It’s crazy, crazy [the need for connections]. And the best…the easiest way to do it is to outsource a bit 
of it, I think. And then use these ’go-betweens’, who are around” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Hereby, the ability to construct relations with agents of foreign actors as well as agents’ 
ability to relate to officials have emerged as a certain form of ’capital’ and source of agency, 
since it makes it ’possible to do anything’ (see Text-box 2), which to foreign actors remains 
somewhat ‘opaque’. According to an agent, ”the best relation with Chinese people is not just 
about business. In China, the law is one thing, but the law can be changed by a person, if 
you have the right relationship” (Int. 45, 2013). In this way, relations are framed as a critical 
capital, in order to make things happen, and they are built through socio-technical means, 
e.g. social capital (guanxi), money, cigarettes, and baijiu (Chinese liquor (白酒)). In the 
following, the case looks into how relations have changed over time, as liquidity issues and 
agents have gradually entered the stage. 
Transformation of relations over time  
In the above, a controversy over money seems to be emerging between Chinese and foreign 
actors, which has drawn a variety of heterogeneous actors into the network. In this 
controversy over money, guanxi are being employed strategically as an ‘obligatory passage 
point’ for entering the supply chain of the largely state-owned Chinese customers. Further, 
guanxi are employed strategically by WTMs – both SOEs and private companies (and 
everything in between) – to gain orders from generating companies and/or wind park 
owners. In the following, the case looks into how the quality of relations has changed over 
time in the liquidity-constrained wind power-TEN. This also implies a further look into the 
nature of so-called ‘embedding’ guanxi, which is employed as a means of establishing trust 
(Chang, 2011). Such embedding guanxi is claimed to be employed by many foreign firms in 
China, as they attempt to develop “enduring, trusting, mutually supportive relationships 
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through joint ventures or partnerships with Chinese counterparts who can help them cope 
with the unfamiliar and complex Chinese environment” (Boisot and Child, 1999; Luo 2001 
in Chang, 2011: 328).  
From cowboy hats and boots to building (trust-based) relations 
In the initial growth phase of the Chinese turbine industry, around “2007, the wind market 
was a seller's market” (Int. 46*, 2012), “it was way too easy, on our premises” (Int. 2, 2012). 
In this context, foreign suppliers had no troubles finding customers, as Chinese SOEs 
”just needed to install, install, and they were buying stuff like crazy…the money, it was an awful lot of 
money, which were put into this wind turbine thing…and there were no problems in terms of payments, 
well, the liquidity was incredibly high” (Int. 2, 2012).  
In this kind of (Western) seller’s market, there was neither time nor need for construing 
associations of trust. Instead, ”it was just that the market was so big and demanding that they 
[the Chinese WTMs] were hungry for all this [foreign technology]” (Int. 2, 2012), and with 
high numbers of new installations, “the Chinese customers required high-speed response”:  
“Because major wind turbine [manufacturers], they all...some have the government relations...so the 
Government wants efficiency…they don't know the details...’I think in half a year or one year, you have 
to get this size’. Then all the guys below him just want to move fast, implement. The time schedule is 
important” (Int. 10, 2012). 
As wind power installments consequently grew almost exponentially at the time, Chinese 
customers almost did not know what they were buying, “they just knew that it was a control 
system” (Int. 2, 2012). Despite this, lots of contracts were signed “without knowing what it 
was all about. It was so easy. You didn’t have to sit down and try to understand” (Int. 2, 
2012). Instead, ”you just had to bring a piece of paper, and then they would sign. And we 
got the money” (Int. 2, 2012). This is being likened to working “with cowboy hats and boots 
on, and then moving ahead” (Int. 2, 2012).  
Today, however, ”that’s not how it’s functioning anymore, you can’t do that anymore” (Int. 
2, 2012). That is, undergoing a phase of consolidation as well as a liquidity and quality 
crisis, the situation has changed. Consequently, today “it’s very much a buyer’s market. 
Yeah, in particular since January this year [2012], when it really hit” (Int. 2, 2012):  
“It changed overnight, in January [2012]. I think so. There were some new initiatives from the 
government, some economic restrictions have been introduced for the wind power sector, which have 
meant that it’s changing now. And then, I can sense that it’s not so much about selling a product 
anymore, it’s about selling a relation” (Int. 2, 2012). 
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This new situation has required foreign suppliers “to sit down and think a bit. And you must 
talk with the Chinese, and need to teach them how to trust you” (Int. 2, 2012). In this way, 
now ”we are back to the things, which really trigger them [the Chinese]” (Int. 2, 2012), that 
is, building guanxi through associations of trust.  Previously, 
”you didn’t have to sit down and try to build trust. Well, that’s for sure what you need now. If the 
Chinese don’t trust you, you can leave. I normally say it this way: you may have the best product, at the 
best price, but you cannot sell it, if you don’t know the right people” (Int. 2, 2012).  
In the following, the analysis dives into different strategies for adapting to these new 
circumstances and demands from the Chinese customers and partners, including the need for 
an ‘agent’. 
Contracts (or working around them) – and moving towards guanxi 
A conventional means of stabilising collaborative relations – to build trust – is contracts. 
Yet, contracts in China are often being worked around after signing them (Int. 2, 2012; Int. 
13, 2013; Int. 42, 2012), as part of the process of trust-building. Thus, “when you sign a 
contract [in the West], it’s certain, because according to Western culture, or let’s say Danish 
culture, when he’s signing a contract, he’s very careful, each sentence, every word, so after 
signing the contract, he has great respect for this contract” (Int. 12*, 2013). Yet, in China a 
”contract is not a contract in the classic understanding. Under the best of circumstances, it’s 
a letter of intention, and that’s it” (Int. 2, 2012). In particular, such pragmatic approach 
towards entering into contracts is needed when it concerns business relations with SOEs, 
who operate under ’special conditions’. That is,  
“because everybody may be state-owned units, so having this background… after signing the contract as 
a state-owned enterprise, my contract has no certain place, I have no clear contract, where I can refer 
back to the contract, even after the contract was signed. We all know that there was too much in the 
contract, so it’s nothing more than an establishment of a relationship between the supply and demand 
sides” (Int. 12*, 2013). 
As a framing device, contracts are meant to delegate responsibilities and rights of the 
different actors in the network. Yet, in China, a contract is framed as ”only a piece of paper. 
Even though I have a signature here, but after I change it...that's the difference” (Int. 10, 
2013). As Chinese employ contracts instead as a pragmatic means for establishing 
relationships in order to work around the contract’s paragraphs, the contract ’overflows’ in 
the eyes of foreign suppliers. Thus, according to many Western actors, ”a Chinese contract 
is not worth the paper it has been written on” (Int. 42, 2013). Also Chinese actors 
themselves reckon that Chinese will “never follow it [the contract]” (Int. 10, 2013), which is 
particularly the case of SOEs: 
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”So that means that he’s [Chinese SOE] not 100 per cent complying with the execution of the contract, 
and this is a big difference. Frankly, it’s not just our clients, but in China all state-owned units, or all 
private Chinese companies are like this. There may be ten points in the contract, but there will not be full 
implementation of all of them. It’s just about laying down the supply and demand relations of the two 
sides, nothing more” (Int. 12*, 2013). 
In the perspective of Chinese actors, this flexibility in reading the contract is necessary for 
stabilising relations. Accordingly, Chinese customers have become dissatisfied over time 
with what they frame as a lack of flexibility from Western partners in regards to contracts  
(Int. 12*, 2013), which has become an increasingly critical issue, as liquidity issues have 
become more pervasive in the wind power-TEN.  
”It’s very strange, in China there is no clear boundary between business and personal relationships. The 
Danes find these mixed lines very strange, cannot figure it out” (Int. 45, 2013).  
In this kind of situation, display of recognition, respect, and understanding of the special 
conditions of SOEs, and some kind of acceptance of delayed payments and introduction of 
agents, from Western suppliers have become increasingly critical to building trust and 
receiving orders. That is, in liquidity-constrained times, Chinese customers require a less 
legalistic and formalistic approach to partnerships, which necessitates other means than 
contracts, namely building guanxi, to construe associations of trust (Int. 45, 2013).  
Changing strategy in order to construe associations of trust  
Over time, as foreign suppliers have had to ’take off their cowboy boots and hats’ and, 
instead of hasty contracts and a legalistic approach, invest time in construing associations of 
trust, it has become increasingly important to show signs of pragmatic flexibility in regard to 
contracts. Recognising how ”we are making a serious mistake if we think that it [the 
contract] has got the same meaning [in China] as in the West” (Int. 13, 2013), foreign 
suppliers have gradually learned that   
”it’s not so much about looking at the contract. It helps that you sit down together at the table. But it’s 
more about building up trust, so they trust you and trust what you tell them. It takes time. Costs some 
money. Haha. But when that has been settled, and you have invested the time, then you can do anything” 
(Int. 2, 2012). 
This change in strategy of foreign suppliers in China has over time implied a higher 
acceptance i.a. of delayed payments and agents, and a higher flexibility in terms of working 
around the contract’s paragraphs, since otherwise ”it would be a very a dangerously 
conservative or ‘to the letter’-approach, right?” (Int. 15, 2012). This implies that many 
foreign suppliers are now “trying another approach”, to rebuild relations which have gone 
’sour’. Rather than just being focused on signatures, it has become necessary ”to have a talk 
343 
 
and to hear what actually went wrong” (Int. 2, 2012). That is, many foreign suppliers have 
lost orders over time, due to the way that  
”the Chinese want to involve personal relations. There are so many competitors in China, so there are 
many factors, which affect X’s (a Chinese SOE’s/WTM’s) decision [on suppliers]” (Int. 45, 2013).  
Lacking a “culture of the contract, a credit system” (Int. 46, 2012), the Chinese “credit 
[reputation] system is based on the person, I only work with the people, I believe in” (Int. 
46, 2012). In this way, there are both personal guanxi, and supply chain guanxi (Int. 12*, 
2013). In particular this is the case within wind turbine control systems, “because this is not 
like selling a bottle of mineral water…It [guanxi] is very critical, especially as a foreign 
brand, if you really want to grow in China, if you don’t have any relations (Int. 12*, 2013).  
Customer-supplier relations as a marriage built on trust and respect – ‘when in China, do as the 
Romans’ 
To build such associations of trust, agents have – as depicted - come to constitute a critical 
means. However, in the beginning, foreign companies reacted with reluctance, due to a lack 
of understanding of the role and function of the agent, thinking: ”Who the hell is he!? It’s 
not because I don’t like him, but what does he do?” (Int. 9, 2012): 
”I found it very difficult in the beginning, when there was suddenly someone…someone in-between…then 
I say…what are you doing? You know, that was really how it was. What is he doing?! You’re just 
disturbing […] It’s not how we do things normally, it isn’t! We don’t want any go-between…no…why is 
he there? What is he doing? It’s difficult to understand. And does he keep the money to himself, or what 
does he do? It’s…we just don’t understand” (Int. 9, 2012). 
Acting with such initial resistance to agents, relations were destabilised over time. That is, as 
the consolidation phase resulted in liquidity constraints and delayed payments from SOEs, 
which necessitated the employment of an agent to act as a buffer, some Chinese customers 
have stopped their orders to foreign suppliers “because we didn’t want to pay the right 
people for their services, I’m totally sure that’s why [we lost our customers]. And nothing 
else” (Int. 2, 2012). That is, ”they just stop paying…yeah, but they think that they have been 
treated badly. And we think we have been treated badly. And then people stop talking. And 
that’s the worst thing you can do. Especially out here” (Int. 2, 2012). According to an agent, 
”in the beginning they [foreign suppliers] didn’t want to have such a relation, to use these 
relations. But I think they cannot make business without it, as they will make so many 
mistakes” (Int. 45, 2013). Gradually recognising the function of the agent and the need for 
construing trust through guanxi, foreign suppliers have changed strategy, “reestablishing a 
dialogue”, e.g. by accepting the introduction of an agent by the customer (Int. 9, 2012). This 
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has made relations more stable, and foreign suppliers have ”also got more orders” (Int. 45, 
2013). Lastly, the gradual recognition of the need to employ framing devices other than 
contracts in China is by the Chinese being constituted as a matter of ‘respecting Chinese 
culture’. In the beginning, with high growth rates, the “very approach to doing business has 
been done in the wrong way…the respect has disappeared” (Int. 2, 2012). According to an 
agent,   
“in China it’s easier to do as the Chinese, adapt and be flexible. But especially Danes find this very 
difficult. They should learn to act as the Romans. A lot of foreigners are very bad at this, Danes and also 
others. Danes want to understand why and how things happen. Instead, I just tell them, ’you just follow 
me’, but I don’t provide the reason, just the results. That’s very difficult for foreign people” (Int. 45, 
2013) 
Overall, it is increasingly recognised that ”it’s extremely important to go out there and show 
respect for the culture and the people…to nourish an amount of deference” (Int. 13, 2013):  
”They [the Chinese] want that you as a Westerner understand Chinese business mentality. You need to 
understand China. You must act with respect, you must be honest. They may not be honest with you, but 
to a certain degree they are anyhow, because as soon as you get under their skin…under their skin, I 
think that the communication becomes much easier. I don’t use as much time for negotiation, when the 
trust has been established. But it takes such a long time!” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Emphasising the need for mutual respect and trust, Sino-Danish customer-suppliers are 
likened to ”an entire marriage!” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Implications for relations between headquarter and subsidiary 
Apart from influencing relations between Chinese customers and foreign suppliers, the 
controversy over money has had implications for the de- and reconfiguration of relations 
between Chinese subsidiaries and Danish headquarters, not only between Chinese and 
Danish employees in Danish supplier firms, but also between Danish employees with 
connection to the Chinese subsidiary and the Danish leadership in the headquarter in 
Denmark. Through the following account, it is illustrated how relations tend to be 
negotiated. 
Chinese concern for a lack of understanding of Chinese culture 
First of all, related to the issue of ‘respecting local culture’, local Chinese employees in 
Danish subsidiaries are concerned that Danish headquarters do ‘not care how we were 
thinking’, displaying a lack of ’trust’ (xinren bu gou 信任不够), ’respect’, and ’confidence’, 
which is often being framed as ’arrogance’, constituting a ’common illness’ (tongbing 通病) 
of Danish companies in China (Int. 40*, 2013; Int. 10, 2012; Int. 46*, 2012):  
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“Yes, they [Danes] do not understand the Chinese market, but we [the local employees] have been 
ignored. So we feel very sorry, we lost to our competitors, especially in the Chinese market. […] This 
regional culture is too diverse, but you should listen to the local managers in what to say” (Int. 40*, 
2012). 
Not feeling ‘respected’ or ‘listened to’, Chinese employees in different subsidiaries tend to 
‘feel lonely’, ‘feel very frustrated’, and ‘very angry’ (Int. 10, 2012; Int. 46*, 2012). This has 
created a demand for more Danish employees moving to China as long-term residents to 
understand the local culture and/or to establish joint ventures, in order to make it easier to 
‘do as the Romans‘” (入乡随俗, ruxiang suisu; literally, “when entering the village, 
following local customs”) (Int. 46*, 2012).  
“When you are not at work, you can consider yourself the king of your own world without a problem, but 
when you are working to get a market share in another market, I think you need to forget about your own 
identity” (Int. 46*, 2012). 
Accordingly, some Danish managers have gradually learned that ”to make business in China 
– it’s a huge challenge. What I’ve learned from this is that we should never think that we can 
save the world with our own solutions” (Int. 13, 2013). Increasingly, Danish employees with 
relations to China, working either in China or Denmark, are working consistently with 
building trust between the headquarter and the subsidiary, giving subsidiaries more 
autonomy, and respecting that ”they are the ones who know the culture. Know the language. 
They are the ones who know all the nuances” (Int. 13, 2013). In this way, relations have 
been and are being negotiated over time. As Chinese companies have acquired new 
capabilities, it is increasingly important that ”you don’t do it as a student-teacher relation, 
but that you do it as an equal partner and with a common wish to do this. That’s the kind of 
respect that I think you must build up” (Int. 13, 2013). 
Understanding the Chinese ball game and ongoing negotiations between subsidiary and headquarter 
Second, some foreign suppliers have sought to reduce complexity, i.a. by bringing 
expatriates to China to control their affiliates and operations in China directly (Chang, 2011: 
327):  
”So now we need a new one out here, we need that. The headquarter doesn’t understand what’s going on 
out here […] You know, well, that the week after we’ve returned home, then it’s old knowledge we have 
got. It’s no use […] And that’s actually what I try to do. [Trying to find out] what the hell is going on 
(Int. 48, 2012).   
In this way, some foreign salespeople and/or foreign managers in China look at this “a bit 
like undercover work, kind of adopting ‘several identities’, as they engage in relations with 
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hybrid ‘in-between’ agents. Indeed, getting to understand the Chinese ‘spiderweb’ requires 
people to lobby, and  
“to act in a certain way in the [Chinese wind power] industry, being secretive. That’s what you become, 
everybody gets that way out here. I also keep the cards close to me. You’ve got your own…and you 
protect that” (Int. 2, 2012). 
Some foreign suppliers have not localised as much as others. Whether or not they have been 
posted in China, or only have localised production in China (which also has implications for 
associations of trust), Danish employees working permanently or interchangeably between 
Denmark and China, face a dual challenge, as they must not only stabilise relations with 
Chinese colleagues and customers, but also with their Danish board of directors and 
management. This has become increasingly difficult in the stagnating and liquidity-
constrained Chinese wind power market.  
”Because the funny thing is…had it been a Western company, then you’d say, then the collaboration 
would have stopped there [due to lacking payments], right, and our customer would probably have 
stopped his development, because he couldn’t get funded…But it seems like the Chinese [companies] 
somehow still have so much money that they can still pay their employees, so they are just continuing 
business […] And production, sales, and development and things like that, it’s still running. And that’s 
kind of a strange schism to face, because how is that possible!?” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Facing the “schism” of comprehending the workings of ‘soft budget constraints’ of the state-
owned customers, Danish suppliers “can never disappear [from the Chinese market]” despite 
lacking payments. That is, “the moment your presence is gone, then you are out of their [the 
Chinese customers’] conscience. And it happens very fast. So it [relations/guanxi] must be 
nurtured, nurtured, nurtured” (Int. 2, 2012). Consequently, the Danish headquarter must be 
convinced that the best strategy is to nurture guanxi, while “the Danish model, the German, 
the French, it’s just stopping [deliveries of components] right away. And then they [the 
customer] have to pay right away, and before they do that, we won’t do anything” (Int. 9, 
2012). While Danish headquarters have sometimes demanded stopping deliveries, when 
payments are failing, some Danish subsidiaries have instead insisted on “sticking to the 
good relationship” in order not to lose all connections and orders: 
”And then it gets even worse, as the Board [of Directors in Denmark], of course, tells me that then we 
need to stop activities – you do that in Europe. Then my next challenge is that this is not possible. I need 
to be on friendly terms with them [the Chinese customer]. Otherwise, they will put me at the bottom of 
the list, and then I will be the last one to be paid. That’s also what the state-owned companies do out 
here. They keep making sure that things run properly. Because they know that some day it will get better, 
and then it’s good to have good friends. […] That’s almost the worst part – we cannot break them [the 
relations] – and that’s why, I’m trying to kind of play by their rules” (Int. 9, 2012). 
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In this way, somewhat paradoxically, ”our biggest challenge is, when we have to report back 
to Denmark […] it’s so difficult!” (Int. 13, 2013). That is, the headquarters does “not realise 
how difficult it is to do business in China” as headquarters and subsidiary “are so far from 
each other” (Int. 9, 2012). In this way, the headquarters “does not get, what’s being said. 
They simply don’t understand the little things being said, because it’s so far away from you. 
It’s just noise you’re hearing” (Int. 15, 2013). Consequently, 
”it’s really difficult to go home and explain this to an owner or to a Board of Directors and the top 
management for that matter…Because ‘how can that be true?! It just can’t be true that we just have to go 
out there and talk with some people, and then believe that this is the best way?’ You simply can’t do that, 
right? But I must…I think personally that this is the kind of ball game we are in” (Int. 13, 2013). 
In this way, as China is being constituted as ”another type of business world that we are 
entering, and we have to understand” (Int. 13, 2013), Danish employees in China and/or 
with relations to China compare doing business in Europe and China with “taking a stroll in 
the park and climbing a mountain” (Int. 42, 2012). 
Dynamics of  ‘the relational’ – and modes of valuating ‘quality’ 
In the above it has been indicated how the consolidation phase of the emerging wind power- 
and software-TEN has produced a controversy over money. In turn, this controversy has 
transformed emergent actors from intermediaries into actors, as actors not just connect 
actors without transforming them, but have also engendered conflict. In this way, agents 
have had an impact on the de- and reconfiguration of relations in the networks that they 
constitute and which they are constituted by. Having traced some of the dynamics of ’the 
relational’ in the marketisation of wind power in China, by following an unfolding 
controversy over money in the software-TEN, which is entangled in a state-controlled 
power-TEN, the chapter has indirectly shed further light not only on the negotiated nature of 
relations, positions, roles, and identities of Chinese and foreign actors in the emerging wind 
power-TEN.  
That is, the chapter has also indicated how ’quality’ (or ’qualities’), understood here as 
processes of valuation and price-setting in the current qualification struggle of wind power,  
also in this regard remains a negotiated and contested matter. Whereas Western companies 
thus have tended to frame the quality of wind turbines through quantitative measures in 
terms of e.g. certified reliability, performance, cost of energy, availability, stability, or 
’algorithmic quality’, which can relatively easily be transformed into comparable prices, the 
quality of wind turbines and components in China are also measured in terms of ’personal 
relations’/guanxi. That is, ”when the Chinese buy things, it’s not just about the quality, but 
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also about price, service, and relations” (Int. 45, 2012). In this way, ”out here, having the 
best relation can justify that the product might not be the best […] But on the other hand, it 
doesn’t work either, if the product is too bad. But quality is something different in China. 
And it’s related to relations” (Int. 48, 2012).  
Additionally, the attribution of associations of quality to a product is in a Chinese 
perspective dependent on the long-term upgrading potential. That is, wanting to be able to 
‘move things’ in the longer run, the Chinese “want the technology, and we [foreign 
companies] want the money” (Int. 47, 2013). In the initial phase, Chinese and foreign actors 
in the emerging software-TEN had not considered that their framing and valuation of 
‘quality’ might differ, and that their framing tools for establishing calculative agencies for 
valuating quality also differed. This can be claimed to have resulted in extensive 
overflowing in the software-TEN, with continuous destabilisation of relations. Yet, over 
time, 
”you understand that it’s because there’s a lack of understanding of what the other party wants. What is 
it that I’m bringing, and what is it that my counterpart is bringing, and how can we make it succeed 
together […] Well, if you are not able to see this picture, then you’ll not succeed, I think” (Int. 47, 2013). 
Over time acknowledging the different “business cases” (Int. 47, 2013) and modes of 
valuation, relations have been temporarily stabilised, although ”it is still difficult to navigate 
in” the Chinese ‘spiderweb’ (Int. 47, 2013).  
The many faces of the ‘system problem’ and potential limits to a turn to quality 
Above, the chapter has so far conducted a case study on how China’s ’system problem’ 
along with China’s ongoing restructuring has produced a controversy over money in the 
wind power-TEN, revealing contested modes of valuation of quality between Chinese and 
foreign actors. In the following, the chapter concludes by looking into how the controversy 
over money produces matters of concern over the potential barriers to a turn to quality in the 
emerging wind power-TEN. 
The (in)visible hand of the political pole 
In the above account, the analysis has displayed overly unstable relations between Chinese 
and foreign actors around control systems. The overflowing nature of relations can in turn be 
related to the way in which marketisation of wind power in China is entangled in an overall 
unfinished ’restructuring’ process. This makes the complete disentanglement and framing of 
the political, market, scientific, and technical poles as well as of the software-, wind power-, 
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and power-TEN impossible. Not possible to bracket actors into ’stable frames’, poles and 
TENs are constantly overflowing. Indeed, in particular it seems that in Chinese wind power, 
the ’political pole’ pervades all poles. For instance, apart from operating as regulator, 
operator, and equipment manufacturer, the political pole also acts as i.a. a price-setter, a 
manager, a credit provider, and a monitor in SOEs. Hereby, despite attempts at moving 
towards ’modern corporate governance’ and disentangling the ‘market’ from the 
government, the political pole seems ubiquitous. Entangled in China’s ongoing ’capitalist 
transition’, rather than reflecting the ideal-type of ’external markets’ and ‘arms-length’ 
transactions, the Chinese political pole is heavily involved in the marketisation of wind 
power, amongst other things in price-setting. In a Chinese journal (2014*) on the ongoing 
and partly stalled reforms in China’s power-TEN, this pervasive role of the political is also 
reflected. As expressed in the article, the Chinese Government is currently in the process of 
shifting ’its old hands’ (by reference to Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘invisible hand of the market’) 
as well as its ‘wrist’, in order to be able continue the stalled market-oriented reforms in the 
power sector. Somewhat paradoxically, the article leaves no doubt that the wrist is attached 
firmly to the arm of the Chinese state, making the ‘invisible hand’ seem very visible instead 
(Caijing*, Mar. 24, 2014). 
The construction of a ’nationalistic game’ 
Hereby, while China, on paper, in general pursues ”a market system that is uniform but 
open, orderly and competitive” (3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 
Nov. 2013, III-Modern market system), the Chinese Government seems to steer the market 
with a ’strong hand’ (and heavy fist) within strategic pillar industries such as the power and 
wind power sectors. This is also visible in public tenders and local content requirements, 
where Chinese SOEs more or less exclusively have won the bids. Meanwhile, such 
preference for SOEs and their low-price bids has resulted in foreign WTMs and suppliers in 
China becoming increasingly weary of doing business in China, since it constitutes “a 
nationalistic game […] It is difficult to be in such a market, you really have to be smart to 
continue to make a good business here” (Int. 1, 2013). In this nationalistic game, an invisible 
boundary is being construed between the ’fair’ and the ’unfair’. While foreign actors argue 
that ”it is entirely fair” to aim towards building up a sound industry” (Int. 1, 2013), ”there 
has to be a balance. And I think that China may overstep that balance. I don’t actually think 
they wanted to get rid of foreign companies, I never think it was their intention” (Int. 1, 
2013). Yet, as Chinese targets have been set strictly for GW, spurring a quest for the lowest 
price bid, and compromising traditional Western notions of quality, China is argued to have 
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”tinkered with the balance” and to have created an “unsound environment for foreign 
investment” (Int. 1, 2013). Overall, the framing of a ’nationalistic game’ produces processes 
of exclusion and inclusion. 
Turn to quality or not – the issue of a blind market 
This emerging ’nationalistic game’ and its inclusion and exclusion processes are construed 
around issues of low price versus quality. While foreign actors are fearing to be squeezed 
out of the market, as they cannot compete on the lowest prices, Chinese experts within wind 
power also raise concerns that the low-price focus is “no good for the country, the people, 
the industry” (Int., 8*, 2013). Although there are various traits of a potential turn to quality 
in Chinese policies, these Chinese experts argue that China’s system problem constitutes a 
potential barrier to such quality turn. That is, as indicated earlier, these actors are “worried 
about the basic system, it's not the driving force to improve that” (Int. 8*, 2013). The 
emerging stem issue of China’s ‘system problem’ is in turn used to explain how China’s 
wind power 
“market is blind. I think under a mature market mechanism, players entering [the industry] are relatively 
smart, but under an immature market system, the players entering are very stupid” (Int. 19*, 2013). 
Accordingly, instead of encouraging higher quality, some foreign actors predict that China’s 
emerging wind power-TEN will be marked by ”a huge market for scrap iron in the next 
years” (Int., 24, 2013), as a lot of turbines have to be demolished and not just retrofitted” 
(Int., 2, 2012). Overall, the framing of wind power as sustainable is being threatened, not 
only in terms of economic, technical, scientific, and financial sustainability, but also in terms 
of what may be termed ’political’ sustainability’. That is, if a turn to quality is being stalled 
by socio-technical barriers, e.g. due to the ‘political’ system problem, overflowing is likely 
to abound. In turn this may put the upgrading and catch-up potential of the emerging wind 
power-TEN into question, potentially delegitimising the emerging wind power-TEN. 
Conclusion and theoretical considerations – controversy over money and a Chinese 
system problem 
In Chapter 11, some of the ‘Chinese characteristics’ of marketisation within wind power 
have been traced. The chapter maps a controversy unfolding over money in the liquidity-
constrained wind power-TEN, and how this has impacted relations between foreign control 
system suppliers and Chinese (state-owned) customers in the potential software-TEN. 
Hereby, while the two first controversy mappings in Chapters 9 and 10 dived into the 
configuration of ‘micro-relations’ around software algorithms, and the pacification of goods 
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through IPRs and standards, Chapter 11 has inquired into dynamics related to price-setting, 
placed in a broader context of China’s corporate restructuring in the power-TEN and 
China’s so-called system problem. Illustrating how the potentially emerging software- and 
wind power-TENs are co-constituted by an unstable power-TEN, as well as co-configuring 
the power-TEN, the chapter sheds light on some of the highly complex, and sometimes 
paradoxical, dynamics of the software-TEN, where relations tend to unwind as soon as they 
have been established. In this way, further light is being shed on some of the roots of the 
overflowing relations between Chinese and foreign actors, depicted in Chapters 9 and 10. 
As boundaries between the political, market, scientific, and technical poles seem to overlap 
and overflow in the power-TEN, largely due to an overly ‘activist’ role of the Chinese 
Government and the entangled nature of actors, an account of a ‘rhizomatic’ and thick 
meshwork emerges, in which relations acquire agency, in themselves ‘qualifying quality’, so 
to say.  
Overall, the last three Chapters 9, 10, and 11 have offered a controversy mapping, which 
indicates some of the socio-material challenges for upgrading and for a potential turn to 
quality to take place. In the next and last chapter of the analysis, Chapter 12, the analysis 
inquires further into the dynamics of price-setting, and looks into the potentiality of a turn to 
quality of the wind power-TEN. This is done by diving into some of the ’power struggles’ 
between wind power and fossil fuels in the power-TEN, as well as the role of price and cost 
calculations in this struggle. This produces an overall account of ‘green marketisation’ in a 
developmental context of China as a matter of experimentalism and pragmatism. 
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Chapter 12. Controversy over price- and cost-calculations entangled 
in a Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation 
 
In the outskirts of Beijing on a full-blown Indian Summer day in 2013, I approach the end of 
my last field-trip to China. The courteous, elderly Chinese gentleman, one of Chinese wind 
power’s ’grand old men’, wraps up the development of China’s wind power market in just a 
few sentences. What seemed like a riddle before, suddenly stands in a new light: 
Figure 21: Controversy over cost- and price calculations in Chinese 
pragmatics of green marketisation 
”In China [it’s] very strange, 
maybe different from Europe, but 
in China every...we first do it – 
then to solve it! Xian zuo, cai 
jiejue [先做，才解决/first do it, 
then solve it]. Then you have the 
problems to force people to solve 
them […] If the problem had not 
appeared, nobody would have 
considered about that […] That is 
not strategy...that is a […] reality. 
To learn from the practice is much 
better than learn from the theory 
or learn from imagination […] It's 
the Chinese way”. 
Finally, the story on the 
genesis, dynamics, and agency 
of Chinese wind power begins 
to take shape, properly taking 
into account its particular ‘Chinese characteristics’. However, how the story will end up 
remains a riddle to me. Will it become a story of China’s ’fight against windmills’, or will it 
be a story of an actual turn to quality in wind power? And is the mapping of a potential, and 
controversial, turn to quality also a story of Chinese ’experimental greening’, I wonder as I 
sit on the plane, returning home from my last field-trip to this both fascinating and 
bewildering country. I cannot wait to write up the rhizomatic story, so full of actors, 
relations, and controversies, and ripe with potential endings and new beginnings!  
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Power struggles in the power-TEN and Chinese experimentalist sustainability  
In Chapter 12, the analysis dives further into dynamics of price-setting in the marketisation 
of wind power in China, some of which were illustrated in Chapter 11. The chapter offers a 
mapping of a controversy over cost- and price-calculations, and how these calculations 
construe a competitive space between wind power and fossil fuels (in this case, coal), as 
well as between local and central governments, and between Chinese and foreign 
companies. These power struggles are taking place within what the thesis dubs a potentially 
particular Chinese ‘pragmatics of green marketisation’, whose ‘sustainability’ in turn is 
being contested and negotiated. In this way, the last chapter of the analysis seeks indirectly 
to shed light on the previous chapters of the analysis, rendering a broader picture of (green) 
marketisation in China, and shedding further light on the paradoxical dynamics of 
simultaneously collaborative and competitive relations already depicted.  
First, forming part of the emerging power-TEN, the chapter offers an account of a power 
struggle playing out between wind power and coal in the emerging wind power- and power-
TENs. This is laid out as a battle of qualities associated to wind power and coal respectively, 
construed i.a. by contested framing tools (in particular in terms of price-setting), as well as 
by lacking coordination between local and central governments. Next, the chapter illustrates 
how this battle has resulted e.g. in sky-rocketing curtailment rates. This leads to a mapping 
of a controversy over China’s seemingly experimental mode of ‘greening’ in which Chinese 
‘pragmatist experimentation with sustainability’ is being contested. In this controversy, not 
only a competitive space may be constructed, but increasingly so also a collaborative space. 
The thesis hereby opens up towards the potential transformation of China’s emerging wind 
power-TEN, i.e., inquiring into how the potentially self-disruptive and ‘self-undermining’ 
experimentalism may be flexibly handled by an agile political pole (and other poles), which 
respond(s) flexibly to ubiquitous overflowing. Chapter 12 hereby not only links back to 
previous chapters, but also points forward to the discussion, conclusion, and wider 
implications of the thesis (Chapters 13-15) of Part IV. Below, in figure 22, it is illustrated 
how the fourth and last controversy-mapping of the analysis is now conducted, with a focus 
on price and cost calculations and the contested sustainability of China’s potentially 
particular mode of green marketisation. 
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Figure 22: Zooming in on controversy over price- and cost-calculations entangled in a Chinese pragmatics of 
green marketisation  
 
Source: Own design 
The power struggle between wind and coal 
To map the controversy unfolding over China’s potential ’green marketisation’, the chapter 
first maps how a power struggle is taking shape in the emerging power-TEN between wind 
power and fossil fuels (in this case, coal). This is done by inquiring into how wind power 
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has been associated with qualities of ’trouble’ for grid companies, generating companies, 
and coal-fired power plants, and how a competitive space between coal and power has been 
construed, entangled in myriads of power struggles of the emerging power-TEN. 
Wind, the ’trouble-maker’! The issue of associations to wind power and coal 
In the following, the chapter offers an account of how wind power has been framed as a 
’trouble-maker’ compared to coal, creating resistance from various actors against wind 
power. 
Associations of ’reliability’ or ’disturbance’   
Having installed enormous amounts of new wind power capacity, of a relatively poor 
quality, and integrating them into the grid within a short time frame, wind power in China 
has become associated with qualities of instability and grid disturbance. That is, since ”wind 
is random” (Int. 8, 2013), ”wind power has the reputation of messing up the voltage” (Int. 
26, 2013). When wind power ”only takes up a small share, it is not so difficult to ensure 
system [load] balance” (Int. 26, 2013). Yet, as larger shares of wind power have been 
integrated into the grid, this requires a great deal of ’stability work’, as 
”wind turbines are NOT synchronous generators! They are asynchronous…an asynchronous machine 
swinging in a synchronous system” (Int. 26, 2013). 
With a vast amount of such asynchronous generators, integrated rapidly into the 
synchronous system of the grid without ensuring the proper amount of ’stability work’, the 
grid basically broke down several times in China during the early growth phase 
(Bloomberg/Bizweek, Mar. 15, 2012). In contrast, conventional coal-fired plants can follow 
load (demand) variations, providing a stable ’base load’ (Int. 26, 2013). For instance, this 
means that ”you wouldn’t worry about the voltage flicker and fault ride through, which is 
necessary in a wind plant” (Int. 26, 2013). Overall, associations to wind power and coal 
power are construing a boundary between ’stable’ and ’disruptive/disturbing’, and between 
’controllable’ and ’non-controllable’ power sources. In turn, grid companies are generally 
interested in ’buying reliability’, when they integrate different power sources into the grid, 
to be able to dispatch stable power to consumers. Grid companies consequently tend to look 
at the stochastically fluctuating wind power source as  
”rubbish! Because when we need, we don't have. But when [we] don't need, there’s too much” (Int. 8, 
2013).  
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Grid companies are therefore often reluctant towards integrating large shares of wind power 
into the grid (Zhao et al., 2012a: 230), as wind power requires a great amount of work on 
operations and dispatch:  
”When we get some information on the grid…it’s a bloody nuisance, right...you’re sitting there in the 
middle of the night, and then the wind stops blowing, and then you have to do a whole lot of things…then 
it’s pretty nice to be able to call a conventional power plant” (Int. 18, 2013).  
That is, a conventional coal-fired thermal power plant, which is comparatively stable, is 
“really comforting to have” to grid operators (Int. 18, 2013). Conversely, framed as a 
’disruptive’, ’disturbing’ power source, “there’s nothing surprising in the fact that there is 
huge resistance in parts of the State Grid [towards wind power]” (Int. 18, 2013); instead, this 
is ”understandable. For them it [the wind] is a trouble-maker...a trouble-maker, a trouble-
maker!” (Int. 8, 2013). 
Associations of economic loss – resistance from coal-fired power plants 
Apart from grid companies, also thermal power plants in China tend to be reluctant towards 
wind power. That is, due to grid balancing requirements, if there is more space for wind 
power in the power grid, this will result in lower coal power production for thermal power 
plants, when demand is low and the wind is blowing (Int. 19, 2013). In this kind of situation, 
”the only thing you can do is to turn down the coal-fired power plants” (Int. 18, 2013). At 
the same time, the primary basis of income for coal-fired power plants is their energy 
production (Gigawatt hours): 
”That means that the coal-fired power plants are losing money. And there’s not really any…they are not 
being compensated for that loss” (Int. 18, 2013). 
The issue of lost income is related to annual coal quota agreements, signed between coal-
fired power plants and local governments. That is, they are “signing some agreements on 
how the power plant has to run on a yearly basis […] this is copied down to the local level” 
(Int. 18, 2013). The Chinese coal-fired power plants are  
”delegated a quota to produce a certain amount of [Gigawatt] hours on a yearly basis. An 
equivalent…their yearly energy production – they are converting that into a so-called equivalent full 
load hours…a number...which has been set pretty high, 5,000 or something like that. That’s a heck of a 
lot! And apart from that, they have the right to supply electricity, when they are producing heat, because 
combined heat and power is good and efficient, energy-efficient” (Int. 18, 2013). 
Without compensation for lost income from power production, coal-fired plants have no 
incentive to reduce their own production to allow for larger wind power shares in the grid 
(Zhao et al., 2012a: 229-230). That is, “if they come under the quota, to which they have a 
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right, and which they negotiate with the local government on a yearly basis, then they lose 
money” (Int. 18, 2013).  
Associations of (in)flexibilities – on being tied by your own  ’constraining ropes’  
In the above, “a big gap in the regulation in China” has been indicated as “there is no 
incentive for the [coal-fired] power plant owners to shut down” (Int. 63, 2012). In addition 
to this gap, China’s coal-reliant power system is being framed as inflexible in both physical 
and institutitional terms. First, coal is being associated with ’physical inflexibility’ (Int. 28, 
2013), as coal-fired plants take relatively long to start up compared to wind farms, which is 
basically, ”just...push the botton!” (Int. 8, 2013). Thereby, coal-fired power plants cannot 
adjust rapidly, when power balancing adjustments are necessary. Adjusting to large shares 
of wind power is consequently being framed as a challenge, due to the ’physical 
inflexibilities’ of the grid and the coal-fired power plants. Second, in order to integrate 
larger shares of wind power, ”physical flexibility is not enough; a market is also necessary”, 
which in turn requires ‘institutional flexibility’ (Int. 28, 2013). Yet, as there are only limited 
means of short-term inter- and intra-provincial power trading in China87 (Int. 28, 2013), the 
power-TEN in China is associated with a lack of ’institutional flexibility’ (Int. 28, 2013; Int. 
26, 2013). This ‘institutional inflexibility’ is also framed as a result of fixed power and wind 
power tariffs, which reduces price flexibility (Int. 28, 2013). Overall, these ’physical’ and 
’institutional’ ‘inflexibilities’ are being constituted as a barrier to integrating larger shares of 
wind power into the grid, as these inflexibilities are tying China by its own ”constraining 
ropes”, some of which are regulative and institutional, while others are physical: ”China is 
doing all the right things, but being tied by itself” (Int. 26, 2013). With such ’inflexibilities’ 
of China’s power grid and dispatching system, wind power integration is being associated 
with reduced grid maneuverability. That is, as wind penetration increases in the grid, 
”information is going up, options are going down” (Int. 26, 2013). In other words, since 
wind power adds another layer of complexity to grid operations, the power-TEN becomes 
”mathematically overconstrained” in its balancing operations  (Int. 26, 2013). In addition 
lacking advanced forecasting tools and other control systems, rapid wind power penetration 
has resulted in heavy fluctuations in netload curves and has created troubles for grid 
operators (Int. 26, 2013). Consequently, wind power tends to be framed as a ’troublemaker’ 
by grid operators, as they face increased information, while their room of maneuver to 
ensure grid balancing is being reduced. In this way, to ’deal with the variability’ of wind, the 
                                                     
87
 for instance, there is only little integration between China’s five-tier dispatching centres at 
national, regional, provincial, local, city, and county levels.  
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power grid and dispatching system must be made more ’flexible’ (China Energy Viewpoint, 
Sandholt, K., Feb. 11, 2013; Int. 8, 2013). 
Associations of costly wind power – on dependence on subsidies 
In addition, costs and prices of wind power play an important role in terms of the 
willingness or resistance towards introducing more wind power into China’s energy system. 
However, it is “very difficult for wind energy, also due to cheap coal. Wind turbines are still 
very expensive. But in the long-term, wind turbines should still have the market’” (Int. 31, 
2012). At present, there is resistance towards wind power due to its framing as a relatively 
expensive power source when compared with fossil fuels. As expressed by a Chinese wind 
energy expert, there should ”not [be] too much wind in China. Why? Because, it's still 
expensive” (Int. 8, 2013). Another Chinese expert explains,  
“we are not like Denmark. We have many resources of coal. So it is difficult, when and how you decide 
to promote these new energy sectors, since we have the low price [of] coal” (Int. 16, 2012). 
Hereby, wind power is being associated with higher prices. In this way, prices and price-
setting construct a competitive space between coal and wind, as price calculations make it 
possible to compare the relative costs and prices of wind power and fossil fuels. As wind 
power is still directly subsidised (like in many other countries), wind power is by various 
actors framed as relatively costly and lacking a ‘competitive advantage’ over coal: 
“The most crucial part is the price of electricity, many [WTMs] need government support. If in the 
future, the price of coal and conventional electricity keeps increasing, then wind energy will have a 
competitive advantage. Now [wind turbine] manufacturers are dependent on direct support” (Int.16, 
2013). 
Overall, as coal prices are relatively low, it is widely acknowledged that improvements in 
turbine and wind farm performance, and reductions of the cost of energy (i.e. cost of power 
generation in terms of US dollars per kilowatt hour) are seen as key elements to improving 
the relative competitiveness of wind power, and to the successful diffusion and deployment 
of wind energy (Li, 2010: 1164).  
Contesting calculative devices and their associations 
Having illustrated how the qualities associated to wind power tend to create resistance 
towards wind power in China, and creating a competitive space between wind power and 
fossil fuels, the chapter in the following dives further into the power struggle between coal 
and wind power. This is done by looking into how calculative devices and the ’calculative 
agencies’ that they construe are being contested. 
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The political nature of (in)flexibilities – and the role of software tools in making wind comparable to 
conventional power 
The calculative agencies that the associations of ’inflexibilities’ to coal and of lacking grid 
‘maneuverability’ have construed, and their ‘competitive space’ between wind power and 
coal, are in turn contestable. For instance, inflexibilities can be reduced by imposing higher 
requirements on wind farms and wind turbines (China Energy Viewpoint, Sandholt, Feb. 06, 
2014), which can e.g. be ensured through the introduction of higher standards, turbine- and 
plant-level software tools, grid codes, prediction and forecasting software tool kits, and 
technological tools to improve interregional dispatch and trading (Int. 26, 2013; Int. 36, 
2013). Such tools and technologies can help create associations of higher grid operation 
flexibility and of more ‘controllable’, predictable, and less disruptive wind power, as they 
help ”increase your options and give you better information” (Int. 26, 2013). Hereby, wind 
farms can begin to act more “as ‘normal’ power plants” (China Energy Viewpoint, Sandholt, 
Feb. 06, 2014). While such technical improvements put more pressure on the Chinese 
WTMs “to be innovative and deliver with high quality” (China Energy Viewpoint, Sandholt, 
Feb. 06, 2014), this is constituted as necessary in order to make wind power ’comparable’ to 
conventional fuels, which in turn is required for reducing resistance towards wind power in 
the grid. 
While putting pressure on technical improvements and innovations, the above at the same 
time indicates how associations of ‘(in)flexibility’, ‘disruptiveness’, and ‘uncertainty’ are 
negotiable and situational. Thus, wind power can be seen as “just adding an extra chunk of 
uncertainty […] just as there has always been uncertainty about the consumption of your 
load [energy production]” (Int. 26, 2013). In this way, rather than being incomparable to 
fossil fuels, wind power is framed as a matter of adding ”a little bit more of the same” into 
the grid (Int. 26, 2013), which requires additional ”economic planning and guessing at 
tomorrow’s load” (Int. 26, 2013). Framed in this way, ”if somebody says that wind power 
screws up your voltage, it’s a matter of bad planning and bad interconnection […] and 
backwardness in technologies” (Int. 26, 2013). Hereby, technologies i.a. for prediction 
emerge as important actors to translate larger shares of wind power into the grid, as the grid 
is like ”a lot of soldiers in need of a general” (Int. 26, 2013). Put simply, flexibility is ”what 
the battle [about wind penetration] is about”, and in this battle, ”technology matters” (Int. 
26, 2013). Ultimately, increasing wind power penetration – at the expense of coal – is not so 
much about fluctuations, but ”about operations [and] commitment from the system operator 
[the grid companies]” (Int. 26, 2013). 
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Overall, this demonstrates how caution is being voiced over constructed associations of 
‘physical’ and ‘institutional’ ‘inflexibility’, and the ‘impossibility’ of adding wind power to 
the grid. Instead, ‘inflexibilities’ are being construed as a ‘political’ matter. That is,  
”[t]hat coal is inflexible is not written in stone! This is a caution for policy people: Coal production 
versus wind production. Why would a coal producer reduce his production and earn less money to 
accommodate wind?…He will say, it’s not possible, I don’t have flexibility” (Int. 26, 2013). 
Overall, ‘physical’ and ‘institutional’ ‘inflexibilities’ framed largely as a ‘matter of fact’ 
seem to be transforming into a contested and ‘political’ ‘matter of concern’. Hereby, the 
calculative devices used to frame wind power, coal, and the grid are being negotiated and 
contested, and technologies have emerged as important framing devices in the struggle 
against different competing framings.  
Construing wind power as a ’real market product’ – on the issue of subsidies and costs 
At the same time, another struggle is taking place between framing tools, as part of the 
power struggle between wind power and coal in the emerging power-TEN. That is, a 
framing struggle is taking place to construe wind power as a so-called ‘real market product’, 
in order to qualify wind power as ‘competitive’ with fossil fuels.  
Attempts at reducing the cost of energy – moving towards the next revolution 
The struggle to construe wind power as a ‘real market product’ configures around attempts 
at reducing dependence of wind power on subsidies. Research institutions and WTMs in 
China and elsewhere “are putting a combined effort in bringing the wind industry out of a 
situation, where we need subsidies – and that’s a global phenomenon. The pressure is on 
subsidies” (Int. 1, 2013). Hereby, the wind power-TEN is entangled in a ‘global’ pressure on 
subsidies, based on conventional neoliberal arguments that subsidisation is to avoided 
(Chang, 2003). Thus, as wind power so far is still reliant on subsidisation, in China, as well 
as elsewhere, wind power is being constituted as a ‘political’ product, rather than a ‘real 
market product’: 
“So far, the wind industry is a policy product more than a real market product. The cost curve for wind 
energy is going down big time, but has still not reached the price of conventional energies. We [foreign 
WTM] are aiming at making the [cost] curve steeper. This is done by reducing cost of production, 
installation, and service, and by increasing efficiency” (Int. 64, 2012). 
In the struggle against coal and other cheaper fossil fuels, attempts are thereby made at 
dissociating wind power from subsidies and construing associations of economic ‘viability’ 
and ‘performance’, in order to construe wind power as a so-called ‘real market product’. The 
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wind power-TEN is consequently, on a world-wide basis, in general striving to decrease the 
‘cost of energy’ and the lifetime generating cost of wind power (Int. 64, 2012). In turn,  
reducing the cost of energy is largely a matter of increasing “how much electricity you can 
squeeze out of the wind. That’s the first thing. The other thing is the cost of capital” (Int. 1, 
2013). In this way, the next ‘breakthrough’ in the wind power-TEN is predicted to be, “if the 
learning continues” (Int. 1, 2013), when wind power will ’break even’ with conventional 
energy. Such a ‘revolution’ would make it possible to associate wind power with ‘real 
market prices’, and dissociating wind from subsidisation (Int. 1, 2013): 
“I don’t think the next breakthrough in the industry will come in technology. I think we will continue to 
see improvements. I think the next breakthrough will be to bring down our costs of energy, where we can 
compete at market prices – when that happens – once the incremental breakthrough in technology has 
made the costs of energy so low that we can compete at market prices, we are going see a revolution 
again. And that is not going to happen tomorrow” (Int. 1, 2013). 
Also in China, “many studies [are conducted] on how to calculate [cost of energy] based on 
different methodologies, [that is] we [China] also have many discussions related to the cost 
of energy, it is not only wind energy, but nuclear. We also had some discussions after the 
earthquake in Japan – and also on water energy [hydro-power]” (Int. 16, 2011). A battle-line 
between wind power and coal, as well as other power sources, is hereby construed around 
cost-minimisation and ‘breakeven’, in which i.a. cost curves and market price calculations 
play a performative role. 
Attempts at including the cost of pollution into coal prices 
The various comparative cost and price calculations, some of which have been indicated 
above, as well as the selected calculative devices and the calculative agencies that they 
construe, are not dissociated from politics, however. Instead, cost calculations are i.a. co-
performing the struggle between wind power and coal. That is, proponents of wind power 
attempt to counter conventional calculations of breakeven and subsidies, which tend to 
frame wind power as non-competitive, through other calculative means. Thus, wind power 
proponents seek to make coal and wind power more comparable in terms of costs (and 
subsidisation), as they point to how ‘actual’ costs of fossil fuels are much higher than 
reflected in the price of coal. That is, the environmental costs of fossil fuels are ’hidden’ as 
they are not being included into the price of fossil fuels. Since fossil fuel prices are “not 
taking externalities into consideration”, they do not account for “what pollution has of extra 
costs” (Int. 63, 2012). Hereby, since power prices in China do not “compensate for negative 
externalities of fossil fuels” (García, 2013: 140), it is argued that fossil fuels ”receive 
subsidies indirectly on the electricity price” (Int. 63, 2012). This makes it difficult for wind 
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power to “compete on equal terms” (Int. 63, 2012). Yet, “if counting the negative 
externalities of fossil fuels, wind energy is competitive [and] wind can compete….but also 
without any formal subsidy” (Int. 63, 2012). This issue of the ‘real cost of energy’, i.e. 
whether or not to include the cost of pollution in the price of fossil fuels, is, however, also 
constituted as ‘political’: 
“That’s the big debate – because everyone is asking, when to get rid of subsidies [of wind power]. And 
nobody is talking about the enormous amount of subsidies going into fossil fuels – and the real cost of 
polluting with such things. So it’s a struggle” (Int. 1, 2013). 
According to a Chinese official, this ”is a very interesting topic, but frankly speaking this is 
also part of a political discussion” (Int. 65, 2012). In this way, coal and their cost 
calculations are being constituted as a politically sensitive issue. To avoid such associations 
of ‘sensitivity’, and to produce resistance, foreign WTMs attempt to frame the issue, not as 
an issue of “bashing coal in China”, which is “a bad idea” (Int. 1, 2013), but instead by 
“bringing some examples of real cost of energy” (Int. 1, 2013). This expresses a desire for 
employing and developing pacifying, ‘innocent’ calculative devices for comparative cost 
calculations. Yet, from the above, it seems that the very calculative devices and the 
calculative agencies they construe, are open for debate and thus can become ‘political’, as 
they are entangled in a qualification struggle between wind power and coal in the power-
TEN.   
The issue of curtailment and environmental sustainability 
While myriads of attempts are taking place at framing wind power as a sustainable power 
source, which can be compared to conventional fuels in terms of flexibilities, prices, costs 
etc., resistance against wind power in the emerging power-TEN is, however, still regarded as 
pervasive. Indeed, a ”battle between the traditional power plant interests and the new 
technologies” (Int. 18, 2013) is taking place in China. The resistance against wind power, 
i.a. due to associations of ‘disruptiveness’ and ‘inflexibilities’, has in turn overflowed in 
terms of curtailed wind power. That is, to ease the balancing operations in the grid, grid 
companies have often decided to curtail wind farms. This is often chosen as the solution, as 
coal-fired power plants on their part lack incentives to reduce own production, which makes 
it ”pretty understandable that the coal-fired power plants are saying, well, it’s not smart to 
have wind in the system” (Int. 18, 2013). Further, grid operators often lack the required 
advanced forecasting tools and other software tools to increase flexibilities. Consequently, 
as ”a matter of balancing wind and coal” (Int. 19*, 2013), ”it’s the grid-connected wind 
turbines, which are being curtailed […] because there’s not enough space on the grid. That’s 
simply the reason why!” (Int. 8, 2013): 
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”The first thing they shut off is the wind power…because the coal is cheaper and makes more money. So, 
if I were Chinese, I’d do the same thing. There’s no question about that” (Int. 63, 2012). 
Hereby, in terms of curtailment, ”there’s an outright conflict there [between coal and wind], 
that’s obvious” (Int. 18, 2013). Since ”curtailment – that’s electricity not being used!” (Int. 
26) – high curtailment rates somewhat paradoxically produce further resistance towards 
wind power i.a. amongst investors, grid operators, developers, and generating companies, as 
associations of ‘waste(d resources)’ are being construed to wind power. In this way, ”when 
the high wind comes simultaneously with low demand […] this is what makes everybody in 
China crazy!” (Int. 26, 2013). Apart from producing associations of wasted money, curtailed 
wind power also threatens to destabilise the framing of wind power as ‘environmentally 
sustainable’. Set into an equation, it reads: 
”Curtailed wind power = more pollution + more costs + less incentives for new wind power” (China 
Energy Viewpoint, Sandholt, Jan. 27, 2013). 
Overall, the issue of curtailment (i.e., when wind turbines are able to deliver electricity, but 
not allowed to) – as well as of lacking grid connection (i.e., when wind farms are not 
connected due to technical issues) – are expressed increasingly as a matter of concern for 
China’s ‘sustainable transition’ by actors in the emerging wind power-TEN. That is, socio-
material resistances to wind power integration such as curtailment and grid connection 
issues, some of which have been illustrated in the above, are likely to continue the 
dominance of fossil fuels such as coal in the grid, and to create further resistance against 
wind power due to associations of ‘waste’ and technical unsustainability. Put simply, the 
reduction of coal consumption by adding wind in China, ”that’s what the battle is about!” 
(Int. 26, 2013). 
The environment lost in translation – and found again  
Suddenly, it seems the ‘the environmental’ reappears in the analysis. That is, it can be 
claimed that ‘the environment(al)’ and the issue of a potential ‘sustainable transition’ has so 
far largely ‘been lost in translation’, as the controversy-mapping of marketisation of Chinese 
wind power has been centred around associations of i.a. technical, scientific, and economic 
sustainability, rather than environmental sustainability. Yet, as worries over wasted 
resources from curtailed wind power seem to increase, in tandem with the ongoing quality 
crisis and the qualification struggle it has produced, the framing of wind power as 
‘environmentally (un)sustainable’ begins to be voiced as a matter of concern amongst actors 
in the emerging wind power-TEN. This concern for the unsustainability of wasted resources 
from curtailment is expressed below. That is, curtailment means that 
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”you have a lot of coal-based power plants, which just stand there and burn off a lot of power, and they 
actually don’t care. They are just producing like crazy. And that’s not sustainable. That’s a matter of a 
resource waste of unimaginable dimensions” (Int. 2, 2013).  
In turn, if the quality of ‘environmental sustainability’ starts to fall apart, the overall 
rationale of engaging in renewable energies and wind power in China (as e.g. expressed in 
the Renewable Energy Law (REL)) may start to unravel, potentially destabilising the 
emerging wind power-TEN. Yet, the concern for the ‘environmental’ seems to surface 
amongst different actors in the emerging wind power-TEN, not just in the political pole as 
an official discourse, but also in the market, scientific, and technical poles (Int. 2, 2012; Int. 
9, 2012; Int. 18, 2013). The concern for ‘the environmental’ in the market pole still seems 
led largely by the political pole, however: For instance, a Chinese domestic component 
supplier, for instance, refers to how the National Energy Administration (NEA) under the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has recently emphasised the need 
to make “the development of China's new energy development a matter of environmental 
protection. For that [environmental protection] you need development of new energy, and 
what is included in these new energies? That’s photovoltaic, wind power, nuclear energy, 
and biomass power, that’s called the New Energy” (Interview 6*, 2013). Overall, it is also 
claimed that “the attitude of [Chinese] people may be changing slowly, so renewable 
energies as wind may become very important, thinking that coal has to die, and that oil has 
to die” (Int. 6*, 2013). Hereby, the issue of the environmental costs is being raised as a 
matter of concern. Conversely, there is still vast resistance to renewable energies in China’s 
emerging power-TEN, where  
“they [’traditional forces of fossil fuels’] still think that renewable energy cannot become a mainstream 
energy, that it cannot replace the traditional energy sources, chemical energy sources. They think they 
are nothing, that they are illusory, they think that within the next 50 years, 100 years, 200 years, we have 
to rely on coal, have to rely on oil, and the forces of this understanding are very strong” (Int. 6*, 2013).  
Likewise, according to a Chinese expert on wind power, in China “it’s like a ferocious 
scream. Everyone is calling, but the sound of the traditional forces [fossil fuels] are much 
greater than the forces engaged in renewable energy (Int. 21*, 2013). Overall, this indicates 
that marketisation of wind power is entangled in a power struggle of China’s power-TEN in 
which wind and coal, amongst others, are competing, involving myriads of heterogeneous 
actors. 
Diving deeper into socio-technical barriers to wind power penetration 
In the above, it has been indicated how a controversy is evolving over cost and price 
calculations, which has construed a competitive space between wind power and fossil fuels 
such as coal in China, as well as producing concerns over the environmental sustainability of 
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wind power. To dive further into the power struggle between wind power and coal, the 
thesis in the following traces further potential socio-technical barriers to wind power 
penetration, which may be ‘particular’ to marketisation of wind power in China, by taking 
outset in the curtailment and grid connection issues, and relating it to a potentially particular 
‘fragmented’ mode of marketisation in Chinese wind power.  
Lack of coordination between grid expansion and wind power installations 
The issues of curtailment and lacking grid connection are linked to issues of coordination of 
grid expansions and new wind farm projects. That is, while wind farms are relatively 
quickly installed, grid expansion has not been able to keep pace (Int. 28, 2013). As 
expressed quite bluntly, 
”they [China] have this disconnect…because maybe the nuclear power plants decide they want some 
wind turbines…but it’s typical of China…you start out big… And then you assume that there will be 
people to buy it all. You don’t ask yourself: ’What’s the demand for this?’” (Int. 42, 2012). 
The issue of curtailment (and grid connection) is hereby largely being framed as a matter of 
poor planning, since ”in the planning, it has not been considered how to integrate all the 
wind. This has resulted in wind curtailment. A big concern. The capacity of the grid has 
been exceeded” (Int. 28, 2013). Accordingly, Chinese actors acknowledge that there has 
been a lack of coordination in both the planning and the development phase:  
”We have more installed capacity, but the grid connection cannot be established this fast. At first, during 
the planning stage, the power grid company doesn't know where to develop wind, how much wind will be 
developed. So they cannot make their own grid connection plan. So the second one, also for big 
connection, the transmission line...eh...the feasibility study to approve the procedure and the cost of 
construction...the period of this [is] much longer than for wind. So...the first is, you...eh...we already 
completed the construction of the wind farm, but we still have to wait at least half a year to one year or 
even more, for the grid connection” (Int. 8, 2013). 
In particular, this issue is being linked to lacking coordination between central and local 
development plans. During the initial growth phase of the wind power market, provincial 
governments were allowed to approve wind farm projects below 50 MW, where ”the rules 
of the game are much freer than for the larger wind farms” (Int.1, 2012): 
“Until recently, there was a rule that regional governments could approve wind farms themselves up to 
50 MW without approval from the central government, whereas parks above 50 MW must go through an 
approval by the central government. It’s sort of like a market controlled by Beijing, and then a free 
market. Of course, there’s no such thing as a free market in a Chinese context, but it will simply be 
easier to get a project approval, if your project is below 50 megawatts – you don’t have to go through 
Beijing” (Int. 1, 2013).  
366 
 
However, such decentralisation of control has resulted in extensive overflowing, as also 
briefly illustrated in earlier chapters, in terms of lacking grid connection and curtailment. 
The seemingly ‘careless’ behaviour of local governments, which have often allowed wind 
farms to be established regardless of the demand for wind power, can in turn be linked to 
how economic performance of local provinces in China remains a ”principal yardstick for 
cadre evaluation under CCP’s nomenklatura system and state administrative hierarchy” 
(McNally, 2006: 20). This implies that many provincial officials have not been concerned 
about whether wind farms could be connected, or whether they all had “to be reinstalled, 
reinvested, retro-fitted, because then it will again figure as 1,000 wind turbines, and thus 
increasing local GDP [gross domestic production]” (Int. 24, 2013). That is, as incentives for 
local officials have conventionally been based on local growth rates (GDP figures), many 
provinces have gone ”beyond target, so that the wind power was not integrated into the 
system” (Int. 28, 2013; Int. 18, 2013). Over time, however, China’s political leadership has 
assigned higher performance ratings for environment- and energy-related work and 
technological innovation, rather than just favouring GDP growth (PWC, 2013: 2), which 
may help to solve part of the overflowing, i.e. , the grid connection and curtailment issue. 
China’s matrix muddle – and Chinese fragmented marketisation in wind power 
In turn, the lack of coordination is being framed as ”one of the main problems for China […] 
That it’s uncoordinated, what’s going on, in relation to how much is actually happening” 
(Int. 20, 2013):  
”It’s obvious, that a streamlined, coordinated planning, they don’t have that. And that’s also…also a 
problem in other places. In the US, they had this long discussion, a chicken and egg discussion. Like – 
what’s coming first? Is it the wind turbines, and then the grid afterwards, or is it installment of lines to 
areas of wind and then hoping that someone will install [wind turbines]?” (Int. 8, 2013). 
Although poor coordination may not be unique to China, the issue of insufficient and 
‘fragmented’ coordination runs through all areas and industries of China. Overall, the 
uncoordinated mode of marketisation of wind power seems to convey a story on China’s so-
called ’fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal, 2004(1995): 187). That is, China is divided 
into different “crisscrossing jurisdictions: the vertical bureaucracies are called lines (tiao 
[条]), while the horizontal coordinating bodies at various levels are called pieces (kuai [块]). 
The relationships between the vertical and horizontal bodies are called tiao/kuai guanxi” 
(Lieberthal, 2004(1995): 187). This implies that geographical vertical coordination lines 
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between ‘centre’ and ‘locality’ (Lieberthal, 2004(1995: 186)88 run along horizontal 
coordination lines (within a given geographic area), which in turn are segregated into 
bureaucratic/functional silos (Lieberthal 2004(1995)). At each geographical jurisdictional 
level, CPC and government bodies (functional silos) are being duplicated, resulting in 
jurisdictions of decentralised, compartmentalised structures along both horizontal and 
vertical lines. This is conventionally framed as China’s so-called ‘matrix muddle’ 
(Lieberthal, 2004(1995): 186-188). In turn, this Chinese matrix muddle is conventionally 
assumed to produce multiple power struggles and vested interests along both horizontal and 
vertical lines. That is, in China,  
”powerful vested interests further increases fragmentation and strains the existing political and 
economic order. Vested interests are closely intertwined with the iron triangle of business-Party-state 
relations” (Brødsgaard, 2012b: 5). 
Since decision-making is influenced by bureaucracies at both national and provincial level 
(Brødsgaard, 2012b), the matrix muddle and mode of fragmented authoritarianism make 
coordination and decision-making processes protracted in China, as they must be negotiated 
across administrative ’silos’, which tend to work poorly particularly along ‘horizontal’ lines. 
That is, governing along intersecting lines and across different levels is highly complex in 
China, as it produces power struggles both along kuai- and tiao-lines, e.g. as officials of any 
given office have a number of bosses in different places (Lieberthal, 2004(1995)). The 
“fragmentation of authority in the Chinese political administrative hierarchy makes it 
relatively easy for one actor to frustrate the adoption or successful implementation of 
important policies, especially since units (and officials) of the same bureaucratic rank cannot 
issue bindings orders to each other” (Lieberthal 2004(1995): 188). This tends to exacerbate 
the issue of weak local enforcement of central policies (Lieberthal 2004(1995); García, 
2013: 134-135). In the case of wind power,  
”what’s challenging in China, that’s…to a larger extent than in other places, that you are operating very 
much within decision silos. That is, the ministries are very…they have a very efficient – I think – vertical 
communication, and the local governments…There are good connections [from the local level]...to the 
central [level]….But across [horizontal]…and that goes all the way up and down, in that regard it’s 
really troublesome”  (Int. 18, 2013). 
In this way, the uncoordinated mode of wind power installments and grid integration 
depicted above seems entangled in China’s matrix muddle and may be claimed to perform a 
specific mode of Chinese market construction, i.e. constituting what may be treated as 
‘fragmented marketisation’ of wind power.  
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 According to China’s four territorial entities, i.e. state, province, county, and city levels 
(Lieberthal, 2004(1995): 179-185). 
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Vested interests in the emerging wind power- and power-TENs 
As the Chinese potentially emerging wind power-TEN is entangled in a power struggle 
between wind power and fossil fuels of the power-TEN, marketisation of wind power in 
China indeed seems characterised by multiple ‘stakeholders’ (García, 2013: 134-135) with 
“a lot of very powerful interests” (Int. 63, 2012) across bureaucratic silos. These are e.g. the 
SASAC-listed ‘Big Five’ generating companies and the State Grid, as well as coal 
companies and a variety of different ministries involved in different power sources (Int. 1, 
2013; Int. 18, 2013). In addition, there are diverse factional infights (García, 2013: 134-135) 
in the power-TEN, for instance as the State Grid “does not have a clear attitude towards 
wind” (Int. 18, 2013). In this way, the power-TEN, which co-constitutes and is co-
constituted by the wind power-TEN, seems characterised by ’vested interests’. Such vested 
interests in China are “in particular powerful in the case of SOEs located in the heavy-
industrial sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas, steel, power generation, and machine-
building” (Brødsgaard, 2012b: 5). Although the Chinese Government has supported the 
renewable energy sector massively, there thus seems to be powerful resistance against wind 
power in the power-TEN, since those fighting renewable energies ”are engaging more in 
getting stronger than those engaging in renewable energies, and this is China's biggest 
problem” (Int. 21*, 2013). These various power struggles amongst heterogeneous actors can 
indeed be claimed to produce Chinese ‘institutional ropes’, which are constraining wind 
power (Int. 26, 2013).  
Power sector reforms – a revolution of the power-TEN or harmless changes 
From the above, it becomes clear that while coal is ”a competitor [to wind]” (Int. 18, 2013), 
the power-TEN is constituted by myriads of power struggles – and a lack of consensus – 
along criss-crossing lines, which produce further barriers to the integration of wind power 
into the power grid, as well as to a ’revolution of China’s energy system’:  
“So you think, asking whether it’s a revolution of China's energy system? To reduce the use of coal, 
right? […] Enhancing the use of renewable energy? This is the most fundamental issue, i.e. the 
awareness of renewable energy. Do you think that in the future, like in Denmark, in Germany, there will 
be a reliance on renewable energy, and where not only 20, 30, 50, but 100 per cent should come from 
renewable energy sources? Originally, it was 20, then 30, then 50 per cent – like in Germany and 
Denmark now…In a century,would the share rise to 100 per cent renewable energy?…I think this is the 
most important direction. However, China's biggest problem is that there is no consensus on the 
structure of China's future energy system, there is no consensus, there is great resistance, from those 
engaged in traditional energy sources, like coal, nuclear, and those engaged in oil (Int. 21*, 2013). 
Facing resistance from not only coal, but also from nuclear power and oil, the analysis 
renders a picture of heterogeneous socio-technical barriers to sustainable transition. 
Accordingly, rather than attempting a ‘revolution’ in the power-TEN, the State Grid is “not 
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interested in changes” (Int. 63, 2012). Conversely, the State Grid is conservative and ”very 
stubborn. The State Grid still thinks that the future is coal. The concepts of the State Grid 
have not changed” (Int. 21*, 2013). However, ”there’s nothing strange in the way that there’s 
huge resistance in parts of the State Grid. And it’s not surprising that some of them can see 
that in the longer run, well, yeah, of course we need to change this” (Int. 18, 2013). That is, 
integrating larger shares of wind power into the grid, constituting a potential revolution of 
China’s energy system, will no doubt produce multiple controversies, vested interests, and 
power struggles. While power sector reforms are upcoming, instead of attempting a 
’revolution’, only smaller, cautious steps are therefore taken. Thus,  
”it’s difficult to find out how the State Grid is developing. Everybody talks about the State Grid having to 
develop. Everybody is talking about this Power Sector Reform. That’s in the Five-Year Plans, it’s in 
NEA’s [National Energy Administration] plan. And it’s being mentioned at the Central Committee 
meeting, so something will happen, I think everybody is agreeing on that. But there’s huge disagreement 
as to what is going to happen. [Instead of large changes] they are going for the small victories instead 
of…because when they speak about power sector reforms, then they are talking about some adjustments 
now, and ’then from 2020 we can make something bigger’, and ’then from 2030 we can do some things 
fundamentally different’…but they try to articulate the necessity to change things in a somewhat 
’harmless’ way. It’s not right now that things are going to change. But at the same time you are thinking, 
if you can do something tomorrow, then let’s try it, haha. But the way that they are talking about it, it’s 
by making it ’harmless’” (Int. 18, 2013). 
As State Grid frames changes and reforms as ’harmless’ in order to reduce resistance, it is 
indicated how an ongoing ”battle between the traditional power plant interests and the new 
technologies” (Int. 183, 2013) is taking place in the Chinese power-TEN. 
Voicing concerns over the need to improve coordination 
As China’s fragmented mode of marketisation has produced extensive overflowing, e.g. 
lacking grid connection, curtailment issues, and resistance to wind power, concern is being 
voiced by actors in the emerging wind power-TEN over the need to improve coordination 
and ensure consensus on wind power integration. That is, involved actors should ”sit down 
together” to align targets and ambitions of conventional and renewable power sources (Int. 
28, 2013). That is, the ”fairly ambitious wind power plans, but also very ambitious coal 
expansion plans” of local governments should be aligned (Int. 18, 2013). While such an 
alignment of interests amongst functional silos is still lacking, a move has been made to 
improve central-local coordination across geographical jurisdictions. That is, the Chinese 
Central Government has engaged in an effort to minimise the ’provincial free-riding’ (Int. 1, 
2013), by centralising the approval process of new wind farm projects (as depicted in 
Chapter 7). That is, “they [the Chinese Government] said they want to take full control of 
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the market. They don’t want to accept this provincial free riding…the provincial free 
markets” (Int. 1, 2013).  
Zooming in on potential particularities of Chinese green marketisation  
Having conveyed an account of some of the multiple socio-technical resistances to China’s 
sustainable translation, and having inquired into a controversy over cost and price 
calculations, which is entangled in a seemingly particular Chinese mode of fragmented 
marketisation, the analysis in the following zooms further in on some of the potential 
(experimental) particularities of green marketisation in China.  
Fragmentation as a means of rapid industrial scale-up 
While the above account has offered a somewhat bleak account of the ’fragmented 
marketisation’, there is also another way to frame the issue. That is,  
“[f]ragmentation in China’s energy governance has allowed for a fast-growing wind turbine market. In 
times when industry development was sorely needed in order to create domestic wind turbine 
manufacturers, local governments were allowed to approve wind farm projects, and the media and other 
actors focused solely on noncritical issues with development. In times of overcapacity, the tune changed 
radically. This was especially evident after 2011, when the full force of centralising power was levied 
onto the industry and the wind industry growth rate declined. The government is indeed flexing all the 
muscles in its institutional body in order to navigate the development (Korsnes, 2014: 196) 
The above quote indicates that the development of the wind power-TEN is a matter (perhaps 
first and foremost) of Chinese industrial policy, and an agenda of upgrading and catch-up. 
That is, the construction of a wind power market-TEN has been influenced by “all these 
agendas. They also had this industrial policy agenda with it, right, and that was quite 
obvious, and they didn’t hide that either [They are] more acknowledging that this was 
industrial policy” (Int. 20, 2013). Also expressed by an expert within China’s wind power 
industry, ”there are some powerful drivers...the industry driver is huge in China, no doubt 
about that. […] One part is the energy policy, that they really want…they want this green 
industry. So therefore, they want to do a lot to ensure that there will be enough wind power” 
(Int. 18, 2013). Overall, resembling a strategy of rapid scale-up, the Chinese “leadership is 
very good, identifying areas, ‘here’s a spot – it’s not really well-developed…and with our 
speed and capital we can get that up to a level, where we can become leaders’” (Int. 1, 2013). 
With such agenda of rapid industrial development, the political pole allowed local 
governments and developers to invest in new installments in a ‘fragmented mode’ in the 
initial phase. This resulted in the rapid growth of the wind power-TEN, creating a 
momentum for industrial development.  
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Gradually fine-tuning policies in the wind-power TEN 
However, as illustrated throughout the analysis, this mode of rapid industrial scale-up has 
fostered continuous overflowing. For instance, in the initial phase, China 
”just wanted some capacity, but was not interested in whether anything [electricity] was generated. But 
that means…that may be a good strategy to get started, that you don’t set up a lot of big barriers in the 
beginning. And it’s obvious that this will result in some problems…these turbines are not very good at 
adapting to the grid. And in 2010 and ’11, then you had some pretty large black-outs due to the voltage 
fluctuation” (Int. 18, 2013). 
The ‘fragmented approach’ to industrial development in the emerging wind power-TEN has 
further been characterised by a gradualist fine-tuning of policies, as overflowing have 
occurred along the way. That is, ”dependent on different stages, different needs, different 
circumstances, different appropriate policies will be enacted. I think this is also a help in the 
development of the whole industry” (Int. 37*, 2013). While gradual adaptation of wind 
power policies is not unique to China, Chinese policy-making (and capitalist transition) is 
often characterised as a matter of ’groping for the stones under-foot while crossing the river’ 
(Goldstein, 1996: 149)89. This further denotes a fragmented and experimental mode of 
policy-making, where industrial policy is also often “rolled out informally and allowed to 
develop organically with shifts in producer practices on the ground. Only after practices 
disseminate and prove successful are the policies then formally announced and 
institutionalized” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 31). This is, indeed, visible in various policies 
related to wind power. For instance, gradual adjustment of policies has been witnessed in the 
case of price-setting for wind power during concession projects (setting the FITs), the 
introduction and abolition of local content requirements, and the potential shift in target-
setting from pure capacity installations towards energy feed-in (through the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) currently in hearing). In addition, it has been witnessed in new 
technical standards to raise quality of wind turbines and of grid connection, and in the 
constant oscillation between centralisation and decentralisation of approvals of new wind 
farms (see also Chapters 6, 7, and 8).  
Such gradualist fine-tuning in Chinese policy-making is often framed as a matter of 
‘experimentation’ (Heilmann, 2008; 2009; 2011; Korsnes, 2014). Taking wind power and 
concession projects and price-setting as an example, this is thus claimed to have functioned 
“as an experimental point for policy development” (Korsnes, 2014: 185). That is, up to 2009 
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 The notion of ‘groping for the stones while feeling for the stones under-foot’ is normally 
related to China’s incremental post-Mao market reforms, constituting a gradualist ‘capitalist’ 
transition (Goldstein, 1996: 149). 
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when the FITs was set, concessions were useful for experimenting and gaining experience 
with pricing policies, which facilitated the coordination of further wind power projects 
through the national FIT (Korsnes, 2014: 186). As explained by a Chinese expert in wind 
power, ”from year 2003 to 2009, we gained experience with the incentives structure [with 
the] purpose for [the] government…[to] try...first for developers...try to lower the generating 
cost” (Int. 8. 2013) as nobody knew in the initial phase ”what is the reasonable cost for 
wind, because of the lack of experience by commercial projects” (Int. 8, 2013). Not knowing 
the ’appropriate’ price, ”the Government tried to use this way to bring down the cost of wind 
generating electricity” (Int. 8, 2013). However, this meant that the first prices were ”even 
lower than coal” (Int. 8, 2013). Since it was the lowest price, which would win the bid in the 
initial phase, and as the bidders ”only want to win the bid”, prices were too low in the initial 
phase (Int. 8, 2013). Through consultations with the Chinese Government, Chinese wind 
power experts ”always strongly convince[d] the government [that this was] nonsense” (Int. 
8, 2013), as the low prices led to unprofitable projects and poor quality turbines. Over time, 
the Chinese Government seems to have realised that ”it's better, not to take the lowest price. 
Should be the average price, by all offered bidding prices, haha, that way should be better. 
Better than lower [lowest], but [still] not reasonable” (Int. 8, 2013). Finally, after more 
experiments and fine-tuning of the FIT, ”we have a benchmark feed-in tariff on wind 
power...that in fact [in] year 2009 [is] for a whole life-time…it's much better. So this is a big 
incentive for developers” (Int. 8, 2013). In this way,  
“gradualism and fragmentation are not entirely negative: Experimentation has paved the way for new 
policies, contributing to a quality check of policies with a smaller impact area, which have then been 
scaled up. The concession rounds amounted to 43 per cent of the total installed wind power capacity by 
the end of the last centrally given concession, meaning that they were not the largest source of turbine 
installations at that point. However, the concession rounds predated the Renewable Energy Law and 
provided useful experience for fine-tuning the legislative measures” (Korsnes, 2014: 194). 
First do it, then solve it! 
The gradualist adjustment of policies over time is often being characterised as a particular 
‘Chinese way’ of experimentation, characterised by an approach of ‘first doing it, and then 
solving it’. This is ”impossible in Europe. I call this a political project. It's very special” (Int. 
8, 2013). Rather than spending long time on planning or coordination, the Chinese approach 
involves experimentation along the way.  
”In China, [it’s] very strange, maybe different from Europe, but in China every...we first do it - then to 
solve it! […] In Europe, you [are] waiting to experiment, to try to...to make...but that maybe saves the 
money, but the problem will take more time to solve, I guess, haha” (Int. 8, 2013). 
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Following such experimental marketisation mode – i.e., of ‘doing it first’, and then 
producing “more problems” (Int. 8, 2013) – may help provide a partial explanation for the 
rapid development and scale-up of wind power installments, as well as for the resulting 
overflowing (e.g. in terms of quality, lacking generated electricity, and curtailment). In the 
explanation offered by the Chinese, ’doing things fast’ is largely framed in positive terms. 
That is, as the trial-and-error approach produces problems faster (due to the ‘appropriate’ 
lack of planning), China has been forced to be innovative in solving them, and thus to learn 
faster from the overflowing. Thus, by experimenting,  
”then you have the problems, which force people to solve them. […] If the problem had not appeared, 
nobody would have considered that [a potential problem]” (Int. 8, 2013). 
In this perspective, the issue of curtailment “is good thing. For example, for this kind of 
curtailment, only five or six years ago, I think...it should have happened in the year 2020 
[reaching Gigawatt-target in installed capacity], but almost ten years ahead of that…So we 
are facing this problem, so it will force us to have the solutions. This is good” (Int. 8, 2013).  
On seizing the opportunity of the crisis - and ’Human Wave Attack’ tactics  
In this account, failures and crises are framed as opportunities for learning. Thus, 
curtailment amongst other things is framed as a matter of seizing not only the ‘threat’ but 
also the opportunity’ of the crisis. This may be claimed to reflect how, in Chinese, the 
characters for ’crisis’ (危机 (weiji)) literally mean threat (wei) and opportunity (ji): 
”This is a very difficult time, but you know in Chinese, it's 危机 [weiji, crisis], you know, crisis, so wei 
(危) means threat, ji (机) means opportunity, so a smart company will find an opportunity in the worst 
time” (Int. 5, 2012). 
Accordingly, foreign actors frame China as a large ’laboratory’, as they are experimenting 
more (Int. 15, 2012). Yet, ”we don’t really understand the scale in China […] So we think 
that it’s terrible” with the failing wind turbines, while ”they just say, it’s fun trying it off… 
There’s a long way to 2020, so now we’ve got this, and then we’ll figure out what to do 
next” (Int. 15, 2012). In terms of WTMs, this experimental mode is also reflected in how 
they 
”put the components faster into the turbines for example […] Where we would instead have…if you take 
Vestas for example, they do most of it in the laboratory. And they have a project leader, and they 
calculate and make plans. Here – they don’t make plans. They just jump into it, and then sometimes they 
make some mistakes. And then they re-adjust. So the time you would use on planning, you could use 
instead on… [learning from your mistakes]” (Int. 15, 2012). 
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The experimental mode of ’doing it’, and then learning from the mistakes, is also being 
framed as ”the Chinese way” of the so-called ’Human Wave Attack’, which is an old 
Chinese offensive tactics, in which an attacker conducts an unprotected frontal assault with 
densely concentrated infantry formations against the enemy line, intended to overrun the 
defenders. That is, ”the Chinese way, you know, we call ’renhaizhanshu’ [’Human Wave 
Attack’/人海战术], zhidao ma? [知道吗?/do you know that?]” (Int. 8, 2013). Framing 
China’s wind power -TEN through this metaphor, an account of gradual learning-by-doing, 
experimental trial and error from flooding the world market, not with infantry, but with wind 
turbines emerges. Consequently, the wind power-TEN is currently experimenting with 
means to contain the overflowing, as a qualification struggle unfolds. In this way, the 
Chinese may have begun running before walking. That is, while ”in Europe, you have 
developed wind energy for many years, so you know how it works, they know how to walk. 
China is just a beginner and we are walking and running, and learning. Sometimes we fall. 
Maybe I should walk or run with slower speed” (Int. 7, 2011). However, although falling 
from the high speed, the wind power-TEN has emerged rapidly and is now “attempting to 
consolidate and to transition towards quality” (Int. 20, 2013).  
A pragmatics of marketisation 
The above account displays how the vast amount of overflows in Chinese wind power is 
framed as a success story of gradual learning-by-doing and pragmatism rather than a failure. 
According to a Chinese expert on wind power, ”to learn from practice is much better than 
learn[ing] from theory or learn[ing] from imagination […] It's the Chinese way. The 
situation, the Chinese still have money […] Sometimes I think, too much money! (Int. 8, 
2013). Accordingly, a foreign actors explains, 
”maybe that’s how they [the Chinese Government] have looked at it. Let’s try to start up something. 
Let’s see what happens! [Then] they [the Chinese Government] make some policies, and then people 
follow those policies. And then they stop them. And then they look to see, what did we get out of that? 
And then they make some new [policies]” (Int.15, 2012). 
In Chinese, even the very notion of “pragmatism” translates as shiyan zhuyi (实验主义), 
which literally means “experimentalism” (Heilmann, 2008: 18). However, rather than blind 
trial and error, experimentalism in China is supposed to be “guided by intentional 
anticipation” (Heilmann, 2008: 18) and learning through direct practical experience 
(Heilmann, 2008: 19), as well as from failure. This learning-by-doing may be claimed to be 
what is taking place now, in the current ‘qualification struggle’: 
”Now the second wave is coming, now that they have realised that it may not be the best quality…it’s 
cheap, the prices have been pushed all the way to the bottom, which has been hard for the Western 
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manufacturers, because they have not been able to sell their turbines…they have decided that the price 
per kilowatt or per gigawatt has to be this and this low, and nobody can sell a quality turbine at that 
price. So, then around one, one and a half year ago or so, then the government intervened and changed 
its standpoint. Okay, we have to recognise that they are not good enough. They are not as they are 
supposed to be, so we need to…focus on quality…so that you […] and that’s kind of the situation that we 
are facing now” (Int. 13, 2013). 
Indeed, China and Chinese WTMs seem to be learning from overflowing in the current 
qualification struggle. As expressed by a foreign WTM, ”one of the things I’ve learned by 
studying China the last ten years is never to underestimate the capability of a Chinese 
company to learn from mistakes and move fast. I see them definitely being able to come up 
to world class level in the next three to five years” (Int. 1, 2013). Further, with gradually 
shifting goals and priorities of the political pole, along the learning process, grid companies 
and power generating companies now must change their “mindset” and “have to handle it 
[wind power]” (Int. 8, 2013):  
”In the future…now, I think they understand. If...without coal, without power, some day must it be 
exhausted, haha. Yeah, so you have to, now, for the transition stage, to try to find [a] way” (Int. 8, 2013). 
Apart from being ‘fragmented’, China’s mode of incremental learning in the emerging wind 
power-TEN may be termed a particular Chinese experimental ‘pragmatics of marketisation’. 
Adaptive responsiveness 
This seemingly particular mode of marketisation requires an ’agile’ Chinese Government. 
Indeed, the political pole of China’s potential wind power-TEN is framed as ”extremely 
good at adapting” (Int. 9, 2012). The different actors and poles of the emerging wind power-
TEN have “just [been] allowed to [try out]…and that with an entirely different budget, 
because it’s concession policy, right. […] According to our standards, it was quite a lot of 
money, but not according to their [standards]…it’s petty cash in their economy, because 
their scope is so huge…ehm…but then they close the gate, then they impose stricter 
requirements, and then they are sorting out [the poor [WTMs] from the good ones]” (Int. 20, 
2013). Apart from an agile government, also the market, scientific, and technical poles of 
the potential wind power-TEN must be agile, following adjustments in the policies of the 
political pole. Indeed, Chinese WTMs seem to ‘just go for it’ (Int. 9, 2012). While the 
political pole has motivated WTMs and other actors to enter the market, the rapid growth 
rates have also been a result of local experimentation ‘from bottom-up’:  
”I don't think this [rapid growth] really [comes] from the Government. This [comes] from the bottom up. 
The Government also does not like to develop so fast, for the Government, planning [is] always behind. 
[…] For onshore [wind power], the Government said, the year 2010, only five Gigawatt, but we had 
30...50-70 Gigawatt” (Int. 8, 2013). 
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This indicates that the emerging wind power-TEN is not just a matter of a ‘top-down master 
discourse’, but that there are also bottom-up indicators (Christensen, 2013: 77, 99-100). 
Indeed, there is room for local experimentation, as “[t]he institutional traits inducing the 
rapid growth of China’s wind power industry are based on legitimacy, alignment of 
expectations, and visions of incumbent and upcoming actors” (Korsnes, 2014: 196). In this 
way, “[i]n practice, the government has induced policy experiments, which have set in 
motion some of the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These, in turn, have had an 
influence both locally and nationally, and have lobbied towards increased policy support for 
wind energy” (Korsnes, 2014: 196). However, the simultaneous fragmented (and 
uncoordinated) mode of experimental marketisation may, at the same time, lead to 
overflowing, as Chinese WTMs are like ”rascals. When they realise that this is where it’s 
going, then they all throw themselves after it. Maybe that’s the weakness in their network, 
because then it is transferred to…then they all talk together, and then they all do the same at 
the same time” (Int. 15, 2012). As reflected in the account of China’s emerging wind power-
TEN, WTMs have indeed moved rapidly, and often simultaneously, which amongst other 
things has produced issues of overcapacity.  
Mapping the controversy – prices, costs, and contested sustainability in China’s 
pragmatics of marketisation 
In the above, an account of a potentially particular Chinese pragmatics of marketisation, 
constituted as a matter of experimental green marketisation, has been outlined, reflecting 
what may be framed as a particular tension between designing (e.g. through extensive 5YPs) 
and experimenting (Callon, 2009). While the picture that emerges is one, which does not 
stress either the ‘positive’ or the ‘negative’ side of this marketisation mode, a controversy, 
however, seems to emerge over the very sustainability of this particular marketisation mode. 
In the following, the analysis concludes with a mapping of how the controversy of cost and 
price calculations is intertwined with a controversy over the negotiated sustainability of 
China’s marketisation mode. This is done by pointing to how China’s marketisation in wind 
power constitutes a potentially ‘self-undermining’ strategy, whilst another account renders 
the development of the potential software-TEN as a matter of ‘agile’ learning-by-doing and 
of foresight. 
Fighting against (own) windmills – on a potentially self-undermining ‘Human Wave Attack’ 
So far, the chapter has illustrated how China “has mustered an impressive ingenuity in fine-
tuning policy mechanisms to induce the growth of a new industry” (Korsnes, 2014: 195). At 
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the same time, however, “[t]o be sure, the industry is facing considerable challenges; a quick 
industry buildup comes with a price” (Korsnes, 2014: 195). As displayed throughout the 
thesis, China’s “choice of governance carries with it several ‘nuisances’ that lead to goals 
being reached only partially or with several consequences. One recurrent topic is the priority 
of quantity over quality, and policies are often created without any enforcement mechanisms 
in place” (Korsnes, 2014: 192). The thesis has illustrated how China in the initial phase 
pursued a deliberate low-price strategy, made possible by low labour and manufacturing 
costs and plenty of land (Int. 20, 2013; Int. 8, 2013). In this approach, China did ”not need to 
do [research and] development. We can make do with the second-last generation” (Int. 20, 
2013). Yet, focused on price-competitiveness, and entangled in a Chinese ‘system problem’ 
(see Chapter 11), Chinese WTM have for long not been focused on upgrading quality. That 
is, concerned with wind power as constituting a means of industrial policy, when to 
”become competitive, when they would be able to supply quality turbines […] That was not 
the most important. The most important thing was to let the industry try…try produce some 
turbines. And then see whether any turbines would come out of that, and see whether any of 
them [WTMs] would become good at it” (Int. 20, 2013). However, according to some, this 
constitutes a ‘senseless policy’, since “it’s not just a car, which you can throw in the garbage 
(Int. 20, 2013). Indeed, the experimental learning from mistakes, e.g. by setting standards 
low to create incentives for installation of generation capacity or not feeding power into the 
grid (García, 2013: 140), seems to have flooded (and overflowed) the Chinese ‘market’ in an 
enormous wave – the ‘human wave attack’ – of poor quality turbines. As expressed below, 
“China’s quest for rapid growth has come at the expense of quality. For instance, the development goals 
set by the government have consistently been measured in terms of installed capacity, and not in terms of 
total electricity generated and delivered to the grid. A lack of incentive to ensure long-term electricity 
generation permeates the whole industry chain from component suppliers to local governments 
approving wind farms, SOEs investing in the wind farms and grid utilities managing the wind farms” 
(Korsnes, 2014: 196).  
The resulting overflowing in terms of quality issues has e.g. led to a need for retrofitting, 
which ”is expensive – everybody hates retrofit, it makes everybody really angry. It’s better 
to think ahead!” (Int. 26, 2013). By degrading quality and pursuing a ‘scale-up strategy’ 
(Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012; 2013/forthcoming), i.e. as wind turbine installments have 
skyrocketed while wind turbines have been ”downgraded to be cheap” (Int. 20, 2013), not 
‘leading at the cusp of novel-product innovation’ (Breznitz and Murphree, n.d.), China’s 
wind power-TEN may somewhat ironically destabilise itself, as it undermines the very 
framing of wind power as sustainable. That is, if overflowing results in even larger 
resistance, this strategy may be ’self-victimising’ or ’self-disruptive’. In this way, there may 
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be a trade-off between quality and rapid catch-up, as the analysis indicates. That is, “the 
preference for low-quality, state-owned projects, induced by government investment, is 
potentially destructive” (Korsnes, 2014: 193). Paradoxically, China is potentially ’fighting 
against [its own] windmills’.  
Delegitimising wind power – and destroying the global reputation of wind power? 
The low-cost strategy produces concerns for the future of the wind power-TEN. As 
expressed by a Chinese expert, the project of the Chinese Government is “very low price 
and very large installed capacity. Nobody cares about twenty years of generating costs”, 
which in turn has resulted in lacking incentives for improving quality (Int. 8, 2013). Apart 
from potentially ‘undermining’ itself, i.e. suffering from overflowing turbines in China as 
well as constituting ”a concern for Chinese companies seeking to export their products” 
(Gosens and Lu in Korsnes, 2014: 197), the Chinese experimental marketisation mode is 
being framed as a ‘global matter of concern’ for wind power. That is, China’s curtailed wind 
turbines risk delegitimising wind power globally:  
”Instead of having 40 factories, they could stick to a few […] It’s completely insane. It’s really worrying. 
In my world view, it’s really worrying that they do it in this way. Because it destroys the reputation of 
wind power, right. […] What do people think about wind power? People here, they taunt wind power 
when they read that 30 to 50 per cent of the wind turbines in China don’t work, then they taunt us and 
say, ’what the heck is this about?’ […] And that damages the reputation of wind power ” (Int. 20). 
Having focused on capacity rather than quality and generated electricity, and on low turbine 
prices rather than a low cost of energy – overflowing into wind turbines which are curtailed 
and/or cannot efficiently deliver energy at a reasonable cost – renewable energy 
development risks being framed as ‘politically’ unsustainable. The analysis has so far 
illustrated how the framing of wind power has become unstable in terms of technical, 
scientific, economic, financial, as well as environmental and political sustainability. In turn, 
the consistent and potentially self-disruptive overflowing may even delegitimise the 
emerging wind power-TEN, as wind power as a means to Scientific Development risks 
being undermined, in turn also threatening the qualification of wind power as 
‘developmentally’ sustainable. 
Construing a collaborative space between Chinese and foreign actors? 
Having displayed how Chinese experimental marketisation may destabilise the framing of 
the potentially emerging wind power-TEN as sustainable, there are however signs that China 
is learning from the overflowing, gradually moving towards a larger focus on quality. This 
has e.g. been illustrated in the case of new and higher standards, experimentation with 
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targets for generated electricity, as well as experimentation with new calculative tools. 
Indeed, actors in the Chinese wind power-TEN are working on ”how to develop a renewable 
energy industry, which […] is capable of surviving in the first place” (Int. 18 2013).  
As regards calculative tools for cost and price calculations, for example, these are gradually 
being aligned with those of foreign companies. That is, in the initial phase, Chinese public 
tendering practices have been based wind power installments (GW), spurring a focus on “the 
price of the turbine, not the cost of the energy” (Int. 63, 2013). In contrast, Western 
companies have been competing on the lowest lifetime generating cost and cost of energy, 
e.g. measured in terms of the cost of Gigawatt per hour (GWh), and thus being ”focused on 
generating the highest amount of energy at the lowest possible price (Int. 1, 2013). Since 
competing on the lowest cost of energy “didn’t really resonate with the Chinese” (Int. 1, 
2013), a competitive space, which “was totally skewed – it had no resemblance of a 
competitive market” was construed in the initial phase of the wind power market in China 
(Int. 1, 2013). While “a practical way of keeping foreign companies out of tendering, 
because we [foreign WTM] could not compete in cost of Megawatt” (Int. 1, 2013), this 
created “one field over here with Chinese players, and a little bubble over here with foreign 
ones that were not competing” (Int. 1, 2013). Competing on completely different criteria in 
the initial phase, criteria (e.g. standards and targets) and cost and cost calculations seem to 
be gradually merging, which may eventually place foreign “players into the same 
competitive space as the Chinese” (Int. 1, 2013). Thus, as China increasingly aligns 
calculative devices of costs and prices, foreign WTMs are becoming “a bit hopeful again. 
Because all the value propositions that X [foreign WTM] has can suddenly come back into 
play” (Int. 1, 2013). At the same time, Western WTMs and component suppliers 
acknowledge that they can “learn from the Chinese”, e.g. in terms of cost reductions (Int. 15, 
2012). A collaborative space for common research, where “both sides can win”, is hereby 
potentially under construction in a mutual struggle on reducing the costs of energy to make 
wind power ’competitive’ in the battle with fossil fuels (Int. 1, 2013). Indeed, myriads of 
international collaborations are already taking place, to improve the ’controllability’ of wind 
power (e.g. smart forecasting tools, simulation tools, energy storage, ultrahigh voltage 
transmission lines, and integration with flexible hydro-power stations ‘smoothing out’ the 
fluctuating output of wind power).  
On contested sustainability – and creative foresightedness 
In the above, a controversy over the sustainability of China’s seeming experimental, 
fragmented mode of green marketisation has been illustrated, entangled in a controversy 
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over cost and price calculations. While the analysis has dubbed marketisation in wind power 
as a Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation, the very sustainability of this is contested. 
While some frame China’s green marketisation mode as sustainable in the long term, others 
see it as a threat not only to China’s development, but also to the global development of 
wind power. For instance, a foreign WTM argues that “bad Chinese quality, it is bad for 
everyone. The reputation of the whole industry suffers from it. We all have an interest in 
improving quality. We want to do what we can to help out” (Int. 1, 2013). However, the 
analysis has also displayed how the Chinese Government’s seeming “navigational skills” 
(Korsnes, 2014: 196) seems to have avoided a complete collapse from overcapacity issues. 
In a Western perspective, however, this experimental approach is framed as ”a funny 
approach to this. It’s very different from ours, and we simply don’t get it. And it may be that 
they get something else out of it than we do, and that’s interesting” (Int. 20, 2013). Overall, 
the seeming gradual “change from fragmentation to alignment have been dominated by 
considerable policy flexibility” (Korsnes, 2014: 196) in the construction of a market for 
wind power in China. In this way, the Chinese political leadership seems highly agile, 
navigating new overflowing along the way. In this way, the analysis underlines how there is 
indeed more to the story of rapid growth (and consolidation) in Chinese wind power than 
just formal laws and regulations (Korsnes, 2014: 177, 195). The analysis further highlights 
how heterogeneous actors and entities are involved in the pacification and price-setting of 
wind power, as well as how these qualification processes engender controversy and 
overflowing, co-constituting a particular Chinese pragmatics of green and fragmented 
marketisation.  
Conclusion and theoretical considerations – the controversy over cost and price 
calculations and a Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation 
Chapter 12 has sought to bring together insights of the previous chapters of the analysis. 
The chapter has inquired into a configuring controversy over cost and price calculations in 
the struggle between coal and wind power. This illustrates how prices, and particularly the 
calculative tools employed in price-setting, are themselves negotiable, rendering the 
qualities they produce unstable. In this way, the chapter sheds light on some of the dynamics 
and controversies that price-setting can engender in the marketisation of wind in China. The 
mapped controversy is, in turn, part and parcel of a controversy over the sustainability of a 
seemingly particular Chinese mode of green marketisation, or what the thesis frames as a 
specific Chinese ‘experimental pragmatics of marketisation’. Several power struggles have 
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been illustrated in the power-TEN, e.g. between wind power and fossil fuels, between 
central and local governments, and between foreign and Chinese companies.  
The chapter illustrates how the employment of calculative tools for price-setting, which have 
favoured growth in capacity rather than generated electricity, has been a matter of Chinese 
gradualist and experimental industrial policy. Yet, the seeming agnosticism in planning is 
framed, by some, as pure ’waste’, which in turn threatens to destabilise the very framing of 
wind power as environmentally sustainable. That is, the Chinese emerging wind power-TEN 
has produced ongoing and extensive overflowing, which threatens to qualify the emerging 
good of wind power as not only technically, scientifically, economically, and 
developmentally unsustainable, but even as environmentally unsustainable. Such extensive 
destabilisation of wind power’s framing in China risks, in turn, to destabilise the framing of 
wind power-TEN not only in China, but also to overflow to other countries. By tracing 
associations assembling around the unsustainability of wind power, the chapter maps the 
overflowing that entails an incomplete and therefore unstable translation of a wind power-
TEN. Such extensive overflowing of both the wind power-TEN and the co-constituting 
software-TEN, as illustrated in earlier chapters, can in turn be coupled to the way in which 
the power-TEN is itself overly unstable and consistently being negotiated, i.a. between 
multiple power sources and local and central bureaucracies.   
While some voice concerns that China’s strategy of pursuing a low-cost/high-quantity 
approach has potentially been self-disruptive, others point to how such targets and 
calculative tools, as well as the related agnosticism in planning and coordination, display 
foresight through learning-by-doing and trial and error of the Chinese political pole. Overall, 
the sustainability of China’s emerging wind power-TEN is being debated and contested, 
entangled in a controversy over the sustainability of China’s experimental, pragmatic mode 
of marketisation. Rather than offering a bleak picture of decline and collapse, a favourable 
account of the Chinese agile, pragmatic experimentation proposes that the myriads of 
overflows in Chinese wind power may, admittedly, be framed as a matter of necessary 
’casualties’ in the short term, while eventually paying off in the long term. This indicates a 
story of marketisation as a subtle tension between designing and experimenting (Callon, 
2009: 536), in which the Chinese political pole has engaged with sensitivity, agile 
movements, foresight, adaptation, and flexible containment of overflowing, engendering  
intended - or at least hoped for - adjustments of the market pole, and over time increasingly 
also of the scientific and technical poles.  
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The chapter has illustrated potential risks of socio-material lock-in into fossil fuels, as 
associations of volatile and disruptive wind power have been construed. These associations 
have i.a. been construed by heterogeneous actors and entities such as coal quota, local 
government contracts and incentive measures, vertical and horizontal lines of coordination, 
GW targets, life-time generating cost, concession pricing, grid inflexibilities, cost and price 
calculations, and forecasting tools. Nevertheless, the analysis points to experimental and 
agile agencies of the Chinese political pole and other poles that are potentially able to 
overcome these overflows during the seeming turn to quality. This indicates how China’s 
’sustainability journey’ (Garud and Gehman, 2012), despite the many barriers encountered 
along the way, might in fact be an account of agile and sensitive adjustment rather than 
systemic failure. Apart from gradual adjustments of policies, targets, and standards, such 
creativity and agile agency is reflected in how the political pole has creatively employed a 
’great narrative’ of China’s renaissance and revitalisation. This can assist in sense-making in 
emerging situations of ’crisis’, and in terms of finding ways to deal with these crises. By 
construing a narrative of China’s long-term, comprehensive, holistic, sustainable 
development, a space has been opened up for flexible interpretation, which may produce a 
better understanding of China’s development. Hereby, narrative devices concerning China’s 
sustainable development seem to have had powerful performative capacities in the 
marketisation of wind power and the potential turn to quality. This, in turn, displays an agile 
ability to manage experimentally the constantly emerging overflowing, and the 
“resourcefulness and improvisation on the part of involved actors” (Garud and Karnøe, 
2003: 278). Through experimental learning-by-doing, e.g. reflected by an oscillation 
between centralisation and decentralisation and the introduction of new calculative devices 
(e.g. standards and targets), a gradual convergence of calculative tools for cost and price 
calculations of foreign and Chinese actors is illustrated in the chapter. As calculative tools 
may be converging, a less contested space than the competitive space illustrated in previous 
chapters may be under construction.  
Overall, the thesis hereby leaves open whether or not the seemingly adaptive, fragmented, 
experimental, and pragmatic mode of marketisation can perform a turn to quality in time to 
reframe wind power as sustainable. Yet, the analysis illustrates how marketisation as a 
qualification struggle, can be seen as a matter of an ‘art of interessement’ (Akrich et al., 
2002). That is, playing on the notion of the art of interessement in processes of translation 
and framing, normally attributed to technological innovation, the thesis can be said to 
illustrate the construction of a market for wind power in China as an ‘art of marketisation’. 
This indicates how China’s seemingly particular ’pragmatics of green marketisation’ can be 
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likened to its own particular form of innovation, as heterogeneous actors are translated into 
the emerging wind power-TEN, e.g. through the creative construction and employment of 
associations in the pursuit of constructing worth to wind power, and through gradualist, 
pragmatic trial-and-error. 
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Summarising findings of the analysis (Part III) 
Together, the respective narratives of Chapters 6-12 serve to provide an account of green 
marketisation within wind power in China, which displays how ”we need to give up the idea 
of substantial definitions of the economy and politics that can serve to distinguish between 
that which is economic and that which is political” (Callon, 2007: 139). Indeed, the analysis 
conveys an account of ‘the negotiated market’ (Callon, 1998: 264), which is contested and 
produces controversy. This renders marketisation a messy, rhizomatic tale – each time the 
narrative has approached an ending, there seems to be many new beginnings. 
Before moving to the final Part IV of the thesis, which presents a discussion and conclusion 
on some of the implications of the inquiry, Part III concludes by reflecting briefly on where 
the inquiry has led, since it set out. This is done by linking back to the theoretical and 
methodological constructivist ‘tool box’, developed in Part II, and which was founded on a 
constructivist pragmatics of valuation of the Anthropology of Markets’ (AoM’s) 
performativity programme, and which was combined with the methodological tools of the 
Mapping Controversies. With an interest in how collaborative collectives between Chinese 
and foreign actors around wind power and software have emerged and stabilised over time, 
in the ongoing qualification struggle in the wind power-TEN, the thesis has traced processes 
of relationship-building. This has been done by mapping processes of valuation, as 
heterogeneous actors engage in the controversial construction of associations of 
sustainability to wind power.  
Processes of qualifying wind power as sustainable – and controversies over framing 
The thesis has provided an account of processes of qualification and the controversies, they 
engender. This was done, firstly, by diving into controversies over attempts at pacifying the 
quality of the emerging good of wind power, by following framing tools of IPRs and 
standards, which are normally seen to work to stabilise the framing of a potentially emerging 
good. However, the thesis illustrates how such pacification is controversial and up for 
debate, as well as how the very framing tools, which are normally seen as stabilising, are in 
fact themselves negotiable. In the two ‘algorithmic case studies’ on the pacification of 
goods, a number of heterogeneous actors emerged and, amongst these, software algorithms. 
Having displayed how the framing of wind power is still not stabilised, and how relations of 
the emerging wind power-TEN and software-TEN are consistently unravelling due to 
overflowing, the last two controversy mappings inquired into processes of price-setting in 
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Chinese wind power. This was done by ‘following the money’ as well as by following cost 
and price calculations in the Chinese wind power- and power-TEN. These controversy 
mappings displayed how controversies over framing and price-setting (and their calculative 
tools) are being contested, as well as being entangled in controversies over China’s ‘system 
problem’ and the sustainability of China’s fragmented and experimental ‘pragmatics of 
green marketisation’. In this way, ‘mundane’ artefacts such as algorithms and money and 
cost calculations have been transformed from intermediaries into actors throughout the 
analysis, as they configure and produce controversy, and thereby in turn de- and 
reconfiguring relations. Indeed, having illustrated how framing and the employed calculative 
tools can be rejected as ‘betrayal’ (tradutore-traditore) (Callon, 1986a), due to the inclusion 
and exclusion dynamics they produce, the analysis illustrates how the “various calculating 
devices [e.g. IPR, standards and certificates, money, cost and price calculations] equipping 
market socio-technical agencements”, i.e (m)STAs, or what in the thesis has been treated as 
‘markets as TEN’, can help further our  
“understanding of relations of domination. Inequalities derive from the unequal power of calculating 
agencies that loop back to reinforce themselves. Due to these asymmetries, the most powerful agencies 
are able to impose their valuations on others and consequently to impact strongly on the distribution of 
value” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 13, drawing on Bourdieu 2005 and Fligstein 2001). 
Calculating (or ‘calculative’) devices of Chinese and Western actors respectively seem to 
collide over and over again in the emerging market for wind power in China, as seen in the 
colliding emphasis on quantitative growth (GW) versus ‘growth in quality’ (often measured 
through generated electricity, GWh). In this way, the colliding calculative agencies, 
produced by the employment of different calculative devices, have produced overflowing 
and trials of strength. However, the analysis also displays how calculative devices of 
Chinese and foreign actors over time seem increasingly to converge in the ongoing 
qualification struggle and potential turn to quality, which can - potentially - construe a less 
conflictual space for simultaneous collaboration and competition.  
While primarily having zoomed in on the dynamics of the pacification of goods and price-
setting, which constitute two of the five types of framing required by the theory of 
marketisation, the thesis, nevertheless, indirectly also sheds light on the three remaining 
aspects of marketising agencies, framing of market encounters, and the construction and 
maintenance of markets (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b). 
Firstly, by setting the mapping of controversies over the performation of the market into the 
particular context of China’s ‘system problem’ as well as a particular Chinese pragmatics of 
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green marketisation, the thesis has at the same time, almost unavoidably, inquired into 
aspects of marketising agencies. The thesis has thus traced some of the multiple and 
heterogeneous actors, who compete in defining and valuing wind power (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 8). These actors include, among others, money, agents, SOEs, concession 
rules, cost and price calculations, standards, guanxi, algorithms, grid codes, coal quotas, 
coal-fired plants, agents, discursive and narrative devices on Scientific and Sustainable 
Development, as well as industrial upgrading and catch-up.  
Secondly, the thesis has, to some extent, also indirectly shed light on parts of the processes 
of the framing of encounters. This is e.g. reflected in the case of large concession projects 
(largely through state-controlled bidding and concessions) and processes of grid connection 
and dispatching in the electricity grid within and between provinces, in which e.g. coal-fired 
power plants, quota, central and local administrations and bureaucracies, grid-connection 
lines, Renewable Energy Fund, FITs, guanxi, agents, are mobilised to help in aiding that the 
wind is actually transformed into power, transmitted, and distributed, and thus ensuring 
market encounters.  
Lastly, by exploring the potentiality of a turn to quality, the thesis also inquires into 
processes of market construction and maintenance, by exploring the various and 
transforming means employed to construe associations of technical, scientific, economic, 
environmental, social, political, and developmental sustainability to wind power, and the 
socio-material work needed for maintaining these associations and, indeed, the inherent 
fragility of those framings. In doing this, the analysis displays the political and contested 
nature of calculative tools needed to construe associations and the resulting fragility of the 
calculative agencies.  
Indeed, it may be claimed that wind as a ‘thing’ cannot even be claimed to have been 
transformed or stabilised into a finalised ‘good’ (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 2010a; 2010b), 
as its qualities, price, and value have not been settled. In Latour’s wording, the analysis thus 
displays how wind power and a market for wind power is not a ‘matter of fact’, but rather 
constitutes a ‘matter of concern’. That is, rather than looking into markets as black-boxed 
‘objectified matters of fact’, the thesis has sought to inquire into how these objectified 
‘matters of fact’ instead often entail controversies and negotiations, constituting politicised 
‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004). In turn, the inability to pacify and qualify wind power 
as ‘sustainable’ seems to create socio-technical barriers to the circulation of wind power, i.e. 
to market transactions, which is reflected in the extensive ‘overflowing’, i.e. wasted and 
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curtailed wind power. Below, examples of some of the myriads of more or less unexpected 
actors that have emerged throughout the analysis are depicted in figure 23.  
 
Figure 23: Examples of unexpected actors in the marketisation of wind power 
 
Source: Own design. 
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Extensive overflowing in a developmental context – on simultaneously collaborative 
and competitive spaces 
The analysis has been set into a particular ‘developmental’ context of China, and looked into 
Sino-foreign collaborations around software and wind turbines. This has provided an 
account of fragile framing and overflowing as the norm. The extensive overflowing may be 
said to be particularly pervasive exactly because the study has been set into this specific 
context, as China can be said to face conflicting forces of globally interdependent markets 
and of demands by its national community economy (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a).  
Further, facing the multiple and rapidly shifting and/or colliding agendas involved i.a. in 
opening up to foreign markets and protection of its own SOEs, as well as of learning, 
upgrading, and technology leverage from international collaborations, while simultaneously 
pursuing indigenous innovation, a hybrid, contested and paradoxical space of collaboration 
and competition has been depicted. In such a space, actions of framing and assignment of 
ownership can trigger legal, ethical, scientific, or economic debates (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 8). By illustrating the multiple, colliding concerns and issues, and how even 
algorithms and processes of price-setting can become ‘political’, reflecting how the 
construction of a market for wind power is entangled in concerns for China’s Scientific and 
Sustainable Development, the emerging wind power-TEN becomes, as it were, inherently 
political. This vividly illustrates how marketisation in China is entangled in processes of 
politicisation. Apart from this, marketisation is also entangled in processes of scientification 
and economisation. First, the constitution of wind power and software as a scientific matter, 
e.g. to be qualified through algorithms and entangled in a concern for China’s Scientific 
Development, shows how scientification is part and parcel of the construction of a market 
for wind power. Second, marketisation is entangled in processes of economisation, e.g. in 
processes of price-setting and cost and price calculations. In the case of China, the ‘system 
problem’, i.e. being entangled in China’s overall corporate restructuring along China’s 
‘capitalist transition’, illustrates how the construction of ‘the economy’ and ‘the market’ are 
entangled. This means that disentanglement of political and market poles becomes 
practically impossible, and that the power-, wind power-, and software-TEN, in mutually 
intertwined and unfinished processes of translation and framing, render marketisation of 
Chinese wind power unstable. In addition, the thesis displays marketisation as entangled in 
processes of what the thesis proposes to be termed ‘technification’. This notion seeks to take 
into account the role of technologies and ambitions of technological and industrial 
upgrading in a developmental context, hereunder the role of collaborations on innovation 
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and technologies between diverse foreign and Chinese actors in the construction of a wind 
power market in China. In other words, technologies can be seen as taking part in the de- 
and requalification of China’s wind power market during the current quality crisis. 
The particular mode of Chinese marketisation – and the art of marketisation 
Lastly, mapping controversies in specific sites of valuation, namely marketisation of wind 
power in the developmental context of China, has illustrated how the process of attributing 
associations of economic worth to wind power is colliding with another kind of worth, 
namely what the thesis dubs ‘developmental worth’. Constructing a market for wind power 
constitutes part of the developmental goals of e.g. Scientific and Sustainable Development, 
along the route towards a Harmonious Socialist Society. While marketisation studies have 
focused on the construction of economic worth, and in the case of market construction in 
renewable energies have highlighted i.a. how the construction of a market for green products 
depends on the economisation of environmental concerns to construe associations of 
environmental quality (cleanliness) and economic worth (price) (Karnøe and Doganova, 
2014, forthcoming), the thesis illustrates how such processes of economisation are contested 
in the marketisation of Chinese wind power. In this particular site of Chinese wind power, 
the socio-material work of constructing economic worth is entangled and colliding with the 
construction of qualities of upgrading and ‘developmental worth’. That is, the concern for 
industrial and technological catch-up is reflected in the need to construe associations of i.a. 
technical, scientific, economic, social, political, environmental sustainability to wind power, 
which can in turn construe developmental worth. The collision of these two concerns may be 
one of the reasons why the framing of the wind power-TEN as sustainable tends to fall apart 
time and again, and why relations in the software-TEN, which co-constitutes and is co-
constituted by the wind power-TEN, keeps unravelling. In turn, entangled in a Chinese 
system problem, characterised by a cautious piecemeal ‘capitalist transition’, multiple vested 
interests, and fragmented coordination, the thesis illustrates how marketisation of wind 
power is inherently ‘big politics’ in China, which necessitated the introduction of a ‘political 
pole’ to the marketisation account in the analysis. As not only the wind power- and the 
software-TEN, but also the power-TEN are characterised by multiple power struggles, green 
marketisation in wind power seems one of lability and hybridity (or of magmatic spaces), in 
which potential socio-technical barriers and potentialities for sustainable transition and 
upgrading exist. 
Lastly, the thesis can be said, indirectly, to illustrate a potentially particular, specific, and 
characteristic mode of Chinese (green) marketisation. That is, adopting a constructivist 
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perspective of the Anthropology of Markets (AoM) has turned out to be  “useful for 
elucidating the range of possible choices (in terms of calculative equipment, modalities of 
framing goods, socio-technical algorithms for market encounters, price-setting, etc.)” 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). The present ethnographic controversy mapping of 
marketisation in Chinese wind power has thus provided an insight into the experimentation 
of markets, exploring “the potential diversity of markets” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). 
Looking into markets as potentiality, it has been illustrated how the emerging wind power 
market in China has still not been made ‘irreversible’, how processes of marketisation are 
being stalled in China, and how calculative agencies and worth are not exclusively centred 
around the construction of economic worth, but also around developmental worth and 
sometimes trapped in China’s so-called ‘capitalist transition’ and struggles of the Chinese 
political pole to (re-)install legitimacy. That is, 
“despite emerging tendencies, the idea of a market is indeed sufficiently open that original significations 
and alternative forms of organization are still imaginable. Moreover, the movement towards markets is 
by no means irreversible; other forms of economization can always be envisaged” (Callon and Çalişkan, 
2010b: 23). 
Hereby, marketisation studies in China arguably constitute interesting sites of further 
exploration into the potentiality of “new forms of organization and theorization” (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 23). Having illustrated the “economic engineering based on trial and error” 
(Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 23) in the marketisation of wind power in China, the thesis 
helps open up “an explicitly political dimension into the process of economization, 
especially when it means marketizing objects and behaviours that have previously defied 
marketization” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 23). Indeed, in the ‘socialist’ market economy 
of China, the analysis should explore the alternative possibilities of markets (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 23). That is, ”[m]arkets have a history; they also have a future that cannot 
be reduced simply to an extrapolation of the past” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). In the 
context of a newly industrialised country as China, marketisation may be construed as a 
matter of industrial policy and upgrading, largely designed through myriads of plans and 
policies. At the same time, however, often lacking specific experience and knowledge within 
the field, there may also be a high degree of experimentation, sometimes even involving  
basic trial and error. Thus, while the analysis has illustrated the risk of China ‘fighting 
against (its own) windmills’, the depicted pragmatics of marketisation in Chinese wind 
power also holds the door open to the ability of, in a manner of speaking, ‘breaking the 
waves’, i.e. to potentially break away from industrial ‘downgrading’ or lagging behind, and 
potentially succeeding in industrial upgrading. Having summarised the analysis, the thesis 
proceeds to the last part, namely Part IV (Chapters 13-15). 
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Part IV: Discussion – Ambiguous Winds of Change and Fighting 
Against Windmills 
”The most interesting places lie on the boundaries between order and disorder, or where different orders 
rub up against one another” (Law, 2009: 144) 
Throughout Part III (Chapters 6-12), the analysis has inquired into the potentially particular 
‘Chinese characteristics’ of marketisation in Chinese wind power. This was amongst other 
things done in order to explore whether and how a constructivist perspective can give insight 
into the genesis, dynamics, and agency of a potential GIN around software programmes in 
the Chinese wind power market, which was enabled through a pragmatist tunnel (Chapter 
2). In Part IV, a discussion is provided in regard to (1) how the ‘black-boxed’ understanding 
of genesis, dynamics, and agency of the traditional GIN literature can be properly unfolded, 
traced and qualified through the adoption of a constructivist perspective (Chapter 13). In 
addition, (2) an overall, final conclusion of the collected inquiry (Chapter 14) is provided, as 
well as a (3) discussion of some of the wider implications of the thesis for related literatures 
as well as critical reflections on limitations of the thesis (Chapter 15).  
After a discussion of the contributions to the GIN literature of the constructivist approach, 
Chapter 13 renders a constructive critique of the somewhat binary dialectics between 
framing and overflowing, a critique emerging from the findings by the constructivist 
perspective. With the aim of pointing to larger patterns, while not falling into the trap of a 
dichotomous binarism, a second ‘pragmatist tunnel’ of the thesis is introduced through the 
notion of figuration (Elias, 1978). This is done in order to inquire into how and whether the 
notion of figuration can help illuminate the dynamics of GIN and market construction in 
China’s wind power market, its ambiguous winds of change, and China’s potentially 
paradoxical fight against windmills. This leads, in Chapter 14, to an answer to the inquiry’s 
main research question. Finally, and as a way of rounding off and looking forward, Chapter 
15 offers a two-pronged discussion: First, the wider implications of the findings are 
discussed, particularly related to China studies, to structural and hierarchical accounts of 
Varieties-of-Capitalism and global value chain (GVC) governance, and to the upgrading and 
industrial policy literatures. Pointing to the need for cross-fertilising perspectives to include 
both structural and processual elements, this leads to a tentative proposal for a new research 
agenda within New Economic Sociology (NES) for exploring market (and GIN) 
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construction in a developmental context (of China). Second, the discussion offers a reflexive 
critique of the constructivist account and its limitations. 
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Chapter 13. Implications for the GIN Literature and a Second 
Pragmatist Tunnel 
To venture into a discussion of the findings and potential contributions to the GIN literature 
from the adopted constructivist perspective, Chapter 13 revisits the notion of ‘GIN’. That is, 
the notion of GIN was left in Part II of the thesis, as the analysis instead engaged in a 
constructivist marketisation analysis within Chinese wind power and adopted the 
constructivist notion of markets as techno-economic-networks (TEN). The thesis hereby 
somewhat paradoxically had to ‘look away’ from GINs in order to shed light on whether and 
how a relational, lateral, and processual constructionist perspective could (though indirectly) 
qualify insights into the genesis, agency, and dynamics of GINs, through a ‘micro-relational’ 
lens. Having pointed to what the thesis coins as a particularly Chinese ‘pragmatics of (green) 
market construction’, the discussion in the following first discusses contributions offered by 
the present inquiry to the GIN-literature in terms of genesis, dynamics, and agency. Second, 
this leads to the introduction of a second ‘pragmatist tunnel’ (through Elias’s (1978) 
‘figurational sociology’). Hereby, the thesis seeks to move beyond both the GIN perspective 
and the constructivist perspective, in order to overcome the inadvertently dualistic account 
of framing versus overflowing that has emerged throughout the constructivist analysis, as 
well as to provide a broader picture of China’s potential turn to quality within wind power. 
Requalifying the GIN literature through a constructivist perspective – capturing 
‘the relational’ 
First, the potential contributions from a constructivist account to the GIN literature are 
outlined in terms of how it renders a lens for genesis, dynamics, and agency. 
Qualifying the understanding of the genesis of GINs 
In the literature review (Chapter 2) in Part II, the thesis outlined how the GIN framework 
has recently been adopted to inquire into GINs in China’s wind turbine industry, and how 
different GINs have been identified in the shape of Chinese WTMs, which have distributed 
their R&D-activities globally, and engaged in globalised technology sourcing patterns 
and/or contractual R&D collaborations (Silva and Klagge, 2013)90. With its structural, 
formalistic, as well as rather hierarchical and positivistic perspective, and a meso-level 
                                                     
90
 Also, more or less interchangeably, dubbed ’collaborative innovation networks’ (Chen et al., 
2014) or ’global learning networks’ within China’s wind turbine industry (Lewis, 2013). 
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account of spaces and scales in the global-local nexus, often seen in a co-evolutionary 
perspective, the thesis argues that the extant GIN literature tends to look at GINs from the 
outside, and as embedded in constraining (or enabling) institutional structures. Despite 
valuable insights into the structure and effects of GINs, and also having detected GIN-
emergence based on formal structures, the thesis argues that the GIN-literature paradoxically 
risks missing out on how GINs have been constructed in the first place, and how such GINs 
may require ongoing work of maintenance. By not tracing how relations are constructed in 
the first place, the thesis argues that the GIN literature risks missing out on the ‘micro’-
processual and –relational (and potentially controversial) aspects of GIN-construction, as 
well as on the distributed agency involved in constructing GINs involving heterogeneous 
(human and non-human) actors. In short, risking to be seduced by its own network construct 
of ‘GINs’, the socio-material work involved in the genesis of GINs tends to be black-boxed 
and assumed away.  
To overcome these shortcomings, and to shed light on genesis, as well as on the dynamics 
and agency of GIN construction, the thesis has argued that in order to trace GIN genesis, 
dynamics, and agency it is somewhat paradoxically necessary to ‘look away’ from GINs, in 
order to trace the socio-material aspects of their potential construction. That is, instead of 
employing the metaphor of GINs, the thesis has conducted an analysis based on a 
constructivist marketisation perspective, which is argued to offer a relational and processual 
account of the socio-material work implied in constructing networks. By tracing the 
construction of associations (framings/qualifications), which are argued to be necessary for 
relating, translating and enrolling heterogeneous actors into an emerging network, and the 
controversies these associations may produce, the thesis treats GINs as verb rather than 
noun. Looking at GINs as a matter of becoming, by looking into the very networking of GIN 
(or processes of ‘gin-ing’) (networks as verb) 91, the thesis seeks to move beyond 
assumptions of stabilised relations and the institutionalised structures (networks as noun) 
they would thereby constitute at the outset. Hereby, the relational constructivist perspective 
of marketisation is argued to open up to a lens for the potentially highly volatile and 
disruptive, as well as controversial, nature of GIN emergence and genesis. 
To reiterate, in order to inquire into GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency, the thesis has 
conducted a marketisation analysis by mapping controversies in the ongoing struggle of 
                                                     
91
 Or even as entangled processes of what could be termed ‘gin-ification’ along with 
marketisation (and politicisation, scientification, economisation, and technification) as indicated 
in the overall conclusion of the constructivist analysis.  
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qualifying wind power in China as sustainable. In the qualification of wind power as 
sustainable in a Chinese ‘comprehensive’ way, i.e. taking into account how sustainability is 
linked to China’s Scientific Development and upgrading and construction of indigenous 
innovation capabilities in core technologies, e.g. through linking up to foreign companies 
and technologies,  attempted translations of collaborative - and competitive - relations 
between Chinese and foreign actors around the core component of software have played a 
performative role. The thesis has illustrated how Sino-foreign collaborative networks 
(‘GINs’) around core components such as software in Chinese wind power are part and 
parcel of the qualification of wind power as sustainable. That is, in the process of qualifying 
wind power as ‘sustainable’ in a way that is in alignment with the Chinese comprehensive 
notion of sustainability and Sustainable and Scientific Development, the construction of 
Sino-foreign collaborations has been seen as critical for the wind power market in China 
since its very beginning. With new ambitions for indigenous innovation, as part of the stated 
strategy for attaining a Harmonious Socialist Society through Scientific Development, i.a. to 
be achieved through Sino-foreign collaborations, the thesis argues that it makes sense to 
trace GIN-construction as part and parcel of the framing/qualification of the emerging 
Chinese wind power market. 
Conducting a marketisation analysis, and adopting the Mapping Controversies approach, the 
thesis looks into the struggles and negotiations involved in the process of qualifying the 
emerging good of wind power, and how these produce controversies, de- and reconfiguring 
relations between Chinese and foreign actors around wind turbine technologies and software 
tools. Treating GINs not as a ‘Matter of Fact’, but as ‘Matter of Concern’, and as part of a 
qualification process in the marketisation process, the thesis argues that by looking beyond 
the traditional formalistic use of the GIN-metaphor, it has been possible to shed light on 
GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency within Chinese wind power. That is, GIN-construction 
in Chinese wind power is shown to be part and parcel of the process of qualifying wind 
power as ‘sustainable’.  
Further, the thesis has disassembled the wind turbine, and traced the construction and 
maintenance of relations around the critical component of software. In this way, the thesis 
treats the construction of network relations as part and parcel of the performance of 
associations of sustainability to wind power. The thesis has consequently fundamentally 
reconceptualised GINs. By not adopting the traditional notion of GINs, hereunder not 
looking at GINs by taking its outset in WTMs and their formal, structural networks within 
the entire wind turbine industry, the thesis has disassembled the wind turbine to trace the 
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meticulous work of translation of Sino-foreign collaborative networks around one critical 
core component, namely software in the process of marketisation of wind power.  
Although the thesis has thus treated ‘GINs’ in a radically different way, the thesis argues 
that there are lessons to be learned for the GIN literature, notably in terms of genesis, 
dynamics, and agency. Surely, in the conventional structural and formal GIN perspective, 
the wind turbine industry in China would be claimed ripe with mature GINs. In contrast, the 
thesis illustrates that if zooming in on micro-processes of relationship-building around a 
particular core component within the wind turbine industry, the picture becomes a different 
and arguably more fine-grained, but also complex, one.  
Nevertheless, if briefly adopting the lens of the traditional GIN-literature and economic 
geography, which was reviewed in Chapter 2, the thesis can be argued to have illustrated, 
indirectly, that is, how China from the outset has ventured into the wind power industry by 
becoming part of a global value chain (GVC), namely largely by acquiring foreign 
technologies in conventional customer-supplier supply-chain relationships. Over time, China 
has moved up the value chain, upgrading in specific components and having built own 
indigenous capabilities in terms of manufacturing, and gradually becoming part of a global 
production network (GPN). Engaging in reverse engineering, and engaging in diverse forms 
of technology sourcing, a GPN has been constructed, whereby China is benefiting from 
general “changes in the global production of services and products”, which have spatially 
fragmented industries and services, resulting in the geographical clustering of activities 
rather than necessarily of entire industries (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 2). Further, as 
Chinese WTMs have engaged in the ‘modularisation’ of the wind turbine, outsourcing most 
components to domestic and foreign suppliers, they have been able to squeeze component 
and turbine prices. This has created a competitive advantage over foreign WTMs, who have 
mostly pursued a more expensive strategy of insourcing. In this process, emerging Chinese 
component suppliers have been able to upgrade capabilities within a variety of wind turbine 
components. Over time, however, Chinese WTMs have acknowledged the potential dangers 
of such modularisation and outsourcing, e.g. in terms of lacking overview of the wind 
turbine, its control, and aerodynamic optimisation, and potential detrimental implications for 
quality. As a turn to quality may take place, Chinese WTMs are gradually moving towards a 
higher degree of internalisation. Not only intent on engaging in specific activities, but also to 
build its own indigenous wind turbine industry, which is independent from foreign 
technology sourcing, the Chinese wind turbine industry has evolved with rapid pace, yet it is 
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also facing considerable challenges in terms of quality and continued reliance on foreign 
core components. 
In this view, the findings of the inquiry indicate how the emergence of Chinese WTMs and 
component suppliers has taken place through processes of integration into GVC and GPNs 
and resulting upgrading. Emerging GIN relations are thereby indicated as well. This is e.g. 
seen in the case of Chinese WTMs such as Goldwind and Envision, which have acquired 
design houses, hired software specialists, and/or set up foreign R&D departments and 
collaborations abroad, and as Chinese certification bodies, test laboratories, and research 
institutes with newly built competencies increasingly collaborate with foreign partners. GIN 
relations are increasingly emerging around core technologies such as software for i.a. design 
tools, control systems, and forecasting tools. For instance, taking the case of simulation tools 
for wind turbine design and certification, universities, research institutions, certification 
bodies, WTMs, and design houses in and from different countries are involved.  
When zooming further into software components, however, the analysis illustrated how 
most relations largely remain part of a conventional GVC. That is, knowledge and 
technologies tend to be commodified and transferred primarily through conventional 
technology transfer mechanisms, rather than being co-created and synergistically produced 
and shared within GINs. When not commodified, there furthermore seems to be barriers to 
knowledge- and technology-sharing, since Chinese actors, which tend to be framed as 
‘inferior’, are often excluded from international collaborations on software algorithms.  
Overall, the thesis illustrates how software controllers and design tools still largely form part 
of the value chain, and that there are powerful exclusion mechanisms in international 
collaborations, e.g. due to IPRs and standards. Nevertheless, the thesis also points to how 
governance relations are in flux, that is, for instance customer-supplier relations are being 
vigorously and increasingly contested and negotiated. Along with rising capabilities of 
Chinese actors, governance relations gradually shift from pure market-based relations to 
network governance, which in turn are gradually becoming less captive and increasingly 
relational (Gereffi et al., 2005). While the GVC literature points to the importance of 
supplier capabilities for the choice of governance mode, the thesis, however, illustrates how 
customer (WTM) capabilities also play a critical role in the choice of governance mode. 
That is, the thesis has zoomed into customer-supplier relations where to begin with it was 
foreign suppliers who seemed to determine how they governed their relations with Chinese 
WTMs. However, as Chinese WTMs have gradually learned from foreign customer-supplier 
relationships and built capabilities, Chinese customers have started contesting the 
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governance mode, e.g. by revolting against the internationally set standards. Chinese actors 
(e.g. WTMs, certification bodies, government agencies) increasingly aim at setting industrial 
standards themselves, and to develop own, indigenous turbine designs, and thereby to gain 
more ‘power’ in the value chain and govern it themselves. Overall, this indicates an ongoing 
power struggle for moving up the value chain, and for deeper and stronger integration into 
and control of GINs. 
By breaking up the wind turbine industry, and zooming in on the component of software, the 
thesis contributes to the GIN-literature by illustrating how there can exist socio-technical 
barriers to GIN construction within relatively innovative and dynamic sub-sectors of the 
wind turbine industry, namely within the sub-sector of software. This is somewhat in 
contrast to Cooke (2013), who has illustrated that it is the most innovative and dynamic sub-
sectors within the ICT-industry in Singapore that are most conducive to GIN construction, 
while the less dynamic and relatively uninnovative sub-sector (of hard disk drives) is still 
dominated by a GPN with a few large dominating MNCs. Hereby, the thesis contributes to 
the GIN-literature by displaying that socio-technical mechanisms of exclusion may prevent 
even very innovate actors for becoming part of a GIN within the relatively innovative sub-
sector of software within the wind turbine industry. On the other hand, the thesis also 
illustrates that technology matters for GIN-construction, and thereby confirms Cooke’s 
(2013) other argument that proposes that there can be vast differences in regard to GIN 
emergence between sub-sectors within the same industry. That is, a more fine-grained 
understanding of GIN genesis can be gained by disassembling the industry into its 
component parts, and dive into specific components. Lastly, these findings may furthermore 
feed into the stream of the GIN-literature which looks into the variety of industrial 
knowledge bases, and how their knowledge base determines the propensity with which firms 
engage in GINs or not (Herstad et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013). That is, representing synthetic 
and thus relatively more ‘sticky’ knowledge, software, and the basic research it contains, 
seems less prone to certain types of GIN formation.  
To reiterate, these findings contribute to the GIN-literature, by pointing to the necessity of 
breaking up industries into smaller sub-sectors, by ‘diving deeper’ and zooming in on 
particular component technologies, and the arduous work of constructing relations around 
them. When doing so, another more complex and blurred picture emerges, which illustrates 
the socio-material work of building and maintaining relations. The thesis therewith sheds 
light on the political, scientific, and technological controversies that different component 
technologies may produce in the developmental context of Chinese greening.  
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Overall, the thesis warns against assuming integration into GINs to be automatic and to be 
detected only based on an exogenous, formalistic, and structural lens ‘from the outside’. 
Instead, the thesis suggests that a focus on the socio-material work of relationship-building 
and -maintenance is necessary, to capture the potential socio-technical barriers to and 
controversies of GIN-genesis, and to shed light on the quality, dynamics, and agency of 
relations. Thus, the construction of GINs cannot be taken for granted, but must be traced 
myopically ‘from within’, and including all the potential heterogeneous actors involved. One 
of the overarching findings of the thesis is the illustration of how GIN relations tend to 
unravel, as soon as they are being constituted. This is largely due to the negotiated relations, 
positions, roles, and identities.  
Summing up, the thesis illustrates how the risk of barriers to GIN construction can be 
disruptive to the entire Chinese wind power market, as it jeopardises the overall framing of 
wind power as sustainable in comprehensive, ‘developmental’ terms, i.e. in terms of 
prospects for Scientific and Sustainable Development towards a Harmonious Socialist 
Society. In this way, the thesis indicates the entangled nature of market and GIN 
construction in Chinese wind power. Further, the findings shed light on seemingly 
contradictory dynamics of GIN construction in Chinese wind power. China’s initial strategy 
of low costs and prices, which enabled the integration into and upgrading within the GVC, 
has over time induced extensive externalities (overflowing) in terms of e.g. poor quality and 
wasted energy. This threatens not only to destabilise the wind power market, but also to 
disrupt the emergent GIN relations between Chinese and foreign actors in Chinese wind 
power, as ‘skewed’ ‘competitive spaces’ have been constructed. For instance, weary, 
suspicious, and concerned with the Chinese pursuit of indigenous innovation (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011: 13), e.g. reflected in controversies over IPRs and international and 
domestic standards, foreign MNCs and component suppliers have left or are considering to 
scale down engagement in China and/or leaving the Chinese wind power market, as the 
state-supported low-cost focus has created an ‘uneven’ playing field (Interviews; 
energiwatch.dk, Jun. 10, 2013). Conversely, the current potential turn to quality taking place 
in Chinese wind power seems to change these skewed competitive dynamics, potentially 
creating a larger space for collaboration, and thereby potentially for more relational 
governance modes and/or GIN configurations. For instance, a collaborative space is 
gradually opening up for the Chinese and foreign actors to engage in mutual learning on the 
common challenge of finding the proper balance between price and quality, and in which 
calculative devices are gradually aligned. Paradoxically, however, while the Chinese 
political leadership seems to intervene to steer the wind power market towards more focus 
402 
 
on quality, which can potentially keep foreign actors in the market, the simultaneous 
Chinese quest for indigenous innovation (e.g. by engaging in strategic games over IPRs and 
domestic standards) may at the same time destabilise the very GIN relations that it seeks to 
promote. This instability of GIN emergence is in many ways related to the constant urge of 
Chinese actors to push the boundaries of knowledge and technology acquisition and 
learning, as Chinese actors build new competencies and shift ambitions. This seemingly 
paradoxical strategy indicates that while GINs may be part of China’s development strategy, 
China may even seek to move beyond GINs, i.e. to become entirely independent of GIN 
relations. Such dual-pronged strategy and ambition is likely contributing to the overly 
volatile and overflowing nature of GINs in Chinese wind power. In particular, this 
paradoxical nature of GIN construction as simultaneously collaborative and competitive, in 
the current qualification struggle of China’s wind power market, has been illustrated in the 
case of GINs around software and the ongoing potential turn to quality. Depicting the 
paradoxical coexistence of collaboration and competition in the constitution of GINs in 
China’s wind power market, the thesis displays the importance of inquiring into 
controversies in GIN construction, e.g. over IPRs, standards, money entangled in the 
Chinese ‘system problem’, as well as over cost and price calculations entangled in a Chinese 
pragmatics of green marketisation. 
Work of containing overflows – qualifying the understanding of GIN dynamics 
In addition to having provided insight into the genesis of and socio-material barriers to GIN 
genesis around software within Chinese wind power, the constructivist approach also 
qualifies the understanding of GIN dynamics. The analysis displays how the work on 
qualifying wind power as sustainable performs ongoing trials of strength and controversies, 
which de- and reconfigure relations in collaborative Sino-foreign networks (or what may be 
termed ‘emerging ‘GINs) around software  on an ongoing basis. The thesis displays how 
‘pacifying’ calculative tools (e.g. IPRs and standards) and processes of valuation and price-
setting (e.g. through money, and cost and price calculations), and the framings they perform, 
are contested. The contested nature of framing processes and framing tools is linked to the 
inherently “incomplete and imperfect” nature of framings and to the “selective inclusions 
and exclusions” they produce (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 8). As framings exclude, they 
tend to produce controversy and overflowing, as displayed throughout the analysis.  Hereby, 
as the thesis sheds light on the overflowing nature of relations, the thesis points to the need 
to inquire into the socio-material work of framing/qualification and of containing 
overflowing. 
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The overflowing, volatile nature of dynamics of GIN-construction in Chinese wind power is 
intricately linked to the way in which roles, identities, positions, priorities, means, and 
strategies of the heterogeneous actors involved in the continuous assembling of GINs are 
constantly shifting. By inquiring into the shifting ontology of the constituting parts of the 
potentially emerging GIN, the ontology of the (potential) GIN is also considered variable. 
By opening up to a variable ontology (or even multiple ontologies) of actors and networks, 
the thesis argues that the black box of GINs can be opened, as it becomes possible to trace 
how different entities and the quality of relations, and the network they constitute, are being 
transformed over time. For instance, large WTMs in China’s wind power market are 
constituted by multiple, heterogeneous, and transforming agendas, entangled in an unstable 
power sector and ambiguous and colliding ambitions of the political pole. Hereby, Chinese, 
often (partially) state-owned, WTMs are often intent on capturing core technologies from 
foreign firms in order to upgrade capabilities for indigenous innovation through 
collaborative means, as well as by pursuing a simultaneously competitive agenda. This 
produces contradictory dynamics of simultaneous collaboration and competition in the 
studied networks, which destabilise them. Adding to this ambiguity, actors in the Chinese 
wind power market often do not know their own end-goal or agendas, but experiment and 
grope forward, as the boundaries of learning are consistently pushed further. The thesis 
coins this China’s consistent pushing of its own ’horizon of opportunity and potentiality’. 
Yet, such transformative ambitions render the identity and goals of its constituting parts 
unstable. In turn, this produces volatile GIN dynamics. Indeed, over and over again, when 
looking into emergent GIN relations, the analysis has displayed how relations often 
disintegrate, displaying a large degree of contingency in relations. The thesis hereby offers a 
story on GIN dynamics around software within Chinese wind power as a matter of 
contingent, disruptive emergence.  
The ongoing negotiation of roles and positions in emerging GINs bears resemblance to what 
Herrigel (2010) has coined sustained contingent collaboration. That is, “role ambiguity and 
the need for suppliers and customers to continuously innovate and upgrade have given rise 
to what it [Herrigel] calls ‘sustained contingent collaboration’ (SCC) as the modal relation in 
supply chains” (Herrigel, 2010: 24)92. According to Herrigel, vertical disintegration in 
manufacturing has resulted in more unstable, complex customer-supplier relations (Herrigel, 
                                                     
92
 Based on an in-depth analysis of transformation of European and US automobile and 
machinery industries over the past thirty years, Herrigel inquires into processes of vertical 
disintegration in manufacturing and implications for customer-supplier relations (Herrigel, 
2010) 
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2010: 141)93. This instability is evidenced in the lack of a clear role division between 
customers and suppliers over time, as well as of a stable division between design and 
production (Herrigel, 2010: 145). As global competition “creates unremitting pressures to 
innovate, while at the same time continuously reduce costs” (Herrigel, 2010: 24), Herrigel 
argues  
“that relations in the disintegrated supply chain are extremely unstable, requiring suppliers and 
customers to play a broad array of potential roles. Moreover, which role(s) will be played and who will 
play them is typically unclear to all players ex ante. Governance problems, both at the level of 
production relations and the surrounding institutional context, are generated by this pervasive role 
ambiguity. Processes of recomposition in manufacturing are in many ways provoking recomposition of 
the entire architecture of political and economic relations in these societies” (Herrigel, 2010: 24). 
In turn, the thesis may be argued to have illustrated the emergence of sustained contingent 
relations around software in China’s emerging wind power market. These relations seem 
even more volatile and potentially self-disruptive than depicted in the existing literature due 
to the extensive role ambiguity detected in China’s wind power market, where roles, 
identities, position, and relations are continuously contested and transformed. 
Algorithms and their consequences – sensitisation to agency 
Lastly, the thesis illustrates a highly active role of the Chinese political leadership in terms 
of moulding and shaping its own industries, and the wind power market in particular, as well 
as in moulding and directing the integration of the Chinese economy into GVCs, GPNs, and 
GINs. This renders the ‘upgrading country’ with a high degree of agency in the process of 
assembling networks. In addition, the thesis has displayed the highly variable ontology of 
actors. Apart from shifting ambitions and roles of Chinese WTMs, also seemingly mundane 
or ‘innocent’ artefacts such as algorithms, money, and cost and price calculations have been 
transformed from intermediaries without agency into actors/mediators (Latour, 2005a), as 
they produce diverse and politicised controversies, which in turn configure relations and the 
networks they come to constitute. Hereby, non-human actors such as algorithms have come 
to have consequences for GIN construction. Rather than assuming agency of spaces, scales, 
systems, structures, institutions, or hierarchies, the constructivist account contributes to the 
GIN literature by providing a lateral and symmetrical perspective of distributed agency 
(Doganova, 2009, Akrich et al., 2002), rendering potential agency to non-human actors.  
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 Herrigel lists five types of emerging original equipment manufacturer-supplier relations: (1) 
arm’s length/spot market relation, (2) autocrative or captive supplier relations; (3), contract 
manufacturing, (4) relational contracting, and (5) sustained contingent collaboration (Herrigel, 
2010: 145). 
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In addition, the thesis displays how emerging GINs, e.g. around software programmes may 
be able to acquire disruptive agency in terms of market construction. That is, the analysis 
has illustrated how the translation – or the failed translation – of a GIN around software in 
Chinese wind power can potentially destabilise the entire framing of wind power as 
sustainable. In this way, the thesis sensitises the GIN lens to how potentially emerging 
GINs, as co-constitutive elements of marketisation, may be disruptive to the very market 
they are co-constituting.  
Rendering a high degree of agency to both human and non-human actors, and having 
illustrated a creative, agile, and experimental pragmatics of marketisation in Chinese wind 
power, the thesis illustrates how actors are not just constrained by embedding institutional 
contexts, but rather also co-shaping them, i.a. through creative construction of associations. 
To some extent, the thesis hereby corresponds with the lens of Herrigel (2010), who 
emphasises the agency of actors to manipulate, rearrange, discard, and ignore institutional 
contexts, engaging in ‘creative action’ and experimentation and pervasive re-composition, 
rather than being constrained by them (Herrigel, 2010: 8-9, 228-229). In turn, these ideas 
also bear a clear resemblance to constructivist notions of path creation instead of 
institutional path-dependence (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; Garud et al., 2010b; Karnøe and 
Garud, 2012), which smoothes out the distinction between agency and structure, 
“entertaining a relational perspective where agency emerges from interaction in 
sociotechnical action-nets” (Czarniawska, 2004 in Karnøe and Garud, 2012). 
A second pragmatic move towards the notion of figuration 
Having briefly summed up the contributions from a constructivist perspective to the GIN-
literature in terms of genesis, dynamics, and agency, and pointing towards how the story 
offered in the thesis links to the notion of the paradoxical and somewhat counterintuitive 
notion of ‘sustained contingent relations’, the thesis arrives at a ‘second pragmatist tunnel’. 
This has already been indicated above, as the introduction of Herrigel’s (2010) relational 
perspective on unstable customer-supplier relations is founded in American pragmatist 
philosophy.  
A second pragmatist tunnel is introduced in the last sections of the chapter due to the 
limitations encountered in the GIN framework in terms of providing a micro-processual 
account of genesis, dynamics, and agency, and in particular to account for the instability of 
GIN relations. As relations often unravel at the very moment of their constitution, it 
becomes difficult to even classify the investigated network as an irreversible GIN unity. 
This begs the question of whether the depicted network could be better captured as 
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something else, as already indicated through the brief introduction of the notion of sustained 
contingent collaboration. Additionally, the adopted constructivist perspective has 
inadvertently also reached its own limits. That is, as the findings of the empirical analysis 
display a constant dynamic between framing and overflowing, a certain dialectics seems to 
emerge, inherently containing a dichotomous duality within it. To some extent, this seems to 
reconstruct the (false) distinction between genesis and structure, as well as to erode the very 
notion of overflowing. That is, as overflowing seems to become ubiquitous, deriving from a 
variety of different sources, the notion of overflowing in the thesis has, to some extent, 
become empty. In this way, the ANT language can be claimed to contain within it a 
paradoxical tendency to ascribe more or less ‘blindly’ to a new type of (theorised) 
generalisation despite its pragmatist ’modest sociology’ and inherent quest to avoid 
”‘higher’ philosophical truths” (du Gay, 2010: 178) that are central to more positivist causal 
explanations typical of i.a. the GIN-literature. In this way, although favouring a lens of 
empiricist particularity, the constructivist account that emerges from the analysis is one 
which inadvertently risks to subscribe to generalisations of ubiquitous performativity and 
translation, as well as to a dialectics of framing/overflowing (du Gay, 2010: 177; Whittle 
and Spicer, 2008).  
Simultaneously with admitting to the limits of the ANT-language, the thesis at the same time 
aims to look for potential avenues for synthesising the relational constructivist perspective 
with more structural perspectives (which is to be discussed in Chapter 15 in particular). 
Further, this links up with how the thesis subscribes both to the principle of empiricist 
modest method as well as to an ambition of discussing potential wider implications of the 
empirical findings, and maybe even so more than conventionally made possible through a 
constructivist perspective. Consequently, having pointed to gaps both in the GIN- and 
constructivist perspectives, the thesis in the following sets out in an exploration of whether 
and how the pragmatism of Elias’s figurational sociology (2006 [1969]; 1978) can help shed 
new light on the findings, by discussing the potential turn to quality in Chinese wind power. 
Introducing the pragmatist lens of Elias’s figurational sociology 
”We say, ’The wind is blowing’, as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in 
time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind 
could exist which did not blow” (Elias, 1978: 112) 
With the aim of potentially finding larger ‘patterns’ than the constructivist approach 
normally allows, and in order to overcome the inherent dualism of the framing-overflowing 
dialectic, as well as to overcome the limitations of the GIN approach in terms of 
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disregarding micro-dynamics and ‘the relational’, the rest of the chapter looks into whether 
and how the findings might be captured through the metaphor of figuration. As the 
analytical tools of ANT tend to ’overflow’ themselves, Elias’s figurational sociology may be 
helpful, as it renders a non-dualistic, intendedly paradoxical lens94 (Stacey, 2003: 295, 296), 
with key words being interdependency, power and process (Brandtstädter, 2003: 92). 
Developed in order to inquire into the ‘civilising process’ in Europe between the years 1400 
and 1800 (Elias, 1978 in Law, 1994), and to overcome the gap between individual and 
society, the notion of figuration seeks to account for a “’web of interdependences formed 
among human beings and which connects them: that is to say, a structure of mutually 
oriented and dependent persons’” (Elias cited in Quintaneiro, 2006: 3-4). Further, Elias’s 
figurational sociology aligns itself with constructivist perspectives, in that it offers a 
symmetrical analysis in terms of “treat[ing] size as a product or an effect, a process worth 
studying in its own right rather than something given in the order of things” (Law, 1994: 
11). Sharing an interest in process, the relational, the symmetrical, and the entangledness of 
individual and society, the constructivist ANT lens and pragmatist philosophy of Elias are 
closely related, even though the latter does not explicitly take into account the potential 
agency of non-human actors.  
A lens of paradoxical transformation and figurational games 
Elias not only defies the division between individual and society, but also between change 
and stability, instead rendering a lens of permanent, paradoxical transformation 
(Quintaneiro, 2006: 2) neither planned or intended, nor the result of unstructured changes. 
Through this processual and relational lens, it becomes impossible to speak of the wind as 
blowing ”as if the wind was separate from its blowing [and a] wind could exist which did 
not blow” (Elias, 1978: 112). Additionally, although people may act in intentional, planned 
ways in local situations, the global, long-term consequences of these individual actions 
cannot be foreseen, as they only emerge gradually (Stacey, 2003: 299), over time giving 
“rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From this 
interdependence of people arise an order sui generis, an order more compelling and stronger 
than the will and reason of the individual people composing it” (Elias cited in Stacey, 2003: 
299). In this way, self-organisation and emergence form an ”essentially paradoxical process 
in which individuals form groups while being formed by them at the same time”, 
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 Largely set up in opposition to Kantian dialectics, but with inspiration from Hegel’s dialectic, 
where ”one thinks of the individual and the social in much the same way” (Stacey, 2003: 295-
296). 
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”constructing the future as continuity and transformation” (Stacey, 2003: 299). This 
”transformative process” constitutes a new unity, a new dynamic,  
”in which stability is always found in instability and vice versa. New meaning emerges in the tension of 
opposites and the paradox remains. Indeed the paradox is the source of the new meaning. The ’edge of 
chaos’ is also a concept of a dynamic characterised by stability and instability at the same time. In all of 
these cases there is no notion of moving from stability to instability and back again – the opposition of 
stability and instability is always present at the same time” (Stacey, 2003: 296).  
The notion of figuration and unplanned change is at the same time closely linked to the 
notion of strategic ’games’ and to power. Expressing the ”complex chain of 
interdependencies and power relationships that constitute the real stuff of social reality” 
(Layder, 1986: 370), the constitution of figurations can be likened to games. Through this 
lens, as players engage in the game, with more players making it more complex (Layder, 
1986: 370), a game process emerges, which ”none of the individual players has planned, 
determined or anticipated’” (Elias, 1978: 131 in Layder, 1986: 370). Despite being 
unplanned and not immediately controllable, 
”the overall process of development of a society is not in the least incomprehensible. There are no 
’mysterious’ social forces behind it. It is a question of the consequences flowing from the intermeshing of 
the actions of numerous people…As the moves of interdependent players intertwine, no single player nor 
any group of players acting alone can determine the course of the game no matter how powerful they 
may be…It involves a partly self-regulating change in a partly self-organizing and self-reproducing 
figuration of interdependent people, whole processes tending in a certain direction” (Elias cited in 
Stacey, 2003: 298). 
In turn, figurations and their strategic games can produce competitive tensions. Thus, ”[b]y a 
’whole’ [of the notion of  ’society’] we generally mean something more or less harmonious. 
But the social life of human beings is full of contradictions, tensions and explosions” (Elias 
cited in Stacey, 2003: 297). The configuration of ”[s]ocial figurations of power” 
(Brandtstädter, 2003: 87) directs attention towards ”the processual nature of figurations; to 
the ever-changing balances of power within complex and interweaving sets of 
interdependencies” (Layder, 1986: 371). Hereby, ”[a]t the core of changing figurations – 
indeed the very hub of the figuration process – is a fluctuating tensile equilibrium, a balance 
of power moving to and fro, inclining first to one side and then to the other. This kind of 
fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration” 
(Elias, 1978: 131 in Layder, 1986: 371).  
Elias’s notion of figuration may be used as a pragmatic means to understanding the larger 
pattern of GIN construction in the construction of a Chinese wind power market and the de- 
and reconfiguration of new strategic games. In the following, the chapter looks into how and 
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whether the qualitative reconfiguring of China’s wind power market may be captured 
through the notion of figuration and reconfigurative games. 
Moving from figuration I to figuration II – and transformative reconfigurative 
games? 
The Chinese wind power market may be seen as a reconfigurative game from one figuration 
to another, as well as a move from one strategic game to another. That is, the thesis has 
pointed to a potential turn to quality. Overall, China’s emerging wind power market can be 
seen as undergoing a transformation from what may be termed figuration I of quantity and 
low costs towards an emerging figuration II with higher focus on quality. As figuration I has 
led to self-disruptive forces of overflowing (i.e. ‘defeating itself’ through low-quality 
turbines), the thesis has displayed what may be termed unplanned or unintended effects. At 
the same time, the analysis has offered an account of the transformative and somewhat 
paradoxical process of de- and reconfiguring relations, in processes of simultaneous 
competition and cooperation between Chinese and foreign actors. Moving from the old 
’platform’ of ordering (figuration I) towards a new one has fostered a reconfigurative game, 
in which control systems and simulation tools and their black-boxed algorithms have entered 
the stage as central actors and have become highly controversial, politicised entities. This 
has ignited a reconfigurative game, which is transforming the quality of relations, and 
making them overly unstable. 
The instability and overflowing is largely deriving from the coexistence of multiple agendas 
and strategies (some explicit and conscious, some not), or what Herrigel (2010) refers to as 
role ambiguity and the configuration of sustained contingent collaboration. As policies and 
the dynamics of the figurative game have changed over time, a radical, non-linear, as well as 
largely unplanned and non-path-dependent transformational change has taken place. In this 
change, algorithms and quality, as well as IPRs and standards, money, price and cost 
calculations have become critical actors, which perform intensive trials of strength. Attempts 
at moving from one figuration to another may be seen as an attempt to break free from 
unplanned effects (‘overflowing’) of Figuration I’s ’upgrading as upscaling’ (i.e. upscaling 
production volumes through numerical targets of GW), which to some extent may be 
claimed to have resulted in ’upscaling as downgrading’ instead, as manufacturers have 
engaged in degrading quality. Pursuing a strategy of tempo, volume, and cost (Nahm and 
Steinfeld, 2013/forthcoming: 30), China has enabled rapid quantitative growth, yet, has 
produced extensive overflowing effects from the resulting poor quality. This has produced 
the paradoxical effect of China ‘fighting against its own wind turbines’.  
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As Figuration II emerges, a new ambiguous reconfigurative game takes place, e.g. over 
IPRs and standards, money, and cost and price calculations, and in the words of the analysis, 
struggles over the pacifications of goods and price-setting. In this emerging game, quality 
(e.g. ‘algorithmic quality’) has become increasingly central. That is, in the formative years 
of the wind power market, policies on wind power have been deliberately ’open’ for 
interpretation, allowing for local, fragmented experimentation. Over time, as unlimited 
growth led to overflowing, approval of wind farms has been centralised, reflecting a gradual 
move towards higher emphasis on quality, which is also reflected in recent attempts at 
introducing new targets and standards, e.g. with indications of higher emphasis on generated 
electricity (GWh) (Bloomberg, 2012). With increasing capabilities and levels of (e.g. 
technical) knowledge of Chinese actors, quantitative targets and technological ambitions 
have likewise been flexibly adapted. As these ‘ambiguous winds of change’ blow in China’s 
wind power market, algorithms have emerged as critical actors, and producing multiple 
power struggles between Chinese and foreign actors.  
The thesis points to how Elias’s pragmatist philosophy can help illuminate the specific type 
of ”order(ing)”, however self-disruptive and chaotic, arising ”in specific dynamics of social 
interweaving in particular places at particular times” (Stacey, 2003: 299). Elias’s theory has 
already been linked to an ethnographic approach and ’taken to China’ (Brandtstädter, 2003: 
88). Indeed, China constitutes an interesting case for anthropologically inspired 
constructivist studies, inquiring into figurations of power ”for a political anthropology of 
institutional emergence” (Brandtstädter, 2003: 87). By combining the constructivist account 
of the genesis of the wind power market in China (e.g. insisting on the potential agency of 
non-human actors) with Elias’s figurational sociology, a larger picture of a particular kind of 
emerging (and constantly transformative) ’order(ing)’ (or ’figurational game’) can arguably 
be rendered, while retaining the situational and specific.   
GIN construction as part of a complex ‘Chinese figuration’ 
Having pointed to the reconfigurative game(s) and qualitative change taking place in the 
figuration during the qualification struggle of China’s wind power market, the thesis 
illustrates larger complexity and more games than envisioned by the functionalistic, 
institutional, structuralist, systemic, and hierarchical imaginary of the GIN framework and 
of economic geography. To account for the transformational dynamics of China during 
processes of globalisation, the thesis suggests that rather than being ‘seduced’ by the GIN 
metaphor and letting it steer the inquiry, GIN analyses can benefit from ‘diving deeper’ and 
zooming in on the micro-relational in an inquiry into GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency. 
411 
 
Additionally, GIN construction in Chinese wind power may even be seen as part and parcel 
of transformative processes of China, which in itself may be treated as a complex figuration. 
That is, entangled in the two simultaneous, but contradictory forces of national “community 
economies” and “global interdependent markets” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010a: 42, 43), 
respectively, and undergoing a so-called capitalist transition, China sits amidst hybrid and 
paradoxical forces of simultaneous collaboration and competition.  
The analysis has illustrated how the Chinese political leadership and the Chinese wind 
turbine industry has displayed creative, agile, and disruptive moves of upgrading, where 
‘fragmented’ marketisation characterised by local experimentation along with centralised 
control has moved in tandem. In this particular Chinese ‘figuration’, new structures tend to 
be dissolved or reconfigured by new radical interventions (or by radical neglect of 
intervention) by the Chinese political leadership, before they add up to complementary, 
stabilised structures. This produces an overly self-disruptive rather than reproductive 
figuration in China, enabling actors to ‘break the waves’, and at times even resulting in what 
may be likened to Schumpeterian (1934) creative destruction. Overall, the thesis has in the 
above inquired into how a coupling of a pragmatist and constructivist account, through their 
common ‘micro’-relational roots, together can help move beyond structural and 
functionalistic accounts. 
GIN construction in China as games of reconfiguration?  
As contradictory forces of integration into GINs along with a perceived need for national 
protectionism engender simultaneous, contradictory multiple games of competition and 
cooperation, and as ambitions and roles of actors are consistently negotiated, relations have 
become overly complex and difficult to manage e.g. through conventional means of 
contracting. This can be argued to render GIN construction in China a constant 
reconfigurative game. Indeed, a key characteristic of GIN construction in Chinese wind 
power is the very multiplicity of simultaneous and often contradictory (and unconscious) 
matters of concerns, issues, strategies, and agendas. This renders the figuration and 
reconfigurative games highly volatile.  
Overall, to account for these particularly disruptive characteristics of the Chinese 
configuration, reflecting ambiguous ‘winds of change’, the thesis suggests that there may be 
grounds for cross-fertilising figurational sociology with the constructivist perspective, set 
into a developmental context of China. That is, whereas Elias’s figurational sociology has 
offered a picture of a larger pattern than that of myriads of overflows, the constructivist 
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perspective contributes to figurational sociology by displaying the multiplicity of 
simultaneous directions, games, and conflicting identities and roles, which complicate the 
strategic games further. Herrigel’s (2010) notion of sustained contingent collaboration 
bridges these different accounts. In addition, the constructivist account adds to the 
pragmatist accounts of Elias (1978) and Herrigel (2010), by illustrating how not only human 
and ’social’ forces and actors play a role, but also how non-human actors may ’come to have 
consequences’. Further, the thesis points to the benefits of adopting an ethnographically 
inspired constructivist approach, in order to trace how Chinese actors in specific sites and at 
specific times are able to requalify themselves, constantly engaging in transformative 
reconfigurative games, and engaging in ‘creative action’ (Herrigel, 2010).  
By synthesising the constructivist perspective of ANT with figurational sociology (Elias, 
1978) and Herrigel’s notion of sustained, contingent collaboration (2010), it becomes 
evident how not only one game is taking place, but multiple simultaneous games alongside 
the global disintegration of manufacturing. Such a lens fosters a more open-ended approach 
than what the GIN lens conventionally offers. Indeed, the Chinese experimental way of 
policy-making and the seemingly high agility and resilience in terms of China’s ability at 
self-correction, as well as the intricate linkages between top-down and bottom-up processes, 
offer a promise of a potential for China to transform and ’reconfigure’ its own figuration, as 
it constructs new games through the construction of associations. Through such 
associational moves, China may be able to ‘break the waves’, instead of ‘fighting against (its 
own) windmills’.  
Lastly, by diving into marketisation in Chinese wind power, and exploring GIN genesis, 
dynamics, and agency, the thesis contributes to the constructivist perspective by shedding 
light on a particular experimental Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation, in which Sino-
foreign collaborations play a critical role in the qualification of the emerging market as 
sustainable. In this way, the thesis draws on but also critically adapts the GIN literature, 
which thereby allows for a contribution to the literature by the very coupling of the different 
perspectives. 
Life lurking in the magmatic spaces between order and disorder  
The thesis has inquired into the labile, ‘magmatic space’ of controversy at the ”boundaries 
between order and disorder, or where different orders rub up against one another” (Serres 
1974 in Law, 2009: 144). The thesis displays how multiple ontologies of the investigated 
emerging GIN and its constituting parts has followed and construed its own figurational 
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‘logic’ of strategic games. These multiple realities and games ”may dovetail, but equally 
they may be held apart, contradict, or include one another in complex ways” (paraphrasing 
Serres, in Law, 2009: 152). Demonstrating some of the fissures, fractures and gaps, i.e. how 
“’life lurks in the interstices” (Whitehead 1978: 105 in Fraser, 2010: 74) between order and 
disorder, the thesis has engaged in an inquiry into how GINs emerge, are activated, and how 
they are made durable, i.e., diving into how the first act has come to be performed in this 
particular way, rather than starting out with the second act (Powell et al., 2012). With this 
final open-ended note on the scientific journey (cf. Chapter 4) of the inquiry, the thesis 
proceeds with a conclusion in Chapter 14. 
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Chapter 14. Concluding the Inquiry 
Chapter 14 provides a conclusion to the dually motivated research question that has guided 
the inquiry. First, a conclusion to the empirical research question is rendered, i.e.:  
 
How may a ‘turn to quality’ in Chinese wind power - reflecting a Chinese mode of green 
market construction - be de- and reconfiguring relations between Chinese and foreign 
actors around software? 
Upon unprecedented growth rates of the Chinese wind power market, China’s wind power 
market is today the world’s largest in terms of accumulative installed wind power capacity. 
Yet, the Chinese wind power market increasingly faces severe quality issues. These quality 
issues are i.a. a result of an extensive focus on high-speed growth in installed capacity 
through an emphasis on quantity and low prices of wind turbine installations, rather than on 
quality, generated electricity, or lifetime generating costs. As associations of low quality and 
low-performing wind turbines to Chinese wind turbines have had detrimental implications 
for the reputation of Chinese wind turbines, an ongoing struggle for qualifying Chinese wind 
power as a sustainable, renewable energy power source is taking place. The thesis illustrates 
how a so-called potential ‘turn to quality’ is emerging in China’s emerging wind power 
market. This potential, yet ambiguous, turn to quality is i.a. reflected in the gradual 
centralisation of wind farm approvals, the raising of technical standards, and trends towards 
a focus on generated electricity (GWh) rather than pure wind power capacity (GW). While 
the development of a Chinese wind power market by the Chinese political leadership has 
been construed as a means of Scientific Development to obtain China’s Sustainable 
Development and an economically, socially, and environmentally Harmonious Socialist 
Society, the quality crisis has destabilised the comprehensive framing of wind power as 
‘sustainable’.  
In the ongoing qualification struggle of the Chinese wind power market, the development 
and upgrading of indigenous core technologies such as software tools have increasingly 
been constituted as critical. However, largely founded on a background in foreign licenses 
and technology transfer as well as on collaborations with foreign companies, the Chinese 
wind power market is to a large extent still reliant on advanced foreign technologies and 
designs. That is, although having upgraded rapidly in numerous component technologies, 
when it comes to indigenous development of critical, advanced software programmes used, 
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for instance, as in the case of this inquiry, in the wind turbine’s main control and in 
simulation tools for turbine design, the Chinese wind power market is still dependent on 
foreign technologies as well as on engagement in diverse Sino-foreign collaborations. The 
thesis traces the socio-material translation of heterogeneous actors into Sino-foreign 
collaborations around software programmes, in the process of qualifying wind power as e.g. 
technically, scientifically, economically, politically, and environmentally ‘sustainable’. 
Engaging in an ethnographic inquiry into the marketisation of wind power, the thesis maps 
how entangled controversies consistently unfold over the qualification of wind power. This 
mapping is done by tracing controversies over IPRs, standards, and money, as well as over 
price and cost calculations in these collaborations. Thus, by mapping controversies over the 
pacification of the emerging good of wind power, as well as over price-setting, the thesis 
illustrates how framing processes, and the framing tools employed, have engendered conflict 
and trials of strength between Chinese and foreign actors in Chinese wind power. This 
renders an account of marketisation in Chinese wind power as consistently overflowing, and 
as ripe with controversy. The inherent instability of the wind power market is in turn linked 
to how the marketisation of wind power market is entangled in a controversy over China’s 
so-called ‘system problem’, which is largely constituted by state-owned and –controlled 
actors in China’s power sector and part and parcel of China’s iterative processes of 
corporate restructuring of its industrial system during ‘capitalist transition’. Further, the 
mapped controversies over the pacification of goods and price-setting are in turn entangled 
in an overarching controversy over the very sustainability of China’s experimental mode of 
constructing a ‘green’ market, and what the thesis dubs a specific Chinese fragmented and 
experimental ‘pragmatics of green marketisation’. In this way, the thesis illustrates a 
potentially particular Chinese mode of green marketisation, which i.a. is characterised by 
trial-and-error and ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, which, besides the conflicts between 
Chinese and foreign actors, also produces ongoing struggles between central and local 
Chinese governments as well as between wind power and fossil fuels.  
The thesis depicts the seemingly paradoxical way in which China seems to be ‘fighting 
against its own windmills’, as it has produced potentially self-disruptive overflowing, which 
e.g. threatens to produce socio-material lock-in into fossil fuels. Yet, while the Chinese 
pragmatics of green marketisation seems to engender disruptive conflict and overflowing, 
undermining the Sino-foreign collaborations that it relies on, it has also resulted in the rapid 
and unprecedented growth of a Chinese wind power market, and the rapid build-up of 
capabilities, as well as in potentially enabling an agile turn to quality in time to restabilise 
the framing of wind power as sustainable. Hereby, the bricolage-like mode of designing and 
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experimenting green markets seems to be resilient. A quality turn seems to be taking place, 
although slowly and ambiguously, incrementally transforming the ‘competitive spaces’ 
between Chinese and foreign actors out of which emerge more ‘collaborative spaces’, e.g. as 
calculative tools on costs and prices of Chinese and foreign actors are gradually aligned. 
Overall, the thesis displays how the potential turn to quality has de- and reconfigured 
relations, placing core technologies such as software and their algorithms at centre-stage in 
ongoing trials of strength over relative positions, roles, and identities in networks around 
particular component technologies. In this way, the thesis also illustrates how non-human 
actors can acquire agency, as they de- and reconfigure relations and the networks they 
constitute.  
Illustrating a high degree of instability of the wind power market, and of collaborative 
networks around software, since the identity, role, and positioning of actors are debated and 
contested, the thesis renders an account of a highly variable ontology of actors in the 
Chinese wind power market, and where governance modes are transformed. This is largely 
due to the way in which Chinese actors consistently push the ‘horizon of possibility and 
potentiality’, as they upgrade. Not necessarily knowing the final goal at the outset, Chinese 
actors are moving impatiently forward, transforming and negotiating their role, identity, 
relations, and ontology. In this way, the particular TENs have produced a certain type of 
agency, which is largely of a self-disruptive, and yet resilient nature.  
Overall, the thesis outlines how framing processes and the employment of calculative 
framing devices, such as IPRs, standards, as well as processes of price-setting and valuation, 
e.g. involving money and cost and price calculations, are contested in the qualification 
struggle of wind power as ‘sustainable’. This sometimes renders calculative framing devices 
with agency, resulting in complex dynamics of overflowing, which de- and reconfigure 
relations in what may constitute highly volatile, yet sustained, contingent relations. 
Summing up, the thesis indirectly, i.e. through a marketisation account, points to the 
potential emergence of international networks of collaboration around critical core 
components and to the role of these in the marketisation of wind power in China. 
In addition to having provided a conclusion to the empirically motivated research question, 
the thesis has provided a conclusion to the meta-theoretical research question, namely: 
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As the GIN literature generally does not pay much attention to the question of genesis, 
dynamics, or agency, how may a constructivist perspective qualify the understanding of GIN 
genesis, dynamics, and agency in a Chinese developmental context? 
While the GIN-literature has detected GINs in China’s wind turbine industry, the thesis is 
interested in how these GINs have emerged, in order to understand their potential role in the 
qualification of wind power as sustainable and in processes of green marketisation in a 
developmental context. Yet, displaying how the GIN-literature’s rather positivistic, 
structuralistic, and formalistic perspective does not put emphasis on how relations are 
construed or maintained, but instead tends to look at GINs after the fact (as results and 
formal structures), the thesis proposes that a constructivist marketisation perspective may be 
better suited to trace issues of GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency. Treating GIN 
construction as part and parcel of the qualification of China’s wind power market as 
sustainable, the thesis adopts a constructivist and relational marketisation perspective. 
Further, the thesis fundamentally reconceptualises GINs, namely ‘diving deeper’ into socio-
material processes of GIN-construction by looking at potential GINs around one critical 
component of the wind turbine, i.e., software, instead of detecting multiple GINs 
(constituted largely by WTMs and their global R&D-networks, and embedded within 
institutional contexts) within the entire wind turbine industry. Although not adopting the 
traditional GIN-metaphor, but instead paradoxically ‘looking away’ from GINs to inquire 
into their potential construction, the thesis argues that the thesis contributes to the GIN-
literature by illustrating the multiple controversies that GIN-construction engender, and 
some of the potential socio-material barriers to GIN-construction.  
Thus, while the existing literature has illustrated the emergence of GINs in Chinese wind 
power, the thesis illustrates that by diving deeper, into one particular and critical core 
component, and into the construction of associations in processes of relationship-building, 
there is no detectable stabilised GIN to be found. Instead, although GIN-relations are taking 
shape around control systems and simulation tools, relations tend to unravel as soon as they 
are constructed due to controversies over e.g. IPR, standards, money, and cost and price 
calculations. Further, knowledge and technologies around software tends to be 
commodified, implying that the detected networks still largely remain part of conventional 
value chains in customer-supplier relationships. Nevertheless, relations are taking shape 
with more mutual knowledge sharing. However, these relations are volatile, e.g. as the 
collaborations are characterised by simultaneous competitive dynamics. Further, while the 
Chinese political leadership promotes Sino-foreign collaborations on technologies and 
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innovation, it also strives towards independence from foreign technologies. This produces 
ambiguous collaborations characterised by simultaneous collaboration and competition. 
Overall, the thesis illustrates that GIN construction is not automatic.  
On this basis, the thesis argues that the GIN-literature can benefit from decomposing 
industries into component technologies. This can render a more fine-grained understanding 
of potential barriers to GIN construction and potential differences within industries in regard 
to GIN construction. That is, through in-depth micro-studies, and by disassembling the wind 
turbine, the thesis illustrates how technology matters. Further, the thesis illustrates what may 
be gained from a processual and relational constructivist perspective, namely sensitising our 
understanding of how GINs can be part and parcel of socio-material construction of markets. 
The thesis thus contributes by displaying how non-human actors such as specific component 
technologies and algorithms can have disruptive agency on the entire constitution of GIN 
relations and on entangled processes of market construction, as well as how China as an 
emerging economy is actively shaping its development and upgrading. The volatile and self-
disruptive dynamics depicted in terms of GIN genesis is linked to the rapidly shifting 
agendas and ambitions of Chinese actors, which renders relations contestable. Further, 
China may even attempt to move beyond GINs within Chinese wind power. This is e.g. seen 
in the introduction of domestic Chinese standards, which displays how Chinese actors seek 
to shape and mould governance of relations themselves. Further, the pursuit of indigenous 
innovation paradoxically seems to disrupt potential GIN-emergence. Overall, the highly 
volatile nature of GINs in Chinese wind power points to how the GIN-literature can benefit 
from making more ethnographically inspired studies into micro-processes and relations, and 
from looking into GINs within a specific context. 
Displaying how the constructivist approach renders insights into genesis, dynamics, and 
agency of GINs, the thesis points not only to the limitations of the GIN-literature, but also of 
the ANT vocabulary. Due to the constant dialectics between framing and overflowing, 
which emerges from the findings of the analysis, the notion of overflowing tends to 
‘overflow’ itself. As the thesis simultaneously aims at identifying larger patterns of GIN 
construction in China, a ‘pragmatist move’ is made through the use of Elias’s figurational 
sociology. Hereby, the thesis renders an alternative understanding of the Chinese wind 
power market, namely, not so much as a GIN, but how and whether it may be captured as a 
figuration. With the notion of figuration, the thesis points to how the findings of the analysis 
display a gradual move from figuration I to figuration II, namely from a focus on speedy 
low cost-production towards a focus on quality. In this move towards figuration II, a new 
419 
 
strategic and more complex game between Chinese and foreign actors is emerging, in which 
dynamics of collaboration and competition coexist. In these paradoxical relations of 
figuration II, software programmes have become centre-stage of contestation. The socio-
material resistance to obtaining access to algorithms has produced an intense power struggle 
and multiple matters of concern for e.g. indigenous innovation, leapfrogging, and catch-up. 
The emerging figuration of GIN construction in China is one which contains contradictory 
self-disruptive dynamics, due to the experimentalist and gradualist trial and error approach 
of constructing new green industries. This renders the wind power figuration in China highly 
resilient to overflowing. This provides an open-ended account in terms of China’s 
possibilities for upgrading, market construction, and for GIN construction. Having 
concluded on the research question, the final Chapter 15 presents a discussion on wider 
implications for related literature streams, an outline for future research, as well as offering 
reflexive perspectives on the delimitations and (ontological) ‘politics’ of the thesis. 
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Chapter 15. Future Research, Wider Implications, and Reflexive 
Critique 
”Where there is an end, there is a beginning” (Deleuze and Guattari (2011 [1980]), “RHIZOME”) 
After discussing and concluding on the research question, i.a. regarding its contributions to 
the GIN literature through a constructivist marketisation perspective, which has been 
enabled by so-called pragmatist tunnels, Chapter 15 inquires further into how the findings of 
the thesis also resonate with a number of other audiences. Based on an account of the wider 
implications for related literatures, the chapter also introduces a tentative new research 
agenda for studying GIN and market construction in a developmental context (of China) for 
New Economic Sociology. The chapter concludes by engaging in a reflexive critique of the 
findings.  
Wider implications 
In the following section, wider implications for selected affiliated literature streams are 
presented. These include contributions to the China literature, and to structural and 
hierarchical accounts of the Varieties of Capitalism lens and the GVC literature. This leads 
to a discussion of implications for the upgrading and industrial policy literature within a 
developmental context. 
A story of bricolage, fragmented authoritarianism, and structured uncertainty? 
The thesis has provided a story on GIN construction as part of green marketisation, not in 
general, but explicitly as a situational study of China in an era of global disintegration of 
production and innovation activities. Apart from contributions to the GIN literature, the 
thesis can hereby also inform the China literature. In particular, the findings of the thesis 
resonate with other studies on China’s experimental, ’adaptive governance’ (Heilmann and 
Perry, 2011; Heilmann, 2011), which confirm that China pragmatically ‘gropes for the 
stones under-foot while crossing the river’ (Goldstein, 1996; Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 
48), i.a. in its gradualist capitalist transition and industrial policy.  
In the analysis, the Chinese seemingly piecemeal and pragmatic mode of marketisation, in 
China’s gradual attempt at performing a turn to quality, was dubbed a ‘particular fragmented 
and experimental Chinese pragmatics of green marketisation’. This pragmatics of green 
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marketisation was e.g. reflected in the constant oscillation between centralisation and 
decentralisation and in the gradual shift from GW targets to include targets for generated 
electricity (GWh). In a constructivist perspective, this can be claimed to reflect a bricolage-
like way of marketisation, engaging in simultaneous designing and experimenting, as the 
market is constructed based on both top-down and bottom-up creative, agnostic processes 
(Callon, 2009). Hereby, the thesis is concerned with a “condition that has received 
insufficient scholarly attention in China-studies” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 34), 
namely, that “while responsibility has been delegated to the provinces, the center firmly 
retains control over major institutional and technological features crucial to the development 
of high-technology industry” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 34).  
While this issue might still deserve further scholarly attention, different China-scholars have 
already looked into the issue of an agile oscillation between centralisation and 
decentralisation in China through the lens of ’fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal, 
2004(1995); Mertha, 2009), and related notions of experimentation under hierarchy 
(Heilmann, 2008: 29) and structured uncertainty (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011; Breznitz 
and Murphree, 2013). As also indicated in the analysis (Chapter 12), fragmented 
authoritarianism is closely coupled to China’s ‘matrix muddle’ of geographically and 
bureaucratically segregated governance structures, which creates a large space for political 
bargaining (Lieberthal, 2004(1995); Mertha, 2009), which was e.g. seen in regard to the 
bargaining between wind power and fossil fuels. In a newly published article on the 
development of wind power in China (Korsnes, 2014), the authoritative, yet responsive and 
flexible quality of China’s leadership has recently been linked directly to wind power, 
marking a Chinese policy of flexibility, institutional adaptability, and resilience (Korsnes, 
2014). Indeed, the China literature is generally concerned with the particular adaptive, agile, 
pragmatic, and experimental governance mode of China’s political leadership (e.g. 
Heilmann, 2005; 2008; 2009; 2011; Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012; 2013/forthcoming; Breznitz 
and Murphree, 2011). As was hinted at in the analysis (Chapter 12), China’s political 
leadership has been inspired directly by the (democratic) pragmatism coined by the 
American pragmatist John Dewey (cf. Wang, 2007), whose thoughts on experimentation, as 
“guided by intentional anticipation instead of being blind trial and error”, was picked up by 
Chinese leaders such as Mao with great enthusiasm (Heilmann, 2008: 18). Whilst Dewey 
argued for the virtue of intentional anticipation, he also argued for the ”legitimacy of 
decentralized experimentation” (Heilmann, 2008: 2) with an emphasis on learning through 
direct practical experience (Heilmann, 2008: 19). The pragmatic legitimacy of decentralised 
experimentation in China is e.g. reflected in loosely defined policy goals. For instance, while 
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the “official goals of the CCP and its ongoing reforms are ‘scientific development’ and the 
creation of a ‘harmonious society’ […] the exact definition of these goals is uncertain; 
interpretations range from simple social stability to comprehensive redistributive justice” 
(Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 48), as well as an increased focus on the environment 
(Christensen, 2013; Fan, 2006).  
Wind power in China as a case of a specific form(s) of capitalism(s) 
The specific experimentalist mode of governance identified in China also resonates with the 
China-related literature, which is based on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) paradigm of 
(institutional) comparative political economy (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001; McNally, 2007; 
Witt, 2010; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Hall and Thelen, 2009). In addition, it resonates with 
VoC affiliated literatures on business systems, which adopt a more sociological (and 
sometimes East Asian) focus95, as well as with the more recent variant of variegated 
capitalism (e.g. Peck and Theodore, 2007; Zhang and Peck, 2014; Peck and Zhang, 2013; 
Fligstein and Zhang, 2010), which seeks to account for multiple forms of capitalism(s) 
within China’s national borders. As regards the VoC literature, it is assumed that 
institutional complementarities across political-economic realms can create an institutional 
comparative advantage (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Hall and Soskice (2001) develop two ideal 
types of liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME) 
respectively (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Based on an inherent logic of institutional 
complementarities between political-economic realms96, the VoC literature argues that 
intermediate positions between CMEs and LMEs are less viable, “as a combination of 
institutional complementarities and competitive synergies would tend to drive national 
capitalisms towards one or other of the two poles” (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 3). That is, 
“nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to 
develop complementary practices in other spheres as well” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17), 
resulting in national-level differences between CMEs and LMEs.  
The firm-centric and transaction cost-based VoC theory seeks to explain institutional variety 
across countries, and was developed and employed for analysing developed OECD countries 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Yet, as interest has gradually grown for characterising non-OECD 
countries, and emerging ‘transition’ economies such as China, the VoC framework has 
                                                     
95
 Looking into corporate governance and emphasising the role of politics and the state (e.g. 
Carney and Witt, 2013: 3; Whitley 1992; 1999; Redding and Witt, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010). 
96
 Corporate structure, financial system, education and training regime, industrial relations, and 
inter-firm relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 6-7) 
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proved problematic. That is, China is often characterised as an ‘odd case’ “off the grid” 
(Zhang and Peck, 2014: 3) of the binary LME-CME dichotomy. This has resulted in VoC 
studies sometimes reaching diverging conclusions as regards the type of China’s national 
VoC. For instance, Witt (2010) has adopted the VoC framework, concluding that China 
constitutes a quasi-LME (Witt, 2010), while Fligstein and Zhang (2011) conversely 
conclude that China’s capitalism is an awkward kind of CME (Fligstein and Zhang, 2011). 
Other studies treat China as a hybrid on the transition path towards the Western-biased 
notions of capitalism of the VoC framework, as it “engages in a general pattern of 
hybridisation where institutions transferred from other contexts are adapted and 
reconfigured to China’s existing institutional structure” (Redding and Witt, 2009: 390). 
Lastly, others have left such grand theorisations and instead claim that China constitute a 
case sui generis (e.g. McNally, 2007), e.g. as China’s emergent type of capitalism displays 
three salient institutional features, namely East Asian state-led capitalism, network/guanxi 
capitalism, and new global capitalism (McNally, 2007: 176-196). Dissatisfied with these 
approaches, which seek to accommodate China to a Western-biased framework, the 
emerging literature stream of ‘variegated capitalism’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007; Jessop, 
2011) seeks to account for the “pertinent sources and dimensions of variation within and 
beyond this national model”, e.g. due to “regional ‘subformations’ of capitalism and their 
(constitutive) extra-local connections” (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 7). In this way allowing for 
the patterned heterogeneity of the Chinese model of capitalism (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 7), 
the literature stream of variegated capitalism privileges “the relational analysis of unevenly 
developed multi-scalar and polymorphic capitalism over the search for institutionally 
stabilized ‘system integrity’ at the national scale, and hold elements of connectivity and 
commonality across capitalism(s) in creative tension with the search for geographical 
divergence and difference” (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 3).  
Beyond accounts of mutually binding complementary structures – an account of China as 
persistently uninstitutionalised 
Overall, the emergent literature, which allows for the coexistence of multiple capitalisms 
within Chinese borders, breaks with the VoC framework’s assumption of the superiority and 
comparative institutional competitiveness of complementary capitalist institutions. That is, 
the emerging variegated capitalism approach points to heterogeneity as the basis for China’s 
mode of capitalism(s), which constitutes “uneven development of globalizing but 
polymorphic capitalism(s)” (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 5). On a related note, the thesis points to 
how the VoC assumption of the superiority of “‘coherence’ of national models, expressed 
424 
 
institutionally” (Zhang and Peck, 2014: 5), in terms of institutional complementarity, does 
not align with the Chinese experience. Instead, the thesis aligns more with the variegated 
capitalism stream, as the thesis illustrates how the Chinese wind power market is not a story 
of mutually binding, path-dependent institutional complementarities, but rather a story of 
continuous disruption of emerging structures. In the muddle matrix of China’s fragmented 
authoritarianism with myriads of conflicting vested interests, it becomes difficult to ‘bind’ 
relations into stable institutionalised structures. Indeed, according to Breznitz and Murphree 
(2011; 2013) and their account of structured uncertainty, China is “unique in being 
persistently uninstitutionalized” (Lieberthal, 2004 in Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 11). This 
lack of institutionalisation is in turn coupled to how Chinese politics are marked by a 
“volatile yet productive combination of decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central 
interference, resulting in the selective integration of local experiences into national policy-
making” (Heilmann, 2008: 29). Accordingly, one of the most important institutional features 
of the Chinese political economy is the consistent presence of what Breznitz and Murphree 
(2011) term “structured uncertainty” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 11). Such structured 
uncertainty denotes  
“an agreement to disagree about the goals and methods of policy, which leads to intrinsic 
unpredictability and to inherent ambiguity in implementation. Thus, structured uncertainty is an 
institutional condition that cements multiplicity of action without legitimizing any specific course or form 
of behavior as the proper one. This ambiguity consequently leads to some tolerance for multiple 
interpretations and implementations of the same policy” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 38). 
In a constant move to experiment with industrial upgrading and scientific and sustainable 
development, and in a constant oscillation between central control and local 
experimentation, Chinese policy-making at times seems (potentially purposely) self-
disruptive. This is i.a. seen in the support of heedless growth in GW installations, which has 
ultimately led to a non-linear, non-path-dependent, non-accumulative, and non-
complementary development of Chinese wind power. While this can turn out as a ‘fight 
against own wind mills’, the thesis has illustrated that it is also this very structured 
uncertainty that has allowed for agile adjustments and a potentially timely turn to quality. 
Dis- and reassembling hierarchical structures 
On a related note to the resonance between the findings of the thesis and the variegated 
capitalism lens, the findings also have implications for the structural, hierarchical, and 
functionalistic literature on GVC governance, which is closely linked to the GIN literature, 
as outlined in Chapter 2. In the experimentalist Chinese context of policy-making, in which 
institutional structures do not necessarily ‘add up’ through efficiency and complementarity, 
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actors in the Chinese wind power market seem to engage in multiple simultaneous and 
sometimes conflicting supplier-customer modes of governance. This has already been 
indicated in Chapter 13 with the introduction of Herrigel’s (2010) notion of sustained 
contingent collaboration.   
Overall, the thesis displays how a simplistic transaction-based logic of governance, as 
represented by the transaction cost-based ‘governance as coordination’ lens (in Gibbon et 
al., 2008), does not render a fulfilling notion for understanding governance in China’s wind 
power market. The findings of the thesis display how such transaction cost-based predictions 
are not always straightforward, but rather opaque in the Chinese wind power market. For 
instance, choices of suppliers and partners may be co-configured by multiple government 
agendas to build core competencies and indigenous innovation capabilities, by narrative and 
discursive devices, by standards and IPRs, and by protectionist policies in favour of 
liquidity-constrained domestic SOEs. This adds to the complexity in governance of 
customer-supplier relations, establishing simultaneous collaborative and competitive 
dynamics, along with role ambiguity, as discussed earlier (Chapter 13).  
Nevertheless, it may be claimed that the thesis can contribute to the governance as 
coordination lens, by displaying how convergence between Chinese and foreign WTMs in 
terms of governance modes is taking place in the qualification struggle of wind power. Thus, 
the thesis indicates how Western WTMs are experimenting with more modular governance 
modes, gradually moving away from pure internalisation and relational governance modes, 
in order to lower costs. Conversely, Chinese companies, who are facing the consequences 
for quality of a market-based and/or modularised governance structure, e.g. as outsourcing 
of many components risks jeopardising the overview of the systemic (algorithmic) interplay 
of the turbines’ thousands of components, are moving towards more internalised and 
relational governance modes, as they gradually build capabilities. This illustrates mutual 
learning as well as upgrading on part of Chinese WTMs.  
At the same time, however, the findings of the thesis relate even more directly to the 
governance as normalisation (in Gibbon et al., 2008; Ponte, 2009; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005) 
and governmentality (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008) lens, which acknowledges the role of quality 
standards in shaping governance relations. The thesis contributes by illustrating how 
standards (and their normative, discursive work) co-configure customer-supplier relations, 
but also contributes by illustrating how these produce controversy and trials of strength over 
the exclusion effects of standards, as well as over the very right to define quality. The 
governance as normalisation literature is concerned with how certification and codification 
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facilitates the emergence of industrial market conventions and of economies of scale 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: 21). It illustrates how powerful lead firms can govern the GVC by 
exerting their power over suppliers in a hands-off way through control at a distance (Gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005), namely through employment of quality standards and dominating 
industrial market quality conventions. Although the literature on governance as 
normalisation (as well as the governmentality lens or the so-called ‘programme of 
government’ approach) (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008: 367) also admits to how there is a politics 
to the measuring “instruments” and tools employed for standardisation (Ponte and Cheyns, 
2013: 461; Ponte, 2009: 241; Gibbon and Ponte, 2008), these perspectives mainly provide a 
social constructivist perspective with a focus on human actors. In turn, the thesis contributes 
by illustrating how the fight over such quality conventions are not just socially constructed 
through e.g. discursive and normative conventions, but produced through socio-material 
processes (e.g. involving non-human actors such as algorithms, aero-elastic codes, 
simulation tools).  
Breaking with hierarchical and structural imageries – on disruptive governance 
Rather than producing stable governance structures, the Chinese highly politicised market 
for wind power renders the relative positioning of firms in the value chain highly volatile 
and unpredictable, as governance relations (e.g. produced through contested standards) are 
inherently political. This is particularly the case in the ongoing ‘quality crisis’ of the wind 
power market, where Chinese and foreign companies consistently experiment with new 
modes of governance. These are characterised by paradoxical dynamics of simultaneous 
collaborative and competitive forces. With extensive role ambiguity, the thesis has earlier 
dubbed emerging collaborative networks as modes of ‘sustained contingent collaboration’ 
(Herrigel, 2010). Yet, as also the ambitions, goals, and identities of actors are shifting, the 
specific governance mode is rendered contested, variable, and situational. In this way, the 
detected collaborations may even be characterised as variegated and/or disruptive 
governance, i.e. reflecting their hybrid, heterogeneous, paradoxical, and experimental nature 
within and across the wind turbine industry and industrial sub-sectors.  
The thesis therefore proposes that the conventional and relatively more structural and 
hierarchical notion of GVC should be modified, allowing for a look into the socio-material 
work of maintaining and disrupting such structural hierarchies. With its focus on the work of 
construing associations, and on the potentially disruptive ‘creative destruction’ of Chinese 
experimental and pragmatic governance, the constructivist perspective of the thesis 
indirectly breaks with the largely structural, functionalistic, and hierarchical accounts of the 
427 
 
GVC literature and the VoC literature and their tendency towards path-dependent lock-in. 
Instead, the analysis of the thesis points to how Chinese actors at times are disrupting value 
chain structures, engaging in experimental moves of building associations to their product, 
and oscillating between centralisation and decentralisation in an experimental mode of 
pragmatist trial and error. Seeking to open some of the black boxes of the value chain (and 
GIN) approach(es), as well as of different VoCs, by way of tracing micro-processes of 
relationship-building and of construing associations, the thesis has indirectly rendered an 
account of governance as political, messy, and self-disruptive ordering, in experimental 
moves of trial and error and network relations. In this account, positions along the chain are 
not fixed, but rather fluid and agile, and unpredictable. Thus, rather than adopting a 
structuralist perspective of GINs or GVCs, the thesis instead emphasises that notions of 
heterogeneous and recursive modes of ordering (Law, 1994, 2003), or relatedly 
agencements/assemblages (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and/or configurations 
and compositions (Latour, 2005a). These more processual and relational notions may 
provide a fruitful starting point for opening up black-boxed (governance) relations, 
structures, chains, and networks. 
Implications for the upgrading literature within the GVC-framework 
The seeming ability of the Chinese ‘figuration’ to disrupt governance structures also has 
indirect implications for the upgrading literature. As illustrated in Chapter 2, upgrading has 
been conceptualised in a variety of ways, originally taking place as a trajectory, and 
generally treated as contingent on the specific type of governance mode (Schmitz, 2004: 6; 
Gereffi, 1994a, 1999, Gereffi, 2005; Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001; Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002; Morrison et al., 2008). That is, prospects for local enterprises to upgrade are 
dependent on the type of GVC that it is tied into (Schmitz, 2004: 1). Overall, the existing 
literature tends to look at the ‘results’ and structural barriers in terms of upgrading, but 
overlook the micro-processes and the role of socio-material actors in resisting upgrading. 
The story of wind power in China can be seen as a story of upgrading and learning through 
relationship-building, that is, of integration into GVCs, GPNs, and gradually also GINs. 
Such integration into global chains and networks has already been argued to bring about 
local and regional development (LoRD) (Parrilli et al., 2013: 967, 968). This aligns with 
Mathews’ (2002) notion a linkage-leverage-and-learning of MNCs from emerging 
economies (Mathews, 2002). 
While having illustrated rapid upgrading within Chinese wind power, and attempts at 
becoming parts of GINs through processes of relationship-building (via the construction of 
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associations), the thesis warns against conceiving of such networking and linkage-leverage-
learning as automatic, and against assuming that integration into and upgrading and learning 
through GINs or GVCs is automatic. Instead, it is necessary to myopically trace how 
relations are built, what they contain (i.e., their quality, and what kind of knowledge is 
shared, and what kind of knowledge is not), and how power struggles may take shape as 
potential socio-technical barriers to upgrading emerge. The thesis has e.g. illustrated how 
‘core algorithms’ tend to resist translation, as well as how certain actors can be excluded 
from research collaborations due to lacking associations of ‘algorithmic quality’. This 
indicates potential socio-technical exclusion mechanisms and barriers to GIN integration 
and upgrading. It is thus necessary to inquire into the socio-material work of building 
relations through the construction of associations. The thesis opens up the issue of upgrading 
as a matter of translation and qualification as well as a matter of the ability to construe 
associations (e.g. of quality and sustainability). At the same time, the depicted experimental 
mode of ordering and the resulting disruptive governance mode, which is marked by radical 
intervention and sometimes even by radical non-intervention, can potentially enable 
disruptive upgrading in radical moves for industrial development.  
Disrupting structures through innovative manufacturing and China’s Run of the Red Queen? 
The account emerging from the analysis may at first sight seem a somewhat pessimistic 
outlook for China’s potential for upgrading from manufacturing. This corresponds to a host 
of studies on manufacturing in China (e.g. Steinfeld, 2004; Dongsheng and Fujimoto, 2004), 
which are concerned that China’s value chain integration through cost-cutting 
manufacturing is shallow (Steinfeld, 2004: 1971). That is, whilst China may have become 
number one in the world in terms of production volume, China is oftentimes depicted as 
“stuck in the imitation of focal models of foreign makers” (Dongsheng and Fujimoto, 2004: 
15). This lock-in is further linked to increasingly modularised product designs, which 
despite quasi-open architectural attributes threaten to lock Chinese assembly companies 
“into the existing product technologies since the incentives of making reverse engineering 
are impeded on the path of accumulating their product development capabilities” 
(Dongsheng and Fujimoto, 2004: 23). In this account of upgrading within manufacturing, 
”Chinese firms may be bending the metal and bolting together the parts”, but is refrained 
from innovation in today’s globalised, highly de-verticalised supply chains (Steinfeld, 2004 
in Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 5).  
In contrast, another related stream of literature takes the opposite standpoint. This literature 
asserts that it is ”precisely because of China’s position within manufacturing, the nation is 
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developing proprietary know-how extending beyond manufacturing”, namely moving from 
manufacturing into ”everything from design capabilities to outright innovation, the 
development and commercialization of completely new products, processes, and services” 
(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2011 in Nahm and Steinfeld, 
2012: 4). As a ‘battle at the bottom’ is taking place, where actors are engaged in cut-throat 
competition for ’the middle’ (Brandt and Thun, 2010: 1560, 1566, 1569) of the market, 
’there is more going on than meets the eye’ within the manufacturing sector (Brandt and 
Thun, 2010: 1571). These studies focus more on micro-level processes of learning and 
organisational structures for knowledge sharing than the depicted GVC-literature (Herrigel, 
2010; Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012; Herrigel et al., 2013). Relating to the technological 
capabilities approach in the GVC literature, the account offered by the literature on 
‘innovative manufacturing’ goes more into the actual manufacturing and learning processes 
at the micro-level than the GVC-literature conventionally does. Placing the notion of 
‘innovative manufacturing’ at the core of the argument (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012; 
2013/forthcoming), China’s rapid development is here seen as a matter of ‘manufacturing 
prowess’ and not just cheap labor, as proprietary know-how and specialisation can be 
embedded in the fabrication and assembly process itself (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 3, 5).  
The notion of innovative manufacturing is amongst other industries also predicated on 
China’s wind turbine industry due to detected processes of multidirectional learning across a 
variety of national contexts (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2013/forthcoming). That is, whilst the 
Chinese wind power market is engaging in cut-throat competition, Chinese manufacturers 
are simultaneously building up competencies and gradually focusing on producing quality 
turbines, as depicted in the thesis. Hereby, central to the Chinese growth story, i.e. its status 
as a “scale-up nation” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2013/forthcoming), is the “specialisation and 
multidirectional inter-firm learning” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 7) as well as the unique 
simultaneous management of tempo, volume, and cost (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012; 
2013/forthcoming). Along the same lines, Herrigel et al. (2013) argue that manufacturing 
upgrading is actively taking place in China (Herrigel et al., 2013). As Chinese manufacturers 
squeeze out costs of high volume operations, redefining existing industrial experience 
curves as they are specialising (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 7, 17), they have engaged in 
relations “with other enterprises that can ‘complete the package’, so to speak” (Nahm and 
Steinfeld, 2012: 25). To account for this upgrading process from manufacturing, Nahm and 
Steinfeld (2012) develop a ”taxonomy for classifying different variants of knowledge-
intensive scale up” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 7). This includes (1) backward design and 
the reengineering of someone else’s existing product (e.g. detected in the wind turbine 
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industry by the authors), (2) making someone else’s (new-to-the-world) product design 
come true (seen e.g. in the wind turbine industry), (3) rapidly-scaled new-to-the-world 
product innovation, and (4) a product platform for technology co-development and 
absorption (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012). Indeed, the thesis has illustrated the first two 
variants of knowledge-intensive scale-up around software and wind power, while it is still 
limited how much new-to-the-world product innovation and co-development is taking place, 
although there are increasing signs of it. However, while this at first sight might give a 
pessimistic account, Breznitz and Murphree (2011; 2013) argue that it is precisely the ability 
to follow behind technology leaders and innovators, themselves thriving “in second-
generation, production, and process innovation” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 2), which 
has resulted in China’s powerful position in the global economy:  
“China’s accomplishment has been to master the art of thriving in second-generation innovation – 
including the mixing of established technologies and products in order to come up with new solutions – 
and the science of organizational, incremental, and process innovation” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 
4).  
Pursuing this strategy of thriving in second-generation innovation has been enabled by the 
general trend towards global decomposition of not only production, but also of innovation 
(Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 13). According to Breznitz and Murhphree,  
“it is much more important to realize that within the new, fragmented international economic system, 
China has developed a remarkably profitable and sustainable model of innovation. This model makes 
China into a critical part of the world innovation system, but it does not rely on China excelling in 
cutting-edge novel-product R&D” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 19).  
This course of development is coined China’s “run of the Red Queen,” by making a 
reference to the world of Lewis Carroll’s ‘Red Queen’ in Through the Looking-Glass and 
What Alice Found There, who, in order even to stay in the same place, had to run as fast as 
she could (Carroll, 2001 in Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 2-3). Through this lens,  
“China shines by keeping its industrial-production and service industries in perfect tandem with the 
technological frontier. Like the Red Queen, it runs as fast as possible in order to remain at the cusp of 
the global technology frontier without actually advancing the frontier itself” (Breznitz and Murphree, 
2011: 3). 
The latter literatures on ‘innovative manufacturing’ and the notion of China’s strategy of the 
‘Run of the Red Queen’ emphasise the potentiality of Chinese firms to break free of 
constraining value chains and their binding structures. Instead, manufacturing and second-
generation innovation can serve as a potential locus for upgrading, and thus constituting a 
”sustainable strategic goal for national economic growth” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 3). 
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Governance and upgrading as associational moves 
The more optimistic accounts outlined above seem to break with the more hierarchical, 
functionalistic, and structural accounts of the traditional GVC and VoC literatures. That is, 
whereas the VoC and GVC literatures tend to offer somewhat rigid accounts of 
hierarchically binding, reproductive, and complementary structures, the accounts of Nahm 
and Steinfeld (2012; 2013/forthcoming), Herrigel (2010), Herrigel et al. (2013), and 
Breznitz and Murphree (2011; 2013) are partly opening up some of these binding structures. 
That is, they open up a space for potential upgrading and breaking free of captive 
governance relations or institutions, through manufacturing. For instance, as expressed by 
Nahm and Steinfeld (2012), the story of China’s scale-up in manufacturing is 
”not simply the story of globalized – and often quite hierarchical – supply chains. Nor is it the story of 
manufacturers purchasing and rapidly integrating mature technologies through one-way learning. 
Rather, it is a story of multiple players sharing knowledge and risk in order to commercialize emergent 
technology. Moreover, it is a story of multiple players participating in a movement down – or even 
outright redefinition of – an industrial learning curve, one not so long ago thought to have been quite 
flat” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 28). 
Also providing an open-ended account in terms of opportunities for upgrading, e.g. by 
pointing to the myriads of controversies, overflows, ability to make associations, and 
pragmatic, experimental marketisation, the thesis aligns itself with the optimistic account. 
Yet, at the same time, the thesis goes further, as it ‘breaks down’ structural, path-dependent, 
and deterministic accounts more than seen before in the extant literature. Through its lens of 
heterogeneous, distributed agency, the constructivist account of the thesis allows for a more 
agentic account, pointing to the disruptive moves of Chinese actors, as they construct 
relations with foreign actors and construe associations of strategic importance to software 
programmes, in this way mobilising a host of actors into the emerging GIN. The thesis 
displays how Chinese actors, by continuously transforming their role and position through 
negotiation and construction of associations, at times succeed in upgrading and breaking free 
from value chain governance relations in experimentalist, guanxi-like moves. This is e.g. 
done by finding creative ways of framing themselves as sustainable, redefining the identity, 
role, position, and relative power of Chinese actors. This disruptive governance results – in 
addition to overflowing – at times also in (disruptive) path creation, which makes it possible 
to disembed from existing relevance structures (Garud and Karnøe, 2003). This aligns 
somewhat with what Herrigel (2010) earlier termed ‘creative action’, and which the thesis 
coined a matter of bricolage and creative experimentation. The case study on GIN 
construction around software in Chinese wind power has depicted a path-creating Chinese 
mode of constructing new markets. The depicted ‘(dis)associational moves’ have made it 
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possible to learn through experimental trial and error, and to gardually develop 
competencies. The thesis contributes to the VoC, value chain, governance and upgrading 
literatures by displaying the inherent instability and negotiated nature of hierarchical roles 
and structures. Rather than relying on a stable account of complementary structures and 
institutions, the thesis hereby conveys an account of highly disruptive, yet creative and 
experimental dynamics.  
Perspectives for industrial policy in a ’transformed era’ 
Having provided a discussion on how the findings of the thesis link up to wider discussions 
within China studies, the VoC literature, and to governance and upgrading discussions, it 
becomes relevant briefly to consider how the thesis contributes to perspectives on industrial 
policy in a developmental context. As a ‘latecomer’ country, China faces fierce competition 
and paradoxical pressures to upgrade by linking up to GINs (and moving beyond them) and 
attracting foreign actors, whilst also wanting to protect its national industries. This has 
created a market characterised by a somewhat schizophrenic dialectics between competition 
and collaboration. 
According to various scholars on China’s development, China’s current situation is indeed 
different and more challenging than what faced the developmental and/or predatory state of 
the ’East Asian Tigers’ (e.g. Evans, 1995; Wade, 2004; Amsden, 2004; Johnson, 1995), 
which was marked by an era of vertical integration of companies (Nahm and Steinfeld, 
2012: 24). In contrast, China is facing an era of vertical disintegration of activities due to 
increased modularity of technologies (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012), simultaneously with 
opening its markets following the WTO accession. In this ’transformed era’ (Steinfeld, 
2004: 1983), Chinese companies are facing new, more complex competitive pressures than 
ever seen before (Nolan, 2001; Steinfeld, 2004). For instance, this implies that firms must 
learn to operate ”in a much more networked form of production, one in which production 
architectures are more modular, inter-firm production relationships are more extensive, and 
firm-level specialization in particular production activities is much more pronounced” 
(Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 25).  
Consequently, with these new conditions, blindly copying from the strategy of 
developmental states of the East Asian Tigers becomes unviable. That is, the successful 
industrialisation of the East Asian Tigers during the 1970s and 1980s was largely a result of 
strategic, longer-term focus, rule-setting, regulation, and strategic intervention, e.g. as 
reflected in the ’archetypical developmental state’ South Korea (Amsden, 2004; Nahm and 
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Steinfeld, 2012: 30). In contrast, in the new era of rapid change and modularity, Chinese 
companies are claimed to be constrained in terms of their room for maneuvre, when it comes 
to traditional developmental, interventionist industrial policy (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012). 
This makes it more important to succeed in specialisation within production stages rather 
than developing large National Champion conglomerates (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 5), 
as this minimises the risk of forcing through integration of activities which are not ’integral’ 
(Steinfeld, 2004: 1984). Indeed, basing their argument on the notion of China’s pragmatic 
mode of ‘structured uncertainty’ as illustrated above, Breznitz and Murphree (2011; 2013) 
note how China’s model of the ‘run of the Red Queen’ does, indeed, not resemble the 
former Asian newly industrialised economies fast-follower model (Breznitz and Murphree, 
2011: 4). While these have had  
“specific policies with clearly defined goals and the pathways to get there, China developed its Red 
Queen run by accident, partly as a result of local experimentation, and the outcome looks quite different 
from the declared goals of the central government” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 4-5).  
As China’s Red Queen strategy has largely come about ‘by accident’ (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011), China instead, officially, pursues an industrial policy of picking strategic 
”pillar industries” (Steinfeld, 2004: 1984), of selecting ‘National Champions’ (Nolan, 2001; 
Brødsgaard, 2012a) by building a strong, independent innovative capacity (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011: 6), and of establishing a Harmonious Socialist Society through Scientific 
Development (Christensen, 2013). Indeed, within wind power, China has pursued a 
“national push to develop a competitive wind industry” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 29), 
which risks not only costly investments in manufacturing capacity and rapid manufacturing 
expansion, but also overcapacity and potential financial losses to investors in the process of 
industry consolidation (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 33). 
Overall, China does not fit neatly into any one specific category within the developmental 
state literature. While China is ”neither devoid of state involvement, nor disconnected from 
state developmental policy” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 29), policies often seem haphazard, 
indiscriminately managed (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 24), or ‘improvisational’. This 
“experimental, almost mercurial fashion” (Nahm and Steinfeld, 2012: 30-31) of intervention 
makes it difficult to discern any particular strategy on the part of the state (Nahm and 
Steinfeld, 2012: 24), which is conventionally one of the most recognisable marks of the 
‘developmental state’ (Evans, 1995). That is, developmental states are normally 
characterised by the dual needs of an ”independent sense of purpose” (Carney and Witt, 
2013: 6) and the need for access to and information from the economic actors it seeks to 
influence (Carney and Witt, 2013: 6). The thesis has illustrated some of the ‘developmental 
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state’ characteristics of China in regard to wind power, e.g. through the narrative of China’s 
catch-up and ‘renaissance’, which construes a long-term purpose and strategy of the state, at 
the same time as pursuing a strategy of ‘picking the winners’ and intervening in industries97. 
However, China’s structured uncertainty, where targets and goals are pragmatic and 
ambiguous in an experimental trial and error approach (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 20) – 
largely a result of China’s complex bureaucracy structures (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 
44-48) and dynamism at the local level with control by the conservative centre (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011: 22, 40) – is according to Breznitz and Murphree (2011) exactly what 
allows for China’s unique advantage and national innovation system (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011: 8). By being open to flexible and agile containment of overflowing, and 
changing the goal of reforms, Chinese “[p]olitics and its unintended consequences are the 
root cause of the particular form and trajectory of China’s economic miracle” (Breznitz and 
Murphree, 2011: 20). Finding it wiser to pursue second-generation rather than first-
generation innovation, Breznitz and Murphree (2011; 2013) find that it is exactly China’s 
creative pragmatism that allows China not to become trapped in its own overall strategy of 
indigenous innovation. That is, while maintaining an official overarching goal of indigenous 
innovation,   
“the Chinese high-technology development path has been drastically different from the one planned and 
hoped for by the Chinese central government. The idealized research paradigm set out by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and government ministries has been to build a strong, independent innovative 
capacity” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 6).  
Rather than fearing this ‘Run of the Red Queen’, the largest peril and threat to China’s 
sustainable economic growth is according to Breznitz and Murphree (2011) the very 
insistence on indigenous innovation by the Chinese Government, which still emphasises 
“independent mastery of novel product innovation and new-technology creation as 
necessary for national wealth and economic security” (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011: 7).  
Indeed, the thesis confirms that a Run of the Red Queen strategy has been largely successful 
in Chinese wind power, as it has resulted in rapid construction of a new market for wind 
power. Further, the thesis also illustrates that a dogmatic insistence on indigenous 
innovation creates controversies, which threaten to destabilise structures and relations. That 
is, the thesis confirms that it may indeed be China’s structured uncertainty that makes it 
possible to establish new markets, and to perform figurational change when needed. 
Pointing to a gradual, yet agile, figurational change from Figuration I towards Figuration II, 
                                                     
97
 Meanwhile, with extensive guanxi-relations, China at other times also has the characteristics 
of a predatory state (Evans, 1995 in Carney and Witt, 2013: 12; Cai, 2004; Yu and Shi, 2010). 
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i.e. as China’s wind power market undergoes a potential turn to quality, the thesis illustrates 
the socio-material work of framing that industrial policy and catch-up demands in a 
developmental context, the overflowing it may produce in today’s globally interdependent 
markets, and the disruptive governance and upgrading from pragmatic experimentalism that 
it performs.  
Future research – on cross-fertilising structural and processual accounts 
Having explored how the findings of the thesis augment and/or correspond to other 
literatures than the GIN literature, in the following, the thesis outlines a tentative new 
research agenda for studying GIN genesis, dynamics, and agency in a developmental 
context. This new research agenda is based on the potential cross-fertilisation of 
perspectives. Rather than having an aim of demonstrating the primacy of the constructivist 
perspective over the GIN literature, the thesis seeks to point to areas of fruitful cross-
fertilisation between the literatures, acknowledging the coexistence of genesis and structure 
as well as disorder and order. Indeed, structures are never non-existent. Thus, there ”is no 
need to abandon studies of formal organizations, so dominant in contemporary life” 
(Czarniawska, 2013: 10). Indeed, the thesis does point to how figurations are emerging into 
temporarily stabilised entities. Apart from letting the constructivist and figurational 
perspectives inform each other, the thesis suggests a further expansion of these processual 
and relational perspectives with a more structural perspective, in order to account for how 
entities are mounted into emerging figurations, which lead to (temporary and ambiguous) 
order and unity. By letting the conceptualisation of GINs include both a structural and a 
processual lens, the stark (and false and overflowing) dichotomy between structure and 
genesis (and structure and agency) (e.g. Derrida, 1978 [1967]; Stark, 2009) can hopefully be 
overthrown. Indeed, “[d]ifferent approaches and ways of conceptualizing organizing have 
their advantages and shortcomings, but the fact is that formal organizations, networks of 
actors and actor-networks, action nets and spontaneous organizing coexist – at the same time 
and in the same territory” (Czarniawska, 2013: 13).  
A new research agenda for development studies within New Economic Sociology?  
The thesis seeks to bridge and cross-fertilise the seemingly contradictory constructivist and 
structuralist perspectives, by inquiring into potential synergies between figurational 
sociology, ANT, and the more structural accounts of VoC and global value chains to 
account for GIN construction (genesis, dynamics, and agency). Making such cross-
fertilisation possible is largely enabled by the use of pragmatist tunnels and bridges (and 
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metaphors) (Chapter 2, Chapter 13), which may be considered one of the major 
contributions of the thesis. This pragmatist bridging has enabled cross-fertilisation between 
perspectives and the seemingly ontologically improbable move from the GIN approach 
towards the constructivist ANT lens. Below, the ’triangular relationship’ between these 
literatures is depicted in figure 24. 
Figure 24: Potential cross-fertilisation of perspectives to account for GIN genesis, agency, and dynamics 
 
Source: Own design 
Such cross-fertilisation goes well beyond the cross-fertilisation suggested by Parrilli et al. 
(2013) of combining insights of the GVC, GPN, and GIN frameworks in order to inquire 
into the implications of integration into GVCs, GPNs, and/or GINs for local and regional 
development (LoRD) (Parrilli et al., 2013). That is, Parrilli et al. (2013) stick to a spatial and 
structural imagery of economic geography, and stay at a relatively high level of aggregation 
(Parrilli et al., 2013; Dicken et al., 2001), rather than offering a lens for inquiring into 
processes of building relations in the first place. Instead, the thesis argues that in order to 
adopt GINs as “a strategic framework for the analysis of current and future trends and 
leaderships in the globalized economy” (Parrilli et al., 2013: 974), the black box of the GIN 
metaphor must be opened up, loosening its ontology. With an interest in the negotiated roles 
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and identities of heterogeneous actors in the constitution of new ‘global’ markets in a 
developmental context, the thesis argues that it is necessary to move beyond strictly 
structural chain and network constructs within economic geography, and adopting an 
integral processual and relational lens of networks. As outlined earlier (Chapter 2), the need 
to adopt a more relational lens has already been recognised within parts of economic 
geography (Dicken et al., 2001: 92), namely, by looking at networks as simultaneously 
relational processes and structures in which power is exercised (Dicken et al., 2001: 92) in 
distinct time- and space-specific contexts, and thereby producing observable patterns in the 
global economy (Dicken et al., 2001: 91).  
Thus, the thesis reiterates the argument outlined in Chapter 2 that the ‘relational gap’ in the 
existing literature must be filled by ‘looking away’ from the ‘GIN’. Further, the thesis 
argues that technology matters, i.a. by underlining its social-material agency, and that 
lateral, symmetrical perspectives must be adopted, to allow for a more fine-grained 
understanding of the dynamic de- and reconfiguration of relations in the global economy, 
e.g. as particular technologies can be disruptive to relations and the networks they may co-
constitute. Having already displayed and discussed extensively what it may imply to adopt a 
relational, endogenous, and processual micro-lens of relations, this leads to a further point, 
namely that the framework sketched above may serve as a very first rough outline of an 
emerging new research agenda for development studies within New Economic Sociology 
(NES). Whether China’s mercurial, experimental way of constructing markets and learning 
from practice, engaging in cross-border collaborations and gradually moving from figuration 
I to figuration II, upon having learned from the resulting overflowing of the previous low-
cost strategy, will turn out successful in the long-term is a question still blowing in the wind 
- and a promising fertile ground for future research.  
Lastly, the research agenda indicated above may further contribute to the  – still emerging 
marketisation account – of the constructivist perspective, namely, offering an account of 
how to understand the “potential diversity of markets” (Callon and Çalişkan, 2010b: 24). In 
particular, studies are missing out on how ’newly industrialised economies’ manage 
unprecedented challenges, as they are entering globalising world markets (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b), because they feel contradictory pressures for national protectionism while 
also being forced to engage in international networks and collectives. Combined with Elias’s 
(1978) notion of figuration, it becomes possible to study GINs in a developmental context of 
globalisation as constantly de- and reconfiguring figurative games. Here, it becomes the task 
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of the researcher to identify and trace the changing quality and types of these games and the 
relations they configure.  
Striking a chord with a constructivist modest method – and limits to generalisability 
Indicating that the findings of the thesis may be extended to a broader framework for 
understanding developments in the ‘global economy’ within NES, the thesis has 
simultaneously extended the ramifications of the constructivist framework. That is, to some 
extent the thesis strikes a chord with the ’modest method’ (Law, 1994) of ANT, which was 
laid out in Part II of the thesis. That is, the thesis is positioned in the ambiguous space 
between the specific account of a constructivist perspective (e.g. Law, 1994; van Heur et al., 
2013) and the demand for larger generalising claims of the GIN literature. With the 
constructivist demand for specificity and a practice-based approach (e.g. Gad et al., 2014; 
Stengers, 2005a), there has, however, been an increased debate within the constructivist 
literature as to how to make the constructivist more relevant, e.g. by making generalisations 
and comparisons and offering potentially critical accounts (e.g. Stengers, 2011; Woolgar and 
Lezaun, 2013; Latour, 1997: 69 in van Heur et al., 2013; Jensen, 2010). For instance, 
Stengers (2011) addresses the issue of comparison as a ’matter of concern’, and Law (1994; 
2004) features a discussion of the limits of generalisation from modest method about the 
extent to which ANT can and cannot be used to study large-scale phenomena spread over 
multiple sites. Following this gradual opening up towards broader, larger claims, the thesis 
has inquired into how and whether the potentially emerging ‘figurations’ in the wind power 
market may tell something more general about China as a particularly ‘complex’ market (or 
‘variety of capitalism’).  
By making wider claims, while still being reflexively attentive to the potentially 
performative power of such claims (e.g. Jensen, 2010; Gad et al., 2014; Barry, 2001; 
Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013), the thesis has not only contributed to the GIN literature and 
related literatures, but also to the constructivist account. In particular, apart from conducting 
an empirical study within a context of a newly industrialised economy, contributing to the 
still nascent performativity programme (Callon and Çalişkan, 2009: 393) in order to explore 
market construction of wind power in China, the thesis has extended ANT’s notion of TENs. 
That is, a political pole has been added to the market, scientific, and technical poles of 
TENs. This has been necessary to account for the key role of the Chinese political leadership 
in the mobilisation of a network around wind power and software programmes in China. 
Hereby, the thesis simultaneously makes an effort to meet the critique that ANT has 
received for not considering politics, and for not being ‘critical’ or ‘political’ enough (e.g. 
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Whittle and Spicer, 2008). Unravelling how the construction of GINs in the Chinese wind 
power market constitutes a ‘negotiated space’ (Murdoch, 1998) as well as a ‘contested’ (or 
‘competitive’) space’ (a further notion added to the framework) rather than a spatial space, a 
highly politicised picture of GIN genesis and of the Chinese wind power market emerges. At 
the same time, it is the contention of the thesis that the constructivist perspective, although it 
advices that scholars stay ‘sober with power’ (Latour, 2005a: 260), is inherently political. 
The main point for a politics of ANT is, however, that hierarchical structures, e.g. the local-
global dualism, which is conventionally seen as constituted by “one scale (the global) 
dominating the other (the local)” (Dicken et al., 2001: 103, referring to Latour, 1997: 5), 
should not be assumed but rather that relations of domination must be traced and treated as 
relational effects of translation (Law, 2009: 147; Law, 1995). Combining ANT with the 
notion of figuration and games may have further accentuated the centrality of power. 
Although power in this account is distributed, uncertain, ambiguous, and disputable in 
nature (Whittle and Spicer, 2008: 612), the thesis contributes to and outlines areas for future 
constructivist studies within a developmental context, tracing the entangled politics of 
marketisation and reflecting the “power struggles at the heart of any market” (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2010b: 12). Indeed, having indicated a potentially particular Chinese experimental 
pragmatics of green marketisation, it can be relevant to look into this in other ‘green’ sectors 
in China. 
Ontological politics – and the multiple worths of wind power 
In addition, the findings of the thesis contribute to an emerging so-called ontological turn 
within STS (e.g. Alcadipani and Hassard,  2010; Barry, 2001; Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013; 
van Heur et al., 2013; Mol, 1999; Mol, 1999; Jensen, 2010; Gad et al., 2014; Blaser, 2009: 
18; Blok, 2013). This stream within STS extends the interest in ’the becoming’ and variable 
ontology (Callon, 1991: 140; Latour, 2005a: 39; Law, 2004) of things, as it seeks to open up 
towards the potential multiple ontologies of things (Mol, 1999). The thesis can be claimed to 
illustrate aspects of the multiplicity of ontologies of actors and entities in the Chinese wind 
power market. For instance, it illustrates how algorithms are not just mundane, technical, or 
scientific artifacts, but also become political as they perform multiple controversies of a 
scientific, technical, economical, and political character. As algorithms emerge as 
political/politicising entities, having ‘become objects of contestation’ (Barry, 2001), the 
emerging ’political and technological ontology’ of algorithms is displayed. Hereby, the 
analysis may be claimed to shed light on how multiple ’worths’ of wind power have been 
enacted, as associations of e.g. scientific, technical, economic, financial, and environmental 
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sustainability have been ascribed to wind power. Or, in the terminology of the ontological 
turn, what we may see could indeed be the enactment of multiple wind power(s). In this 
perspective, each enactment of different qualities, construing different worths of wind 
power, is not only an epistemological matter, but rather an ontological matter. That is, 
multiple wind power(s) may actually be emerging. Mimicking Blok’s (2013) notion of 
”many worths of nature(s)” (Blok, 2013: 3, 16), the project may be said to demonstrate 
(some of the) ’many worths of wind power(s)’ in the specific site of China. In this site, wind 
power has in many instances been qualified through algorithms, that is, what we may term 
’quality (and sustainability) by algorithm’, yet, at least as many times, algorithms have 
objected to this qualification. Opening up the ontology of algorithms and mapping the 
controversies that algorithms can perform, the project has engaged ethnographically in 
tracing what the algorithms do, i.e. inquiring into how such material actors co-perform and 
enact markets. 
The mutable ontology (or ontologies) of things is in turn related to the streams of the 
sociology of associations (Latour, 2005a) and the pragmatics of valuation (Callon and 
Çalişkan, 2009, 2010b, 2010b), on which the thesis is based, and which has its roots in the 
early American pragmatist Dewey’s ”Theory of Valuation” (Dewey in Stark, 2009). 
Opening up the multiple worths of wind power, the thesis also has implications for the more 
sociologically and institutionally oriented sociology of worth of French convention theory 
(e.g. Stark, 2009; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), which is concerned with how actions are 
justified and valued through different sociologically and institutionally constructed 
economies of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 (1991); Thévenot, 2009). However, 
convention theory is founded on a social constructivist perspective on the role of economies 
of worth, which seems to pre-exist and be relatively stable, and as such to some extent bears 
resemblance to the notion of institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Thus, 
although convention theory does acknowledge that potentially contradictory economies of 
worth may overlap (Stark, 2009; Thévenot, 2009), the thesis instead demonstrates the 
dynamically contested nature of ontologies, worth, and qualities, and how they must be 
myopically followed as they differ across sites, and how they are being socio-materially 
constituted. 
Method critique 
Finally, before completing the ‘journey’ of the thesis, and after having discussed some of the 
potential implications and areas for future research, as well as making a partial break with 
modest method to suggest a tentative framework for a future research framework for NES, 
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the chapter concludes by venturing into a section of reflexive critique to contemplate the 
limits of the account and the (ontological) performative ‘politics’ of the thesis itself. 
On the limits of the particular and the general 
At the same time as the thesis to some extent breaks with the premises of modest method, 
i.e., reflexively seeking avenues for modifying the demand of modest method, it recognises 
that there are limits to generalisations of the highly specific site of marketisation of Chinese 
wind power. In this way, adhering to the premise of situated ways of knowing (Jensen, 
2010), it should be acknowledged that when reaching the conclusion of the scientific 
journey, the researcher ”is still somewhere particular (albeit somewhere new) and for that 
reason not everywhere else” (Jensen, 2010: 12). And, yet again, the thesis positions itself in 
the ambiguous, and awkward stretch between the general and specific. Thus, claiming that 
wider lessons can be drawn from the case, as indicated in the above sections, the thesis 
argues that some of the findings of the thesis can be extended and somewhat generalised. 
Overall, the thesis argues that some of the same types of controversies, as traced in the 
thesis, may also occur in other (green), state-controlled, and -subsidised ‘strategic pillar’ 
industries, which constitute part of China’s catch-up strategy of indigenous innovation. 
There is no doubt, that the story provided in the thesis could have taken many other shapes 
or turns, than the one offered in the thesis. Indeed, the story provided is one of many stories 
emplotted within one, which together point in various directions instead of having just one 
beginning or one ending. Not aligning with any essentialist notion of the world, but opening 
up to the potentiality of multiple worlds and realities being enacted simultaneously, 
sometimes clashing and sometimes not, the ANT-based story is thus one that  
”tends to tell stories, stories that have to do with the processes of ordering that generate effects such as 
technologies, stories about how actor-networks elaborate themselves, and stories which erode the 
distinction between the macro- and micro-social” (Law, 1994: 17).  
Indeed, there seem to be multiple potential endings and beginnings in the account provided, 
and which could consequently also have been emplotted otherwise.  
Traps of language and moving beyond structure-genesis dualisms via metaphors 
Having pointed to the potentiality of other plots and stories, it is worthwhile to make a brief 
note on the way in which language and the structures it creates, by itself may work against 
the attempted processual account of the thesis. That is, ‘false dualisms’ (Stark, 2009; Elias 
1978 in Layder, 1986; Derrida, 1978 [1967]; Latour, 2004; 2005a; 2005b) almost inevitably 
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emerge, as researchers strive towards sensemaking (Weick, 2003). This was e.g. seen in the 
emerging dualism of overflowing and framing. In addition, it is also reflected in the very 
meta-narrative of the thesis, i.e. the “theorized storyline” (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007) 
(see Chapter 4), where a gap, i.e. the genesis, dynamics, and agency, and the need for a 
relational lens to account for the ‘first act’ of market construction, has been construed, 
creating a dualistic categorisation of structural versus processual accounts (Chapter 2). To 
counter the emergence of unintended dualisms, in an acknowledgement that there “is no 
genesis without structure, and no structure without genesis” (Derrida, 1978 [1967]), the 
thesis has used metaphors, which at times can create new (non-dualistic) imageries. For 
instance, the adoption of the notion of the magmatic (Venturini, 2009) space of lability, i.e. 
the ambivalent space of controversy between order and disorder, constituted by both genesis 
and structure was proving useful as inspiration, illustrating how new knowledge products in 
organisation theory are often a result of bricolage, in which metaphors play a central role 
(Boxenbaum and Rouleau: 2011). Likewise, metaphors of the rhizome (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2011 [1980]) and meshwork (Czarniawska, 2013) have proved helpful to capture 
the both structure- and process-like nature of networks, which lie at the heart of the 
proposed research agenda for NES. In particular, through the metaphor of the dense mesh of 
the meshwork, which also bears resemblance to the metaphor of figuration, an imaginary 
emerges of “self-organizing and planned organizing, formal organizations and informal 
networks” (Czarniawska, 2013: 16). In this thick mesh, networks 
“are connected and disconnected, stabilized and destabilized; actants busy themselves trying to become 
actors; and trajectories of people and things crisscross. The type of activity may differ from place to 
place, but then, in time, another type may replace it” (Czarniawska, 2013: 16).  
This breaks up the more structural imaginary of networks, with its “notions of levels, layers, 
territories, spheres, categories, structure, systems’” (Latour 1997: 3 in Dicken et al., 2001: 
104).   
Critical reflexivity and the (ethical) space of potentiality 
Lastly, the power of plots, language, and metaphors implies that the stories and the language 
and metaphors we use have performative power. Indeed, by going ‘GIN  hunting’, while 
acknowledging the performative, discursive politics that the GIN metaphor constitutes, by 
mapping controversies, the study itself may have ‘performed’ a particular story of the 
Chinese wind power market. Such intra-reflexivity (e.g. Latour 1988 in Jensen, 2010; 
Jensen, 2010) is an integral part of a constructivist case study, as performativity also relates 
to how researchers are co-performing the object of our inquiry. Indeed, time and again, the 
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myriads of plots, potential narratives, and stories emerging from the data have had to be 
cross-checked and triangulated, as far as possible, ensuring not to become ‘seduced’ by 
certain accounts, as the researcher was slowly submerged into the field. Avoiding too early 
emplotment has been an ongoing concern, since the researcher strived not only to see and 
listen to “those who are strong enough and shaped in such a fashion as to impact”, and listen 
only to those who have the power to raise their voice, and who have succeeded in mobilising 
a network of allies around them (Bowker and Star, 1999: 49). Yet, as ”we do not know how 
the landscape we encounter at the end of our journeys will look”, this poses to scientists the 
important challenge of learning how to become “responsible for all the entities of our 
making”, a landscape, however, which ”we are not mastering”’ (Stengers cited in Jensen, 
2010: 12; Jensen 2010: 12). Always open to how the world could be otherwise (asking ‘what 
if’), resonating with a space of ’potentiality’ (e.g. Whitehead, 1989; Woolgar and Lezaun, 
2013; Jensen, 2010; van Heur et al., 2013), a constructivist perspective implies a certain 
(moral and ethical) responsibility to think about what kind of world it is that the researcher 
wants to construct (e.g. Gad et al., 2014; Stengers, 2008; Barry, 2001; Woolgar and Lezaun, 
2013). Indeed, having set out to explore the emergence of GINs in Chinese wind power, in a 
developmental context of global disintegration of production and innovation, the thesis has 
shed light on the ‘first act’ (Powell et al. 2012: 434), of GIN construction rather than 
offering “a play that begins with the second act, taking both plot and narrative as an 
accomplished fact” (Powell et al. 2012: 434). While some of the findings have been 
surprising and paradoxical, they do tell a story of China’s negotiated role in the world 
economy, where networks of simultaneous collaboration and competition take shape. 
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